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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis re-conceptualises civil society as a process of cross-sectoral networking and 
alliance building among individual activists and organisations. Civil society networks are 
built on personal connections and develop into flexible, often informal structures that 
engage in path-breaking advocacy with authorities and elites. In the challenging political 
contexts of China and Vietnam, civil society networks have brought about significant social 
change. The findings of extensive fieldwork in both countries demonstrate a wider range of 
advocacy techniques and strategies than previously documented in one-party 
authoritarian political systems. Four in-depth qualitative case studies are presented to 
illustrate a range of network structures, histories and advocacy strategies: the Bright 
Future Group of people with disabilities (Vietnam), Women’s Network against AIDS 
(China), the Reunification Park public space network (Vietnam), and the China Rivers 
Network. Research questions concern how civil society networks form, how they operate, 
and what strategies they select to influence and interact with state actors and other 
stakeholders, as well as how network members evaluate the effectiveness of their actions. 
The thesis concludes with comparative evaluations of the case studies and 
recommendations for donors and international partners to support networks that form 
organically. 
 
 
 
 
我想：希望本是无所谓有，无所谓无的。这正如地上的路；其实地上本没
有路，走的人多了，也便成了路。  
 
I thought: hope cannot be said to exist, nor can it be said not to exist. It is just like roads 
across the earth. For actually the earth had no roads to begin with, but when many 
people pass one way, a road is made.  
         鲁迅 (Lu Xun), 1921 
 
In China you do things not because there is a legal channel to do them: you occupy the 
space before the government claims it, and the legal mechanisms all happen after the 
fact.... Use the space you have – don’t wait for policies and laws, because you have to 
create new ways of doing things. 
      Women’s organisation leader, 2002 
    (cited in Bentley 2004) 
 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to Giang, for her patience, support and inspiration, both for my long 
periods of research and writing away from our family, and for theoretical and practical 
reflections and discussion over the past four years. Without you, I could hold up only half 
the sky. 
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PREFACE 
 
“So, please tell me about your research!” 
The Chinese director of a non-profit development organisation leaned back in a 
comfortable chair. We had not met before, but had been introduced by colleagues from 
the time I worked in China as a volunteer teacher in the 1990s. I presented my standard 
one-page research summary and explained my interest in networks of individuals and 
organisations who engage in advocacy. The director listened politely, then responded. 
“Very interesting. Now who do I know who might be able to help you?” 
The director pulled out a cell phone and began searching for contacts. “When you go to 
Beijing, you should talk to [this person]. And [this professor]. You can say that I 
recommended you. You can speak Chinese, right?” 
My Chinese was a little rusty, but passable enough for interviews. It was near the 
beginning of my first research visit to the mainland. I had not been to this city for nearly 
a decade, and it had changed to be almost unrecognisable. So had the social landscape. 
“You should be fine then,” the director said. “They can both speak some English. Here are 
their cell phone numbers… No, even better, I will call them for you and set up 
appointments!” (China interview #21). 
A few smiles, laughs, and high-speed Chinese conversations later (with the English 
phrase “civil society” interposed in the middle), the director had arranged two meetings 
for me the following week with specialists I would have had little chance of reaching on 
2 
 
 
my own. The Beijing professor, in fact, later told me, “I don’t usually meet with foreign 
researchers. But when [the director] told me you were coming, of course I made time!” 
(C35). The two meetings resulted in a series of further introductions to organisation and 
network leaders who provided valuable information in subsequent interviews. 
As a student of networks, I frequently noted a congruence between my research subject 
and the process of data collection. The director drew on a wide-ranging network of ties 
to other non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academia, and government officials. 
Meanwhile, I was constructing my own network of informants in both China and 
Vietnam. Of course, the director was far better connected than I could ever be. In 
Chinese terms, a well-networked person can “pull more guanxi” (关系, Vietnamese quan 
hệ); in sociological theory terms, the director had both a broader stock of social capital 
and higher status in the social system (LinN 2001).  
My status was not zero, however. I had lived in Asia for over a decade and worked with 
multiple domestic and international NGOs. I began research with an existing set of 
contacts and ties that widened over time and led to deeper connections and friendships. 
All of my interviews were arranged by introduction from an intermediary; such 
connections are essential to developing a guanxi network (YangM 1994:124). Some 
introductions came through my current and previous work, others via my Vietnamese 
family. The majority, though, arose from the “weak ties” (Granovetter 1973) of friends 
and acquaintances, including recommendations from scholars I know only virtually 
through e-mail exchanges and list-serves.  
In both its subject matter and methodology, this thesis “accords primacy to relations” 
(Bourdieu 1998:vii), depicting social and political reality in dynamic and process-based 
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terms (Emirbayer 1997:281). The key theoretical innovation is a re-conceptualisation of 
civil society as a process of building cross-sectoral networks, rather than a set of 
autonomous organisations. These networks are built on personal connections and 
develop into flexible, often informal structures that engage in path-breaking advocacy 
with authorities and elites. Through research, I also have pursued several normative 
goals: to bridge China and Vietnam studies through fostering increased connections 
among networks in both countries; to demonstrate the potential of civil society 
networks to others; and to contribute to diffusion of network models and advocacy 
strategies.  
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INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The dynamic societies of China and Vietnam 
In most scholarly and journalistic portrayals, China and Vietnam are undergoing 
economic reforms without any corresponding political change (Abuza 2001, Hom and 
Mosher 2007, Ho 2008a, Hayton 2010). China is depicted as “a country that bans 
independent non-governmental organizations and has no organized philanthropy” 
(Rucker 2008), with a “repressed civil society” in which “the present political systems 
are not viable in the long run” (Alagappa 2004:vi,19). Chinese civil society actors are 
“loosely arranged and fragmented, with no self-conscious participation in a larger 
project or sphere” (Howell and Pearce 2001:140); the “absence of networks” is held to 
be a “serious problem” (MaQS 2006:199). Vietnam is viewed as a “mono-organisational 
system” in which “anything resembling the various definitions of civil society seems to 
be lacking” and pseudo-NGOs “try to pass themselves off as ‘genuine’” (Salemink 
2006:121, Thayer 2009:10-1). “The presence of the state is so overwhelming that civil 
society has yet to truly develop,” says another researcher; it only exists in the “wishes 
and imaginations” of foreign observers (London 2009:393).  
In comparative studies, China and Vietnam only come up as negative examples, when 
they are mentioned at all: divided domestic movements with weak leverage (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998:118), counterexamples where little change occurs (Potter 1996:14), or 
countries with little participation in “global civil society” (Ougaard and Higgott 
2002:152). Implicit in many of these accounts is an identification of civil society with a 
linear model of democratisation and “transition from authoritarianism” (Holmes 1997, 
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Linz and Stepan 1996, O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986), which is not presently occurring 
in China or Vietnam.1  
The reality is more complex: China and Vietnam are not and may never be fully open and 
democratic societies, yet political change is demonstrably possible. Although each of the 
above negative statements may have been accurate at one time or in certain settings, 
they do not capture contemporary dynamics and result in a skewed picture (Luong 
2005:124). Contrary to the picture of a political system that “remains frozen”, there have 
been sweeping changes in “a period of extraordinary contention” (Perry and Selden 
2003:6,20). In spite of “political wraps” (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2006), citizens are not 
passive, apathetic, or ignorant; instead, they “develop new ways to articulate their 
interests in the political system” (ShiTJ 1997:264). In particular, many of the activists, 
NGO leaders, journalists and academics interviewed for this thesis are highly strategic 
and independent in their thinking, whatever their connections, negotiations and 
conflicts with state authorities. They are pathbreakers in constructing new forms of 
organizing and ways to engage in advocacy. With few exceptions, network members are 
not anti-government dissidents, but neither are they afraid to express critical views. 
Although the systemic constraints they face are real, their agency as civil society actors 
is absent or undervalued in much existing literature (Büsgen 2006:14).2 
                                                        
1 Ironically, the strongest believers in the democratic potential of civil society in China and Vietnam may 
be certain branches of government, such as security departments, who hold to the idea of a zero-sum 
dichotomy between the state and civil society (HeZK 2008:170; V59) and fear the potential of “colour 
revolutions”, as unlikely as this seems (Wexler et al 2006:56-7). Officials who work directly with civil 
society networks, such as in health and labour/social affairs ministries, do not generally share such 
oppositional views. For an analysis of state views of civil society, see LamW (2006) and Hannah (2007).  
2 For instance, if the legal regulations for non-governmental organisations are taken at face value, there is 
no way to explain the rapid growth of NGOs in China and Vietnam; only actors’ agency can account for it. 
As a Burmese writer argues, “To understand the role of civil society organisations in authoritarian 
countries, we need to look beyond the legal space for civil society set by the state” (Kyaw 2004:414). 
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One reason that standard portrayals of China and Vietnam appear one-sided is that they 
depend on conceptions of civil society that, for all their varied philosophical roots, insist 
on identifying independent organisations that are voluntary and autonomous from the 
state.3 Faced with a situation in which an existing concept does not seem to apply well, 
analysts have three possible options (Connolly 1974:31, Chamberlain 1998). If the 
existing criteria are applied strictly, one could conclude that no civil society exists in 
either country, thus preserving the concept intact but eliminating its analytic relevance. 
Second, one could qualify the new cases as exceptions or “diminished subtypes” (Collier 
and Levitsky 1997). Third – and this is the option taken in this thesis – one could revise 
the criteria of the concept in order to preserve its meaning. The problem, in this case, is 
not with China or Vietnam, but with the limitations of existing theories of civil society 
and their “precooked historical or theoretical scenarios” (Mulder 2003:233).  
This puzzle formed the starting point for the research process. The search to redefine 
civil society led to integration of concepts from other literatures on social movements, 
policy networks, and social capital, much of which is conventionally labelled as 
“sociology” rather than “political science”, and from alternative approaches to state-
society relations in the work of Vietnam specialists such as Kerkvliet (2001a/b, 
2003a/b), Heng (2004), Koh (2006a), and Hannah (2005,2007). Similar debates are 
occurring in China studies in greater quantity and empirical depth, though with little or 
no reference to Vietnam.  
One of the questions posed to interview respondents is whether they consider their 
activities to be political. In China and Vietnam, the term “politics” (政治, chính trị) is 
                                                        
3 See chapter 1, p. 25. 
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frequently understood either as internal workings of the party and government 
apparatus, or conversely as oppositional-type activities that are considered “sensitive”   
(敏感, nhạy cảm).4 Topics such as social networks and state-society relations do not fit in 
either category. This thesis conceptualises politics in broader terms, as “a process of 
public deliberation and scrutiny of matters of collective concern or interest to the 
community” and “a process for holding to account those charged with collective 
responsibility” (Hay 2007:61-2). Rather than limit politics to formal, institutional 
settings, this definition is open-ended and expressed through social conflict, power 
relations, and human agency (Hay 2007:64; Foucault 1980:122). 
Research questions  
This thesis seeks to demonstrate that civil society networks exist in the political contexts 
of China and Vietnam and understand how they engage in advocacy, through answering 
the following questions: 
 How are civil society networks formed? How do they operate? 
 How do networks interact with state actors? What strategies do they select to 
influence other stakeholders? 
 How do network members evaluate the effectiveness of their actions?5 
                                                        
4 Political science is taught in major Chinese universities and includes both domestic and international 
politics, including research into state-society relations. In Vietnam, the only department of political 
science is in the Ho Chi Minh Political Academy, the equivalent of the China Central Party School.  
5 These questions, formulated independently, are similar to Keck and Sikkink’s (1998:5) research 
questions: “What is a transnational advocacy network? How and why do they emerge? How do they work? 
And under what conditions can they be effective?” The key differences are in this thesis’s focus on 
domestic rather than transnational networks and view of advocacy as an activity networks carry out, not a 
type of network. The theoretical basis behind these questions is explored further in chapter 1. In a 1995 
study of “NGO alliances” in the Philippines and Mexico, Covey asks a similar question: “What factors 
increase the effectiveness of NGO alliances in achieving policy outcomes and strengthening civil society?” 
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This Introduction provides an overview of the thesis rationale and research 
methodology. Chapter 1 presents a selected literature review and develops a theoretical 
framework for the thesis, with a brief comparison between the Chinese and Vietnamese 
contexts. Chapter 2 describes the background of development of civil society and 
networks in the two countries and then introduce a typology of networks with 
illustrative examples. Primary source interviews and secondary data from both 
countries are juxtaposed in dialogue with each other. Chapter 3 details three overall 
advocacy strategies observed among Chinese and Vietnamese networks, followed by a 
series of hypotheses on how networks employ these strategies.  
The successive four chapters, comprising the heart of the thesis, present in-depth case 
studies of four selected networks in different sectors, two in Vietnam and two in China. 
The Bright Future Group of people with disabilities (Chapter 4) is a longstanding 
informal network of individual activists that has supported the development of disability 
organisations and policy in Vietnam. The China Women’s Network against AIDS 
(Chapter 5) is a newer network that began as a virtual support group for HIV-positive 
women and now faces conflicting pressures from its membership and donors. The 
Reunification Park public space network (chapter 6) has successfully struggled to 
preserve Hanoi’s largest park from private development, while keeping a very low 
profile. Finally, the China Rivers Network (chapter 7) has experienced both formal and 
informal periods in its multi-faceted advocacy campaigns against dams in south-western 
China. A concluding chapter identifies commonalities and variation among the case 
studies, assesses the results of research questions and hypotheses, and extends the 
findings for potential application to other networks and research contexts.  
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Research methodology  
This thesis employs a comparative case study method in order to answer the above 
research questions and illustrate the history, structure and advocacy strategies of 
selected civil society networks in China and Vietnam. The case study, as used here, is “an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident” (Yin 1994:13). The comparative use of cases allows for in-depth analysis 
of complex and changing issues and “engenders an extensive dialogue between the 
investigator’s ideas and the data” (Ragin 1987:49).  
This research process is based on actor-oriented theories of constructivism that 
deliberately emphasise processes of human agency, while not losing sight of structural 
incentives and limitations – a “philosophically principled middle way” between 
positivism and post-structuralism (Wendt 1999:2). Political meaning is socially 
constructed through relationships among people, with their collective beliefs and 
perceptions playing a crucial role (Wendt 1999:1)—though, as Weber emphasised 
(1996:105), this should not be taken to mean that material conditions are unimportant. 
The systems and structures that result are contingent and open to change, and can be 
understood and influenced by actors through political engagement. Such constructivism 
brings human agency back into politics, with a focus on persuasion and influence to 
contest definitions, frames and political spaces (Finnemore 1996:24).  
Because of agency, politics is not like the natural sciences. As a consequence, detailed 
qualitative data is necessary to understand actors’ perspectives and their relations with 
others, gathered through a “field-based method of rich description and case-focused 
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dynamic analysis” (Mosse and Lewis 2006:9-10). In an interactive interpretive tradition 
(Denzin 1989), the researcher seeks understanding, not causal explanations or universal 
theory, focussing on the meaning that actions have for actors themselves (Marsh and 
Furlong 2002:21) and asking both phenomenological (“What is this experience like for 
these people?”) and heuristic (“What do these findings mean in relation to my own 
experience and orientation?”) questions of data (Patton 1990:67-71; Devine 2002:199). 
Following a “strategic-relational” middle ground in the structure and agency debate, 
actors are reflexive and formulate strategy based on what is known to them in a context 
that is in part of their own making (McAnulla 1995:280, Apter and Sawa 1984:13-4). 
Although there is no assumption that subjects have perfect information or act rationally 
at all times, reflexivity does imply that actors are generally in the best position to know 
the extent and nature of the political space, opportunities and constraints they face 
(Jiang and Ortolano 2008:64).  
The outcome of this process is one among many possible narratives of civil society 
networks. Immersion in the empirical world of people’s experiences, contexts and 
perceptions leads to the construction of inductive or “grounded theory” (Patton 
1990:67). As Bourdieu argues, “The deepest logic of the social world can be grasped only 
if one plunges into the particularity of an empirical reality” (1998:2). This means that all 
concepts and narratives should be empirically examined, which is not necessarily the 
same as being tested “scientifically”. Theoretical concepts influence empirical fieldwork, 
which results in the development of new narratives about civil society networks that 
feed back into the academic community of practice.6 
                                                        
6 See Figure A.1, p. 13.  
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A key assumption behind this methodology is that understanding others is possible, 
what Fay calls the “basic question of social science philosophy” (1996:5). This forms the 
opposite pole to exceptionalism (the idea that “we” are different from all others) and 
exoticism, also known as orientalism (in which others are fundamentally different from 
us); both are identical forms of “particularizing” (Bourdieu 1998:1) that insist on strict 
dichotomies, for instance between “Asia” and “the West”. A corollary of exceptionalism is 
the “fallacy of origin”: the idea that a concept only has validity in the place where it arose 
(Lawson 2006:173). Instead, “what really matters is not the nationality of the theory, but 
whether it is a good theory” (Walder 2007:10).  
Exceptionalism emerged at two points in the research process: first in certain writings 
on civil society and social movements that define these concepts in Eurocentric ways, 
and second in some Chinese sources’ claims that civil society there is irreconcilably 
different from “the West”, due to a unique “traditional Chinese collective identity” (HeXR 
1997:116, XieL 2007, GuHY 2008).7 Such thinking seems less prevalent in Vietnam, 
perhaps since it is a smaller country with greater historical exposure to foreign 
influences, both benign and invasive (from both China and “the West”). A wider version 
of exceptionalism is the “Asian values” discourse prevalent in the 1990s, which depends 
on the construction of a homogenised “West”, as well as the problematic, de-historicised 
idea of Asia as a coherent entity (Lawson 2006:15, Gilson 2002:12,26). The best way to 
challenge such assumptions is through stressing the diversity within Asia (Spivak 2008). 
In this thesis, Chinese and Vietnamese cases are considered together in order to focus 
                                                        
7 Exceptionalism may rise to the level of state policy. In a 2009 speech, the minister of the State Council 
Information Office said, “China is different from all other countries in the world. To know China, it is 
necessary to take its history and culture into account” (WangC 2009), as if this were not true of any other 
country. 
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attention on the common trajectories of networks, rather than on the particularities of a 
single country (Womack 1987:480). To the extent that China and Vietnam are similar, 
neither country is unique; to the extent that China and Vietnam are different, it is hard to 
maintain the illusion of a unified Asia.  
If cross-cultural understanding is possible, there is no clear-cut division between 
insiders and outsiders (Mullings 1999, Lawson 2006:176). Prolonged engagement and 
“persistent observation”, rather than national or cultural origin, are the grounds for 
credible and trustworthy research (Erlandson et al 1993:133). As a participant observer, 
“the challenge is to combine participation and observation so as to become capable of 
understanding like an insider while describing for outsiders” (Patton 1990:207). A 
critical, reflexive researcher may play both inside and outside roles while remaining 
“meaningfully connected” with the subjects of research (Rosaldo 1989:182). 
Data collection and interpretation took place in two successive “waves” (Blee and Taylor 
2002:110). Following a literature review and development of a theoretical framework 
for civil society networks, a scoping survey (step 3 in the below diagram) identified 
dozens of civil society networks in both countries that fit initial definitional criteria 
identified from theoretical review. The survey was conducted through reading available 
literature, participant observation of network meetings, workshops and conferences, 
and through interviews with network leaders, members, other domestic and 
international NGOs, and representatives of government agencies, embassies, and the 
media in both countries.8  
 
                                                        
8 See list of interviews in the Appendix, pp. 314-18. 
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Figure A.1 Research design 
 
    Critically examine existing literature on civil society,  
    social movements, social capital and public sphere 
 
    Develop model of civil society networks 
 
      Survey existing networks in China and Vietnam 
      and infer advocacy strategies 
 
     Conduct in-depth case studies of selected networks 
 
 
        Assess case study findings in light of theoretical 
        model and literature 
 
The next step was identification of four case studies, selected from the networks 
identified in the scoping survey using a purposive sampling method aiming to “select 
information-rich cases” (Patton 1990:169) that illustrate a diversity of sectors, network 
forms, size and prominence. Selection did not deliberately focus on extreme cases, either 
of success (Shi and Cai 2006) or resistance (O’Brien and Li 2006:114). As the focus of the 
argument is on networks and advocacy as forms of political organisation, networks were 
selected with four different areas of focus (environment, health, disability and land 
rights) rather than from a single social sector. The majority of networks identified in 
both countries work in one of these four focus areas.9 The sample includes long-
                                                        
9 Other topics considered, but not selected, were labour, gender equality, legal aid, and human rights. None 
of these areas is a separate sector; in practice there is significant overlapping. The health network selected 
has strong gender aspects, and several networks have used legal and rights-based approaches to conduct 
advocacy. Informants concurred that labour and human rights are the most restricted topics in China and 
Vietnam (C9,C79,V3,V6) and that interviews of these networks would be difficult to arrange and possibly 
risky for those being interviewed. 
 
         (chapter 1) 
 
         (chapter 1) 
 
         (chapters 2-3) 
 
         (chapters 4-7) 
 
         (Conclusion) 
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established and new networks; more formal and less formal structures; and networks 
with individual membership, organisational membership, and a combination of the two. 
Each case study chapter follows a consistent protocol, as recommended by Yin 
(1994:64-5), consisting of information about the issue, history of network formation, 
membership and structure of the network, advocacy strategies, and political 
implications. Subject to space limitations, the case study chapters offer detailed and 
context-specific “thick descriptions” (Geertz 1973) of each network, focussing less on 
content than on the framing of meaning in the struggle for political space (Eyerman and 
Jamison 1991, Gamson and Meyer 1996:289). Since the level of analysis is the network, 
not the individual or organisation, case studies tell a collective narrative instead of 
individual stories of network members and activists, as compelling as these frequently 
are. The presentation of case studies is based to the greatest degree possible on 
interview data and primary source documents written by network members themselves.  
Each of the selected networks has some degree of presence in its respective capital city, 
Hanoi or Beijing, in order to engage with national-level policy-makers (and in some 
cases international donor agencies). Not all members or activities of the networks are 
necessarily located in the capital, but it was efficient to conduct most data collection in 
major cities. This may result in a degree of urban bias, since informal organisations and 
local self-help associations are often stronger in rural areas that still make up the 
majority of Chinese and Vietnamese society (C34,V4). Networks with an urban presence 
have access to resources such as media and the Internet that some rural groups might 
lack (although technology and network forms are rapidly spreading). In addition, this 
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research deliberately focuses on informal networks that might be overlooked by 
analysts using an organisation-based definition of civil society. 
As with scoping research, case study research was conducted through a combination of 
individual interviews, direct observation, and published materials, the latter including 
reports, websites, media articles, and academic publications. The amount of available 
documentation varied from very little in the case of the Vietnam disability network to 
immense for the China rivers network. Overall, much more secondary data is available 
on civil society and networks in China than in Vietnam, both in English and the local 
language. This balanced my greater access and linguistic fluency in Vietnam.  
Group interviews or focus group discussions were employed on several occasions 
mainly for the logistical ease of bringing multiple network participants together at the 
same time.10 One-on-one, semi-structured interviews were the main direct method of 
data collection. These conversations, ranging from 30 minutes to three hours in length, 
offered the best chance to speak at length and develop rapport with informants. 
Interviews allowed for in-depth understanding of networks from members’ 
perspectives, bringing human agency to the centre (Blee and Taylor 2002:90,96). In all, 
interviews were conducted with 154 informants.11 Multiple interviews with informants 
within and outside the network were the primary check to ensure balance and 
                                                        
10 Several organisational interviews were conducted in small groups, usually one key informant or leader 
together with staff or junior colleagues. In most such cases the senior colleague did most or all of the 
talking, in which case the interview is listed as individual (see Appendix). If other colleagues present 
seemed to have independent ideas or other sources of information, a separate interview was arranged 
with them later. In a few cases a colleague joined in the interviews: a Dutch researcher participated in 
several days of meetings in Beijing, and Vietnamese NGO colleagues were present at a few interviews in 
Hanoi. The presence of others did not detract from, and often added to, the quality of discussion and 
amount of information presented. 
11 Some key informants were interviewed more than once. The number of interviews in China was greater 
than in Vietnam, even though the majority of fieldwork time was in Vietnam. This was due to greater 
familiarity with the Vietnamese context and thus fewer background and scoping interviews there, as well 
as a larger number of research locations within China. 
16 
 
 
accuracy.12 Where available, secondary literature formed the third leg of triangulation, 
allowing for multiple observations that increase the reliability of findings (Yin 1994:87, 
Patton 1990:187-8). Following drafting of the case study chapters, each case was 
circulated among one or more network members and secondary informants for review 
and comment, a form of “peer debriefing” (Erlandson et al 1993:31).  
Each of the cases may stand on its own, as an example of what Tilly calls “individualized 
comparison” (1984:81-2). Taken together, the four case studies provide a composite 
picture of some of the range and extent of civil society networks and advocacy in 
present-day China and Vietnam. The conclusion to the thesis offers comparisons among 
the cases and proposes “modest generalization” (Ragin 1987:xiv) that may apply to 
other networks in these two countries and elsewhere. Of course, conclusions based on 
four diverse cases cannot be proven in any positivistic sense. The point is not to be 
“representative” or to generalise to all networks, but rather to inductively generalise 
findings to theory (Yin 1994:37). The conclusions thus offer hypotheses and 
propositions for further research into the formation, roles and effectiveness of civil 
society networks, aiming to contribute to “middle-range theory” (Klandermans and 
Staggenborg 2002:317) that can inform further theory-driven empirical research. 
 
 
 
                                                        
12 For instance, several informants in chapter 6 make statements about their own roles in advocacy that 
contradict statements by other informants. These discrepancies are noted and analysed in the text. In 
chapter 5, it was not possible for reasons of geographic spread and time constraints to interview many 
network members outside Beijing, but information they provided was checked against data collected from 
donors and other actors in the HIV/AIDS field who are familiar with the case. 
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Arranging research in China and Vietnam 
It’s I who should thank you for this interview, because you’ve given me an 
opportunity to talk about experiences that are so important for me. (V51) 
One-on-one interviews with network participants formed the core of fieldwork; most of 
these interviews were fascinating, even exhilarating experiences. Although China and 
Vietnam are held to be challenging research settings, no significant obstacles or delays 
were encountered. Everyone interviewed was willing, even eager to talk about their 
work; in no case did anyone appear afraid to speak for political or security reasons.13 
The fact that the interviewer was a non-Asian foreigner did not seem to present any 
impediment.14 There were also no observed gender differences in responsiveness; an 
equal number of men and women were interviewed in both countries. In China, several 
respondents said that they were more interested to meet with a researcher living and 
working in Vietnam than with a foreign academic from a western country. On first 
meetings, my hyphenated last name provided an entry into the “politics of self-
representation” (Mullings 1999:340) and in China, often led to an an ironic explanation 
that Dang is the Vietnamese equivalent of Deng, as in Xiaoping. In this and other ways, it 
often happened that “research participants interviewed me before I interviewed them” 
(Miraftab 2004:599). 
The smoothness of research arrangements was a direct result of the chosen design and 
methods. Since interviews were almost exclusively with network members and 
arranged by personal introduction, there was no need to set up formal appointments 
                                                        
13 In two exceptional cases, interview respondents have subsequently been subject to harassment or 
arrest by security forces, but this had nothing whatsoever to do with their speaking to a foreign 
researcher. 
14 In a study of NGO advocacy in China, a team of Chinese and Chinese-speaking Americans carried out 
interviews with 40 organisations and reported no clear differences in responses among researchers 
(Wexler et al 2006:44).  
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with government officials, submit paperwork to a sponsor or intermediary, or obtain 
anyone’s advance approval. These practical consequences had the unintended, salutary 
effect of making research much simpler than it might otherwise have been. Research in 
Vietnam took place while living and working there; three trips to mainland China were 
all conducted on tourist visas. Chinese authorities appeared to apply the same “hidden 
rules” of “no recognition, no banning, no intervention” to informal research as to many 
unregistered foreign and domestic NGOs (DengGS 2010). 
I initially intended to affiliate with universities in both countries as a research fellow. 
Through a network contact, I sent a letter to the chair of the sociology department at 
Hanoi National University, who provided a handwritten confirmation of a link with the 
department (the politics department at the National Political Academy not being a viable 
possibility). After this, however, there was no need for further contact with the 
university. I made one visit to Hong Kong in 2008 as a visiting fellow at Hong Kong 
University’s Centre for Asian Studies. Subsequently, I visited numerous universities in 
Shanghai, Beijing and Kunming to pursue potential affiliations; while most departments 
were interested in my research topic, they explained that sponsoring me for a short 
period would be difficult to arrange. I eventually concluded that a university host was 
unnecessary and that I enjoyed better access to research subjects as an independent 
visitor. During my third research trip to China, I was hosted by a Beijing NGO, China 
Development Brief (中国发展简报) on a voluntary, informal basis, which proved 
productive for me and, I hope, Chinese colleagues.15 
                                                        
15 The expatriate founder of China Development Brief was forced to leave China in 2007 following official 
investigations (Young 2007). Contrary to some claims (DengGS 2010:206, ChenJ 2010:519), CDB was 
never shut down and continues to manage a website and publish a quarterly magazine in Chinese, for 
19 
 
 
Like research subjects, I made strategic calculations to identify who was worth meeting 
and which approach would bring the best results. At times respondents’ busy schedules 
(and mine) made it difficult to arrange interviews. This proved easier in China where I 
visited for shorter periods, had fewer other responsibilities, and could tell respondents, 
“I only have this week, then I have to go back to Vietnam.” Approximately half of 
interviews were conducted in respondents’ offices during working hours, as this was 
convenient for them and also allowed me to see their working environment. The 
remaining interviews took place outside working hours at respondents’ homes, in my 
own office in Hanoi, or in restaurants or cafés (sometimes a challenge due to 
background noise and distractions). If we shared drinks or food, generally the older 
person paid, following local customs. When visiting a high-status or retired person in 
his/her home, or when meeting a close contact for a second or third interview, I brought 
small gifts (fruit in Vietnam, Vietnamese souvenirs in China) as a gesture of thanks, but 
never money.  
In almost all cases, I arranged interviews on the basis of an introduction from another 
informant, a “snowball sample” of network members that is a productive method for 
selecting information-rich or critical cases (Patton 1990:174). The last question in each 
interview was “who else I should talk to about this?” I continued interviews until there 
was no one suggested that I had not already met. Initial contact with respondents was 
made through e-mail, phone or text message. Interviews took place in a mix of 
languages: the majority of interviews in Vietnam were in Vietnamese, since I speak that 
language fluently and preferred to let respondents speak in their own language even if 
                                                                                                                                                                             
which I have written several articles. My time as the first foreign researcher based at CDB since 2007 
passed without incident and contributed to the re-launching of a CDB English edition, announced in 
January 2011. 
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they also speak English. In China, a greater number of interviews were in English, as 
many respondents speak better English than I speak Mandarin. The language of each 
interview is listed in the Appendix; all translations from Vietnamese and Chinese, 
including of secondary sources, were done by me unless otherwise stated. 
Interviews followed semi-structured questionnaires for network members and 
secondary informants. Questionnaires were piloted in 12 interviews in Hong Kong in 
February 2008, then revised slightly prior to use in Vietnam and mainland China. In 
some interviews, I filled in the photocopied questionnaire myself during the interview; 
in other cases this seemed distracting. More often, key information was jotted in a 
notebook, usually in English, and wrote up afterwards as needed.16 Interviews were not 
recorded, a decision reached on grounds of both sensitivity and practicality. Since 
recording of interviews is not common in China or Vietnam and might suggest 
surveillance or security risks, most respondents speak more freely without a recorder 
present. Practical reasons included the time and effort that would have been necessary 
in transcribing taped interviews in multiple languages, and also transporting equipment 
that might have attracted attention when leaving a country.  
The names of people interviewed are not mentioned in the text, in order to preserve 
their anonymity and keep the focus on the networks that are the subject of this study. 
Informants are listed by “C” or “V”, standing for China or Vietnam as the area of their 
                                                        
16 In a classic account of fieldwork in China during the 1980s, Mayfair Yang explains, “I learned to avoid 
taking notes directly in front of people, except those whom I had come to know well, for fear that the act 
would make them self-conscious, guarded, or even suspicious. Even more problematical was the use of a 
tape recorder in these casual conversations, although it proved a convenient method in interviews with 
officials” (1994:3). A generation later, the level of suspicion accorded to foreign researchers is far lower 
than Yang experienced, and in most cases note-taking during interviews was natural and acceptable. 
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knowledge, and usually (but not always) the place where the interview occurred.17 
However, the actual names of organisations are included in the text, as are the authors of 
public printed sources (including web materials), even if these authors are also network 
members and/or interview subjects, as this is information in the public domain.18 In 
order to prevent confusion among people with the same family name, Chinese and 
Vietnamese authors are cited in the text by their family name plus one or two initials (as 
in “WangA” and “NguyenTM”). Initials are not used if sources have multiple authors.  
Having lived and worked in China (1993-5) and Vietnam (1997-2010) as a staff of 
several international and local NGOs, I had prior knowledge of some of the people, 
organisations and networks that are the subject of this study. In China, several 
longstanding contacts facilitated introductions and network building. In Vietnam, I was 
employed during the period of field research by Catholic Relief Services, an American 
NGO, as deputy country director and subsequently country director. CRS Vietnam works 
in the areas of education, health and emergency preparedness, and its largest 
programme supports inclusive education for children and youth with disabilities, a grant 
co-funded by the US Agency for International Development. This brought me into 
contact with members of the Bright Future Group (chapter 4) and other groups of 
people with disabilities. Although CRS has provided small-scale support to the Bright 
Future Group on an ad hoc basis, there is no formal partnership or ongoing funding 
                                                        
17 This format is also used in cases when an informant was not interviewed directly, but spoke publicly at 
a workshop or event I attended. If the location and context seem important, these are noted in the text.  
18 Partial anonymity of research subjects is a middle ground between full disclosure of individual 
identities (as in several key sources such as Büsgen 2006, Ho and Edmonds 2008, Mertha 2008) and 
complete anonymising of all names, including organisations (Wells-Dang 2007, Hannah 2007, Batley and 
Rose 2010). While full identification is useful for subsequent researchers, some informants spoke on the 
basis that they would not be quoted by name. The presentation here ensures that there are no resulting 
potential ethical or security issues from interview research, consistent with the University of 
Birmingham’s Code of Conduct for Research (http://www.research.bham.ac.uk/ethics.shtml).  
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relationship. Interview respondents knew me primarily as an NGO colleague, not as a 
donor. I began such interviews by clarifying that my research is personal and not 
connected with CRS. The fact that I was already known and generally respected in the 
disability sector made appointments easier to arrange, helped me know what questions 
to ask, and probably led to respondents sharing more information than they would have 
to a stranger. This status could also be a potential source of bias, to the extent that 
respondents wished to provide a more positive view of their effectiveness to another 
NGO colleague or overemphasised the role of international support, although these 
could occur with any external interviewer. Possible bias was controlled by triangulating 
interview data with printed materials, observations in meetings, and impressions of 
secondary informants. 
My research was also aided by a Vietnamese NGO, Action for the City (Trung tâm Hành 
động vì Đô thị), which was founded by my wife, Giang in 2006 with a mission of 
improving the urban environment and quality of life in Hanoi. Although I play no formal 
role in Action for the City, I have assisted in planning and strategising for the 
organisation and have full knowledge of its establishment, operations, and relations 
with other organisations and donors. In this sense, Action for the City serves as a 
“control group”, showing what is possible for a local NGO (and disproving critics who 
claim it is not possible). Action for the City also participates in the Reunification Park 
network (chapter 6), though not as one of the core members. My association with Action 
for the City benefited me in similar ways to the CRS-disability connection described 
above, in that some respondents already knew me as Giang’s husband (while others 
spoke to me without knowing this, then were surprised to learn it later). Conversely, 
Action for the City’s participation in the park case was partly influenced by my interest 
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in the issue, and I provided comments and edits for reports on public space and parks in 
Hanoi (Action for the City 2008). 
Professional and personal roles also proved useful in China. CRS has no office in China, 
but a former CRS staff living in Hong Kong passed on key contacts in Beijing and 
Shanghai. My wife became acquainted with several Chinese environmental and health 
activists through participation in an Asia Society Young Leaders programme. Chinese 
graduate students at Birmingham shared ideas and contacts with me. Most importantly, 
network members, NGO leaders, and academics in China and Vietnam provided 
invaluable research suggestions, contacts and introductions, references, and in some 
cases detailed comments on draft chapters. All remaining errors are, of course, my own, 
whether in the theoretical reflections in the next chapter or the empirical case studies 
that follow. 
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Chapter 1   A NETWORK-BASED THEORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
This chapter theorises civil society as a process of collective action that occurs and 
develops when organisations and individuals join together to influence power and 
promote positive, nonviolent social change. The basic units that comprise civil society in 
this analysis are networks of organisations, informal groups and individual activists, 
rather than non-governmental organisations alone. A network is defined as any set of 
individuals, informal groups and/or organisations linked together for a common 
purpose. One subset of networks consists of civil society networks, which engage in 
advocacy in pursuit of a shared agenda for social change. Such networks frequently span 
traditional social and political boundaries between state and non-state actors. The 
theoretical basis for understanding civil society networks begins with a critique of 
existing definitions of civil society, then incorporates key insights from social movement 
theory, network analysis, social capital and the public sphere, drawing on multiple 
literatures from politics, sociology, and development studies. While acknowledging 
transnational aspects of civil society, the analysis focuses on the components of civil 
society networks at a national level. The chapter concludes with a brief comparative 
application of this theory in Vietnam and China. 
Civil society and its limitations 
Since the early 1990s, political theorists have revived and expanded their interest in the 
concept of civil society. There is no single theory of civil society, but rather multiple, 
elastic and ambiguous versions of an “essentially contested concept” (Gallie 1956), with 
little scholarly agreement about how the concept applies in varying political and cultural 
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contexts (Amoore and Langley 2004, Hann and Dunn 1996). The idea has historical 
roots in the Western Enlightenment among political philosophers such as Hegel, Locke, 
Paine and Tocqueville (Hyden 1997); some civil society revivalists emphasise the 
cultural and historical specificity of the concept (Hall and Trentman 2005, Seligman 
1992) and particularly Tocqueville’s links between associational life and democracy 
(Welch 2006, Cohen and Arato 1992, Bellah et al 1985, Edwards et al 2001). Other 
theorists working within a Marxist or Gramscian framework interpret civil society as a 
bourgeois phenomenon that relies on capitalist development under the hegemony of the 
state (Wood 1990, Cox 1999). The new-found interest in civil society took place in the 
context of Central and Eastern European “velvet revolutions” in 1989 and Latin 
American struggles against authoritarianism (Cohen and Arato 1992, Keck and Sikkink 
1998, Khagram et al 2002). Even if concepts of civil society are sometimes vague and 
contradictory, they have motivated many people with visions of change (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1999). 
In spite of their variations, most existing theories of civil society share certain basic 
assumptions. In this standard model, civil society is held to be (a) separate from, or even 
opposed to, the state and market; (b) comprised of autonomous NGOs or other “civil 
society organisations”, which in turn are made up of (c) autonomous individuals who 
volunteer their participation (Anheier et al 2003:8). Civil society thus forms a “third 
sector” (Florini 2000), an arena of social action separate from the state and the market 
(Cohen and Arato 1992:x).1 
                                                        
1 Similar arena-based definitions of civil society have been put forward by Deakin (2001), Habermas 
(1992), Howell and Pearce (2004), Salamon and Sokolowski (2004), Scholte (2002), and White (1996) 
among others. 
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The three-sector model of civil society is appealing in its simplicity. It implies a rough 
equivalence among the sectors: if the state is too strong, the solution is to strengthen the 
market or civil society as a balancing force. It is typically assumed that western 
democracies have relatively balanced divisions between the three sectors, as in the 
above picture, while poorer developing countries of the south and east have stronger 
states and smaller markets and civil societies (Fowler 1996:21). When theorists speak of 
a “global associational revolution” (Salamon 1994:109) or “another great 
transformation” (Cohen and Arato 1992:1), they mean a realisation of the importance of 
the “third sector” and an expansion of the area covered by civil society in the pie. 
Grouping all non-state and non-market social forces into civil society, analysts have 
attempted to measure the aggregate size of civil society worldwide (Salamon and 
Anheier 1997; Salamon and Sokolowski 1999,2004). This approach has been criticised 
for being too broad and of limited analytic value (Rieff 1999), since “dark side” 
organisations such as the Mafia and Al Qaeda also qualify (Anheier et al 2003). Post-
structuralist critics go further, citing the “three-sector fallacy” as an example of the 
hegemonic power of Western social science, which divides reality into “spheres” and 
then constructs artificial categories to impose its view of the world (Chandhoke 
2002,2003; Trivedy and Acharya 1996). 
Normative theorists, by contrast, emphasise that in order to be considered part of civil 
society, associations should possess “distinct civil qualities” of autonomy, openness, 
accountability and internal democracy (Hyden 1997:16). The development of civil 
society thus becomes a “political project” (Kaldor 2003:11) made up of activists building 
a better world, working through organisations with an “active political orientation” 
(Ougaard and Higgott 2002:147). In recent decades, these theorists argue, these 
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organisations have increasingly reached beyond national boundaries to comprise a 
“global civil society”, as witnessed in the campaign for the Ottawa treaty to ban 
landmines, Jubilee 2000 debt cancellation, or the series of protests against the World 
Trade Organisation, among other examples (Edwards and Gaventa 2001, Risse 2000).  
The extensive “global civil society” literature has been ably critiqued for, among other 
limitations, an imposition of Euro-American liberal norms on the rest of the world. The 
main focus of most collective action still takes place within national contexts, not in the 
imagined communities of “fantasy internationalism” (Chandler 2004:179,208). Much 
ostensibly “global” organizing is derived from top-down declarations and summits in 
which the participation of national civil societies is notional or at best incomplete. The 
types of activist organisations that are held to make up global civil society are largely 
centred and headquartered in Europe and North America, while significant parts of the 
world are either under-represented or seen as “no-go areas” (Anheier et al 2001:24).2 
For an analysis including these peripheral zones, a normative focus on voluntary 
associations that oppose the state is too narrow, as it might overlook other types of local 
civil and political action based on ethnic, kin-based and religious groups (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1999:20). 
One way around the limitations of the three-sector model is a theory of multiple civil 
societies, similar to ideas of multiple modernities (Taylor 2004). Although theories such 
as democracy and civil society may have originated in the west, the practice of these 
concepts has indigenous roots in many societies, and their cultural and structural 
specifics vary accordingly (Hefner 1998:14,35; Wasserstrom and Liu 1995:375). The 
                                                        
2 Naidoo (2000) notes that many “global” organisations do not have significant representation in 
Indonesia, Japan, Russia, or China, which together form a substantial proportion of the world’s population. 
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meaning of civil society may be historically and culturally contingent, but this does not 
necessarily imply cultural relativism or incompatibility among societies (Alagappa 
2004:13-5).  
When analysts look closely at civil societies in non-western settings, however, several of 
the main assumptions of the standard model do not appear to hold, namely the assertion 
that the component parts of civil society are associations or autonomous organisations, 
and second the separation of civil society from the state and the market, with civil 
society cast in the role of actual or potential political opposition. Where either or both of 
these is not the case, observers are faced with an unsatisfactory dilemma: either 
eliminate the case from analysis, concluding that civil society does not exist in this 
setting, or discard the concept of civil society as irrelevant and seek to explain social and 
political developments using a different body of theory.  
Alternatives to civil society theories 
To overcome this dilemma, this thesis seeks to refine the concept of civil society using 
insights from sociological theories of collective action. In dialogue with this rich and 
well-developed literature, the resulting network-based theory of civil society is more 
robust and better able to travel to the contexts of China and Vietnam considered here. 
This theoretical recombining also aims to establish links among concepts that often 
stand in parallel isolation, divided through the artificial separation of disciplines 
(Khagram et al 2002:5).3 Some social theorists, for instance Habermas and Putnam, link 
their core concepts to civil society, but most, including Tarrow, Tilly and the 
                                                        
3 McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly note that by unspoken agreement in the 1950s-60s, institutionalised 
politics—parties, voting, collaboration—became the precinct of political “science”, while anything that 
happened outside institutional bounds was sociology (2001:6). This division is now, happily, receding, 
with acknowledgements of the need to bridge the conceptual divide (Goldstone 2003). 
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“contentious politics” literature, do not. Conversely, few political analysts refer to the 
burgeoning social movement literature, though as Cohen and Arato point out, the major 
theoretical paradigms for analysis of social movements “each presuppose the concept of 
civil society” (1992:xvii-xviii). I begin with theories of the public sphere and social 
capital, which are relatively closer to civil society theory, and then continue to social 
movement theory and network analysis. 
The public sphere, according to critical theorists, is “a domain of our social life in which 
such a thing as public opinion can be formed...open in principle to all citizens” 
(Habermas 1991:398). The content of the public sphere is unrestricted critical 
discourse, leading to “the strong sense of a consensus about the common good” (Fraser 
1992:113, Taylor 2004:85). These end goals are similar to normative visions of civil 
society, but the content and process are different. The participants in a public sphere are 
individual citizens, not associations or organisations; the principles of voluntarism and 
autonomy still apply. In Habermas’ formulation, a bourgeois public sphere consists of 
“private people assembled for a public purpose” (1962:38). Civil society is a more 
general term describing an arena for communication and action; a public sphere arises 
out of civil society as people come together to form a public (Madsen 1993:190). 
In practice, the “strong” public sphere with consensus about the common good cannot 
be fully realised, since the public is fragmented into competing interest groups, even 
under the conditions of liberal democracy that Habermas and his followers consider. 
Many societies produce “weak publics” that form opinions but do not make decisions 
(Fraser 1992:134). As with multiple civil societies, it might be preferable to think of 
multiple public spheres at different levels (Edwards 2004:57), or in Bourdieu’s terms, of 
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various “social fields” or sub-sectors of civil society within the lifeworld of existing 
societies (Bourdieu 1998:31-4, Goetze 2007:44-5). In a social field, individuals and 
groups occupy relative positions and exist relationally to each other, acting within the 
field and also transforming it. A theory of multiple public spheres must consider both 
the composition of each social field and their interrelationships in the context of a whole 
society. 
The language of public spheres and social fields is resonant of spatial metaphors for civil 
society as a sector or arena. Compared to many civil society theories, critical theory 
offers a deeper understanding of the formation and reproduction of social action. Rather 
than identify civil society with the undifferentiated base of this action, however, civil 
society might be more usefully conceptualised as the sum of all publics in a society, the 
process through which “actors consciously try to enhance, expand, and transform the 
public sphere” (Chambers 2002:98).  
A second set of theories concerns social capital, which can be summarised as “trust, 
norms and networks” (Putnam 1993:167, Baron et al 2000:9). For Bourdieu (1998) and 
Lin (2001), social capital is an individual attribute measured in the degree of 
connectedness to social networks. For Putnam, social capital is a collective attribute of 
all communities and societies, similar to liberal theories of civil society. Societies with 
dense networks of social interaction establish norms of generalised reciprocity that lead 
to greater potential for sustaining democracy (Putnam and Goss 2002:7).4 Putnam 
explains north-south variations in Italy on the basis of differing historical networks and 
                                                        
4 Similar to quantitative analyses of civil society, some analysts have attempted to measure national stocks 
of social capital via quantitative surveys or qualitative measures of group cohesion (Fukuyama 2001). This 
is problematic in terms of cross-national comparisons, as in the example of Dalton and Ong (2004) on 
Vietnam.  
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norms of civic engagement (1993:15); a similar approach is taken by Luong (2005) on 
Vietnam, although the north-south divide is less stark in the Vietnamese case than 
urban-rural and ethnic differentiation. Social capital theories of both types consider 
horizontal network ties of reciprocity and cooperation as well as vertical ties 
characterised by authority and dependence. While both are important, horizontal ties 
are seen as holding greater potential for civic engagement and political change (Weller 
1999:13). Bourdieu and Lin introduce sub-types of bonding and bridging social capital, 
similar to concepts of strong and weak ties (Granovetter 1973); for network and 
political purposes, bridging ties across social groups are of primary importance. 
Social capital has been an influential concept among Asia scholars such as Weller 
(1999,2005), Luong (2003,2005), and Tsai (2007), in part since it offers a way to 
“sidestep” perceived constraints of civil society theory, such as the demand for complete 
autonomy from government (Madsen 1998:14). One advantage of this approach is that it 
is not difficult to identify “networks of horizontal ties” at different points in time, while 
the historical application of civil society theories is more challenging (Hefner 1998:233, 
Rowe 1993). Weller’s analysis of communal, kinship and religious associations in China 
and Taiwan describes an “apolitical society” of “alternate civilities” that nevertheless has 
the potential to contribute to civil society and politics (Weller 2008:127, 1999:32-5). 
Social capital resides with informal temple and lineage associations as much or more as 
in formal, voluntary NGOs (Luong 2005). However, local horizontal networks may or 
may not have democratic effects, depending on the context; thick social capital is a 
32 
 
 
necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy, which requires a balance of state 
and society (Hefner 1998:36-9, Weller 2008:129-30).5  
The concept of horizontal and vertical ties links to Confucian traditions, which originate 
in China and neighbouring countries but also apply elsewhere (Hefner 1998:234-6, Shils 
1996:69-71). In Confucianism, the family is critical as a “point of departure” and is 
viewed as the model for other forms of association (Madsen 2002:202). Family and 
kinship ties, often overlooked in civil society theory because they are not fully voluntary 
(Kaldor 2003, Phillips 2002:72), demonstrate differential gendered aspects of the 
formation of social capital (Chambers 2002:90, Howell and Mulligan 2004) as well as the 
effects of lineage and social class distinctions.  
Social capital is also theoretically related to the concept of guanxi, defined as “dyadic 
relationships that are based implicitly on mutual interest and benefit” (YangM 1994:1). 
Personal networks and reciprocity have been a central component of Chinese society 
(FeiX 1992:24-25) and politics (Pye 1995), historically and in the present, but this 
phenomenon is not unique to Confucian-influenced societies (YangM 1994:7).6 Guanxi 
might best be thought of as “the Chinese word for the personal networks, social capital, 
and gift economies” differing in degree among Asian and non-Asian contexts but “found 
in all societies” (Gold et al 2002:3). Individuals have “guanxi networks” (关系网, 
guānxiwǎng) that carry a positive meaning of being well-connected and able to get 
                                                        
5 Critics note that social capital explanations of political change can be circular: “a democratic culture 
promotes democracy” (Törnquist 1999:131), without actually showing how this occurs or taking power 
relations into account. 
6 Mayfair Yang theorises Chinese civil society as the minjian (民间), “a realm of people-to-people 
relationships which is non-governmental or separate from formal bureaucratic channels… The art of 
guanxi can be seen as a dominant theme of the Chinese minjian” (1994:288-9). Guanxi “privileges neither 
the individual nor the group or association” (290). Yang is correct to locate civil society within personal 
networks; but these relationships are as important within government as outside it; as she eloquently 
describes, guanxi is one of the main ways that her informants engaged with authorities.  
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things done, as well as a negative connotation of pulling strings through the back door, 
leading to corruption (Gold et al 2002:6). Social networks permeate contemporary 
societies, including among business and government elites (Castells 1996, Marsh and 
Rhodes 1992, Unger 2002:204), even as the subject of a hit 2010 Hollywood film. In a 
specific meaning of patron-client gatekeeping within a shortage economy, guanxi may 
decline as a society develops, but different forms of guanxi may be expected to emerge in 
different historical and institutional contexts.  
Social movement theory and political opportunities 
Beginning from psychologised explanations of collective behaviour (Smelser 1962, 
Turner and Killian 1957) and “resource mobilisation” analyses of the US civil rights 
movement (McAdam 1986), social movement theory has emerged in the past decades to 
become a distinct branch of sociology. Among various streams, social movement 
theorists seek to understand how individuals are mobilised to join in collective action, 
how movements form and why they succeed or fail. Links between social movement and 
civil society studies have deepened in the past decade through the efforts of more 
politically inclined movement theorists, particularly the “political process” school 
associated with Tarrow (1998,2005), and the dissatisfaction of some political scientists 
with the static and depoliticised character of existing civil society concepts (Törnquist 
1999:165, Amoore and Langley 2004:103). Social movement studies have become more 
internationalised and diverse in the process. 
For the purpose of this thesis, a social movement is defined as “a sustained and self-
conscious challenge to authorities or cultural codes by a field of actors, some of whom 
employ extra-institutional means of influence” (Gamson and Meyer 1996:283), with the 
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“field of actors” consisting of multiple civil society networks. The key word in this 
definition is “sustained”, meaning coordination that is directional and goal-oriented over 
a long period of time (Khagram et al 2002:6-9). Tilly (2004:4) adds that movements 
“show concerted displays of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment”.  
As with normative definitions of civil society, certain approaches to social movement 
theory are too narrowly-construed to travel well. One strand associates movements too 
closely with their identified historical origins in Euro-American democracies;7 another 
defines movements on the basis of the selection of radical, confrontational political 
tactics (Zirakzadeh 2006:5). In the “political process” school, movements’ claim-making 
is described as aimed only at authorities and power holders (Tilly 2003:247, Tilly and 
Tarrow 2006:23,202). The Gamson-Meyer definition cited above avoids these 
limitations by noting that political challenges and extra-institutional tactics are part of 
movement actions, but not necessarily the only part. The mention of “cultural codes” 
also links to the European school of “new social movement” research (Touraine 
1985,1992; Melucci 1988,1996), which emphasises the collective identity and meaning 
forged through collective action more than specific political acts. The environmental, 
peace and women’s movements Melucci studied have formed new, autonomous “social 
spaces” that extend beyond traditional dichotomies of state–civil society and public-
private and “are located at several different levels of the social system simultaneously” 
(1996:3-4). Thus, movements operate along a continuum from higher to lower levels of 
engagement with authorities, with direct challenge constituting a tactical choice rather 
than a definitional requirement.  
                                                        
7 For instance, Tilly defines social movements as “a distinctive way of pursuing public politics [that] began 
to take shape in Western countries [and] consolidated into a durable ensemble of elements” (2004:7). 
These are held to be “historically unique” features to western democracies (Colás 2002:75). 
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European and American perspectives have converged in the post-2000 literature on 
“contentious politics”, much of which is transnational in content. McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly (2001:6) characterise contention as dynamic interactions between collective actors 
and government that can be either “contained” (institutional) or “transgressive” 
(confrontational). Contention takes place in “episodes” that have a distinct beginning 
and end. Earlier theorising of “cycles” of movement activity (Fox 1996, Tarrow 
1998:141) have been supplanted by metaphors of “waves” (Milwertz 2002:5, Koopmans 
2004). Actors draw on existing “repertoires” that have developed historically in different 
countries into cultures of activism (Traugott 1995:2); an underlying reservoir of 
collective organisation may remain latent for a long period but only come to the surface 
when conditions permit, either through a crisis or opportunity (Diani 1992:16). 
“Contentious politics” is a broad category covering all forms of collective action 
(Aminzade et al 2001:6,238), including the topics of this thesis. But the meaning of 
contention is itself contentious (O’Brien and Li 2006:52). Contention is sometimes 
misconstrued as confrontation, and some scholars consciously prioritise research on 
“transgressive contention” out of a belief that it leads to greater social change (McAdam 
et al 2001:8).8 In reality, movements use a variety of tactics spanning the “fuzzy and 
permeable boundary” between institutional and non-institutional action, and 
movements that use both protest and conventional tactics are seen as the most 
successful (Goldstone 2003:2-7, O’Brien 2004:106, Keech-Marx 2008:184). In place of 
“contention”, this thesis uses the more neutral terms “collective action” and “advocacy” 
                                                        
8 Similarly, Mouffe’s agonistic politics privilege contention over cooperation: why is only antagonism 
political? (2000:101).  
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to describe the political activities of networks, some of which may also be “contentious” 
in its usual sense of controversial or sensitive.9  
Movements’ selection of strategies and tactics depends on their existing scope of choice 
(repertoires of collective action) and their perceptions of external incentives and 
barriers, referred to as “political opportunities” that provide incentives or constraints to 
people undertaking collective action (Tarrow 1998:18-9). These conditions, including 
changes in relative institutional openness, stability of elite policy arguments, presence of 
elite allies, and state capacity for repression, condition the emergence of movements and 
affect their chances of success (McAdam et al 1996:3,10). The relationship between 
movements and dominant structures is interactive: “opportunities open the way for 
political action, but movements also make opportunities” (Gamson and Meyer 
1996:236). What matters most is not objective opportunities, but rather actors’ relative 
perceptions and how these shift qualitatively over time (Klandermans et al 2002:321).10 
People mobilise for collective action in response to perceived opportunities and 
constraints: for instance, some studies find that opportunities are greatest when elites 
are supportive, while others conclude that grievances have the largest mobilising effect 
(Tilly 2004:111-2, Van Dyke 2003). Repression can suppress movement activity entirely 
in some circumstances, while increasing it in others (Goldstone 2003:21). 
                                                        
9 A significant body of writing on contentious politics and social movements in China has appeared since 
2004, due largely to the leadership of Perry and O’Brien (Perry and Selden 2003, Gries and Rosen 2004, 
O’Brien and Li 2006, Perry and Goldman 2007, O’Brien 2008, Tarrow 2008, Keech-Marx 2008). Some of 
this literature is referred to in detail in subsequent chapters. There has been no comparable scholarship 
on Vietnam. 
10 Gamson and Meyer note that most activists “systematically overstate the degree of political 
opportunities, and if they did not, they would not be doing their job” of conveying agency and possibility 
to mobilise people (1996:285-7). 
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The original use of political opportunity analysis, as with other features of social 
movement theory, was within a national or sub-national context, usually a Euro-
American one. Parallel to the “global civil society” literature, a new focus on 
transnational social movements emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Smith et al 
1997, Cohen and Rai 2000, Khagram et al 2002, Piper and Uhlin 2004, Tarrow 2005, 
Bandy and Smith 2005, della Porta and Tarrow 2005, della Porta et al 2006). Social 
movement research has shifted away from a western focus to consider movements in 
non-western, and frequently non-democratic, contexts where the “classic social 
movement model” does not always apply well (McAdam et al 2001:18), although the 
focus of movement advocacy is still usually assumed to be the state. From a western-
centred perspective, the existence of movements in non-democratic countries is seen as 
a “puzzle” that can be explained away by disembodied forces of globalisation (Goldstone 
2003:10), but might be better understood as an interactive indigenous tradition. As a 
Burmese activist notes, even the most authoritarian states cannot prevent the 
emergence of social movements, since the state may have enough despotic power (Mann 
1984) to close legal spaces, but not enough infrastructural power to close illegal spaces 
(Kyaw 2004:390,398). 
Less usefully, comparative studies of social movements are sometimes reduced to 
dichotomies of “open” and “closed” political opportunities, following Freedom House’s 
Cold War-era rankings of countries (Tilly and Tarrow 2006:54-66).11 As with “global 
civil society”, some transnational social movement research prioritises Euro-American-
                                                        
11 Even a range of rankings from open to closed is too simplistic, as opportunities shift in complex ways 
that are not necessarily improving or worsening (O’Brien and Li 2006:93). McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 
group China as a “high capacity, low democracy” country with a “failed revolution” (2001:196); they do 
not mention Vietnam. 
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centred movements, particularly those that are activist or protest-driven. Some 
countries and regions attract more attention than others.12 Although the number and 
scope of transnational linkages is increasing, domestic movements and networks remain 
the primary actors in each national context. Changing political opportunities within 
states remain more important to the emergence of movements than static differences 
between states (Tarrow 1996:60-1), and opportunity structures should be described in 
depth, not ranked as a binary variable. 
Network analysis 
Networks are pervasive in today’s world, evoking diverse images of the World Wide 
Web (a virtual network), cocktail party chatter (personal networks)13, and terrorist 
sleeper cells (an underground network): “the new social morphology of our societies” 
(Castells 1996:469). One report, perhaps a victim of hyberbole, states that networks 
“will be the pre-eminent global public policy mechanism of the future” (Ramalingam et 
al 2008:1). Simply put, networks are made up of relations among actors, “a set of links or 
ties connecting nodes” or “a set of interconnected nodes” (Katz and Anheier 2006:242; 
Castells 1996:470). The size of nodes can range from individuals in personal networks 
up through nation-states (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982:14-5); together, network 
“relationships and roles…construct politics” (Knoke 1990:7).  
As a field of social research, network analysis offers the clearest example of relational 
thinking (Emirbayer 1997:298-9). Networks are, by definition, “interstitial”– they cut 
across discrete clusters, groups and communities—though in certain cases they may 
                                                        
12 Tilly and Tarrow admit, “we have neglected Asia” (2006:173). 
13 For clarity, this thesis uses the term “personal network” rather than the more generic “social network” 
to describe an individual’s friends and acquaintances. This is similar to Bourdieu’s concept of personal 
social capital. 
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also congeal into identifiable units, termed “category networks” or “catnets” (Tilly 
1984:29). Networks fit at the meso-level of social analysis, forming key links between 
individual agency and macro-level social processes and structures (Diani and McAdam 
2003:4,284, Marsh and Rhodes 1992:1); social structure is formed of positions, roles 
and relationships, not individuals (Knoke 1990:8). Thus, networks are an appropriate 
modal unit of analysis for social research, more than separate organisations (Castells 
1996:198; della Porta and Tarrow 2005:140). As social structural theorists Wellman and 
Berkowitz put it, “the world is composed of networks, not groups”, since networks may 
not be divisible into discrete organisations (1986:20,37). The renowned sociologist Fei 
Xiaotong (1992) saw Chinese society in similar network- and kinship-based terms, 
which lie at the core of Confucianism (Rosemont 2002:361). Both anthropologists and 
business analysts have seen network approaches to be appropriate in Asian contexts; at 
the very least, the concept is not out of place there.  
Common network structures include the pyramid, hub-and-spokes wheel, and web. 
Other possible structures are a “clique”, an egalitarian but closed structure in which all 
nodes are adjacent to each other; a polycephalous structure in which a few main groups 
are linked by bridges, or a “segmented decentralized” structure with weak network 
identity and high organisational loyalty (Diani and McAdam 2003:306-12). Networks 
that are highly centralised (hub structures) are seen as more susceptible to external 
shocks, since if the hub stops functioning the network will collapse (Schiffer and Waale 
2008:14). The choice of network structures also has power implications: a centralised 
network (in which a few nodes have many ties, while other nodes have only a few ties) is 
implicitly more hierarchical. Boundary spanning between networks increases the 
informal power of individual leaders and of the group as a whole, but offers diminishing 
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returns the more bridges are built (Krebs 2004). Such brokerage or bridging is often 
carried out by loose-knit connections such as acquaintances, since strong ties such as 
kinship are already assumed to be networked (Granovetter 1973:1376). 
Figure 1.1 Network structures14 
 
A core problem in analysis is boundary specification, differentiating network members 
or participants from mere supporters (Emirbayer 1997:303). Using the so-called 
                                                        
14 Men are represented in these network diagrams by triangles, women by circles and organisations by 
squares. Thus, the pyramid in this example is an individual membership network, the clique an 
organisational network, and the others have mixed individual and organisational members. 
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“realist” criterion, “the network analyst adopts the presumed subjective perceptions of 
system actors themselves, defining the boundaries of a social entity as the limits that are 
consciously experienced by all or most of the actors that are members of the identity” 
(Knoke and Kuklinski 1982:22, Diani 2002:176). Actor-centred mapping of network 
boundaries enables people to speak for themselves as to who is part of the network, 
rather than impose external criteria. 
Castells (1996:470) conceives network structures as open, able to expand without limits 
and to integrate new nodes as long as they are able to communicate with existing ones. 
Ties or “adjacencies” can be both interpersonal and inter-organisational; some linkages 
are direct (non-mediated) while others are indirect. Linkages can be inferred by joint 
participation in the same set of events or activities, but should not be assumed to exist 
on the basis of preferences alone (Diani 2002:177). Networks can be categorised along a 
range of characteristics: size of the network, density (number of ties), cohesion or tie 
strength (how well people in the network know each other), equivalence (the extent to 
which people in the network have similar relations with others), prominence and 
marginality (whether people are in the hub or towards the outside of the network) and 
range and brokerage (bridging unconnected networks, usually through individual 
brokers: Baron et al 2000:21).15 Network ties can be “binary” (on or off) or “valued” 
(given a qualitative scoring of strength). They may also be symmetric (reciprocal), 
directional, or competitive (Diani 2002:188). Ties may be evaluated on strength over 
time and level of intimacy, among other factors noted above.  
                                                        
15 For instance, in Figure 1.1, organisation A in the web diagram has the greatest density and prominence, 
while individual B is at the margin. In the segmented-decentralised network, the shaded individual acts as 
a broker between two organizations. 
42 
 
 
Social movement theorists have studied networks in order to understand mobilisation 
processes, creating the category of “movement networks” (Diani 1992). Individuals join 
such networks through relational channels such as existing friendships, not as single 
individuals (Melucci 1996:330). Movements grow out of informal networks, 
communities and organisations (Crossley 2002:93), and people are mobilised to join 
networks by people they already know (Katz and Anheier 2006:246).16 Thus, networks 
demonstrate social capital and “bounded solidarity” (Coleman 1990), referring to the 
level of trust and cooperation among members; a network’s social capital consists of the 
sum of ties it includes. “Prior ties” and “network capital” are thought to matter even 
more in authoritarian and communist regimes, where people rely on networks for 
transactions (such as access to power holders or acquisition of restricted goods) that 
would otherwise be structured through markets or state institutions (Osa 2003:78-9, 
Vala and O’Brien 2008:109). The process of networking conveys a collective identity 
among participants that is itself a mobilising factor. Dense yet informal, network ties 
extend beyond instrumental linkages to include shared meanings, stories and identities 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998:3; Diani and McAdam 2003:5,23).  
The earliest theorists to connect networks to social movements were Gerlach and Hine, 
who proposed in 1970 a model of “decentralized, segmented and reticulated” groups 
with an informal, web-like structure (cited in Tarrow 1998:129). Several decades later, 
Korten (1990b:2) found that “the power of voluntary action arises not from the size and 
resources of individual voluntary organizations” but rather from “vast and constantly 
evolving networks” that reach across sectors: 
                                                        
16 This may be changing in an age of virtual web-based relationships, but evidence so far suggests that 
while social media are an effective communications tool for organizing, mobilisation still occurs largely on 
the basis of direct personal connections, as in the recent demonstrations in Egypt (Lehmann 2011:33).  
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As our understanding grows, we see that strategic networks are the building 
blocks of social movements. A strategic network is a temporary alliance of 
individuals and organizations though which their resources are combined in 
pursuit of shared, defined and consequential goals that strengthen the 
movement’s position in relation to major opposing forces. These alliances 
commonly reach beyond the formal voluntary sector to engage students, media, 
universities, agencies of government, and responsible business organizations 
(1990b:2-3).  
Korten expects networks to be large and “energize spontaneous voluntary action on a 
considerable scale” (1990b:3), but not exist permanently: “Participants in successful 
movements collaborate in continuously shifting networks and coalitions” (106).17 These 
loose networks do not always function smoothly. Hirsch and Warren (1998:11) note 
that networks and coalitions in the environmental sector “typically build and dissolve 
around particular issues, prevailing sentiments and even personalities.” Mayfair Yang 
quotes a Chinese artist: “Guanxi networks are like casting a fishnet into the sea; when 
the fish have been caught, the people (holding the net) disperse. When the net is recast, 
not all the same people are in the new network” (1994:304).  
The best-known work linking network analysis with civil society and social movements 
is Keck and Sikkink’s Activists Beyond Borders (1998), which depicts transnational 
solidarity networks engaged in “production, exchange, and strategic use of information” 
(1998:3), in contrast to the information-suppressing habits of states and other actors. 
“Network campaigns” (McCarthy et al 2004), such as Jubilee 2000 or the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines, can reframe debates, contribute new ideas, norms and 
identities, and enhance political resources available to domestic actors.18 Keck and 
Sikkink insist that networks be formed of “non-state forces”, but they do not have to use 
                                                        
17 This description evokes Eyerman and Jamison’s alternative cognitive definition of social movements as 
“temporary public spaces [and] moments of collective creation” (1991:4).  
18 Keck and Sikkink describe transnational advocacy networks, but many of their core examples are single 
country-focused. One historical example given is the campaign against foot-binding in China, led by both 
western missionaries and Chinese reformers.  
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only confrontational means (1998:1). Transnational advocacy networks include both 
NGOs and other actors, with NGOs “play[ing] prominent roles” (2).19 In Keck and 
Sikkink’s view, networks are primarily horizontal and reciprocal in their patterns of 
communication and exchange (1998:3). Although a desirable ideal, this may not always 
apply to networks’ internal  structures: as with other forms of social organisation, 
networks may reproduce existing social norms of vertical or even authoritarian 
structures led by a charismatic individual or a core clique (Encarnación 2006:370).  
NGOs and/or individuals may act as “bridgers” or “gappers” brokering among networks, 
often transnationally as “rooted cosmopolitans” (Cunningham et al 2007:19,70; Tarrow 
2005:29,190) or “strategic network catalysts” (Korten 1990a:124). According to one 
analyst, NGOs’ “most promising long term future…is to become nodes, hubs, enablers 
and supporters of civic networks” (Fowler 1997:233). Compared to formal 
organisations, according to network promoters, these structures are cheaper, quicker, 
better at sharing information, more fun, and ultimately more effective (McCarthy et al 
2004:212-3). 
Network theory is not without detractors. Accountability can be missing, and large 
networks are difficult and expensive to maintain (McCarthy et al 2004:214). The claims 
of network theorists have been criticised for overreach, while the more technical side of 
network analysis is viewed as static and disembodied (McDonald 2006:37). A simple 
map of nodes and ties does not indicate who in a network is more influential or why; 
“meaning does not stem automatically from ties” (Diani 2002:194-5). Network theory 
has also been critiqued as structurally biased (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994); since 
                                                        
19 This differs slightly from an earlier description by Potter and Taylor (1996:2) in which NGOs are 
embedded in but distinct from movements. 
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everyone is potentially part of networks, they have little effect as mobilising structures 
(Goodwin and Jasper 1999:46). In response to these critiques, leading theorists began to 
move from static models to investigations of dynamic mechanisms and processes of 
change (McAdam et al 2001, Diani and McAdam 2003). Network analysis should not 
stand on its own, but link to the broader process of civil society in specific contexts. 
Networks form the component parts of civil society, linking organisations and 
individuals with a shared conception of desired social change and an identified mission 
of influencing power. 
Redefining civil society: networks and advocacy 
Network theory offers the basis for a re-theorisation of civil society, not as a sector or an 
arena but as a political process of collective action and alliance-building. This definition, 
while new, resonates with approaches that have become more influential in the 
literature on civil society and social movements in recent years.20 I propose three key 
adjustments to existing civil society theory. First, civil society is comprised of networks, 
not organisations. Second, civil society occurs as networks act, therefore the question is 
no longer who is “in” or “out” of civil society, but what civil society actually does (Uphoff 
and Krishna 2004). Third, the actions of civil society networks cross boundaries 
between society, family, the market and the state, which are not monolithic but must be 
disaggregated according to their roles and positions. 
                                                        
20 An initial step is to broaden civil society to include both a metaphorical “realm”, as well as the actors 
who operate in this space (Walzer 1995:7; Hughes 2003:138). Other approaches to civil society as a wider 
“social process that generates trust and mutual understanding” across various degrees or “thresholds” are 
proposed by Deakin (2001:7), Jorgensen (1996:44-7), and Hedman (2006:184). Schak and Hudson 
(2003:1) argue that civil society in Asia should be understood as a dynamic project in process, while 
Hannah’s 2007 dissertation on Vietnam focuses on “social and political processes involving civil society 
and the state” along a continuum of possible roles (58,92). 
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Civil society in a network analysis is composed, not of individual actors or associations, 
but of the relations among them. Surprisingly, however, the connection between 
networks and civil society has rarely if ever been made, as most social movement and 
network theorists keep a distance from civil society. The few existing references to “civil 
society networks”, such as on CIVICUS’ website,21 describe links among NGOs. The only 
identified use of the term in a sense close to this thesis is in a short article on Malawi 
(James and Malunga 2006). Even writers who take an actor-centred view of civil society 
(Hannah 2007, Wischermann 2010) or look at personal network ties (Büsgen 2006, XieL 
2007) still use NGOs as their unit of analysis.22 Other related, but not identical concepts 
include “solidary groups” (Tsai 2007) and “action groups” (Haynes 1997). Perhaps the 
closest definition is Kadir’s, in a chapter on civil society in Singapore, made up of 
“networks of voluntary organisations… formed by citizens to pursue mutual interests or 
beliefs” (2004:330). This definition is still organisation-based, but Kadir notes that 
activists have “ad hoc gatherings as a way of strengthening informal networks” (332).  
Civil society networks are networks of individuals and/or organisations that engage in 
advocacy towards state authorities and elites. Such networks may have individual 
participants, organisational participants, or a combination of both (Diani 2002:174, 
Wilson-Grau and Nuñez 2006), ranging in size from a small group of individuals to a 
formal organisational coalition. Their structures may be formal or informal, with a 
variety of leadership and coordination models. In mixed networks, participants have 
some degree of individual participation as well as associational identity. NGOs and other 
                                                        
21 www.civicus.org/csn.  
22 Blair (1997) defines “civil society organisations” as a type of NGO that aims to influence public policy; all 
CSOs are NGOs, but not the other way around. This is a step forward from assuming all NGOs are part of 
civil society, but still limits civil society to formal organisations. 
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associations may be active parts of civil society networks, but their participation must 
be demonstrated through collaborative actions with others and their embeddedness in 
network structures (Potter and Taylor 1996:2).23 Simply having non-profit status is 
insufficient, as organisations may act in their own private interests, rather than the 
network’s, even if they are not distributing profits to members or shareholders. This 
differs somewhat from Putnam’s conception of membership in associations having value 
in itself for building social capital and democratic values (1993:167); in a process view 
of civil society, formal or informal association membership has the potential to bring 
about these effects, but only when and if associations join in networks with others to 
pursue shared goals and engage authority. Networks and organisations may also have 
legitimate differences concerning goals and strategies, leading to intra- or inter-network 
conflicts. 
Networks may at times include other individual and collective actors, such as for-profit 
businesses and media outlets, to the extent that they work together with others for 
perceived public benefit in addition to their own private interests. It is even conceivable 
that some component parts of states, such as local governments, ministry departments, 
or research institutes, may participate in civil society networks.24 Specifically, individual 
government officials may act in their own capacities as part of collective efforts to 
address climate change, improve women’s rights, or numerous other possibilities. As 
                                                        
23 Whether NGOs strengthen or indeed detract from civil society depends on the extent and nature of their 
participation in the networks that comprise it, and on the domestic and international opportunity 
structures they are presented with (Khagram et al 2002:17-20). Overall, analysts working from Latin 
American experience seem to be the most positive in their evaluation of NGOs’ contributions (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998), while African and South Asian perspectives are more critical (Chazan 1994, Chandhoke 
2002). 
24 The argument here is not that government-organised NGOs (GONGOs) should be lumped into civil 
society; quite the opposite. Rather, civil society can arise from within parts of the state to the extent that 
civil servants or agencies adopt “amphibious” identities alongside their official roles (DingXL 1994, Fforde 
and Porter 1994, Hannah 2007).  
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one Chinese environmental official has said, “During the day, I work as a government 
official. But that is just eight hours a day! For the rest of the time, I am an environmental 
activist” (C63). 
Not all networks are civil society networks. Many networks among individuals remain at 
the level of personal ties and have no public or advocacy component: for instance, most 
private clubs and business networks exist only to serve the interests of their members. 
Religious groups, by contrast, often have a vision of the common good but are identity-
based and do not engage in advocacy. Social capital theorists sometimes claim that 
whether groups operate in the public interest or in private interests, they build social 
capital and civility, which foster civil society (MaQS 2006:206). This is too naïve; certain 
networks may be harmful. States may set up networks or corporatist arrangements of 
their own and co-opt other social actors to join (Lee and Rhyu 2008). The same 
possibility exists for corporate-initiated networks, let alone networks operating in illegal 
or semi-legal domains such as mafia or terrorist groups. In greyer areas, some networks 
may have multiple functions, incorporating certain civil society features while also 
pursuing private interests. Such actors require informed, context-specific yet ultimately 
subjective evaluations; analysts should “stick with the empirical facts and scrutinize 
each and every civic organisation carefully, as to whether or not they might be 
contributing to ‘civil society-building’” (Krishna, cited in Wischermann 2006:209). 
Information technology is key to the communications and operations of civil society 
networks. Many newer networks have emerged parallel to the growth of IT access, and 
network members use information and communication technology – e-mail, chatting 
and cell phones/texting – as their main modes of communication. In fact, many network 
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activities would be impossible without these technologies. This does not imply that the 
Internet has inherently liberating tendencies (Diamond 2010) or is responsible for 
creating networks, but rather that technology is a tool that has changed the operating 
realities of networks as well as state and private actors (Lehmann 2011). 
Civil society networks’ actions offer the potential, though no inevitable guarantee, of 
positive social change. The content of this change and its valuation as positive is an 
object of contestation within and across circumstances and cultures. For instance, 
liberals may assume that that individual freedom is of ultimate value, and that civil 
society should be rights-based (Kaldor 2003:14,46). Theorists operating from other 
interpretative approaches would disagree, positing alternative values such as liberation 
and fulfilment in place of individual autonomy (Mohanty 1998). One may dismiss this as 
a “post-modern argument,” as in reality “communitarian traditional associations...can be 
very oppressive” (Kaldor 2003:43), but this surely depends on the association and the 
perspective of its participants. A lawyers’ association in Pakistan might be promoting 
the public interest, while its US counterpart pursues private interests. It is precisely this 
divergence across societies that makes qualitative comparisons interesting and valuable, 
and provides direction for cross-societal research.  
A process-based definition of civil society brings time and human agency back into what 
can be a static and structural form of analysis (Fay 1996:242). The dynamics of civil 
society cannot be quantified on a linear scale or graphed in a box; they must be 
understood within national and local contexts. Furthermore, static pictures of the nature 
of civil society cannot do justice to the historical processes at work in social and political 
change; a time dimension is essential (Sztompka 1993:277-8). Networks may originate 
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in one form and change into another, from civil society-initiated to state-dominated or 
vice versa. Social change, in this concept, is an interactive process of ideas, values, 
networks and interests, rather than forms or structures. It is “ecological” in the sense 
that what happens now depends on what has already happened and what is happening 
elsewhere at the same time. As political opportunities shift and waves of contention rise 
and fall, change is both contingent and path-dependent: once a tipping point is reached, 
there is no return (Koopmans 2004:40-1).  
Social movements may be viewed as a particular sub-case of civil society networks that 
are large, sustained and highly coordinated – “a network of networks” (della Porta et al 
2006:31). The same is true for an intermediate form, advocacy campaigns, which have 
certain features of social movements but on a smaller scale. The differences among 
networks, campaigns and movements are not fixed but are rather a question of 
perspective, size, and degree; all three are forms of civil society. It is reasonable to 
assume that the difficulties of cohesion and sustainability increase as collective action 
becomes more complex, and hence there are fewer past or present examples of full-
fledged social movements than focused campaigns, fewer campaigns than civil society 
networks, and fewer networks than social organisations (Khagram et al 2002:6-9); “the 
transformation from network to movement is not always intended or attained” (Bandy 
and Smith 2005:3).  
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Figure 1.2 Networks, social movements and civil society: a nesting paradigm25  
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This paradigm differs from traditional depictions of civil society in that it describes the 
relationships among the components, showing that social movements and campaigns 
are sub-sets of the broader phenomenon of civil society networks, and that all forms of 
networks are based on underlying social relations. This schema also has the advantage 
of not posing civil society as one of the components that is contrasted with other types of 
social and political organisation. By looking at a sample of networks, each of which 
includes a number of organisations and numerous individuals, it becomes possible to 
describe the “organisational ecology” of a civil society in which “movements are 
comprised of more than the sum of their affiliated organisations” (Minkoff 2002:261). 
Such an approach is flexible enough to apply in all societies, while offering a context and 
direction for comparative research. For instance, one might investigate whether 
                                                        
25 The nesting paradigm, adapted from literature on conflict resolution and peacebuilding, considers both 
the narrower and broader aspects of a social structure, ranging from issues to more systemic concerns 
(Dugan 1996, Lederach 1997). 
52 
 
 
countries with more developed civil societies show a greater diversity of network forms, 
including campaigns and social movements, or whether networks that are directly 
confronting state power select looser, less institutionalised structures compared to 
those with more cooperative relations with state agencies. 
Civil society networks engage in advocacy, defined as “any attempt to influence the 
decisions of any institutional elite on behalf of a collective interest” (Jenkins 1987:267). 
This definition is broader than policy change alone: advocacy also can focus on policy 
implementation or public opinion (O’Brien and Li 2006:85,96).26 In the development 
and public policy literature, advocacy models have also been used to explain policy 
processes within the state. The concept of advocacy coalitions, “composed of people 
from various governmental and private organisations who share a set of normative and 
causal beliefs and who often act in concert” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993:17), is 
closely related to civil society networks as used here. Other writers describe “policy 
networks” made up of individual actors (Marsh and Rhodes 1992) and “governance 
networks”, multi-stakeholder groups involving members inside and outside the state 
(Schiffer and Waale 2008). Noteboom looks at “adaptive networks” in the Netherlands, 
defined as people from multiple sectors who cooperate to find solutions to social 
problems and “try to connect thinking and acting in different parts of society” (2006:21). 
Such networks are based on interpersonal relationships within and outside government; 
they self-organise or “coagulate” from loose personal networks and rely on high levels of 
trust among members. Contrasted with “power networks” which are wholly within the 
state, adaptive networks have no formal power or resources; their effectiveness 
                                                        
26 This is consistent with the Gamson-Meyer definition of social movements presented above, challenging 
both authorities and “cultural codes” (see p. 33). On the other hand, this definition is more specific than 
Keck and Sikkink’s of “plead[ing] the causes of others or defend[ing] a cause or proposition” (1998:8). 
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depends on influence on the public agenda (Noteboom 2006:155-60,174-6,19). Many 
advocacy networks depend on individual “policy entrepreneurs” in or out of government 
who invest resources and take personal risks for the sake of an idea, sometimes joining 
with other specialists to form a “policy community” (Najam 1999, Kingdon 2003:117-
22). 
Advocacy coalitions, issue networks and adaptive networks share many common 
features with civil society networks as profiled here. Given the greater level of 
democracy and collaborative experiences in Euro-American societies, these networks 
are larger, stronger and better established than many in China and Vietnam, but not 
necessarily more formalised structurally. Though based on models of interest group 
politics, the advocacy literature transposes rather well to the fragmented authoritarian 
political structures of Asian single-party regimes.27 Nothing in the concept of civil 
society networks requires democratic forms of government; the only requirement is that 
there are interests within the ruling authorities that tolerate advocacy. This implies a 
complex set of relationships and interactions between social actors and the state, from 
information sharing to engaging the state along a range of advocacy strategies from 
dialogue to contention.  
Table 1.3 Key concepts and definitions 
Collective action General term covering ways people cooperate to 
engage in politics. 
See pp. 24, 
35 
Political space 
(or political field, in 
Bourdieu’s terms) 
The sum of perceived opportunities and 
constraints for collective action, negotiated 
between states and other social forces.  
pp. 35-6 
                                                        
27 This is contrary to Potter and Taylor’s assumption that advocacy is easier in democratic settings, since 
government is more accountable and representative; there are a diversity of power centres within and 
outside the state; civil and political rights are protected; and popular participation is high (1996:5-6). 
While authoritarian states such as China and Vietnam do not protect civil and political rights well, the 
picture for the other factors is not uniformly bleak. 
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State A field of power made up of multiple political 
institutions at national and local levels that project 
an image of coherence and control. 
p. 54 
Civil society Part of the political field, a process of networks 
making claims to state and/or social elites. 
p. 45 
Social capital The degree of an individual’s or group’s 
connections to interpersonal networks, particularly 
dense horizontal networks of trust. 
p. 30 
Personal networks Relations and ties among individuals that build 
social capital. 
p. 38 
Civil society networks Networks of individuals and/or organisations that 
engage in advocacy in pursuit of a social change 
agenda.  
p. 46 
Social movements Sustained, large-scale forms of collective action, an 
elaboration of the basic civil society network form.  
p. 33 
Advocacy Ways that networks engage and make demands to 
state and society, consisting of various strategies 
and tactics from institutional to transgressive. 
p. 52 
Campaign An episode of advocacy carried out by one or more 
networks or movements on a specific issue. 
p. 50 
Disaggregating the state – and society 
Instead of a zero-sum “civil society against the state” opposition (Cohen and Arato 
1992:29), a process-based definition of civil society that includes the possibility of state 
involvement presents a distinctly different picture of state-society relations (Uphoff and 
Krishna 2004). The issue is not how to balance between state and society sectors, but 
rather to disaggregate each into component parts – some potentially “civil,” others 
“uncivil” – and to see both as part of a broader whole, namely “society”. In the “state in 
society” view, “societies affect states as much or more than states affect societies” 
(Migdal et al 1994:2, Evans 1995). Migdal defines the state as a field of power made up 
of an image of coherence and control, together with the actual practices of component 
parts (2001:16). In this way the state is “both real and illusory”, a system and an idea 
(Mitchell 2006:169): “the edges of the state are uncertain; societal elements seem to 
penetrate it on all sides” (Mitchell 1991:81).  
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Social and political action involves “alliances, coalitions and conflicts among social forces 
in multiple arenas, including components of the state” at national, provincial and local 
levels (Migdal 2001:123). These struggles can lead to a range of outcomes, from total 
transformation and dislocation, incorporation, accommodation and disengagement 
(126-7). Even in “strong” states such as China and Vietnam (Migdal 1988:269), the state 
may be “transformed by other social forces”, which include “informal organisations, 
networks, formal organisations (including business and churches) and social 
movements” (2001:112,107). 
State and society exist in relation to one another; neither has complete autonomy or 
separate identity, whether the state in question is authoritarian or democratic. Neither 
state nor society is monolithic. Power resides, not in the state as such, but in the 
interplay of disciplinary practices among the state, market and society that Foucault 
(1980) terms “governmentality”. Such power is shifting and multi-faceted, a shared 
capacity rather than a unilateral exercise (Lukes 2005). In a Gramscian view, the state is 
not an end in itself but rather an instrument of particular interests (Bobbio 1988:76). 
Recognising the fuzzy boundaries between state and society, analysis should consider 
multiple levels of governance, with a particular focus on local politics (Kohli and Shue 
1994) and the unified or fragmented structure of elites (Goldstone 2003:13-5). “Seizing 
on the fissures and the ruptures, the contradictions in the policies, programs, 
institutions and discourses of ‘the state’ allows [activists] to create possibilities for 
political action and activism” (Gupta 2006:231).  
The possibilities of fragmentation may be witnessed, for instance, in appeals by rural 
protestors for central government intervention against perceived local corruption 
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(Unger 2002:215). Even highly centralised political systems may be highly fragmented 
among different levels and interests competing for influence. Conversely, a unified 
government structure (at either the national or local levels) may at times provide better 
leverage to grassroots groups than a fragmented one, since if the leadership can be 
persuaded, action will follow (Swarts 2003:79). The interplay of centralisation and 
fragmentation is especially relevant in China and Vietnam, where strong states have 
diversified without losing their monopoly on power. In the still-relevant formulation of 
Lieberthal (1992), these states exhibit “fragmented authoritarianism” among multiple 
levels of government, between ministries and state subsystems, and among competing 
bureaucracies and patronage networks. The “one country-two systems” model of China 
and Hong Kong can be seen as extreme examples of state fragmentation, but 
fragmentation also exists on the mainland, creating a conglomeration of “one country-
many levels-many systems”. 
Actors within a fragmented state, together with private sector allies, also have agency 
and may form counter-networks of their own to attempt to outbalance civil society 
networks (Eccleston 1996:83). State agencies, attitudes and ideologies may influence 
political opportunities or impose restrictions on civil society action (Jenkins and 
Klandermans 1995:16-7, Uphoff and Krishna 2004:360), but the influence can also go 
the other way, as civil society actors also play a role in structuring the state and 
negotiating outcomes. Since an authoritarian state is unable or unwilling to control all of 
society (as a totalitarian state would strive to do), everything that is not prohibited is 
tolerated, if not expressly permitted. In such nuanced contexts, civil society has a mixed 
role of supporting the state where it needs support, challenging its authoritarian 
tendencies, promoting transparency and accountability, and defending the state and 
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society from domination by external political and economic forces, without becoming 
co-opted (Malhotra 2002:46-7).  
In situations where state power appears to be weak, Chazan (1994) finds that civil 
society growth has accompanied increases in state capacity, and civil society is strongest 
in more stable states. States have power that should be “brought back in” and not 
neglected, but this power is not unidirectional; instead, it can be “mutually 
transforming” (Kohli and Shue 1994:304,319). There is no zero-sum inverse relation 
between a strong state and weak civil society, or the reverse; instead, a range of 
relationships is possible.28 A strong civil society should, in Heng’s view, go beyond 
autonomy and colonise the political order (2004). Hannah (2009) describes this as 
“mutual infiltration”, building on Ding’s (1994) “amphibiousness”.29 It is precisely the 
multifaceted and inconsistent nature of the state that gives NGOs space to operate 
(MaQS 2006:7,10). Interpenetration does not mean co-optation, necessarily; conversely, 
infiltration does not necessarily make the state weaker, but might even strengthen its 
indirect power (Gainsborough 2007,2009). 
The components of civil society must also be disaggregated. Simply having non-profit 
status is not sufficient, as organisations may act in their own private interests even if not 
distributing profits. The literature on NGOs is full of examples of corruption, 
mismanagement and misdirection, as in the Filipino acronyms of BONGOs, GONGOs, 
QUANGOs and COME ‘NGOs (for business-organised, government-organised, quasi-
                                                        
28 For instance, Kadir finds that state-civil society interaction in Singapore is more dynamic than believed, 
but does not necessarily lead to political change or democratisation (341,350). Somewhat counter-
intuitively, groups that keep the most distance from the state are the most successful at advocacy (349).  
29 In a recent volume on NGOs in China, Lu also describes the “interpenetration” of state and society, but 
since in her reading the state is so much more powerful than society, NGOs’ influence on the state is 
extremely limited (LuYY 2008:27,115). It may be a mistake, however, to equate NGOs with “society”. 
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NGOs, and fly-by-night NGOs), among a series of other types (Constantino-David 
1998:29). Of these, the term GONGO has become widely accepted as a legitimate 
category of social organisation in China (MaQS 2006); but NGOs may act in self-interest 
regardless of how they were formed. Particular instances of uncivil NGO behaviour have 
been documented in China (LuYY 2008, Unger 2008) and Vietnam (Gray 1999, Salemink 
2006), abetted in part by a regulatory environment that subjects NGOs’ political 
activities to close scrutiny while only loosely checking on finances and organisational 
governance.  
Comparing networks in China and Vietnam  
This thesis does not directly compare the nation-states of Vietnam and China. Rather, 
the unit of comparative analysis is the network, and the sample of civil society networks 
examined is taken from a field encompassing both countries. A focus on networks 
increases the size of the sample and compares among multiple smaller units (King et al 
1994:210,226), in place of the “methodological nationalism” (Anheier et al 2003:4) and 
other limitations of a binary comparative analysis between two nations (Dogan and 
Pelassy 1984). Comparison among networks is nevertheless based on an assumption 
that China and Vietnam share enough social, historical, cultural and political 
characteristics to be considered an “area of homogeneity” (Ragin et al 1996:752) for 
civil society research. Comparisons of China and Vietnam undertaken to date mostly 
focus on history (Womack 2006, Woodside 1988) and comparative economic reforms 
(Chan et al 1999, Abrami et al 2008).30 Although China has always been much larger and 
                                                        
30 Two of the few scholars engaging in full-scale comparisons of China and Vietnam (though not including 
civil society) are Woodside (1988,1998,2006) and Womack (1987,2006). Other interesting comparisons 
have been conducted of China and Mexico (Cheek and Lindau 1998) and China and India (Friedman and 
Gilley 2005). On Southeast Asia, Anderson (1998) and Mulder (2003) compare Indonesia, Philippines and 
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more powerful, these comparisons show that influence has not been unidirectional, but 
rather the two countries have related in a process of co-evolution and adaptation. 
Vietnam is not a mere subset of China or a secondary variant of “Confucian society” (Bell 
2006, Alagappa 2004:13).  
Surprisingly, given the countries’ proximity and apparent similarity, there has been little 
dialogue among the respective literatures. Vietnam is mentioned as a footnote in some 
studies of civil society in China (Bell 2006:251, Howell and Pearce 2001:146), while 
Vietnam-focussed studies do not refer to Chinese civil society at all.31 In what Woodside 
(2006:15) terms one of the “idols of the postwar Western academic (and strategic) 
mind”, the border between China and Vietnam also forms an imagined boundary 
between the regions of East and Southeast Asia. More than actual border controls, this 
arbitrary division inhibits the emergence of a coherent approach to commonalities and 
intersections between China and Southeast Asia (LiuH 2001:261). 
The discontinuity extends to civil society actors in both countries, who have little if any 
contact with each other. As a Vietnamese respondent noted, “we only meet Chinese 
colleagues at international meetings in a third country” (V46). Third-country meetings 
can offer important opportunities for information exchange and network-building, but 
are expensive and time-consuming to organise. Language barriers form a significant 
obstacle to direct interaction, as do mental barriers. Many Vietnamese are fearful and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Thailand, while Hedman (2001) compares the “dyads” of Philippines/Thailand and Indonesia/Malaysia.  
Kerkvliet writes on both Vietnam and Philippines, though usually not together (Scott and Kerkvliet 1986); 
Scott (2009) has also taken an original look at “anarchist” history of non-state areas. Read and Pekkanen 
(2009) group neighbourhood associations and quasi-NGOs from East and Southeast Asia (including China 
and Vietnam) together in a category of “straddlers” that does not fit all cases equally well. 
31 Comparisons between Vietnam and other ASEAN countries are more common. A recent paper on public 
administration reform (Vasavakul et al 2009) compares Vietnamese experience to Southeast Asian 
neighbours and to Taiwan and South Korea, but makes no mention of the elephant to the north. 
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suspicious of China (Hayton 2010:188-92), and Vietnamese civil society actors feel they 
have nothing to learn from people in another single-party, communist state: they would 
rather emulate what they see as more successful instances of civil society in developed 
countries (V21). On the Chinese side, most people are unaware of Vietnamese 
sentiments, and unless they happen to live near the Vietnamese border, they pay little 
attention to their neighbour (C25). As a result, there is little cross-border networking 
between groups in China and Vietnam (Hinton 2000).32 The civil society networks 
examined in this thesis are primarily domestic, not transnational, in their nature and 
structure. External links may be important, as may expatriate or diaspora membership 
in some cases, but for most networks, the local context remains of primary importance 
(Edwards and Gaventa 2001:8; Kalland and Persoon 1998:2,18; Florini 2000:148). 
No published literature compares civil society or networks in China and Vietnam.33 
Many studies assume that “socialist states have weak civil society because of the 
predominance of the party and state in social and political affairs and the absence or 
weakness of domestic capital” (Howell and Pearce 2001:123). Yet comparative political 
analysts conclude that Vietnam is relatively more open than China. Kerkvliet, Chan and 
Unger (1998:6) describe Vietnamese policies as “less ideologically strident” and 
“divisive” than China’s. Labour experts find Vietnam’s legal protections more effective 
                                                        
32 Sun and Tysiachniouk (2008) find a similar lack of cross-border cooperation between Chinese and 
Russian environmental NGOs, on the basis that organisational structures and political opportunities are 
asymmetrical on the two sides of the border: there are many well-funded Russian NGOs in the Far East, 
but few Chinese groups in Heilongjiang. 
33 Regional comparative studies of civil society have been conducted or co-ordinated by Yamamoto 
(1996), Clarke (1998), Shigetomi (2002), Schak and Hudson (2003), Lee (2004), and Alagappa (2004). Of 
these, only the two Japanese volumes include chapters on both China and Vietnam; Schak-Hudson and 
Alagappa include China but not Vietnam, while Lee limits his discussion to Southeast Asia and covers only 
Vietnam. On environmental issues, Hirsch and Warren (1998), Kalland and Persoon (1998), and Lee and 
So (1999) offer regional perspectives, but none of these includes China or Vietnam. Gu Chengyong (2002) 
compares NGOs in China and Southeast Asia; a university dissertation by Peřinová (2005) compares civil 
society in China, Vietnam and Myanmar, stressing the mutual interaction of associations and the state. 
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than China’s, resulting in a “less abusive” system (Chan and Wang 2003:5). A series of 
liberal Chinese writers, led by a former deputy editor of the People’s Daily (人民日报), 
have argued that Vietnam has greater “intra-party democracy” and has made progress 
on political reform that China should emulate (XuX 2006, FuG 2006, LiuZT 2006, QianJ 
2010, LamW 2007b).34 While these issues were widely discussed in the Chinese media, 
analysts conclude that Vietnam’s state-owned media is freer than China’s, in part 
because authorities are less able to take retribution against political enemies (London 
2009:392,376). More inclusive governance structures have also been found to explain 
Vietnam’s apparently slower increase in income inequality (Abrami et al 2008:38). 
Given this record, one might assume that the political space for civil society networks to 
engage in advocacy is relatively greater in Vietnam than in China. Indeed, some features 
of civil society in Vietnam confirm this impression.35 It is, on the whole, easier to register 
a new NGO in Vietnam (Kerkvliet et al 2008:12; Wexler et al 2006:127), although many 
groups still experience lengthy delays (V11,V19; Hannah 2007:148). The laws and 
regulations that exist are often less rigidly enforced in Vietnam. Donors are under more 
scrutiny in China, and fundraising is harder: some Chinese NGOs have been closed or 
threatened with closure because they accepted funding from unwelcome donors (C74; 
Büsgen 2006:41-2), which has not occurred in Vietnam. International NGOs are more 
numerous and active in Vietnam and can usually register without obstacles (Kerkvliet 
2003a:12, Wells-Dang 2007), while most international NGOs in China operate without 
                                                        
34 The Chinese writers’ political intent is laudable, but they are too credulous about Vietnamese political 
reform: debates within the Vietnamese communist party may be a sign of splits within the leadership, 
rather than openness to change. 
35 A Chinese network leader says, “I have the impression that Vietnamese people are better networked 
and organised. China is too big for this!” (C29). But other Chinese activists who have been to Vietnam find 
it “difficult and chaotic” (C48). 
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legal registration (C30,C43, MaQS 2006:174). Both domestic and international NGOs 
routinely work directly with Vietnamese government ministries and provincial 
authorities, who usually welcome aid and take credit for positive results. This is 
sometimes the case in China, but stories of the reverse are also common: following a 
successful project, a local government feels threatened by the NGO and forces it to leave 
the area (C9). 
Other factors, however, point towards greater potential for civil society in China. Many 
Chinese networks and organisations are larger, more professional and have existed for 
longer than their Vietnamese counterparts. This sophistication is not only true for 
certain NGOs, including “government-organised NGOs” or GONGOs (MaQS 2006:96), but 
also religious organisations, media, and research institutes. The university system in 
China is far more established than in Vietnam, with higher relative levels of scholarship 
and academic freedom, including several well-known civil society-related research 
centres in key national institutions. China’s growing prosperity has also fostered the 
development of a new sector of domestic private foundations, which hold the potential 
to transform fundraising and philanthropy (C25,C27); nothing of the sort has yet 
occurred in Vietnam. And although international NGOs and foreign aid in general are 
thinner on the ground in China,36 certain international programmes that are banned in 
Vietnam are able to operate openly in China, including the Salvation Army, Peace Corps, 
and political party foundations such as the International Republican Institute (C40,C43). 
When making any such comparisons, it is crucial to consider the distorting effects of size 
and time. The most obvious difference between China and Vietnam (or indeed, China 
                                                        
36 The LSE’s Global Civil Society yearbook finds that China has the lowest “membership density of INGOs” 
in the world, at 1.7 per 1 million people; Vietnam’s score is 10.7 (Anheier et al 2002:324,327).  
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and any country besides India) is that China is much larger: about 15 times larger in 
population than Vietnam. Vietnam is not a small country – at 87 million people, it is the 
thirteenth largest in the world – but it is barely the size of a single large Chinese 
province (Womack 2006:12). There are significant regional differences within China 
(LeeCK 2007a), and also to some extent in Vietnam, though the latter are often 
overstated by outsiders who recall the relatively short historical period (1954-75) of 
forced division into North and South (Wischermann 2003, Blanc 2004).37 A more 
appropriate geographical comparison might be between regions or cities: say, Vietnam’s 
northern mountains with Yunnan province of China, the capital cities of Hanoi and 
Beijing, or the economic centres of Ho Chi Minh City and Guangzhou (Turley and 
Womack 1998). A national-level comparison shows that there are, in absolute terms, 
many more social organisations operating in China than Vietnam.38 Considering the 
scale difference, however, the per-capita density of civil society involvement may be 
comparable or higher in Vietnam. 
Time sequencing is also an important distinction between the countries. Although 
Vietnam began some economic reforms before China (Fforde 2009), China began 
“reform and opening” (改革开放) from a much stronger economic position than 
Vietnam’s “Renewal”, or đổi mới (Chan et al 1999:9). Chinese society also liberalised 
                                                        
37 Historical reflexes may account for the pattern of observers who visit only Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, 
notice certain differences between them, and ascribe this to a regional dichotomy. Actually, the two cities 
have more in common than either has to its rural surroundings. The starkest division in Vietnam is not 
north-south or even urban-rural, but between relatively prosperous coastal areas and ethnic mountainous 
areas where the highest poverty rates are concentrated (World Bank 2009).  
38 No statistics are available for networks; for NGOs, the most recent surveys count 386,916 registered 
social organisations in China (Gao and Yuan 2008:34), about half of which are NGOs, but only perhaps 
20% grassroots-based (ChanK 2005:26). In Vietnam, 1700 local NGOs are registered (VUSTA 2010:7). The 
number of informal and unregistered organisations is estimated to be several times higher (Gao and Yuan 
2008:19, Watson 2008:37). In the 2000 World Values Survey, China was found to have low membership in 
NGOs but high levels of volunteering, while Vietnam was high in both areas, presumably because 
membership in mass organisations was included (Anheier et al 2002: 363-4). 
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significantly in the 1980s, and the first independent Chinese NGOs, such as the 
Protestant Church-led Amity Foundation (爱德基金会) formed at this time (Fiedler and 
Zhang 2005).39 These “drops in the ocean” (Howell 1996) expanded when political space 
opened again in the early 1990s: China’s best-known environmental NGO opened in 
1994, and others formed in subsequent years (MaQS 2006:116-25; Sun and Zhao 2007). 
By contrast, comparable Vietnamese organisations mostly date to the early 2000s. 
Analysts routinely (and somewhat glibly) state that Vietnam’s reforms are a decade or 
more behind China’s (ChangPM 1997:147-8, Vu 2009, Oxford Analytica 2010); one need 
not agree with oversimplified stage-theory reasoning to theorise that the most 
appropriate direct comparison might be between a present-day Vietnamese network 
and a Chinese network at the time that it was the same age or state of formation.   
Overseas diasporas and networks play a role in advocacy in both China and Vietnam, 
especially in the internet age. There is no Vietnamese corollary, however, to the offshore 
islands of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan with their different histories and political 
systems. Hong Kong has followed “a unique middle path” (Thomas 1999:viii), playing an 
influential role in development of civil society in China (MaQ 2006:179). With a mixture 
of inside and outside identities, Hong Kong Chinese act as cultural and linguistic network 
brokers (Smart and Smart 1998). Hong Kong connections with the mainland are not a 
question of citizenship but rather context, geography and social networks, perhaps also 
cultural sensitivity (C66,C48). Weller’s comparisons of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong 
(1999,2005,2008) form “close to a natural experiment” (1999:11) to show that cultural 
factors do not determine socio-political outcomes, since all share a Chinese identity but 
                                                        
39 I worked as a teacher for the Amity Foundation from 1993-5. 
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have diverging trajectories. On the other hand, despite clear political differences, 
sometimes China and Taiwan share common social outcomes (Read 2009). Weller and 
Read hardly mention Vietnam, but the parallels are clear. These connections and 
common features form the basis for understanding the development of civil society 
networks in China and Vietnam, presented jointly in the following chapter. 
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   Chapter 2 CIVIL SOCIETY NETWORKS: AN OVERVIEW AND TYPOLOGY IN 
CHINA AND VIETNAM 
 
At a meeting of close to 40 environmental activists in Beijing in November 2009, I asked 
a seemingly simple question, “Do you consider yourselves to be part of a network?” 
Participants demurred. “We often work together on many issues,” said a journalist, “but 
there is no formal structure or name. When there is an environmental workshop, then 
we get together… We’re too small for a network–we’re more like a fraternity or a club” 
(C51). His hesitation seemed out of place, given the crowded room and the large 
database of contacts open on his laptop. 
The journalist may have been modest or cautious because of others in the room, as 
others later suggested (C25,C64). But part of the reason that this group does not think of 
itself as a network is that the term (网络 wǎnglùo, Vietnamese mạng lưới) is new in this 
context (C59,V42). The word is used frequently in reference to the Internet, and the idea 
of personal or guanxi networks has been common for decades. For civil society groups, 
however, words such as “group”, “platform”, “forum”, “alliance”, and “coalition” are more 
frequent. In some localities, a “network” might sound threatening to insecure 
authorities, while “a group of organisations” is less so (C28). Yet even if certain networks 
call themselves by other names, “network” is still the best general term, precisely 
because of its connotations of personal ties and the Internet.  
Chinese and Vietnamese civil society networks take form and develop their identities in 
a complex context of social change, negotiation for space from authorities, and 
international influences. The existing literature on civil society in Vietnam and China is 
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largely state-centred and leaves little space for agency of civil society actors. Legal and 
extra-legal structures set limits on network activities, yet network members can and do 
engage parts of the state and mould political opportunities through advocacy. This 
chapter shows how civil society discourses have transformed since the 1990s, 
integrating aspects of international discourses on civil society, social movements, and 
networks. The discussion mixes concepts and citations from the China and Vietnam 
literatures, as similar processes are underway in both settings. I then present findings of 
a scoping survey of Chinese and Vietnamese networks, outlining a typology of network 
structures, their key characteristics, and illustrative examples. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of ways to conceptualise network effectiveness.  
Changing discourses of civil society 
Recent analysis by Chinese, Vietnamese and international scholars on civil society may 
be grouped in three general approaches, corresponding roughly to the early 1990s, late 
1990s-early 2000s, and 2005 to the present.1 In the first period, scholars imported 
existing theories of civil society comprised of autonomous organisations from the state 
and applied them to “the great unknown” of Asian Communist regimes (Potter 
1993:375). A thorough, if at times sterile debate took place about the historical (non-) 
applicability of civil society and the public sphere in China (Wakeman 1993, Rowe 1993, 
Rankin 1993, Chamberlain 1993, GuX 1994, HeBG 1997). In the post-Tiananmen years, 
                                                        
1 China-focussed scholarship has been in advance both theoretically and empirically. Several Vietnam 
specialists have adopted concepts from the China civil society literature, such as Frolic’s “state-led civil 
society” (Lux and Straussman 2004) and Ding Xueliang’s “amphibious organisations” (Hannah 2007), but 
have not engaged with the literature in depth. On the other hand, some Vietnam scholarship, such as 
Kerkvliet’s (2001,2003) on state-society relations, has no parallel in China studies. Chinese academics 
have participated equally with their international counterparts for decades, with much of the best 
research now being conducted by Chinese scholars both within and outside China. Vietnamese 
researchers within Vietnam began writing about civil society only after 2000 (eg, BachTS 2002), but 
overseas Vietnamese and Vietnamese studying abroad have made important contributions. 
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researchers who arrived with binary opposition-type models encountered “common 
frustration” (Perry 1995:297) and found little or no evidence of civil society according to 
their definitions. “An organization that is ‘non-governmental’ is practically unheard of in 
Vietnam or China”, wrote Kerkvliet and Porter (1995:26; see also Gray 1999). Some 
observers found Vietnamese NGOs “virtually non-existent” (Potter and Taylor 1996:14). 
Chinese NGOs did exist but were found to be “very tame” and “deeply compromised”, 
since they “either work closely with the state or are repressed” (Weller 1999:127-8). 
There were QUANGOs, GONGOs and other associations, but most were not independent 
and autonomous, self-regulating, or even voluntary. There was no agreement on the 
terms for civil society (HeBG 1997:61, Goldman and Perry 2002:4-5).2 Most groups 
avoided being called “non-governmental” (非政府 fēi zhèngfǔ, Vietnamese phí chính phủ), 
preferring to identify themselves as “non-profit” or “charitable”. The problem in 
Vietnam, wrote one academic, is the lack of “agents of change”, defined as “organized 
and autonomous groups with their own authority system” (Abuza 2001:9). If civil 
society depended on autonomy, there was little of it to be seen in the “mono-
organisational socialism” (Thayer 1995) under the central authority of the Communist 
Party. To scholars of post-communism and democratic transitions, there was only the 
                                                        
2 The major Chinese alternatives are 国民社会 guómín shèhùi “national people’s society”, 公民社会
gōngmín shèhùi “citizen’s society”, 市民社会 shímín shèhùi “city resident’s society” (a mis-translation of 
Marx and Hegel’s bürgerliche Gesellschaft), 文明社会 wénmíng shèhùi “civilised society”, and 民间社会
mínjìan shèhùi “popular society”. Of these, 公民社会 is the most commonly used in present-day China. 
Hefner terms all of these phrases “awkward neologisms… None of them easily capture the connotations of 
the English term” (1998:233). Actually, “civil society” is itself a translated term in English and has no 
obvious meaning either. In Vietnamese, the previously unfamiliar term xã hội dân sự “civil(ian) society” 
has become accepted and used by social organisations, as well as some government officials. An 
alternative, xã hội công dân (“citizen’s society”, the equivalent of 公民社会) was used for a time but is now 
seen as too linked to rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis the government (V9). Others still prefer 
“community” (cộng đồng) or “people’s organisations” (tổ chức nhân dân) (DangKS 2007).  
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question of where to go next, “in the footsteps of Eastern Europe or East Asia”? 
(McCormick and Unger 1996), a bizarre dichotomy.  
More nuanced research started from a theory of civil society based on European 
experience, then sought to compare Asian realities to this theory; the most in-depth 
example of this genre is White, Howell and Shang (1996), In Search of Civil Society. The 
authors conclude that something is occurring in China that fits under the rubric of “civil 
society,” but that it differs in several important respects from the imported definition, 
particularly in the lack of clear separation between civil society and the state. This 
finding led several China specialists to argue that state-society relations can be better 
understood in terms of corporatism, rather than civil society (Unger and Chan 1995), an 
approach that has also been influential in Vietnam studies (Jeong 1997). In state 
corporatism, the state creates a system of formal interest representation and recognises 
or licenses only one association per constituency (Schmitter 1974:93, Unger 2008:7). In 
this way, also labelled as “mobilisational” or “soft authoritarian-corporatist”, a 
fragmented state may delegate some roles to society while retaining overall control over 
national development (Kerkvliet 2001a:180, Dixon 2004:25-26).  
From the level of analysis of the state, advocates of corporatism have a strong case in 
China and Vietnam. The legal systems in both countries conform to the key assumptions 
that all social organisations “belong” to state agencies at either the central or 
provincial/local levels, with GONGOs receiving preferential treatment.3 Official sponsors, 
                                                        
3 Specific examples of corporatist legal structures include China’s dual registration system, in which social 
organisations must have both an administrative “mother-in-law” and a legal government sponsor, and 
Vietnam’s use of quasi-governmental umbrella organisations to register and limit the activities of 
domestic NGOs. Both countries’ regulations also state that no more than one association may represent a 
given constituency in the same geographic area, though this rule appears to be enforced more strictly in 
China. 
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in the corporatist view, “completely dominate” associations, while grassroots 
organisations remain at the periphery with “delicate, precarious” status (Unger and 
Chan 2008:55,63-4). Research on business associations has found that entrepreneurs 
seek embeddedness not autonomy, confirming a corporatist hypothesis (Dickson 2002, 
Gallagher 2004, Foster 2002, Stromseth 2003). Gallagher notes perceptively that the 
Chinese state is capable of enforcing its corporatist regulations, but instead allows 
“unofficial civil society” to grow outside of the corporatist framework since capturing it 
would serve to legitimise these groups. Instead, marginal social groups such as migrants 
and religious sects build “informal, flexible networks” outside the state, building internal 
social capital but not contributing to civil society (2004:436-9). In another view, the 
state does not actually have the capacity to carry out all of the regulations it issues, but 
uses them selectively or arbitrarily “like a stick” to make an example of organisations 
that “cross the line” (V61,C28). Chinese and Vietnamese regimes no longer seek to 
control all aspects of society (a goal that was never fully achieved, at least in Vietnam), 
and instead pursue policies of “small government, big society” (小政府大社会, xiǎo 
zhèngfǔ dà shèhùi) or the Vietnamese euphemism for privatisation, “socialisation” (xã 
hội hoá) conducive to the corporatist model. The Party-sponsored mass organisations in 
Vietnam are relatively stronger than their Chinese equivalents (V10); together with 
their coordinating “umbrella” body, the National Front (Mặt trận Tổ quốc)4 they have the 
ambiguous dual function to “pre-empt the emergence of autonomous civil society 
bodies”, while simultaneously representing interests of constituents and serving as 
channels through which people can organise (Shanks et al 2004:xiv). 
                                                        
4 Commonly translated as “Fatherland Front”, however the Vietnamese name is gender-neutral. 
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At the same time, scholars who looked less at legal structures and more at the grassroots 
level noticed a significant change taking place in both Vietnam and China: the formation 
of semi-independent NGOs. Still defining civil society as autonomous organisations, they 
saw a limited or restricted form of civil society emerging in negotiation or contestation 
with state authorities – an arena of struggle, in the Gramscian sense. As one observer 
noted, Vietnamese were forming “what they believed were independent organisations”, 
and they felt free “to decide their own agenda and to raise money to act” (Beaulieu 
1994:3, quoted in Kerkvliet 2003a:1). These groups numbered “at least in the hundreds” 
and were “among the most exciting, dynamic sectors” in the country (Sidel 1996:293). 
Vietnam specialists began to see signs of “creeping pluralism”, in which newly-formed 
organisations engaged in a process of negotiation with the state (Kerkvliet and Porter 
1995:86).  
By the early 2000s, Vietnam specialists noted greater numbers and variety of 
organisations, improved though not complete legal structures, more discussion of civil 
society in the media, and less state repression (Luong 2003, Kerkvliet 2003a:15-6, Gray 
2003). The initiative, however, still lay with the state’s decision to employ more or less 
repression or incentives for civil society (Kerkvliet 2003a:18). Organisations were still 
“deeply entangled with each other and the state” (Nørlund 2008:2); they engaged in 
some forms of advocacy, but within bounds set by state authorities (Hannah 2005:109). 
As in China, shifting boundaries between state and society resulted in “many groups 
hav[ing] a fair degree of operational autonomy” (Gallagher 2004:419,446). 
In this second phase of scholarship, civil society remained the primary theoretical 
reference point. The term “civil society” began to be used widely by scholars, donors and 
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organisations in both China and Vietnam (Nørlund 2008:2, Alagappa 2004:14).5 Some 
authors, however, preferred to qualify civil society with adjectives – a “partial and 
patchy” or “semi-civil society” (White 1996:207, HeBG 1997), a “state-led civil society” 
(Frolic 1997, Lux and Straussman 2004), or infantilising metaphors such as “nascent”, 
“embryonic,” “immature”, or “fledgling” (Thayer 1992, HeBG 2003, Nørlund 2006, XieL 
2007:9,55, YangGB 2009).6 Other writers described contradictory puzzles of “dependent 
autonomy” (LuYY 2008), “embedded activism” (Ho and Edmunds 2008), or “civil society 
and corporatism simultaneously” (MaQ 2006:137), in which large associations are 
corporatist while grassroots NGOs fit a civil society model.7 Autonomy remains an 
important determining factor in these analyses, but as a range instead of a binary 
variable. Many authors place organisations in categories on a spectrum from most to 
least autonomous (White et al 1996, Gallagher 2004, Watson 2008). Ma Qiusha, likewise, 
argues that autonomy is “not the only important question” for Chinese NGOs (2006:13), 
but still emphasises a typology of organisations grouped according to relative autonomy.  
The comprehensive works by Ma, Lu and Ho make a number of convincing arguments 
about state-society relations in China: the political and social structure offers 
opportunities as well as restrictions for NGOs; state corporatism no longer applies very 
well as an explanatory model; civil society can develop without leading inexorably to 
                                                        
5 This has changed since Hannah’s fieldwork in the early 2000s; in his experience, Vietnamese 
organisations never used “civil society” except when talking to donors (2007:110). That is no longer the 
case. 
6 This “conceptual stretching” along the “ladder of abstraction” (Sartori 1970, Collier and Mahon 1993) is 
an example of the use of diminished subtypes to qualify a concept, rather than redefine it; see p. 6. 
7 Similarly, Aspinall (2004:71-2) describes civil society in Suharto’s Indonesia as comprising 
“semicorporatist organizations” that were independent in origin but compromised with the state in order 
to survive, together with “proto-oppositional” NGOs which “avoided repression by emphasizing 
particularist goals rather than pushing for systemic change”. As with much of the Chinese and Vietnamese 
literature, this assumes that organisations should and did want systemic change and devalues (mere) 
social goals. In other respects Aspinall’s description of a “combination of repression and toleration” (75) 
sounds very much like the cases in this thesis. 
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democracy; and NGOs are enmeshed in a web of guanxi with the state. All, however, 
focus on NGOs as their unit of analysis, particularly environmental NGOs; they do not 
consider networks or informal groups. In Vietnam, Kerkvliet outlines three contrasting 
interpretations of state-society relations: the “dominating state” model, 
authoritarian/corporatist, and dialogical, premised on the actions of “organized activists 
beyond official channels to voice citizens’ concerns and demands” (2001a,2001b:248). 
Although Kerkvliet is clearly partial to the dialogical model, he is careful to point out that 
each has evidence to support it and may be relevant in differing situations.8 As 
Vasavakul points out, however (2003:54), each of these interpretations takes state and 
society as monolithic entities. Dialogue does not take place only between state and 
society but within and among their component parts. 
Both China and Vietnam now have societies that are far more diverse than a corporatist 
or “partial civil society” model would predict. Many non-profit organisations, religious 
groups, and informal local associations have found alternate means to operate beyond 
the corporatist structures set by the state, either registering as for-profit businesses, as a 
subsidiary of other legal organisations such as universities and the media, or by simply 
not registering at all (Howell 2004a:151-9, MaQS 2006:76-94).9 Individual leaders and 
members of these groups demonstrate independent thinking and strategising (Büsgen 
2006, Wells-Dang 2010) beyond the loyalty and subservience expected of them by the 
state. Even official associations such as mass organisations and GONGOs may have 
                                                        
8 For instance, the “mono-organisational socialism” framework may continue to apply in analysing the 
behaviour of security forces, though overall it is probably more applicable to North Korea at present.  
9 One informant, a Chinese government official, explained this by drawing a pyramid on a scrap of paper. 
The base of the pyramid, she said, is formed of unregistered groups, followed by a thin layer of NGOs 
registered as businesses, and registered social organisations at the top. Since it is difficult to register with 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs (民政部), most groups remain unregistered, but this does not stop them from 
many activities (C83). 
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significant autonomy to pursue their own objectives (MaQS 2006:96). One study of 
NGOs in China concludes that the legal registration status of an organisation actually has 
no value as a predictor of an organisation’s behaviour towards the state (LuYY 2008:30).  
The legal structures for social organisations in both China and Vietnam remain very 
strict on paper (Jiang and Ortelano 2008, Sidel 2010), yet the numbers of registered 
organisations keeps on rising rapidly – an annual rate of 34% in China from 1989 to 
2003 (HeZK 2008:162). The registration system creates barriers to legitimacy, but 
bridging these barriers is usually “not a formidable task in practice” (Sun and Zhao 
2007:124), and “more a frustration than a deterrent” (Schwartz and Shieh 2009:27). The 
director of one Beijing-based organisation that was unregistered for years before 
registering in 2008 says, “It’s hard to register, but once we do, it’s easy to do what we 
want. The government doesn’t give us any trouble” (C63). With economic and social 
changes came increased inequalities and social problems, but also state fragmentation 
and therefore space. Particularly in China, local governments have pioneered 
innovations such as government contracting of NGO services, while newly-formed 
private foundations have set up state-NGO and corporate-NGO partnerships in some 
cities (C13,C15,C25,C27). 
The apparent incompatibility of corporatist, statist and civil society theories may lie in a 
lag in observers’ ability to account for these changes. Asian Communist parties did 
indeed pursue mono-organisational strategies at one time, and corporatism may have 
applied quite well to the Chinese and Vietnamese contexts in the 1990s, but is no longer 
sufficient (Howell 2004a:162-4). The best-informed writers, such as Kerkvliet and 
Howell, have adjusted their terms and findings to fit changing conditions. But not all 
75 
 
 
observers are equally aware of changing conditions, and those who cite articles or base 
their findings on fieldwork from over a decade previously are bound to present a 
distorted picture.10  
The third and newest phase of scholarship has moved beyond organisational 
characteristics to look at how informal groups and activists legitimate activities and 
engage with authorities (Büsgen 2006, Kerkvliet et al 2008:49). Realising that “the term 
NGO has set many researchers on the wrong track” (C28), this analysis emphasises 
agency as well as structural limitations, brings in insights from social movement studies, 
and considers informal as well as formal organisations and networks. Gao Bingzhong 
(2007) considers forms of legitimacy other than legal registration; an organisation or 
network can also be recognised as legitimate by society, then say, “Yes, we do not have 
your permission, nor have we registered, but what we have done is right in nature” (62). 
As long as groups are not perceived as anti-state, they have significant freedom to act. 
Once scholars look beyond formal organisations, the picture of civil society appears 
different – in part because Chinese and Vietnamese societies have changed, but also due 
to a new and liberating concept of what makes up civil society. As Howell puts it, there is 
“a new multi-tiered configuration of organising, reaching from registered social 
organisations at the top to substrata of affiliated centres, networks, groups and projects” 
(2004a:151). Groups and individual activists are promoting a public sphere in the sense 
of “making an issue a public issue”, even though the Chinese government still can 
determine what is or is not public (2004a:153). A public sphere forms, in this 
                                                        
10 For an example, see Salemink (2006), whose finding that Vietnam does not have a civil society is based 
on a single provincial case study from the mid-1990s. Salemink’s arguments are used heavily by Thayer 
(2009). 
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interpretation, as actors act to bring about changes in social and government policy 
through “invited consultation” (160). But the result is far from the encompassing public 
sphere envisioned by Habermas; instead Howell finds “a multiplicity of protopublic 
spheres that are occupied by technical and intellectual elites, that are evolving 
separately and unevenly, and because of their uncertain and episodic relation with the 
Party/state, are both transient and fragile” (161). By 2011, some of these multiple 
spheres are developing in a more substantial and stable way than Howell observed 
nearly a decade previously.  
As international scholarship takes steps away from a three-sector model of civil society, 
ironically, the concept is increasingly being accepted by Chinese and Vietnamese 
authorities.11 Official publications such as Vietnam’s Tạp chí Cộng sản (Communist 
Journal) have printed theoretical articles on civil society (VuDP 2008, VanT 2006). 
Another media article argued, “Don’t be afraid of civil society!” (KhietH 2006). The main 
argument of these writers is that civil society is not in opposition to the state but is a 
separate axis that can be complementary, and even help the state to do things (V9). As 
one respondent notes, “the line is in different places at different times. Before, no one 
was allowed to talk about ‘civil society’; now the term is being used in the National 
Assembly” (V48). Since the authorities have already acknowledged the importance of a 
separate market sector, the argument proceeds, the “third sector” is just one more step 
along the path to government decentralisation (C21, JiaXJ 2004) or a defence to 
minimise negative impacts of market and government failures (DangKS 2007:308). Most 
                                                        
11 Kerkvliet and colleagues (2008) found that there was a range of opinions and concepts of civil society 
among their interview subjects in Vietnam, but no correlation with an informant’s position inside or 
outside the state system. Wischermann (2010) presents results of a questionnaire sent to nearly 1,500 
organisations and associations (including GONGOs); slightly under a third used the term “civil society” to 
describe their activities, but this group was not otherwise distinct from respondents who did not self-
identify as civil society. 
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Chinese and Vietnamese writing is based on foreign sources from the liberal 
individualist side of civil society theory, influenced by economic management and public 
policy discourses, as well as some discussion of social capital (Gao and Yuan 2008, 
NguyenMC 2009). Analysts have taken a generally positive view of the greater 
acceptance of civil society terminology as “evidence of a developing and widening civic 
space” and a move beyond corporatism (Kerkvliet et al 2008:28,49, Wischermann 
2010).  
A sharply different view comes from dissidents such as 2010 Nobel Peace laureate Liu 
Xiaobo, who identifies civil society with “resistance movements” on the part of a united 
“people” opposing the “officials” (2006:121). Liu believes “there are no Chinese NGOs in 
the internationally-accepted sense,” since registered organisations “all are covertly 
manipulated by the Communist Party and their very existence depends on the Party’s 
estimation of how much of a threat they pose to power” (2007:119,116). With due 
respect to Liu’s activism and sacrifices, he undervalues the ways that registered and 
unregistered organisations and networks find ways to work through and around the 
existing system. In Vietnam studies, the strongest advocate for a confrontational model 
is Thayer, who defines civil society as “the creation of public space where Vietnam’s one-
party state can be challenged by the non-violent political mobilization of ordinary 
citizens” in a “struggle for democracy against the authoritarian Vietnamese state” 
(2009:10). The possibility that NGOs, religious groups and others could form networks 
that cut across classes and regions and form a “base against the party-state” is exactly 
what authorities most fear (Gold 1998:176, YangGB 2008:137), but aside from small 
networks of individual dissidents who are willing to take on immense personal risks, 
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few activists share this vision.12 The dissidents and critics correctly point out that civil 
society is fundamentally political, is not comprised solely of formal organisations, and 
depends on what people actually do. Without denying the bravery of dissidents, 
however, a definition based on total opposition to the state is far too narrow and misses 
contestation that takes place within, around and among the state and society.  
Networks in China and Vietnam  
Compared to the voluminous literature on NGOs, there is as yet no systematic study of 
networks in China or Vietnam, though the subject is gradually attracting greater 
attention. Howell’s 2004 Governance in China mentions several emerging networks in 
HIV, gender and labour sectors as “a direction that civil society may be moving towards,” 
though this was “risky” at the time (163). Hannah (2007:224-5) noted several networks 
forming in Vietnam at the time of his field research in 2002-3, in most cases limited to 
“personal networks and informal ties”. Since then, several case studies have been 
published on Chinese environmental networks (XieL 2007, Büsgen 2006), community 
and homeowners’ networks (Shi and Cai 2006, Read 2009), Vietnamese NGO networks 
(Desmond et al 2007, Hoang and Bui 2008), and relief networks that formed after the 
2008 Sichuan earthquake (Shieh and Deng 2011). Most of this research has focussed on 
horizontal networks among participants, rather than vertical networking between 
citizens and officials (Shi and Cai 2006:316), perhaps due to the theoretical attention to 
horizontal links in forming social capital.13 
                                                        
12 Thayer recognises that dissidents have little domestic support, but counters that political civil society 
should also include “groups of foreign origin”, namely overseas opposition (2009:14,18,26).  
13 See p. 31. 
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Personal and local networks have existed in Vietnam and China for centuries. 
Vietnamese academics associate historical civil society with networks and connections 
among villages, which had partial autonomy from the state (V4), as reflected in the oft-
quoted proverb that “the king’s edict stops at the village gates”. China had a stronger 
national state, but its civil society was also made up of local traditional social 
associations (Pye 1996, Tsai 2007). Many observers saw the emergence of informal 
associations in Beijing and other cities in 1989 as the beginning of a new civil society, 
but their hopes were dashed afterwards (Pye 1996:39, Sullivan 1990:126, Saich 1990). 
Since 1989, there have been many popular protests in China but no major social 
movements, with the exception of Falun Gong (Shue 2004:25, Johnson 2004, LinN 
2001:217-26, HuP 2007). Informal social network ties have been critically important in 
maintaining Chinese associations and tradition through periods when formal 
organisations have been repressed or co-opted (Weller 1999:42,57). 
The potential of informal “rhizomatic networks”, operating with no permanent members 
or titles, is illustrated in Yang’s study of guanxi:  
The flexibility, relative anonymity, and weak integration that characterize 
guanxi networks are what enable them to withstand incursions made by the 
state. The quasi-group can continue to function even though occasionally a few 
members get caught. Given the current political conditions in China, quasi-
groups are better off not becoming crystallized and institutionalized into full-
fledged and visible formal associations and corporate groups…. Most likely, this 
form is only a transitional phase, so that once the state can guarantee the 
legitimacy of formal associations…quasi-groups can be transformed into open 
associations that contribute to the welfare of a community or the larger public. 
(YangM 1994:304-5) 
Twenty years after Yang’s fieldwork, political conditions have shifted greatly, and 
Chinese and Vietnamese authorities allow many types of formal social organisations to 
register. Yet the informal networks that she astutely describes continue to function as a 
repertoire of collective organisation, for some of the same reasons. Legal requirements 
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do not encourage horizontal networks, but “loose connections do form…based on 
personal relations, not institutional ones” (C13). There is no legal category for networks 
in either Vietnam or China (Kerkvliet et al 2008:27; Schwartz and Shieh 2009:9). Some 
networks have managed to register as organisations or as branches of a larger 
association,14 but most are unregistered. As with organisations, being unregistered 
“doesn’t mean you’re illegal or legal; if you do good things, the government doesn’t pay 
too much attention” (C61). Authorities use registration requirements to restrain the 
formation of networks; in China, there is an added regulation that organisations (even 
GONGOs) may not set up branches in other cities and provinces (C21,C25,C65). But due 
to the lack of a legal framework, government control of networks is weak.  
One NGO director points to the 1995 United Nations World Conference on Women as a 
key turning point in grassroots organising, as Chinese had opportunities to meet and 
network with international counterparts. At that time, Chinese activists were “isolated 
islands” and didn’t even know each other. The first formal network among Chinese non-
profit organisations began in 1999 with the sponsorship of the NGO Research Institute 
at Tsinghua University in Beijing and the China Youth Development Foundation’s Project 
Hope. This led to a large capacity building conference in 2001 among 18 NGOs, which 
became the China NPO Network (C16).  
Keech-Marx (2008) considers women’s networks as well as organisations in Beijing, 
treating networks as a type of organisation or association, not a distinct category. She 
analyses civil society as made up of personal networks across institutions, citing Perry’s 
description (1995:297) of Chinese associational activity as a “peculiar blend of public, 
                                                        
14 The Bright Future disability network profiled in chapter 4 is an example of a creative registration 
process; see pp. 156-7. 
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private and state”. Lu Yiyi’s survey of Chinese NGOs found that a desire to expand 
personal networks, including internationally, can be a key reason to form a new 
organisation (2008:121). NGOs use informal ties to compensate for inadequate 
institutional capacity (106). Overall, however, personal networks contribute to civil 
society development, and “millions of Chinese are participating in some sort of formal or 
informal network” outside of registered organisations (MaQ 2006:108-115,135).  
Given China’s immense size, many networks operate regionally rather than nationally; 
for instance, several informal community development networks cover Yunnan, Sichuan, 
and Guizhou provinces in southwest China, with links to southern networks in 
Guangdong and Guangxi, as well as to Hong Kong (C46,C47). In one donor’s view, 
provincial or regional networks may have a better chance of sustaining themselves than 
national ones (C58). “Different networks should exist at different levels and sectors,” 
says one activist. “National-level networks should be spontaneous and develop 
naturally, not be man-made (sic) by outside forces… Real networks grow up from the 
bottom; they are not artificially created. There is conflict and opposition, but it’s real” 
(C40).  
Many networks are nameless, as it could be risky to draw attention to a large group: 
“Having a name is too much trouble!” says the coordinator of one network (C46). Such 
groups have little contact with government and primarily provide training and support 
for their members and local NGOs, rather than engage in public advocacy, but they have 
latent potential for civil society involvement, as demonstrated in the case of the 2008 
Sichuan earthquake. The earthquake was “a shock of consciousness” (Gadsden 2008), a 
turning point in government attitudes towards NGOs and networks (C20,C25, Ford 
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2009). After the earthquake, two NGO networks came together rapidly to channel 
materials and information to affected communities (Teets 2009). These networks were 
able to form quickly because members were already connected to each other through 
existing social ties, including regional NGO training programs and rivers advocacy 
experience (C47).15 Unregistered NGOs who joined the earthquake relief effort were 
found to rely more on networks than did registered, business, or individual-based 
organisations (Shieh and Deng 2011:187).  
In addition to regional networks, national sectoral federations would be desirable but 
are more difficult to form (C13). At present, one organisation in Shanghai reports “close 
ties” with other local NGOs through project cooperation in the same geographic areas; 
they intend to form a more formal alliance, but this requires cooperation with local 
government. There are different levels of networks including GONGOs at the outer level, 
but a core of grassroots groups in the centre (C15). In contrast to membership 
organisations, which are closed and only for members, such informal networks operate 
flexibly among organisations whose staff meet each other at conferences, workshops 
and salons (C16). Closer to Yang’s “rhizomatic networks” are unregistered Buddhist 
women’s groups that meet in informal groups and connect through the Internet in both 
China and Vietnam (C22,V20). These groups have names that are known internally but 
not mentioned to outsiders; if members speak to the media to promote their activities, 
they do so as individuals and not as members of any group. Unlike large Buddhist 
organisations in Taiwan and some other Asian settings, these networks exist with a 
semi-underground status, but their goal is the same: to attract Buddhists to social 
                                                        
15 These links were facilitated by a Yunnan-based member of the China rivers network; see p. 283. 
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service, including not a few government officials and Party members who would not be 
able to take part in a public group (C22). 
Perhaps the best-developed networks in China and Vietnam are in the area of 
environmental protection, as environmental groups have “crossed the bridge” from a 
service orientation to advocacy (C30). In Vietnam, there are formal networks on river 
protection and climate change, as well as many informal task forces. An informal 
network among anti-wildlife trade campaigners, with a “strident campaigning agenda 
and access to top politicians” (Hayton 2010:166-7), operates in small cells known simply 
as the “bear group”, the “tiger group”, and so on, with assigned members from different 
organisations. Task forces share information, avoid overlap, and strategise jointly on 
policy advocacy. “There are only 100 bears and 30 tigers left in the wild, so there’s no 
space for us to be competitive!” says one activist (V48).  
In China, besides the anti-dam network profiled in chapter 7, a water pollution network 
holds an annual conference along with several networks of mostly unregistered 
grassroots groups funded by the same donor. An environmental education network is 
based in Sichuan, while almost every province has networks of student environmental 
groups (C31, LuHY 2003). These groups are very well connected online; the amount of 
information is staggering. Since environmental issues affect everyone, it is possible to 
stimulate broad participation and international donor interest (C36, Futrell 2008). 
Chinese activists equate environmental development with the public involvement of “a 
participatory group of citizens who share the same views” (Liang and Yang 2007:xv).  
Environmental networks provide the clearest evidence of a growing generational 
transition in membership. Civil society networks formed in the 1990s or earlier, such as 
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women’s networks dating from the 1995 Beijing conference, were initially led by a 
generation of activists who matured during the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath in 
China, or the American War and “subsidised period” in Vietnam.  By the 2000s, these 
pioneers were increasingly joined by students and younger professionals who grew up 
during the decades of reform and economic development. Compared to the older 
generation, the younger activists have relatively lower anxiety about politics, more 
international connections and exposure, and higher use of information technologies. The 
younger network members also tend to be pragmatic rather than ideological, with 
repertoires of collective action based more on international and regional NGO 
campaigning and less on socialist-era mass struggles. The tension among generations is 
a consistent element of Chinese and Vietnamese networks, offering diversity and also at 
times sharp differences of opinion on strategy and tactics. 
On theoretical grounds described in chapter 1,16 the networks considered in this thesis 
are primarily domestic in focus, meaning that their objectives and actions are located 
within a national or local context, as are most of their members. Transnational linkages, 
however, are important to most networks in one or more aspects. First, increased 
international connectivity enables Chinese and Vietnamese living overseas to participate 
virtually in domestic networks. Some networks also include foreign residents as 
members, particularly though not exclusively those who are linguistically and culturally 
integrated. Second, domestic networks may be linked to one or more international or 
regional networks, such as Asian NGO coalitions that desire Chinese and Vietnamese 
members. Through processes of diffusion (Meyer et al 2002, Tarrow 2005:186), 
international models of networking have influenced domestic thinking. Third and 
                                                        
16 See p. 38. 
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perhaps most significantly, some networks (or their organisational members) have been 
able to access international funding, most often through foundations, bilateral or 
multilateral donors with programmes in China and Vietnam. Funding decisions and 
mechanisms have had undeniable influence on network capacities and structures, 
whether through deliberate conditionality of funding or underlying attitudes towards 
civil society. Donor support, though welcomed by most networks, is not always an 
unmitigated blessing; as with government regulations, networks have also developed 
strategies to engage and manage funding relationships. 
For example, donors in Vietnam have focussed attention on “collaborative groups” (tổ 
hợp tác), informal networks in rural areas focused largely on agricultural production, as 
a form of “surrogate civil society” on the assumption that “a vibrant, genuinely 
independent civil society does not yet exist” (Fritzen 2003:3,25). While this strategy 
may have resulted in temporary gains for participants in local groups, it created issues 
of sustainability and dependence. A workshop in 2007 found that collaborative groups 
established independently by local residents are more sustainable than those set up 
through external projects (PPWG 2007:7). As there has been no sign yet of aggregation 
of these local networks into larger federations with advocacy capacity, collaborative 
groups might be said to have more potential than actual civil society features. In this and 
other cases, donors thought networks were important, but Vietnamese participants had 
other priorities (V15).  
Donors and international NGOs have also funded large projects to create new 
nationwide networks, with international study tours, capacity building training, and all-
expenses-paid meetings, among people who had not previously worked together. The 
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results have been disappointing. In one case of a donor-initiated network, an evaluation 
found that individuals participated in training provided for their own benefit, but there 
was no sustainable network after the conclusion of the project or observed net effect on 
civil society development (Desmond et al 2007:14,17).17 Similar counterproductive 
results have been documented by other INGOs including CARE and ActionAid (V12). 
Larger donors, such as bilateral and UN agencies, may at times be too far removed from 
the implementation of their projects to notice how their funding is used (V20). 
At a workshop in October 2008, one Vietnamese NGO delegate worried whether donor-
funded workshops on advocacy and networking were becoming a “fashion” (V25).18 “A 
lot of organisations want to do advocacy, but only some are able to” (V24), due to both 
lack of resources and knowledge, according to speakers. Vietnamese observers sense 
that much network advocacy has not been as effective as expected (Hoang and Bui 
2008:14; VuTN 2008:2). In one case,  
advocacy went no further than issue identification and training, [with] no 
impacts on the local policy-making process…. An underlying assumption of 
networking is that the whole can be greater than the sum of the parts. If the 
network only serves as an umbrella…it is not realising its value-added 
potential. (Hoang and Bui 2008:17-8)  
Lack of skills and confidence on the part of network members was one explanation, 
together with resistance and lack of recognition of the network’s legitimacy by policy 
makers. Some government officials still perceive advocacy as a threat to their power 
(VuTN 2008:26); this may also be because they do not understand activists’ use of terms 
like “civil society” and confuse this with Party warnings about “colour revolutions.” It is 
                                                        
17 Thanks to colleagues at Oxfam Great Britain for sharing an unedited version of this report. All 
development agencies have some projects that do not proceed as expected, but not all are willing and able 
to document these results and discuss them with others. 
18 In addition to four workshops on advocacy-related topics I have attended in Hanoi, at least three others 
took place in 2007-08, some with as many as 90 participants (VuTN 2008). 
87 
 
 
also worth acknowledging that many organisations and networks are not themselves 
representative or transparent (VuTN 2008:28). Lu Yiyi (2008) cites several examples of 
unsuccessful networks and campaigns in which Chinese NGOs had difficulty working 
together, presenting a perhaps overly negative picture of the possibilities of network 
success.  
In a more promising example, one community development organisation in China forms 
networks through participatory organising involving local leaders, social workers, and 
resident committees. In some areas, multiple community networks then get together to 
form a “platform” (平台, píngtái or 讲台, jiǎngtái), with a newsletter and cooperation in 
community services with local governments (C36,C46). The degree of advocacy is 
limited, but the model has possibilities to expand: 
There are obstacles on the government side: they are sometimes not 
transparent, wanting to capture the project and not share information. But 
NGOs can work together and form alliances among organizations in the 
community, for instance bringing groups of elderly people and cultural groups 
together, or holding festivals for migrant workers. (C36)  
Labour activists are less networked, by design. Workers practice “cellular activism” with 
few cross-factory protests, due both to state opposition and the perceptions and 
repertoire of workers (LeeCK 2007b, ChenF 2008). Bernstein and Lu (2003:17,117) find 
that peasant protests do not aggregate into a social movement since they have no urban 
allies. The level of rural-to-rural networking is also limited, as cross-jurisdictional 
protests are more likely to provoke repressive responses. International NGOs and 
donors often find it difficult to fund such networks since they have no legal status to 
receive donations, and especially in China, the funder may not have legal status either 
(C30). Instead, many donors channel funds to one or more organisations that are 
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network members or act on behalf of a network; while this often works smoothly, it is 
less than ideal. 
A very different type of network, the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology 
Associations (VUSTA) is corporatist in structure and intent (Vasavakul 2003:34-45) if 
not always in results. An umbrella organisation that has registered over 600 Vietnamese 
NGOs,19 VUSTA carries out loose political control of its members (V34); its status as a 
legal registration body forms an unavoidable conflict of interest with its stated roles to 
“build networks of NGOs” and “networks of core farmers” (V13,V20). VUSTA considers 
itself a network and claims to be the most effective Vietnamese organisation in policy 
advocacy, for instance in mobilising intellectuals and scientists to reduce negative 
impacts of the Son La dam (V34). For purposes of this thesis, however, VUSTA is not 
considered a civil society network since its state management function is greater than its 
representational role, and VUSTA members do not join voluntarily but rather for 
purposes of legal registration.20 Nevertheless, some Vietnamese network members view 
VUSTA as a supportive state ally for policy advocacy (V9,V35).  
A typology of civil society networks  
As the above examples show, civil society networks carry out multiple activities, 
showing a combination of internal and external orientations. They train and support 
their members, raise funds, share information, link with international partners, and 
                                                        
19 Action for the City, the NGO established by my wife, registered with VUSTA in 2006. The process took 
about three months, which was viewed as fast at the time. This was facilitated by her location in Hanoi, 
previous employment history with a GONGO research institute, and family connections to central 
government ministries. Applicants without one or more of these ties have had more difficult registration 
experiences, though the duration has varied widely and procedures have been streamlined over time 
(V11). Although VUSTA is a national association, it mostly registers Hanoi-based NGOs. In southern 
Vietnam, a similar role is played by the Ho Chi Minh City Psychology and Education Association (Hannah 
2007:144). 
20 See row 1c in Table 2.2, p. 94. 
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conduct advocacy campaigns. One way to categorise networks is by their varying 
priorities among these activities, summarised as “capacity building” and “advocacy”. 
Respondents emphasise that networks should keep a balance among these activities 
(C25,C28). 
A second key distinction is the formal or informal structure of a network. This is not the 
same as legal status, as nearly all networks are unregistered, although legal recognition 
is a strong indicator of formality. Some networks have organisational members who 
themselves have legal status, but others do not. Formal networks (“The X Network”) 
have organisational structures, fixed membership, regular meetings, by-laws, mission 
statements and strategic plans, and set means of internal communication. They may or 
may not have other organisational features such as paid staff and a permanent office, 
which depend on stable funding. By contrast, informal networks (“my friends and 
allies”) have none of the trappings of an organisation and may not even have a proper 
name. They cover a wide range from virtual networks and volunteer groups to 
information sharing fora and self-help groups. The self-attributed use of the term 
“network” is not required. Externally, they may be nearly invisible, or appear 
indistinguishable from personal networks. But they are personal networks with a public 
purpose.  
Both informal and formal networks maintain websites, organise events, and conduct 
advocacy campaigns. A Chinese activist distinguishes between two categories of formal 
and Internet-based networks: the first type have websites, some form of registration, 
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and funding, but exist mainly for information sharing, while the second type of “informal 
networks are more action-oriented” (C74).21 
Closely associated with formality is the size of a network. Most informal networks are by 
nature relatively small; as they grow, issues of formal organisation inevitably arise. At 
the opposite extreme, federation-type formal networks can have highly complex 
structures with thousands of members, as witnessed in some NGO networks in the 
Philippines (Silliman and Noble 1998:11-20). Networks may follow any of the basic 
structures outlined in chapter 1, or variations on them, including a mixture of horizontal 
and vertical ties.22 It is sometimes useful to differentiate the formal structure of a 
network with its actual operation; for instance, some networks may be rhetorically 
committed to equality among members, but in reality a small core makes key decisions.  
Whether formal or informal, networks may have individual members, organisational 
members or a combination of both. An “NGO network” is typically a formal network of 
organisations (Heyzer et al 1995), but there are also informal alliances of organisations 
cooperating on a particular issue. Many NGO networks contribute to civil society, but not 
all necessarily meet the definition of civil society networks as engaging in advocacy in 
pursuit of a social change agenda. Conversely, individual membership networks may be 
highly formalised. Individual members may be committed, full-time activists, or retired 
or current government officials wearing multiple “hats” (Bentley 2004).23 Thus, a binary 
division of NGO networks and informal networks, or “strong coupling” and “weak link” 
                                                        
21 On networks’ use of information technology, see pp. 119-20. 
22 See Figure 1.1, p. 40. 
23 Xie Lei (2007:51-3) contrasts individual membership networks (which she terms “personal networks”) 
with organisational networks. She notes that “individuals can’t be reduced to the organisations they 
belong to”, since in individual membership networks, members cannot be readily replaced by other 
individuals within the same organisation. The aggregation of individual networks does not automatically 
result in institutional linkages among organisations. 
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models (TongZF 2009) is not sufficient, nor should all networks be categorised together 
with unregistered and underground organisations (Schwartz and Shieh 2009:9,33).24  
Based on these distinctions and the observed variety in network types in China and 
Vietnam, it is possible to prepare a more detailed typology of civil society networks, as 
well as pose several general hypotheses. Hypothesis A is that networks with denser 
cooperative ties (social capital) will be more effective. Hypothesis B is that networks 
that are more structured and larger will be more effective.25 These and other postulates 
will be evaluated through empirical research. 
  
                                                        
24 Fisher (1998:4-9) divides NGOs into two types (grassroots membership organisations and “grassroots 
support organisations” or intermediary NGOs) and examines features of networks of both types. 
Membership organisations form either “formal umbrella networks” such as associations and cooperatives; 
informal economic networks (such as of the “collaborative groups” mentioned above); or “amorphous 
grassroots social movements”. Intermediary organisations also form their own formal and informal 
networks among themselves and with grassroots organisations. This typology covers much of the variety 
in network forms, but is restricted to networks of NGOs. 
25 This hypothesis echoes Keck and Sikkink’s finding that “networks are more effective when they are 
strong and dense” (1998:206). 
92 
 
 
Table 2.1 A typology of networks 
 NGO networks Issue-based networks   
 Cross-sector Intra-sector Advocacy Individual   
Coalition 1. NGO 
membership 
coalitions 
2. Sectoral 
coalitions 
  Larger More 
formal 
Forum  3. NGO 
information 
sharing fora 
5.  Issue-
based fora 
   
Informal 
network 
 4.   NGO 
task forces 
6.  Informal 
advocacy 
networks 
7.  Semi-
formal 
membership 
groups 
 
 
 
 
 
Personal 
network 
   8.  Social 
groups 
 
Smaller 
Less 
formal 
 Organisation-
based 
  Individual-
based 
  
Table 2.1 categorises networks vertically into four types.26 Coalitions have a high degree 
of formality, an organisation chart (hierarchical) structure, and usually a large 
membership. Their main purpose is representation with government and society. 
Forums are also formal structures, but their main purpose is information sharing among 
members. Informal networks are less structured civil society groups, differentiated from 
personal networks that exist only among individuals. The two columns of NGO networks 
both have organisational members only; issue-based networks may have a combination 
of organisational and/or individual members; individual-based networks have 
individual members only. (Of course, some NGOs themselves have members, though this 
is rarer in China and Vietnam than in some other settings. In NGO networks, however, 
the organisation participates at a head-office level, not via its own membership base.) 
Personal networks are pictured in a box in a row directly beneath informal membership 
                                                        
26 A Philippine study uses NGO networks, issue-based coalitions and task forces; the latter are described 
as “issue-oriented [but] typically more narrowly focused and less permanent than issue-based coalitions” 
(Silliman and Noble 1998:12). 
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groups. Virtual networks are not considered as a separate type, but rather as a sub-set of 
informal advocacy or personal networks that have selected a particular communication 
structure. Virtual organising is employed by a variety of networks but is a particular 
feature of dissident networks such as Vietnam’s Bloc 8406 (Thayer 2008, Hayton 
2010:113-34) and anti-bauxite mining campaign (V39, Thayer 2010). Whether networks 
can be considered as civil society networks depends on their relative position in this 
typology as well as the extent to which they share other characteristics described in 
chapter 1. 
Type 1 (NGO membership coalitions) can be divided into three sub-types depending on 
their membership. The first, and primary form is made up of NGO members only; the 
second by both NGO and government representatives; and the third is the “umbrella 
organisation” (Vasavakul 2003), a government-organised entity for the purpose of 
representing, registering, managing and/or controlling NGOs. These distinctions are 
particularly salient in Vietnam, where legal associations (hội) take various forms of 
Party-sponsored mass organisations (tổ chức đoan thể) such as the Vietnam Women’s 
Union, government-organised professional “umbrella organisations” such as VUSTA, and 
quasi-governmental social associations (tổ chức xã hội) (Nørlund 2006:32).  
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Table 2.2 Characteristics of civil society networks, by type 
Network types  
Size 
 
Members 
Level of 
Formality 
 
Funding 
 
Structure 
Reason for 
joining 
Main  
purpose 
Secondary 
purpose 
Characteristics 
1a. NGO 
membership 
coalitions 
Large Organ-
isations 
High Members Hub and 
spokes 
Legal 
representatn 
Represent 
members to 
govt 
Advocacy Bureaucratic, 
stable 
1b. NGO-Govt 
membership 
coalitions 
Large Orgs High Members, 
some 
grants 
Hub and 
spokes 
Legal 
representatn 
Represent 
members to 
govt 
State mgmt of 
NGOs 
Tension between 
NGO and govt 
roles 
1c. Umbrella 
organisations 
Large Orgs High Members, 
governmt 
Org chart Registration State mgmt of 
NGOs 
Represent 
members to 
govt 
Little civil society 
potential 
2. Sectoral 
federations 
Large Orgs High Grants Org chart Access 
funding 
Channel funds 
to members 
Advocacy Tends to 
concentrate power 
at top 
3. NGO 
information 
networks 
Any Orgs Medium None Concentric 
circles 
Share work, 
learn 
Information 
sharing 
Advocacy Depends on 
leadership of a 
small core 
4. NGO task 
forces 
Small or 
medium 
Orgs Medium Members, 
some 
grants 
Circle Collaborate on 
issue 
Advocacy Information 
sharing 
Closed group 
5. Issue-based 
fora 
Medium Orgs and 
individuals 
Medium  
Grants 
Hub and 
spokes 
Collaborate on 
topic 
Information 
sharing 
Advocacy Often has one 
coordinating 
organisation 
6. Informal 
advocacy 
networks 
Small Indiv or 
mixed 
Low Members Web Collaborate on 
issue 
Advocacy Information 
sharing 
Main focus of this 
thesis 
7. Semi-formal 
membership 
groups 
Small or 
medium 
Indiv Medium Members, 
some 
grants 
Concentric 
circles 
Connect with 
others on 
interest or 
identity 
Mutual support Advocacy If gets large, tends 
to become more 
formal 
8. Personal 
networks 
Small or 
medium 
Indiv Low None Web As above Social activities Mutual support Tocquevillean. Has 
civil soc. potential 
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Table 2.3 Illustrative examples of network types 
Network types Examples in China Examples in Vietnam Other Asian countries 
1a. NGO 
membership 
coalitions 
None None NGO Forum on 
Cambodia; CODE-NGO 
(Philippines); Asia NGO 
Coalition 
1b. NGO-Govt 
membership 
coalitions 
CANGO VUFO-NGO Resource 
Centre 
 
1c. Umbrella 
organisations 
Yunnan International 
NGO Society (YINGOS) 
VUSTA  
2. Sectoral 
federations 
China AIDS CBO 
Network 
Vietnam Civil Society 
Partnership on AIDS 
Myanmar NGO Network 
3. NGO information 
networks 
Climate Change Action 
Network 
NGO Resource Centre 
working groups 
 
4. NGO task forces 5-12 Sichuan 
Earthquake network 
Working for Advocacy 
and People’s Initiatives 
(WAPI) 
 
5. Issue-based fora Women’s Network 
against AIDS (see 
chapter 5) 
Disability Forum (ch. 
5), Vietnam Rivers 
Network, CIFPEN, 
GenComNet 
 
6. Informal 
advocacy networks 
China rivers network 
(ch. 7) 
Reunification Park 
network (ch. 6), 
bauxite network, Bloc 
8406 
 
7. Semi-formal 
membership 
groups 
HIV self-help groups, ie 
Henan Golden 
Sunshine (ch. 5) 
Bright Future Group 
of People with 
Disabilities (ch. 4) 
Micmac (Micro-Macro) 
network, Laos 
8. Personal 
networks 
Birdwatchers groups Bright Future Group 
before 1995 
 
Mass organisations All-China Women’s 
Federation 
Ho Chi Minh 
Communist Youth 
Union 
Lao Front for National 
Reconstruction 
Organisations 
calling themselves 
networks 
China HIV/AIDS 
Information Network 
(CHAIN) 
None Southeast Asia Rivers 
Network 
The scoping research conducted for this thesis in 2008 identified more than 20 civil 
society networks in each country; a selection is presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Most 
have not been previously described in print. The Asia Foundation (2008:85-6) includes 
mention of eight networks in Vietnam in a publication on organisational advocacy, all of 
which are categorised here as issue-based fora or NGO task forces.27  
                                                        
27
 The eight are the Microfinance Working Group, Vietnam NGO Alliance, GenComNet, Vietnam Rivers 
Network, CIFPEN, Vietnam Water Partnership, Cooperative Development Group, and People’s 
Participation Working Group. Members of six of these eight were interviewed for this thesis (excepting the 
microfinance and water groups); three are included in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4 Features of selected civil society networks in China and Vietnam 
Network Location Sector Year 
estab. 
# of 
members 
Network 
funding? 
Networkwe
bsite? 
Structure/ leadership Advocacy involv’t 
China AIDS CBO Network 
(CNNAC) 
China 
(national) 
Health 2004 133 orgs  Open Society 
Inst. 
None Rotating chair, but 
one leading org 
Legal aid and advocacy 
for gays/lesbians, HIV+ 
Vietnam Civil Society Partnership 
on AIDS 
Vietnam 
(national) 
Health 2007 160 orgs 
and groups 
Global Fund, 
Ford 
www.vcspa.
org.vn  
Coordinator, steering 
committee 
Govt and donor policy on 
HIV; UN reports 
China Civil Climate Action 
Network 
China 
(Beijing) 
Environt 2007 8 core, 31 
participnts 
Member-
supported 
None Core group led by one 
org 
Policy research, energy 
saving campaigns 
Climate Change Working Group 
(NGO Resource Cen.) 
Vietnam 
(Hanoi) 
Environt 2007 ~40 orgs + 
indiv 
None ngocentre.o
rg.vn/ccwg 
Core group of 7 intl + 
local NGOs 
Statements to govt/ 
donor consult. group 
5-12 Sichuan Earthquake 
network 
China 
(Sichuan) 
Emerg 
relief 
2008 40 orgs (a 
few intl) 
Member-
supported 
www.512ng
o.org.cn  
“Centre” hosted at 
one local NGO 
Coordinate NGO supprt 
to quake victims 
Working for Advocacy and 
People’s Initiatives (WAPI) 
Vietnam 
(Lang Son) 
Rural 
devel 
2007 3 orgs. (orig. 
4) 
Member-
supported 
None  Rotating chair Input to National Front 
on ethnic minor. policy 
Women’s Network against AIDS  China 
(national) 
Health 2007 21 orgs. UNAIDS wnac.csrpio
neers.org  
Secretariat, 3 paid 
staff 
Improve policies for 
women affected by HIV 
Vietnam Rivers Network Vietnam 
(national) 
Environt 2005 150 indiv + 
20 orgs 
ICCO (NL), 
McKnight 
Found. (US) 
www.warec
od.org.vn  
1 coordinating org, 
sub-groups in 
north/centre/south 
Research on impacts of 
dams and flooding 
Building Civil Society Inclusion in 
Food Security and Poverty 
Elimination Network (CIFPEN) 
Vietnam 
(mostly 
Hanoi) 
Rural 
devel 
2005 43 orgs + 2 
observers 
EU, ActionAid www.cifpen
.org  
1 coordinator, exec 
committee 
Influence local govt socio-
economic planning 
Gender and Community 
Development (GenComNet) 
Vietnam 
(Hanoi) 
Gender 2006 12 orgs + 11 
indiv 
ActionAid www.genco
mnet.org  
4-person exec 
committee, elected 
Wrote shadow reports on 
gender for CEDAW 
China Rivers Network  China 
(Beijing, SW 
provs) 
Environt 2003 ~20 indiv; 
orig. 7 orgs 
Member-
supported 
Not at 
present 
Core group of 
individual activists 
Protect rivers, prevent 
dam construction 
Reunification Park network  Vietnam 
(Hanoi) 
Land 
rights 
2007 ~15 indiv + 
2 orgs 
None None Web structure, 1 core 
org + indivs 
Prevent privatisation of 
parks 
Bright Future Group  Vietnam 
(Hanoi)  
Disability 1988 30 indiv DTU 
(Denmark) 
www.ttsong
doclaphn.vn  
Chair and elected 
exec committee 
Disability laws; created 
national association 
Bauxite mining network Vietnam 
(virtual) 
Environt 2009 ~30 key 
indiv + 
supporters 
None www.bauxit
evietnam.in
fo  
Segmented- 
decentralised, 
multiple nodes 
Stop Chinese-invested 
bauxite mine; political 
website and blogs 
Bloc 8406 Vietnam 
(national) 
Democy, 
h. rts 
2006 2,000 indiv 
signers 
None None Underground core 
group 
Circulated manifesto. 
Members arrested. 
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Factors of network effectiveness 
The case studies that follow will consider three ways of thinking about effectiveness: 
policy change, sustainability, and political space. The first and most direct measure of 
success is influencing policy and achieving the advocacy objectives of the network 
(“winning”).28 Evaluating advocacy results is notoriously difficult, since it can be nearly 
impossible to measure exactly what the network has contributed compared to state 
responses or other actors (Wilson-Grau and Nuñez 2006:2).29 In most cases, if the 
objective is achieved the network can claim to have influenced it in some way even if 
they are not solely responsible. Piven and Cloward (1977:xix,32) define success as 
concessions from the state or other opponent, but note that such victories are rarely 
total and often come at a price. 
A second type of effectiveness is longer-term and internal: does the network persist and 
develop organisationally, and is it useful to its members? This may be measured in terms 
of membership growth, geographic coverage, longevity, steps towards formalisation, or 
more stable funding.30 Although both winning and network sustainability are considered 
as measures of effectiveness, they are to some degree inversely related (Covey 
1995:175). Quick success may sometimes lead a network to disband, as might complete 
failure. Rapid growth of membership could lead to a lack of focus (V46) and the eventual 
                                                        
28
 Keck and Sikkink (1998:201) define effectiveness as influence on politics, but include within this the 
importance of framing debates and getting issues on the agenda. As in a case of anti-logging activism in 
Sarawak, Malaysia, advocates may fail to meet their substantive goals, but still have procedural success 
(160). 
29
 Wilson-Grau and Nuñez list four “types of achievements for an international social change network”: 
operational outputs, organic outcomes, political outcomes, and impact on society in the long term 
(2006:10). These categories are related to, though conceived differently from the three forms of 
effectiveness presented here: for instance, my measure of policy effectiveness might include aspects of 
both “operational outputs” and “political outcomes”. 
30
 As Tarrow (1998:162) notes, citing Melucci (1996), success for some movements may consist more in 
establishing a collective identity than in achieving policy change. 
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loss of civil society functions; however, too little focus on organisational sustainability 
could lead to disintegration. 
A third way to conceptualise effectiveness assesses the impact of advocacy on the 
operating environment and political opportunity structures. A network could 
conceivably fail to achieve many of its policy objectives and leave no ongoing structure 
behind, yet have a positive demonstration effect for succeeding waves of collective 
action (Swarts 2003:79).31 Action can have unpredictable results, sometimes expanding 
political opportunities for civil society, but also potentially increasing the influence of 
opponents (Tarrow 1996:58-60). A successful network in either of the first two senses 
could provoke state responses that reduce opportunities for subsequent advocacy. More 
often, effects are mixed: state responses may contract opportunities for certain groups 
in the short term, while examples of successful policy advocacy and organising 
nevertheless create possibilities for future movements (Piven and Cloward 1977:xiii). In 
these cases, the greatest legacy of networks lies not in specific achievements but in the 
“growing repertoire of tactics and strategies from which future campaigners may select” 
(Mattausch 2000:195). Especially in authoritarian contexts, activists often need to “look 
beyond quick policy and procedural victories and eschew simple notions of success and 
failure” (O’Brien and Li 2006:96). Systemic outcomes on political space are the hardest 
to predict, as they depend most heavily on external factors; however, all three types of 
effectiveness come about through the interplay of internal network capacities and 
                                                        
31
 For instance, Hughes shows how election observation networks started advocacy campaigns in 
Cambodia that were largely unsuccessful, but through “the act of demanding accountability”, created a 
precedent and put pressure on the government (2002:182). 
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external opportunities and constraints.32 When networks succeed, they can “break the 
cycles of history” (Keck and Sikkink 1998:x), but there is no certain measure of success 
in complex, contingent environments. An understanding of civil society networks’ 
effectiveness depends not only on their structure and formation, but also on their 
chosen strategies for advocacy, the subject of the following chapter. 
 
  
                                                        
32
 Keck and Sikkink consider that domestic opportunity structures are critical in the formation of 
networks, but are insufficient to explain why some networks are effective while others are not 
(1998:202). 
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   Chapter 3 THREE ADVOCACY STRATEGIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY NETWORKS 
 
This chapter builds on the theoretical framework developed in chapter 1, the survey of 
Chinese and Vietnamese networks in chapter 2, and observations from scoping research 
to outline three distinct advocacy strategies employed by civil society networks. These 
strategies form a basis for analysis of network case studies profiled in the remainder of 
the thesis. Advocacy is used here as a synonym for engagement and consists of a range of 
strategies for engaging the state and public opinion.1 Within a particular advocacy 
strategy, networks choose among multiple tactics, meaning approaches or methods to 
reach an objective: personal lobbying and blogging are two of many possible tactics. A 
network may have more than one strategy and use multiple tactics within these 
strategies, constituting an advocacy repertoire. After forming strategies and tactics, 
networks conduct specific advocacy activities or events, such as meeting a particular 
official over tea or posting an open letter online. Often, repertoires take shape 
organically through trial and error or “venue shopping” as networks seek appropriate 
frames and audiences for their advocacy messages (Keck and Sikkink 1998:18).2 Few 
observed networks have formal advocacy strategies with position papers, objectives and 
definitions of success. Instead, strategies are understood inductively through the 
statements and actions of network members. 
                                                        
1 See Table 1.3, p. 53. Some interview respondents take a narrower view of advocacy as “one subset of 
engagement”, namely direct lobbying of government officials (V19). However, I am using advocacy in a 
more specific way than Kerkvliet’s (2008) “forms of engagement with the state”, which also includes 
service delivery (V10). Vietnamese and Chinese studies emphasise that “mere” service delivery can also be 
an important way for organisations to involve in public issues (Kerkvliet et al 2008:7, Wexler et al 
2006:10, Schwartz and Shieh 2009); I do not dispute this finding, but it is outside the scope of this 
research. 
2 Keck and Sikkink (1998:25) describe four basic network tactics: generating and disseminating 
information, using symbols to make sense of events, leveraging help from powerful allies, and holding 
actors accountable to stated claims and principles. Mass mobilisation techniques are rarer. 
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Advocacy is a key defining feature that distinguishes civil society networks from 
personal networks. As one Vietnamese activist states, “networks are most effective and 
achieve their greatest power when presenting advocacy messages” (VuTN 2008:31). 
Networks are necessary for local groups to advocate with a common voice (V32). 
Chinese NGOs, similarly, are “increasingly aware of the need for joint actions”, since 
most NGOs are not large enough to carry out advocacy on their own (LuYY 2008:135). 
The focus on advocacy strategies does not mean that other network functions are less 
valid or important, or advocacy is a higher function than others. Korten (1990a:127-8) 
describes four “generations” of voluntary action, beginning with charity and moving to 
community development, advocacy, and alliance-building, stressing that all these 
components are necessary, and mature organisations may engage in all of them. 
Advocacy is not limited to civil society networks: business interests also invest heavily 
in advocacy campaigns for their own benefit (VuTN 2008:25), using some of the same 
strategies and tactics as civil society.3 
The term “advocacy” has entered theoretical vocabularies relatively recently in China 
and Vietnam, but the practice has long existed in reality (Asia Foundation 2008:6). A 
study of Chinese NGOs conducted by China Development Brief found that most conduct 
some form of advocacy, favouring non-adversarial tactics (Wexler et al 2006:9). Over 
two-thirds of 79 Vietnamese NGOs report an interest in advocacy, but most have little 
capacity or strategies in place (Asia Foundation 2008:32,37). Kerkvliet, Nguyen and 
Bach describe cases of advocacy in which authorities resisted or showed suspicion at 
                                                        
3 Businesses and other social groups, including humanitarian organisations, may also be involved in 
corruption, defined as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International 
2010:x). Corruption, such as bribery of government officials, is outside the scope of advocacy, although the 
line between engagement and abuse may be difficult to draw at times. Cultivating a relationship through 
shared meals and study tours is a legitimate advocacy activity if it is done for a public purpose and not for 
private gain; this distinction is consistent with Transparency International’s definition. 
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first, but “over time, the relationship improved” (2008:27). This suggests that 
organisations or networks that have been established for a longer time will have better 
results from advocacy than newly-formed groups, a hypothesis that the Vietnamese 
study did not test, since they only selected organisations with “some years of 
experience” (9). 
Existing research on advocacy in China and Vietnam emphasises its supposedly “non-
political” orientation (Wexler et al 2006:37). Ho (2008b:29) sees depoliticisation as a 
conscious strategy of Chinese environmental organisations seeking to avoid state 
repression. Hannah depicts leaders of several Vietnamese organisations as “non-political 
professionals” who work through partnership, not confrontation, a choice based on their 
personal working styles (2007:186,207,210). Others present this approach as an 
immutable aspect of cultural heritage (XieL 2007:8). 
Just saying no to things is effective advocacy in some countries, but not in 
Chinese culture. It makes you look like an extremist going against the “golden 
mean”. To be mainstream, you need public support and for that, you can’t just 
be opposed to things. (C25) 
This exceptionalist view is based on an assumption that all Euro-American advocacy is 
confrontational all of the time. To be fair, one could easily get this impression from 
reading the contentious politics and social movement literature: at times, “contention” 
seems to mean confrontation or illegal protests only.4 Applied too strictly, the theory 
could lead to the conclusion that China has no environmental movement because 
environmental advocacy is not “contentious” enough (Stalley and Yang 2006). Actually, 
thousands of annual environmental disputes become confrontational; the questions are 
how civil society networks do or do not link with protestors and what strategies they 
employ at different times.  
                                                        
4 See pp. 35-6. 
103 
 
 
 
Hannah (2005:106) theorises a continuum of possible civil society roles stretching from 
implementation of state policy to “public resistance”, with intermediary steps of 
advocacy, lobbying, watchdog and opposition.5 At the time of his field research, he found 
that the Vietnamese state sanctions only advocacy for better implementation of existing 
policies, not calls for policy change or public opposition (2007:249). In fact, the state is 
not a monolithic unit, and the lines of what is possible have shifted significantly over 
time. In 2008, a Vietnamese NGO presenter at a conference in Hanoi cited four different 
advocacy techniques – lobbying, social mobilisation, demonstrations, and public 
pressure – then added, “in Vietnam, we don’t use these last two” (V26). By 2009-10, 
activists were publicly describing their role as “watchdogs to ensure that rights of 
affected people are safeguarded” (V25,V47). As I will show in case studies, some 
networks have made selective use of both demonstrations and public pressure, even 
though these tactics are potentially “sensitive”.  
On paper, to be sure, the space for contentious advocacy tactics is highly restricted. 
Vietnamese regulations issued in 2009 limit the approved advocacy activities of 
associations and other social organisations to a long, but far from exhaustive, list of 
scientific and professional topics (Sidel 2010). Furthermore, policy recommendations 
must be communicated privately to the state, not shared with the public.6 International 
observers worry that the decree is having a dampening effect on advocacy (V59, Sidel 
2010), while informal network activists do not seem overly concerned that it applies to 
them, as long as they do not take legal steps to formalise their network (V64,V66). In 
                                                        
5 In Hannah’s definitions, “advocacy” is restricted to mean action on behalf of constituents for policy 
implementation, differentiated from lobbying for policy change, watchdog actions that expose corrupt 
officials or practices, and public criticism of policies or the regime (2007:93). I consider all of these as 
forms or tactics of advocacy. 
6 The regulations were widely interpreted as being aimed at a single independent think tank, the Institute 
of Development Studies, which announced its closure the day before the new decree took effect (V19). 
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practice, the sensitivity of a topic or sector in China or Vietnam is conditioned by social 
context, framing, timing and location (ShiTJ 1997:252), with a shifting “zone of 
tolerance” (Shi and Cai 2006:331). Although gender equity may be less sensitive on the 
whole than labour rights, for instance, “it’s easier to talk about labour in an informal 
closed meeting [with government officials] than to talk about women’s rights on June 
Fourth”7 (C9). As a Yunnan association member told Howell, “You can do difficult things 
but you have to be careful. You need the government’s approval, so there is a limit. It 
depends on timing”. Howell concludes that activists tread a “precarious line…in a terrain 
where the boundaries of the possible [are] fluid and unpredictable” (2004a:159).  
Thus, the argument that advocacy has been “depoliticised” depends on one’s perspective 
and definition of politics. In the narrow senses of politics as internal affairs of the state 
or opposition to the regime,8 there is very little space for networks to engage. But most 
network members have no such aims. Instead, they wish to change certain policies and 
practices of the state and social elites. These goals are indeed political in a broader 
sense, whether activists choose to describe their advocacy in these terms or not, and 
regardless of how contentious or “sensitive” a particular tactic or action might be 
perceived to be. Given the shifting and contingent nature of sensitivity and the fuzzy 
boundaries between contained and transgressive contention,9 it is inadvisable to define 
advocacy by how the state (or part of a state) reacts to it. A viable alternative, in keeping 
with an actor-centred approach, is to conceptualise advocacy based on the goals and 
methods used by advocates themselves. The selection of advocacy strategies and tactics 
                                                        
7 The anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army assault on protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989. 
Security forces go on high alert every year around this anniversary, among other high-profile occasions. 
8 See p. 7. 
9 See p. 35. 
105 
 
 
 
is structured in part by limits imposed by state agencies, by the fragmented nature of the 
state, and by complex and incomplete legal systems, yet successful activists find room to 
maneuver within, or around, structural limitations.  
Based on the initial scoping survey of Chinese and Vietnamese networks, advocacy 
strategies can be summarised in three inductive categories: embedded, media, and 
community.10 Embedded advocacy, which has been described most thoroughly in the 
literature on China, consists of working within the system and making direct contact 
with parts of the state using personal and institutional ties. Media strategies work 
through state-owned newspapers, online media, blogs and international media to reach 
advocacy objects indirectly. Community advocacy seeks to put public pressure on 
advocacy objects by involving more people and building links between local residents 
and elites. Figure 3.1 presents an illustration of the three strategies, associated tactics, 
and objects of advocacy.   
In a broader definition of contention as non-institutionalised politics, almost everything 
in Figure 3.1 qualifies, except for the internal policy channels at the top of the tactics 
column. Much of the literature on contentious politics privileges protest narratives, with 
even embedded tactics such as petitioning described as a form of protest (O’Brien 2008). 
Repertoires of collective action are really collections of tactics, with less attention to 
underlying strategies. In practice, activists choose advocacy tactics to be more “radical” 
or “moderate” depending on the object, location and other factors (ChenX 2007, LinTC 
2007). Even institutional tactics can be applied in a confrontational way, for instance 
                                                        
10 These categories correspond roughly to what Wexler, Xu and Young describe as different types of 
advocacy by international NGOs in China: constructive engagement, media campaigns, and raising 
visibility and voice of marginalised groups (2006:61-5). 
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using government workshops to criticise policies in an “impolite” way (as some people 
with disabilities and people living with HIV have done). Conversely, protest can be 
carried out in a more or less confrontational style.  
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Figure 3.1 Overview of Civil Society Networks’ Advocacy Strategies and Tactics 
Network  Allies / Initiators   Tactics     Objects of Advocacy 
       Institutionalised policy process 
       (official workshops, review boards, 
      Sympathetic   Party Congress, National Assembly hearings) 
     govt. officials 
    Personal connections 
       (with government officials)     Central government  
              agencies 
Scientists and   Open letters and petitions 
   academics (“experts”) (signed by network members, “experts”;  
   (state / GONGOs)   submitted directly to leaders and/or via media) 
 
Core       Print media 
members      (network members and allies write articles directly,  Public opinion 
(individual  Journalists   place articles by journalists, or are interviewed) 
activists, NGOs)  (some state employees, 
some (semi-)private sector) Internet media, websites, blogs  
       (includes bulletin boards, chats, organisational 
       websites, personal sites) 
 
Film/video 
   Local    (self-produced or commissioned)    Provincial and local 
   communities          govt agencies 
(people affected by  Legal action and negotiation 
   network’s issues)   (using available legal mechanisms to participate in the 
       policy process) 
     
    Embedded advocacy   Protest and direct action 
     Media advocacy    (complaints, “rightful resistance”, demonstrations;   Corporations 
     Community advocacy    usually peaceful but could result in violence)   (private or state-owned) 
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Embedded advocacy 
Embeddedness is a central concept in social theory, describing relations between the 
state, economy and society (Granovetter 1985, Evans 1995,1996). In a narrower sense, 
embeddedness refers to mutually co-opted relations between an individual, 
organisation, or network and elites, and is closely linked conceptually with guanxi, 
vertical social capital, and corporatism.11 Embedded advocacy is based on reciprocal 
relationships with authorities. In China and Vietnam, all social organisations need 
permission from some level of authority, which in turn can exercise oversight and 
control over the organisation. Yet the same relationship can also form an entry point for 
advocacy, as networks leverage access and connections with other parts of the state. A 
network member who is a current or former state employee may use this position to 
collect information or influence others.12 Embeddedness carries positive connotations of 
state-society synergy (Fox 1996), but it also suggests a lack of objectivity and 
independence, as in journalists embedded with military units who lose sight of the 
broader context of the conflict. How can civil society networks take advantage of 
connections without “getting in bed with” the authorities they seek to influence? 
Interview informants routinely confirm that they need good personal relationships with 
government officials in order to carry out advocacy (V16,V48,C31,C71). “We deal with 
people [as individuals], not with the authorities as an institution” (C49). In return, most 
informants feel that authorities welcome their participation, although there is a range of 
                                                        
11
 See pp. 69-70. 
12
 As with the above discussion of corruption (note 4), It can be difficult to tell where embedded advocacy 
ends and back-room deals or interest group politics begin. This system of influence is not unique to China 
or Vietnam, as the western public policy literature shows (Marsh and Rhodes 1992, Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1993). The difference is that the objects of advocacy in China and Vietnam may also have the power 
to register or shut down the advocates themselves, an inherently unequal and hazardous situation. 
109 
 
 
 
views within both the Chinese and Vietnamese states. A network leader observes, 
“Government agencies have their own social development strategies. They don’t pay too 
much attention to us. Their attitude is, if you have money you can do something, if not 
what’s the point of it?” (C29). “The government does some things well, other things less 
well,” says a Chinese NGO director. “Many of its social policies are good, but the 
government doesn’t know how to apply them. NGOs can give them advice on this” (C36). 
The same applies for advocacy towards GONGOs: “they are not progressive, but we bring 
our agenda to them. They want to involve young people, because there is lots of funding, 
but they don’t know how… When I tell them, ‘This is what we want,’ they usually say 
yes” (C68). Effective engagement requires knowing where to engage in an immense, 
fragmented bureaucracy with its own agendas.  
These views are supported in the NGO/development literature in general and studies on 
China and Vietnam in particular. To be effective advocates, writes Bratton, organisations 
need to “identify openings in the administrative system” and “cultivate non-adversarial 
working relationships with the politically powerful” (1990:95-6). Chinese NGOs 
prioritise finding ways to agree and communicate with government (Wexler et al 
2006:34).13 Rather than compromising activists’ independence, state connections are 
desirable and necessary for achieving grassroots impact and policy objectives, making 
activists more effective communicators and advocates, as well as shielding them from 
potential criticism or reprisals (White et al 1996, O’Rourke 2002:121, Heng 2004, 
Bentley 2004, Ho 2008b:37, LuYY 2008:116-7).  
                                                        
13
 Batley and Rose (2010:584) find similar dynamics in South Asia: all NGOs in their study of educational 
collaboration wanted to build close relations and avoid confrontation with their governments. Playing 
insider roles risks losing independence, but also gives them leverage and influence. “Soft lobbying” proved 
more effective than “hard”, defined as external critique of government policies. Insiders (or relative 
insiders) understand opportunities and constraints on officials and can explain better why change is 
necessary. 
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As outlined in Figure 3.1, tactics of embedded advocacy include both personal lobbying 
and the use of expert intermediaries. Howell summarises major activities of NGO 
advocacy in China as “research dissemination, the demonstration of alternative models, 
and conducting training courses for government leaders” (2004a:160).14 In addition, 
networks as well as communities make heavy use of open letters and petitions to higher-
level authorities, a “new norm” that is encouraged by the state to some degree (Zweig 
2003, CaiYS 2004, Minzner 2006).15 The prevalence of petitions may be new, but the 
processes are not, as Ding’s (1994) discussion of “amphibiousness” shows. Marr (1994) 
described Vietnamese civil society “infiltrating the state, finding informal allies and 
building networks” (cited in Hannah 2007:116). Even during pre-reform days, advocates 
could attempt “the Zhou Enlai end run”: appealing to an apparently sympathetic official 
at a higher level in hopes of personal intervention (Meyer 2009:182).  
A Vietnamese activist notices improved state responsiveness to advocacy efforts: 
Five years ago, if you wrote to the Prime Minister’s office, there would be no 
chance of a response. Now if you put in the correct language, pick the right 
issue and send the letter at the right time, you can get a response. It’s possible 
to know where the line is if you keep contact with people in high positions. 
(V48) 
By keeping contact, this respondent means sharing drafts of a letter first and listening to 
allies’ advice on when it’s “safe” to send. In addition to phone and e-mail, contact is 
                                                        
14
 This list is similar to Lin Teh-chang’s (2007) repertoire of seven methods used by Chinese 
environmental NGOs: petitions, signature campaigns, media debates, public forums, investigative field 
trips, photo exhibits and websites. Most of these are embedded tactics, but some extend to media and 
community advocacy. 
15
 The use of open letters and petitions is described in greater detail in network case studies, especially 
chapter 7 (see pp. 259-60). Cai Yongshun terms appeals “the most important mode of political 
participation in China” since officials are accountable upwards, not to the people (2004:427). Minzner’s 
law review article focuses mainly on individual petitions, not group or network initiatives; he points out 
that petitions (信访) are a “multipurpose tool of governance” that allow for citizen participation in an 
authoritarian state, but petitioning is by nature “an appeal to discretionary authority, rather than an 
assertion of clearly defined independent rights” (2006:107,110,118).  
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maintained through informal meetings and “occasionally having a dinner to talk about 
the issue, but not too often” (V48). A Chinese blogger notes,  
There seem to be two common ways of lobbying the Chinese government or 
corporations. One is taking officials or researchers on study trips to the affected 
sites; this is expensive and...counts too much on the emotional impact of what 
they witness. What if they don’t change their minds? The other is working with 
Chinese academics who are positioned near official ears. (MqVU 2010) 
Effective embedded advocacy requires having something to say that elites will listen to 
and take seriously: not only arguments, but also “scientific” evidence (V45). Actions can 
speak louder than words. “We don’t push [authorities] and tell them what to do; we do 
our own thing, and if it’s good they’ll take it on. We can afford to make mistakes, but the 
government thinks they can’t” (C55). However, evidence can be hard to obtain if state or 
corporate actors restrict access; control of information can then be used as an excuse to 
deny activists standing to comment on policy issues. If networks cannot provide 
evidence on their own, one alternative is to circulate information on a related subject 
written by others. According to one research institute expert, the most successful 
advocacy is carried out by “famous scholars” – individuals who are well-connected, 
rather than NGOs who often are not (Wexler et al 2006:70). Translations from foreign 
sources demonstrate international links, therefore credibility, and also show that an 
issue is not limited to the local context (V45). A Vietnamese environmental network 
might disseminate information about Thai dams, for instance, or renewable energy in 
China, sending an indirect critique of Vietnamese policy.16  
                                                        
16
 I have consciously adopted this tactic when speaking to Chinese audiences about Vietnamese civil 
society and the reverse. In part, my purpose is to raise awareness of similar issues in the other country, 
but it is also a way to talk indirectly about the host country. Much Vietnamese criticism of China may be 
understood in this manner, as can Chinese praise of political change in Vietnam (see p. 61). At least on the 
Vietnamese side, disguising political statements through use of Chinese stories and analogies is an ancient 
art (Womack 2006, Woodside 1988). 
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Embedded advocacy in the Chinese and Vietnamese contexts is limited by the gap 
between policy and practice: just because activists succeed in including a provision in a 
law or policy does not mean that other parts of the state will implement it. A second 
limitation is that the topics that can be selected for advocacy must not be interpreted as 
a threat to existing elites (Gamson 1990:41) or to networks’ broader constituencies 
(C65). “If we go slowly and gradually, according to the appropriate way, we can still get 
many things done”, says one network coordinator. “We need to be flexible and not too 
strong [in advocacy messages]; if we were, it would make it hard for many of our 
members to take part” (V46). 
In a recent book on Chinese environmentalism, Ho and Edmonds (2008) describe 
“embedded activism” as a China-specific phenomenon resulting from a mixed political 
context that is “restrictive but conducive” (Ho 2008b:21). This results in a “fragmentary, 
highly localized, and non-confrontational form of environmentalism” that nevertheless 
can be highly effective within China’s political system (2008a:14). Using an approach 
based on social movement literature, Ho brilliantly captures the “negotiated symbiosis” 
of state-society relations (2008b:36) that have moved beyond corporatism but not (yet) 
approached pluralism. However, in so doing he misinterprets the nature of some of the 
advocacy he describes. Ho sees embeddedness as central to the identity of Chinese 
NGOs: “civil organizations find themselves embedded in a Party-statist structure of 
control, as well as an intricate web of personalized relations and informal politics.” 
Based on little empirical evidence – a 2000 interview with the leader of one NGO who 
disavows “political aims” and “extremist methods”17 – he claims that environmental 
                                                        
17
 In 2003, the same activist also stated that “Chinese environmentalism cannot always rely on non-
confrontational tactics to achieve its aims” (cited in Ho and Edmonds 2008:221). In 2010, a Chinese 
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activists “de-politicise politics” and engage in “self-imposed censorship” 
(2008a:8,2008b:29; see also JiangR 2005). This picture assumes that activists really 
desire to engage in oppositional political action but are constrained from doing so by the 
state: if these activists then claim they have no such goals but just want to protect the 
environment, this must be a sign of their own false consciousness or colonised minds.  
My interviews and data collection with leaders and members of many of the same 
environmental groups that Ho studied result in different findings. Regardless of their 
particular political views, these respondents have definite policy and organisational 
objectives in mind and pragmatic strategies to achieve them. While Ho is correct that 
Chinese activists face a mixed and sometimes contradictory set of political opportunities 
and constraints, this does not “force” them into “de-politicized spaces” where they can 
only carry out “media-attractive yet politically innocent activities” (2008b:29). Instead, 
activists engage in strategic framing (Gamson and Meyer 1996, Keech-Marx 2008) and 
consciously select strategies and tactics that they believe will be effective (LinTC 2007). 
At times, these are embedded strategies. At other times, the same networks engage in 
“boundary-spanning” or “transgressive” actions (O’Brien 2004, McAdam et al 2001) that 
extend well beyond the tame, constrained activism described by Ho.18 Thus, 
embeddedness is best understood as one among several advocacy strategies, not as an 
essential characteristic of Chinese (or Vietnamese) activism. Choosing an embedded 
strategy does not require censoring oneself. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
newspaper profiled her as an “extreme environmental activist” – and meant this as a compliment (HeHN 
2010). 
18
 “Boundary-spanning contention,” according to O’Brien, “goes on partly within the state and hinges on 
the participation of state actors.” Such a campaign “is not prescribed or forbidden, but tolerated (even 
encouraged) by some officials, and not tolerated by others” (2004:107). 
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Along similar lines, Lu Yiyi argues that Chinese NGOs take a pragmatic or opportunistic 
approach to relations with the government, seeking to advance their own interests, not 
mount a political challenge (2008:144). Their “multiple dependence on the state has led 
many NGOs [directors] to view their relationships with government agencies and 
officials as the most important of all” (117). While perhaps accurate for some NGOs, I did 
not find evidence of such displaced accountability among civil society network members 
in China or Vietnam. Working with (parts of) the state, such as (in Lu’s example) inviting 
officials to write blurbs for an organisation’s promotional materials, does not 
automatically indicate dependence: it could also be a conscious strategy to form 
alliances and protect one’s interests against opponents. One researcher with long 
experience in China finds there is some truth to Lu’s arguments in the case of small 
NGOs who face difficulties in registration and inadequate funding, and thus need good 
relations with government, while large organisations can act more strategically (C52). 
Lu, however, actually argues the opposite: larger organisations may receive outside 
funding, but then need official cooperation in order to carry out programmes, while 
small groups can afford to act without government support. “The bigger you are, the 
more you need the state!” (LuYY 2008:45). Both have a point, but need to specify their 
arguments. Different organisations need different parts of the state for different things. 
Close ties with a government agency do not equal dependence; conversely, a lack of 
connections does not necessarily result in autonomy, but might lead to isolation (C58). 
When organisations use tropes of state discourse, such as a “harmonious society” (和谐
社会, héxié shèhùi), they creatively hold the state accountable to its own laws and 
rhetoric, pointing out the gap between rights promised and delivered (O’Brien 
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1996:55).19 This is a key technique of network advocacy (Keck and Sikkink 1998:25). 
Chu shows, for instance, how Vietnamese Catholics are skilled at maintaining the 
“illusion of state control” within existing rules of the game, finding ways to use the state 
against itself (or parts of the state against other parts) and express criticism in subtle 
ways (2006:28,34,35). Shi Tianjian (1997:xii) describes ways that Beijing residents play 
politics: “Rather than trying to influence or change bureaucratic decisions, people 
usually manage to circumvent them” by looking for new sponsors or allies. “Since 
government policy is hardly monopolistic, there is always space for citizens to 
maneuver” through patron-client exchange transactions, “borrowing” power from 
others using connections, or exploiting state fragmentation by asking government to 
“faithfully” implement existing policies, using a higher level of authority against a lower 
one (1997:17). Such advocacy remains within the system, but pushes at the boundaries 
of embeddedness.  
Media advocacy 
The second major advocacy strategy of Chinese and Vietnamese networks involves 
information technologies of all types: print and online newspapers and magazines, blogs, 
e-mail list-serves, chat groups, even mobile phones and texting. Internet and other 
communications technologies are crucial advocacy tools. Media strategies differ from 
embedded advocacy in their public nature and use of channels both within and outside 
the fuzzy boundaries of the state. The purpose of media advocacy is both to reach 
leaders and to influence public opinion. If activists use connections with officials or 
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 O’Brien’s “rightful resisters” “use the vocabulary of the regime to advance their claims... They launch 
attacks that are legitimate by definition in a rhetoric that even unresponsive authorities must recognize, 
lest they risk being charged with hypocrisy and disloyalty to the system of power they represent” 
(1996:35). 
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other prominent people to place an article in state-controlled media, this would qualify 
as an embedded tactic (see Figure 3.1). Most of the time, however, this is not the case. 
Journalists for state-owned media outlets report the news (YanY 2009). Most of them 
are contract employees, not government staff. Some go beyond neutrality to be explicitly 
sympathetic with networks they are covering (V51,C25,C63). In this way, “the media 
have become…the natural ally of civil society” (Baum 2008:176), at a minimum “useful 
intermediaries, even the ‘people’s friend’ on certain occasions” (Marr 2003:284).  
State-owned media can be colonised by civil society networks, and state control over the 
Internet is often partial at most. In cases such as the Reunification Park and China rivers 
networks (chapters 6-7), journalists are not only allies of civil society networks, but 
active participants in them. Journalists publish their own articles and interviews with 
other network members, and facilitate public comment through web interfaces. 
Prominent journalists are public figures or experts in their own right and can lend their 
clout to a campaign through coverage (O’Brien 1996:44). Two network participants, an 
architect and a journalist, describe the media as  
a system of public information [that] plays an extremely important role… It is 
just about the only information source for the community to understand about 
the situation, its changes and structure… Journalists always gather the opinion 
of people living in the surrounding areas. This is almost the only channel that 
people have to present their opinions. (Tran and Linh 2010, emphasis in 
original) 
In particular, these analysts continue, the media plays three roles in an advocacy 
campaign: first, providing information by bringing issues to light; second, using 
interviews as a way to force leaders to speak and respond to criticism. This can increase 
the sensitivity of an issue, but also help to suggest solutions; however, leaders’ 
statements alone are not enough to solve a problem, as verbal remarks do not have the 
official weight of a signed, stamped document. Third, the media can facilitate the 
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formation of a discussion forum that includes both experts and community opinion, 
becoming spontaneous voices of the people (Tran and Linh 2010).  
One experienced Vietnamese activist says that “if you have your own funding source, 
sometimes it’s so easy to put something in the news” (V48). Technically, printing 
materials and circulating them publicly (or to government officials such as National 
Assembly members) requires prior permission from the Ministry of Information and 
Communications. But in reality, “as long as we don’t ask for permission, it’s no problem. 
If we did ask for permission, it could take two or three months”. This network’s media 
strategy is to say nothing at all about themselves. “Occasionally one of us will give a 
personal interview if requested, but in that case he will appear as a neutral expert, not as 
an NGO activist. If it looks like organisational public relations or fundraising, everyone 
will dismiss what you say”. Media can also be used for direct criticism of government 
actions or policies, as in Hannah’s categories of watchdog or opposition. “When we have 
to do more confrontational advocacy, we don’t do this ourselves but leverage the media. 
But this is not our first option” (V48). 
The China Development Brief advocacy study found that environmental organisations 
and networks were the most likely to seek out and use media as allies (Wexler et al 
2006:30). Their strategy is to raise public awareness of an issue through the media, then 
use media articles to advocate with the government (C55). Media are both objects and 
means of network advocacy. Journalists and NGOs work together: “NGOs can better 
motivate the public, and media can disseminate information. This [combination] is an 
effective way to reach the government. But the media [alone] has many limitations; 
NGOs can reach a broader public and get more people to participate” (C63). 
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This portrayal of “smart, idealistic and risk-taking” journalists clashes sharply with “the 
standard international presentation” (C65), which focuses on violations of press 
freedom in both countries. Vietnamese journalists have been jailed for reporting on anti-
corruption cases; blogs have been shut down for airing what regimes see as anti-
government views; websites containing sensitive information are blocked, especially by 
China’s “Great Firewall”, while other websites have been attacked by hackers believed to 
be linked to government agencies.20 When journalists receive information, they need to 
receive approval from their editors before publishing. Although articles are not subject 
to pre-censorship, editors are responsible for the political content of everything they 
print (Heng 2003:569). Networks have also been the subject of internet censorship and 
cyber-attacks, as in the case of one unregistered regional network in south-west China 
whose website has been blocked on several occasions; the network responded by setting 
up a new web address in the .info domain that is registered outside China and thus not 
subject to state controls (C33,C67). 
Despite these limits, the media environment is not as closed as the legal structures make 
it appear, or as many external analysts suggest (London 2009:392, Hayton 2010:140-
58).21 Censorship affects only a small fraction of websites, and Internet use continues to 
increase geometrically in China (Rawnsley 2008:126,132-3, WangC 2009) and Vietnam 
(Cullum 2010). Media roles are relatively less restricted by the state than other civil 
society roles (V64). A social organisation that crosses a political line can in extreme 
                                                        
20
 For details on press freedom and the above cases, see Human Rights Watch (2010a,2010b), US 
Department of State (2009), OpenNet Initiative (2007), Cullum (2010), and Hayton (2010:136-40), among 
many other available sources. 
21
 This perception may be furthered by the fact that the English-language Viet Nam News and China Daily, 
published by the Vietnam News Agency and Xinhua respectively, shy away from critical articles and are 
less open than many local-language newspapers, let alone websites. 
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cases be shut down, while a newspaper may have its editorial board replaced, but 
remains owned by its managing agency. For individual participants, there is little to no 
risk from posting a comment online, compared with the potentially substantial risk from 
joining a demonstration. In this way, media act as “insider-dissenters,” using their 
connections with the state to limit risk (Heng 2004:154,156). 
With the proliferation of blogs and websites, it is no longer the case that all media in 
China and Vietnam are state-controlled. Blogs can be blocked and their authors 
intimidated or arrested, but most activists know how to thrive despite these limits 
(YangGB 2008:129,2009:35), and new blogs keep arising (Esarey and Xiao 2008). Of 
course, all media are not equally powerful, and not all blogs are widely read, but some 
have gone viral and attracted wider notice than any print media article. Although 
authorities are still controlling media and internet, a “quiet revolution is underway” 
(Baum 2008:162). As long as articles avoid perceived anti-government topics, blockage 
is unlikely. If one blog site or social messaging service is blocked, Internet users move to 
another. Even when a site is removed, “the Great Firewall has numerous leaks, and many 
netizens have become adept at navigating around it” (173). Once Chinese or Vietnamese 
print media articles are published on newspaper websites, they are then uploaded onto 
international sites where they remain in the public domain, in theory forever. 
Conversely, when a user posts a comment on a Chinese- or Vietnamese-language 
website, it is generally not possible to identify whether the post originates from within 
the country or outside.22 When advocacy messages are circulated by mobile phone 
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 As “global civil society” enthusiasts would point out, citizenship is too narrow a frame to capture who is 
posting from “inside” or “outside” a country. Is a Chinese student in the UK “Chinese”? What about a 
blogger in Hong Kong or Taiwan? A second-generation Chinese-American? Also, people’s online identities 
may be deceptive, as in known examples of overseas Vietnamese posing as local, Vietnamese posing as 
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texting, as in the case of the SARS epidemic (Baum 2008:173) or the Xiamen chemical 
plant “flash mob” (LiFC 2007), official control is virtually impossible.  
Thus, civil society network members generally experience enough freedom to meet their 
purposes for communication and advocacy. “If the media were afraid of the authorities, 
we wouldn’t have any place to do advocacy,” says a Vietnamese activist. “They give me a 
forum and are open to balanced views” (V21). However, the potential of the media and 
Internet should not be overstated. Communication technology can be an empowering 
force challenging state control of information, but does not change the underlying reality 
of state power or lead to “the development of democratic politics” (WangC 2009). 
Although there are clear links between the Internet and network formation, this should 
not be equated with democratic political potential (Rawnsley 2008:132).  
Community advocacy 
Both embedded and media advocacy are basically elite strategies that can be carried out 
by small groups of urban activists with connections to government or journalists. The 
third network strategy, community-based advocacy, instead requires building larger and 
broader-based networks with communities affected by an issue: in short, community 
organising. Both China and Vietnam have indigenous traditions of such advocacy, 
including James Yen’s Rural Reconstruction Movement in the 1930s and Thich Nhat 
Hanh’s engaged Buddhism and School of Youth for Social Service in the 1960s, not to 
mention the origins of the Chinese and Vietnamese Communist Parties themselves. 
Perhaps because of these historical connections, community advocacy often faces 
                                                                                                                                                                             
overseas, even perhaps members of security forces lurking as pro-regime citizens or anti-regime 
provocateurs. The anonymity of the Internet potentially adds a transnational element to primarily 
domestic advocacy campaigns. 
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restrictions from security forces in both countries. This does not mean that local 
protests and legal disputes are rare. Environmental pollution, corruption and land 
expropriation, among other issues, result in thousands of disputes each year, 
particularly in rural areas (O’Brien and Li 2006, CaiYS 2008, Bernstein and Lu 2003).23 
In Vietnam, spontaneous demonstrations over land rights and compensation have 
occurred in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City on a near-daily basis in recent years (V6, 
London 2009:394, Wells-Dang 2010). 
Most community protests take place with no links to networks or NGOs. A common 
finding from research on rural protest in China is that networks among protestors from 
different communities, or different factories, are the first to be suppressed. There are 
many outspoken individual “rights defenders” in rural areas, but they have not formed 
networks among themselves or set up NGOs (C25, Johnson 2004, Brettell 2008:132-3). 
Ho and Edmonds claim that “activists are forced… to abandon any radical, 
confrontational, and mass mobilisation tactics to achieve political objectives” 
(2008:221), assuming that they had these aims in the first place, and that 
confrontational tactics are desirable and effective. In reality, community-based protests 
have used all of these tactics as well as others, sometimes effectively and other times not 
(CaiYS 2008, Shi and Cai 2006).  
An alternative strategy is to address injustice through legal means. Several Vietnamese 
networks have undertaken education campaigns to inform local residents of the rights 
they already enjoy, at least on paper, in Vietnamese law. Once people know their rights, 
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 In China, 87,000 cases of rural protest were documented in 2005 (CaiYS 2008:163). In Vietnam, an 
official estimated 15,000 land disputes took place in 2007, 70% concerning compensation (Hayton 
2010:41).  
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they can then advocate with local and sometimes national government to address their 
grievances. This type of organising can be paternalistic if networks simply tell 
communities what to do, but in a more activist version, network members are able to 
directly implement laws in the community, as long as they act “sensitively and according 
to the law” (V25). In China, a “rule of law” network of environmental lawyers has formed 
in recent years (C75,C79; van Rooij 2010) alongside a broader “rights defence” 
community (Béja 2009:13-4). Chinese NGOs do not have standing to sue on behalf of 
communities, only acting as legal aid intermediaries for class action suits.24 Up to now, 
there have not been any successful cases of legal action for people threatened by 
resettlement, while collective action and protest have been successful in some cases 
(Zweig 2003, ChenX 2007, CaiYS 2008). Facing such mixed opportunities and 
constraints, network members are pushing at the boundaries of the legal system. 
Community-based legal advocacy may be expected to increase in China in coming years, 
alongside the established repertoire of embedded and media strategies. 
Incidents of community environmental activism have attracted media attention within 
and outside China: the Xiamen chemical plant protests (LiFC 2007, Watts 2007), 
Shanghai homeowners’ protests against a high-speed train (Wasserstrom 2009), and a 
Beijing community, Liulitun, organising to oppose construction of a solid waste 
incinerator on the site of an existing landfill (Kuhn 2009). In 2007 on 5 June, which is 
World Environment Day and also a sensitive day in the Chinese political calendar (XuN 
2009), more than 1,000 Liulitun residents in matching t-shirts held a protest in front of 
MEP’s office in downtown Beijing (FengYF 2008). The project had already been 
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 In one case in Fujian province, a local doctor organised farmers in a loosely-structured network to sue 
for the closure of a heavily polluting factory. The plaintiffs won the suit, but received little compensation, 
and the doctor was attacked in 2009 by unknown assailants, forcing him to close his clinic (C25). 
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approved by the municipal government (Yu and Zhu 2007), and protest appeared 
fruitless given MEP’s limited power (LiuJQ 2007b). However, city authorities put the 
project on hold, citing residents’ opposition, and in January 2011 announced that the 
Liulitun project was cancelled and the incinerator would be built instead in a distant 
Beijing suburb (CuiXH 2010, Global Times 2011).  
Most cases of community activism are not connected with NGOs, leading some to 
wonder if Chinese NGOs are losing relevance (LoSP 2007:21). Local governments do not 
always welcome NGO presence, and NGOs are hesitant to take sides in disputes (C53). In 
Liulitun, residents faced threats and intimidation from police to keep them from forming 
a formal organisation or linking with other communities (Kuhn 2009). Given these 
barriers, NGOs and networks need to tread carefully. Because of its existing community 
activism, Liulitun was selected by the environmental NGO Friends of Nature as a location 
for a community education project to reduce solid waste production, but FON was not 
able to work directly on the incinerator campaign (C53). Community advocacy is thus 
highly sensitive even in major cities, and there are few cases where government has 
responded positively to outside facilitation. Network members can share information, 
but not encourage people to take action, which would be viewed as political instigation. 
These “pragmatic considerations” keep most networks using elite advocacy strategies 
and prevent them from too close identification with communities (C25).  
Many community activists start out with embedded tactics, such as petitions to higher 
levels of government, seeking to stay within the law in the tradition of “rightful 
resistance” (O’Brien 1996,2006). In the view of one Vietnamese network member, a 
retired official now leading a professional association, 
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The demonstrators have justice on their side. The problem is that the laws [on 
land compensation] are not clear or well applied. No social organisation is able 
to protect people’s land rights in a situation like this… Demonstrations are risky 
and often ineffective, but what other choice do people have? There should be a 
clearer system of complaints and comments, and if that fails, access to the 
courts. But we don’t have a system like that yet. (V53)  
When petitioners cannot obtain satisfactory results from local or provincial officials, 
who may be corrupt or the cause of the problem, they “scale shift” to the national level 
(della Porta and Tarrow 2005:126, O’Brien 2004:110). In both China and Vietnam, well-
connected urban residents, such as intellectuals, artists and retired officials, feel greater 
freedom to speak out on public issues. Poor and rural citizens have fewer chances to 
raise their voices through the Party-government system and resort to public protest 
after they have “exhausted approved but ineffective channels of participation” (CaiYS 
2008:164, Brettell 2007:156-9, LiuXB 2007, YangGB 2010:112). In many cases, a 
combination of embedded and community-based strategies may offer the best chances 
of success (Zweig 2003). In Vietnam, successful strategies combine local-level networks 
with state connections, mustering political resources through both vertical and 
horizontal networking (O’Rourke 2002:97, Vasavakul 2003:26).  
Combined strategies: the “inside-outside” model and “jujitsu advocacy” 
Hypothesis C, following on two network hypotheses in chapter 2, is that the three 
network advocacy strategies are a cumulative, chronological process. In the first phase, 
corresponding roughly to the 1990s, embedded advocacy was the only option available. 
By around the middle of the past decade, this situation had shifted: as media became 
relatively freer and Internet technologies more available, media advocacy became more 
prominent, though not replacing embedded strategies. However, the availability of 
media access makes connections with state agencies less crucial for advocacy than 
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previously. In theory, an individual with no links to officials can now engage in advocacy 
through a computer and an internet connection, even if based in a rural area.  
The last decade has also seen an increase in community advocacy in China and Vietnam, 
though mostly not yet networked with each other. Network linkages are hypothesised to 
increase over time to the extent that authorities do not repress them.25 As nodes mature 
and personal network ties develop, urban NGOs and networks will seek to develop and 
deepen advocacy links with rural as well as urban poor communities, and disadvantaged 
groups will increasingly link with each other.  
Figure 3.2 Advocacy strategies as a cumulative process 
 Embedded   Embedded  Embedded 
 advocacy  advocacy  advocacy 
 
    Media   Media 
advocacy  advocacy 
 
       Community 
       advocacy 
 
This hypothesis does not imply linear movement towards progress. Once a strategy is 
widely used in activists’ repertoires, it is assumed that it will not be given up. But 
strategies alone do not equal success, and the availability of more strategies does not 
automatically result in better outcomes. Effective advocacy will result in political change 
in terms of policies, implementation mechanisms, and public participation, but these 
changes are expected to take place within the existing political system. As strategic 
options increase, opponents of civil society networks also have increased opportunities: 
for instance, media and internet can be used by all, as can techniques of community 
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 Ho (2008a:14) suggests that embedded activism in China may be a transitory phenomenon, later to be 
replaced by more institutionalised forms of civil society. 
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organising. If activists do not use available strategies effectively, or are unable to due to 
state restrictions, the tables can be turned against them, as occurred to Catholic land 
protestors in Hanoi (VietNamNet 2008, AsiaNews 2008). 
Most networks do not limit themselves to a single strategy or tactic, but instead use a 
varied collective action repertoire, on the basis that they want to reach an objective and 
will try all feasible means to get there. Such advocacy has some elements in common 
with O’Brien and Li’s (2006:2) model of “rightful resistance”, which “hinges on locating 
and exploiting divisions within the state, and relies on mobilizing support from the 
wider public”.26 Based on perceived state fragmentation and gaps between the central 
and local levels, activists identify “local targets who can be blamed and elite advocates 
who can be trusted” (2006:42).  
Given the limited institutionalization of Chinese politics and because their 
opponents usually have protectors among the local notables who matter most, 
rightful resisters typically find it advantageous to press their claims wherever 
they can. They recognize that state power nowadays is both fragmented and 
divided against itself, and they know that if they search diligently, they can 
often locate pressure points where elite unity crumbles. (O’Brien 1996:44-5) 
Following these principles, Hypothesis D states that networks select strategies based 
on the presence of allies at different locations within the elite. If they identify allies in a 
local government or department that can easily be accessed, networks will likely choose 
embedded strategies. If local government or corporate elites are opponents, but allies 
can be located at a higher level, then media or combined strategies will be more 
effective. The most common combined strategy is an “inside-outside” model that 
balances allies within part of the elite with external allies in the media, public opinion, or 
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 In other respects, however, “resistance” is not an appropriate way to describe network advocacy; for a 
critique of the “rightful resistance” approach, see Mertha (2008:153). 
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international links (Büsgen 2006:28, Chapman and Fisher 2000:158).27 In particular, the 
combination of embedded and one or both of media and community strategies forms an 
effective combination that can put pressure on power-holders from several directions at 
once. In some networks, members specialise in different strategies, using diversity as a 
strength; in other cases, individuals “wear different hats – journalist, researcher, and so 
on. They use these multiple identities as assets to their advantage” (C28). With one foot 
in the system and another outside of it,28 or some members in and others out, networks 
can obtain leverage that a single approach would be unable to accomplish, using 
external means to support internal allies to gain the upper hand against opponents.  
Hypothesis E follows from this: Networks that use multiple advocacy strategies and 
tactics will be more effective than those that use only one. Closely related, Hypothesis F 
posits that effective networks will include diverse members who specialise in different 
advocacy strategies and tactics. 
An inside-outside strategy gives civil society networks the possibility of influencing 
political decisions even when they are much weaker than their opponents. The 
strategy’s success depends on fragmentation of state authorities into multiple levels and 
components, some of which are aligned with, or themselves members of, the network. It 
does not require that the network’s allies be the most powerful components, which is 
unlikely in any case, as the power-holders would then have little incentive to cooperate 
                                                        
27
 This strategy has relevance beyond the cases considered here: a similar combination of confrontational 
and consensual strategies has been used to describe Hong Kong environmentalism (Chiu et al 1999:59,75-
6), Chinese peasant protests (Bernstein and Lu 2003:13), and contemporary Russian civil society (Nikitin 
2010). Filipino activists describe a bibingka or sandwich strategy, consisting of allies at the top and the 
bottom (central government and communities) against local elites in the middle (Franco 2004) – in terms 
of this thesis, a combination of embedded and community advocacy. 
28
 I am aware of the similarities between this description and my own inside-outside position as a 
researcher (see p. 12).  
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with civil society. As one of Büsgen’s informants describes, “We never directly confront 
the state, but we support one department to oppose another” (2006:30). Using the 
image of a balance scale or a see-saw, even a small weight placed at a point of high 
leverage can tip the balance against a heavy force on the opposite side. This technique is 
reminiscent of martial arts such as jujitsu and aikido, through which a lighter contestant 
can use positioning and the opponent’s own momentum to throw a stronger contender 
off balance (Fowler 1997:227).29 To some extent, each of the civil society networks 
profiled in this thesis have used jujitsu advocacy, with differing levels of skill and 
effectiveness. This is implicit in Büsgen’s description of Chinese environmentalists as 
“the weakest part, but the strongest link” (2006:36) in tipping the balance against the 
Nu River dam projects (see chapter 7). 
The balancing metaphor also contains the concept of a tipping point, a point at which 
accumulated pressure builds up until an irreversible change takes place, like the 
proverbial last straw that breaks the camel’s back. Networks may face seemingly 
impossible odds of success against powerful opponents and engage in activity after 
activity with little apparent result until, sometimes quite suddenly, the political equation 
shifts and a decision comes in their favour. Authorities may, of course, postpone or 
prevent a tipping point through repression, and some advocacy efforts never produce 
results regardless of effort. Yet repeated failure can also result in increased pressure 
during subsequent advocacy cycles. Power-holders who avoid responding to civil society 
concerns may inadvertently sow the seeds of increased contention in the future. As 
some critics warn, long-term regime interests might be better served by promoting 
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 The martial arts metaphor also echoes, perhaps, Gramsci’s (1971) “war of position” among competing 
social forces.  
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state-society cooperation and allowing smaller, more gradual tipping points to occur 
naturally (YuKP 2009:78,90, Mertha 2008:157). 
Tightrope acts 
Networks, organisations and individual activists also need to keep their balance while 
engaging in advocacy, as opponents attempt to destabilise them. In a March 2009 
interview, one interview respondent described her advocacy efforts “like walking on a 
tightrope” (V32). Tightrope walkers typically carry a long pole, carefully balanced with 
an equal weight on both sides.30 If the acrobat keeps focussed on the end goal, she will 
move forward, but if one weight is heavier than the other, she will fall off.31 
Many network activists have done a remarkable job of staying on a tightrope despite 
pressures from many sides. Not all have been so lucky. Several Chinese HIV activists, for 
instance, could be said to have fallen off, or been pushed off, ending up in prison or in 
self-imposed exile. In 2009, one network leader, referred to by some as “China’s 
foremost activist” (Gallagher 2004:445), faced a financial crisis due to a cut in donor 
funding. Without funds, the activist couldn’t “keep friendship relations” with the over 30 
other network members that had been supported financially for four years (C54). 
External funding gave the network coordinator position and balance, and the network 
was able to access support from potentially controversial donors without government 
blockage. When the activist’s host organisation lost these funds, he became an easier 
target for his enemies in the government, who saw his situation of weakness and found 
regulations they could use against him (C68). “The pressure is always there,” another 
                                                        
30
 In her book on Chinese environmentalism, Economy (2004:131) also refers to a “tightrope act”, but only 
between NGOs and the state. 
31
 Of course, no metaphor should be stretched too far: advocacy is not a linear process that only moves 
forward. 
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activist commented afterwards. “The government can act against people at any time and 
implement the law on a selective basis” (C40). After moving to the USA, the activist told 
a reporter that “there’s no clear boundary between a political and a non-political 
organization,” since the line is always moving (Richburg 2010).  
A typical balancing act, as in the above case, is between government minders and 
international donors (LuYY 2005:7). Organisations need to negotiate political space and 
keep good relations with the state, while satisfying foreign donors that they are 
autonomous enough (ChanKM 2005:37). Bratton (1990) found that among other factors, 
effective advocacy relies on a domestic funding base, rather than dependency on foreign 
sources (cited in Lewis 2001:124). Domestic funding is just beginning to be an option for 
organisations and networks in China and Vietnam, and could provide a defence against 
nationalist criticism. Yet domestic foundations and corporations may also have their 
own balancing acts with government to consider and prove unwilling to fund advocacy 
initiatives. Along with multiple advocacy strategies, networks will also keep their 
balance better with multiple funding sources. 
The past two chapters of this thesis have introduced civil society networks and advocacy 
strategies in China and Vietnam, and presented a range of hypotheses based on an initial 
scoping survey. The succeeding chapters (#4-7) explore network structures, history, 
strategies and effectiveness in four in-depth case studies, alternating between the two 
countries. 
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  Chapter 4 THE BRIGHT FUTURE GROUP AND THE STRUCTURING OF 
VIETNAMESE DISABILITY NETWORKS 
 
On 16 November 2008, a network of disability activists in Hanoi called the Bright Future 
Group celebrated its 20th anniversary with a review workshop “to share experience in 
working for advocacy” for the rights of people with disabilities (BFG 2008). The event 
was held at a government-owned hotel in Hanoi that is known as a centre of NGO 
activity and is one of the few affordable workshop venues in the city that is accessible to 
people with mobility impairments. Network members showed a video of their history 
that was produced for the occasion, sang songs, and gave emotion-filled testimony of 
how much the network has meant in their lives.  
A diverse group attended the celebration, including government staff from the National 
Coordinating Council on Disability (NCCD)1 and its parent Ministry of Labour, Invalids 
and Social Affairs (MOLISA); international and Vietnamese NGOs who have been key 
partners of the network, other groups of people with disabilities in Hanoi and 
neighbouring provinces, such as the Hanoi Club of Disabled Women and the Hai Duong 
province association of people with disabilities (PWD); and three reporters from the 
local and national print media. One international guest came from the Hong Kong 
Society of Rehabilitation who also serves as Vice-Chair of the Asia Pacific Disability 
Forum (APDF). In the discussion and question-and-answer sections of the workshop, 
participants suggested how Bright Future’s experience is relevant to other self-help 
groups of people with disabilities that have formed more recently. The workshop and 
                                                        
1 The National Coordinating Council on Disability (NCCD) includes representatives of 15 ministries and 
other government-linked agencies. It holds monthly meetings in Hanoi with participation from people 
with disabilities, including Bright Future members (V50; IDRM 2005). 
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celebration that followed were funded by small donations from three international 
NGOs, a private Vietnamese company whose director is a network member, and an 
individual contribution from the network’s then- vice-chair (BFG 2008).2  
 
Members of the Bright Future Group at the 20th anniversary workshop in November 2008. Source: 
www.ttsongdoclaphn.vn 
Bright Future Group of People with Disabilities (Nhóm Vì tương lai tươi sáng của Người 
khuyết tật)3 describes itself as “the first organisation of people with disabilities in 
Vietnam” (BFG 2008). Bright Future has never operated as a formal organisation, but is 
rather a membership network of individual activists. BFG members have been present at 
almost every important event and policy decision relating to people with disabilities in 
Vietnam over the past 20 years; in the view of one international NGO leader, they have 
been “the most sophisticated in terms of advocacy, with the closest links to policy-
                                                        
2 The INGOs are Catholic Relief Services, Handicap International France, and Medical Committee 
Netherlands-Vietnam; the company’s name is August Technology and Application. Of these, CRS and 
MCNV have been among the ongoing supporters of BFG since the mid-1990s. For my involvement with 
CRS and positionality as a researcher, see pp. 21-2. 
3 There is also a self-help group of HIV-positive people with a similar name, Bright Futures, which is part 
of the Vietnam Civil Society Partnership on AIDS (see pp. 95-6). There is no connection between the two 
groups. 
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makers over many years” (V46). BFG members have become the core of the Hanoi 
Association of People with Disabilities (DPO Hanoi), founded in 2006. As I will show, the 
network has passed through distinct stages of group formation and has pursued varied 
advocacy strategies: primarily embedded advocacy within existing state structures, at 
times combined with more confrontational, community outreach-based strategies.  
Little has been written about disabled people’s organisations (DPOs) in Vietnam or 
elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region, perhaps because their members are socially 
marginalised, or that disability activism does not fit a “romantic vision of civil society as 
a democratic surge that would bring political change” (Young 2008). The number of 
academic studies of disability issues in Vietnam and China can be counted on one hand 
(Vasiljev 2003, ChenX 2007). DPOs are membership-based self-help groups (nhóm tự 
lực), which most other groups calling themselves NGOs are not; in a way, this makes 
them more akin to the Philippine category of “people’s organisations” (Kerkvliet 
2003a:8, Silliman and Noble 1998:29) or what are usually termed “community-based 
organisations” in Vietnam. While the idea of “self-help” or “self-reliance” is broadly 
compatible with socialist ideology, the number of such local groups has not historically 
been large (Vasiljev 2003:138-9). Vasiljev (2003) stresses links between people with 
disabilities and Vietnam’s war-torn history.4 As time elapses, the effects of war are less 
salient, and although landmine injuries make up a small proportion of physical 
disabilities, the majority of disabled Vietnamese have no direct connection to the war. 
The symbolic link, however, remains politically important.5 Vasiljev focuses on a self-
                                                        
4 MOLISA (2005) estimates that 23% of disabilities come from war-related causes, but the source of this 
data is not clear. 
5 2.4 million veterans, including many people with disabilities, who fought on the revolutionary side in the 
American War are members of the Veterans Association of Vietnam (Hội Cựu Chiến Binh), a mass 
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help group in Hoi An in central Vietnam and the Disability Forum in Hanoi;6 his chapter, 
researched in 2001, contains one brief, accurate mention of BFG (2003:140), the only 
published reference to the group in English.7  
The Bright Future anniversary event was an exemplar of the network’s advocacy 
strategy to embed itself in existing structures of state and society in order that PWD are 
fully included in these structures, while also linking horizontally with other disability 
organisations and networks with varying degrees of connection to the Party-state. The 
group’s own internally circulated report on the anniversary noted that one outcome was 
“a good opportunity for the community and authorities to recognise the abilities of 
people with disabilities” and garner increased media attention (BFG 2008:3). As one 
Vietnamese journalist summarises, the status of people with disabilities has improved 
over the past decades for a variety of reasons, but crucially through the efforts of PWD  
to organise themselves into self-help groups, of which the Bright Future Group was the 
first (ThanhT 2010). In this way, the experiences of Bright Future members and other 
disability activists are emblematic of larger social and political changes and shifts in 
state-society relations in Vietnam (Vasiljev 2003:134). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
organisation set up in the early 1990s (TranH 2009) as a state response to independent veterans’ 
organising in Ho Chi Minh City (Abuza 2001:162-73). 
6 The Disability Forum (Diễn đ{n Người Khuyết tật Việt Nam) is an “information-sharing network” of self-
help groups and individual participants (IDEA, undated) that meets on a bi-monthly basis and maintains 
an e-mail list-serve. The forum evolved from an international NGO-led Disability Working Group that 
formed in the late 1990s, coordinated by Health Volunteers Overseas (HVO), who sought to transform the 
group into a Vietnamese-led network. HVO eventually localised their own operations, forming a local NGO, 
Inclusive Development Action (IDEA) in 2006. While the Forum and IDEA could be viewed as competing 
networks to the Bright Future Group in some respects, in fact the groups are closely connected. The 
Disability Forum coordinator during the HVO-led years was a BF member and is now serving as Bright 
Future’s chair. Several IDEA staff, including the recently-appointed executive director, are also BF 
members (V42). 
7 Bright Future Group has a stub Wikipedia page in English, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bright_Future_Group_for_People_with_Disabilities, with information 
gathered from secondary sources. 
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Network formation and history 
The Bright Future Group was formed in Hanoi in the mid-1980s by seven people with 
mobility impairments (four men, three women) who met while attending university in 
Hanoi. Five of the seven are still active; one has passed away (V47). Some members had 
known each other previously, even since childhood; for instance, the second chair went 
to school with the wife of the first chair, and two other members were neighbours 
growing up. As one of the seven founding members writes on the group’s website:  
I still remember like it was yesterday what it was like when we all first met 
each other. At that time, the spirit of renewal [dổi mới] was beginning to spread 
throughout the country, and international organisations began to enter 
Vietnam, among them Bread for the World [from then-West Germany]. They 
had a project with the National Economics University, and suggested that they 
might take a small part of the project funding to support an organisation of 
people with disabilities. So the school sent someone to look for one. They asked 
MOLISA, but received the response that there was no such organisation. They 
then went themselves to look for people with disabilities in Hanoi to gather 
together, and through contacts with a few friends who knew each other, we 
were all introduced to each other. The first meeting was at Mr. H.’s house, there 
were five of us… (BFG 2010a) 
Initially, members supported each other to find work and earn income, a difficult task 
for all Hanoians in the 1980s, especially for people with disabilities who faced many 
social barriers to inclusion (V18). In 1988, the seven original members decided to form a 
club and elected one member as chair.  
The idea to form an association of people with disabilities was H.’s. Everybody 
supported it. We wrote up by-laws and submitted a letter to the Hanoi People’s 
Committee [city government] and MOLISA. With the enthusiasm of youth, we 
even thought we could ‘pressure’ the ministry into forming a national 
association, as Mr. T. [another of the group] put it! The ministry sent one 
person down to meet us. Because the conditions in Vietnam were not yet ripe, 
they didn’t agree with our request. After that H. sent a letter to the People’s 
Committee asking to set up a Hanoi Association of Disabled Intellectuals. They 
also refused and said we could only form a group or a club among ourselves.  
We were all disappointed by this. But then Ms. T. said, ‘Well, we’ve already 
formed a club, haven’t we? Let’s just go ahead and keep meeting at H.’s house!’ 
Every holiday or special occasion we all got together and shared among 
ourselves, anyone who had difficulties got support and advice from the others. 
The name ‘Bright Future Group’ didn’t appear until 1995… [when] we applied 
to register with the Hanoi Support Association for Handicapped and Orphans [a 
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government-organised NGO].8 The leadership board of the Association helped 
us heartily, especially the chair, Ms. C…  
[From that point on,] the main activities of the group aimed at influencing the 
legal documents and policies of the state about disability issues, among them 
the Ordinance on Disabled Persons [1998] issued by the National Assembly 
Committee on Social Affairs, the construction standards of the Ministry of 
Construction relating to accessibility, and other policies to improve awareness 
and inclusion of the disabled. (BFG 2010a) 
From 1995 onwards, BFG transformed from a personal network of people with 
disabilities to a civil society network advocating for disability rights. This intent was 
present in the group at its founding, but an expanded role only became possible in the 
mid-1990s due to established trust among members, support from government 
agencies, and international exposure. A key indicator of this change was the naming of 
the network as “Bright Future Group,” which happened in response to external 
opportunities: “Other people wanted to work with us, and we needed our own identity 
for that” (V18). When opportunities became available, members had already been 
meeting together regularly for at least seven years, forming a reserve of social capital. As 
a result, funding and international travel were not viewed primarily as means for 
individual advancement, but rather were shared as a contribution to the whole group.9  
Network membership and structure 
Bright Future’s membership has varied somewhat over time, but remained small: about 
20 members at any given time, with a core group of ten who are most active (V43); the 
current membership of 30 includes a number of new, younger people (V42,V55). All 
membership is on an individual, voluntary basis, and almost all members have full-time, 
outside jobs; BFG has never employed staff, and there is no permanent office. At one 
                                                        
8 According to Vietnamese regulations, legal registration via a government-affiliated organisation is 
required in order to open a bank account and receive foreign funds (SRV 2003, Decree 88, Articles 22-3). 
In the mid-1990s, there were few options to do this; now there are more. In Vietnamese terms, BFG didn’t 
have its own “red stamp”, and had to ask to borrow someone else’s. 
9 This organic experience contrasts with donor-initiated networks (Desmond et al 2007); see pp. 85-6.  
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point in the 1990s, many members lived together in a rented house, but this ended when 
external funding for the facility ran out (V42). Some members are government 
employees, including teachers; others are in business, others staff of local or 
international NGOs. The group appreciates this diversity and uses it consciously. The 
level of joint decision making is high, even about members’ jobs: members talk about 
“assigning” or “seconding” members to work in different organisations (V18). BF 
members are represented in most of the key local and international NGOs working on 
disability issues in Hanoi, as well as within several government ministries. 
Members and outsiders alike agree that the main characteristic of Bright Future, 
compared to other disability groups, is that its members are educated intellectuals, an 
exception in a society in which most PWD have had limited opportunities for education 
(V40,V42,V43,V54). Almost without exception, BF members have mild to moderate 
mobility impairments: paraplegics, polio victims, amputees, and people with cerebral 
palsy. Most get around using wheelchairs, adapted three-wheeled motorbikes or 
motorbike taxis. Compared with most PWD in Vietnam, BF members could be 
considered an elite, relatively advantaged group, though none is rich by local standards. 
All members have engaged in national and international disability advocacy, and each is 
“an example of special effort to integrate into mainstream society” (BFG 2008). It is this 
combination of success, commitment and vision among the core group that has attracted 
new members to join the network (V42). 
Membership in Bright Future is a core part of members’ identities, even a life-changing 
event: “My life used to be concentrated only on my family and relatives,” says one 
member who joined around 2000.  
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Since I’ve participated in the group, I feel like I have a new life. I consider the 
group is my second home. I love participating in group activities and do 
everything to the utmost of my effort. The first time I came to a meeting, I just 
sat there and didn’t say anything, but I still really liked it.... [Now] when I 
conduct training on forming self-help groups, I always share my own personal 
experience: from a person confined to my family, I’ve become a specialist in my 
work. Through the group’s activities, I am more aware of my rights and more 
self-confident. (V43)  
The network’s structure is horizontal and democratic, with key decisions voted on by all 
members at quarterly business meetings. These gatherings are usually held at members’ 
houses or in a meeting room borrowed from another organisation (V68). An Executive 
Committee is elected every two years in accordance with the network’s by-laws, 
consisting of a chair, two deputies, a secretary and an accountant (V18). There have 
been three chairs over time: one man and two women. The current chair, serving since 
2006, is in her thirties. The first two chairs, both original founding members, are now 
serving as president and vice-president of DPO Hanoi. In February 2010, Bright Future 
elected a new Executive Committee, with only the chair continuing from the previous 
committee.  
Some significant differences exist between older and younger members, a reflection of 
social and economic changes in Vietnam since the 1980s. Members identify three 
generations in all: the original founding members are the first generation, now in their 
50s and 60s; a second generation joined in the mid-1990s and are now mostly in their 
30s; and the third generation in their 20s has joined recently (V42). All of the new 
Executive Committee officers come from the younger generation (BFG 2010c), a shift 
that older members have supported (V42). As the first chair stated in an online 
interview, “the contribution from the younger generation is always present in all 
periods; some even are better than the senior members. I believe that it is time for the 
younger generation to grow up and replace their predecessors” (ThanhT 2010). 
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While younger members consider themselves part of a network (V42,V55), older 
members refer to themselves as a “group” or a “club” (V47). This is largely a linguistic 
issue: the term “network” has only been widely applied to social groups in Vietnam for 
the last five years or so; BFG’s existence far predates this.10 Over time, the network’s 
structure has evolved from a tight personal network (at left below) to a more expanded 
structure (centre and right):11  
Figure 4.1 Bright Future network structures over time 
 
Communication among network members is mostly by e-mail and via a phone tree 
structure. As the network is in a large city, access to computers and phones is not a 
difficulty (V18), but transportation for PWD can be a challenge, and face-to-face 
meetings have become less frequent as members have busier schedules (V54). The 
                                                        
10 See chapter 2, p. 66. 
11 The network maps in each case study are approximate for purposes of illustration. Connections among 
members are based on general impressions from interviews, not actual observation or quantifiable 
demonstration of network ties. As in Figure 1.1, men are represented by triangles and women by circles. 
The chair of the network at each stage is shaded. Each diagram was discussed and developed with several 
network members during interviews. 
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executive committee is in touch on a daily basis. Members are expected to attend 
quarterly meetings and contribute small monthly dues according to the network’s 
financial regulations (V18). Dues have been collected since the start of the network, 
beginning at 10,000 dong per month (about 75p at 1990s’ exchange rates) and now 
increased slightly to 150,000 dong per year. This is easily within members’ ability to 
pay. Several members who have been “assigned” or “seconded” to jobs have contributed 
10% of salaries they earn to the network (V42), a unique practice among Vietnamese 
civil society groups. 
The network has faced challenges in recruiting new members. Some members feel the 
younger generation of PWD, having grown up in a period of rapid socio-economic 
development and expanding opportunities, is less committed to the cause of disability 
rights:  
For several years now we have tried to invite more young people with 
disabilities to participate, but this is very hard… Before, there were some 
people who applied to join the group but thought that as members they would 
get benefits for themselves. When they realised that they had to pay their own 
motorbike taxi fares to come to meetings, they got bored and left the group. 
(V42)  
Others were invited to join, but declined because they were not interested in a group 
that was made up only of other people with disabilities (V43). Naturally, when the group 
looked for new members, they tended to identify people similar to themselves – well-
educated and mobility-impaired – which also may have limited their success. Some 
younger people are hesitant to join a group with many mature members, especially as 
more student groups of PWD have now formed. To address these issues, BFG is working 
to build links with younger groups and improve its media outreach to attract broad 
participation from PWD in the city (V42). Bright Future is also implementing a new 
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project to operate an Independent Living Centre for PWD in Hanoi.12 Unlike previous BF 
initiatives, the Centre emphasises the needs of people with severe disabilities who are 
not able to take care of themselves (BFG 2008).  
Advocacy strategies 
Bright Future’s public description on its Vietnamese-language website presents the 
group’s mission and objectives as follows (BFG 2010b): 
(1) Encouraging people with disabilities to live independently, and removing 
social barriers and prejudice against PWD;  
(2) Creating opportunities for vocational training for PWD in information 
technology, foreign languages and other areas, and encouraging PWD to 
contribute to social action;  
(3) Exchange information and promote social awareness for PWD to integrate 
into their communities. 
In an interview, one of the founding members gives a slightly different, more advocacy-
centred version of these three main objectives (V18):  
(1) Raise awareness of PWD and of society on disability issues;  
(2) PWD help each other to share information and educate themselves;  
(3) Build an accessible society that eliminates obstacles for PWD. 
Of eight main activities listed in the network’s public materials (BFG 2010b), six include 
advocacy components: lobbying for policy change, advocacy on behalf of constituents for 
better policy implementation, and support to implementing state services. Bright Future 
members and other disability activists frequently use the term “awareness raising”13 as 
a synonym for a form of advocacy towards both authorities and public attitudes. 
Activities to “disseminate” information and policies can be interpreted in the same 
fashion. 
                                                        
12 The Independent Living Centre opened in 2009 and is jointly sponsored by the Nippon Foundation and 
the Disabled People’s Organisation in Asia Pacific (DPIAP) through 2011 (Tharp 2009). 
13 Nâng cao nhận thức, literally “increasing knowledge”, sometimes also referred to, especially by older 
members, as tuyên truyền (“propaganda”), a term used by the Party-state in its original (positive) 
meaning. 
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In interviews, BFG members use terms such as “policy advocacy” (vận động chính sách), 
“movement” and “civil society” that do not appear on their website. They express more 
clearly that policy advocacy is their priority and main contribution, while projects and 
direct support come second (V42,V43). “Our group members are educated people with 
access to information, so we are able to contribute to policy. All important legal 
documents like the Ordinance on Disability include opinions from our group” (V42). As 
with the differing versions of the group’s objectives cited above, this should be 
understood as a deliberate decision to adjust wording to suit different audiences. 
Nothing is left out or changed in public materials, only presented in different terms or in 
a different order.14  
The denial of legal recognition from state authorities in 1988 forced BF members to 
postpone their plans for expanding into a larger association. By the mid-1990s, official 
attitudes had loosened, and BFG was allowed to register as a subsidiary of a GONGO. 
Advocacy and cultivation of important relationships, as with Ms. C. at the Association of 
Support for Vietnamese Handicapped and Orphans (ASVHO)15 cited above, also 
contributed to changed government responses. Registration gave the network standing 
to participate in policy discussions: 
The drawback was that we didn’t have our own stamp or legal identity and had 
to go through the Support Association for everything. But the good part was 
that as members of the association, we got invited to meetings, conferences and 
workshops. If we hadn’t [registered], there’s no way the authorities would have 
paid attention to us. When we went to meetings, we spoke out about the needs 
of people with disabilities, such as going to school and getting a job. The 
officials may not have liked it, but they had to listen to us. Even if they didn’t 
listen a lot, they had to listen a little. Our voice was weak at first, but over time 
                                                        
14 This re-wording is closer to the concept of “framing” in social movement studies than it is to “self-
imposed censorship” (see p. 113). 
15 The Association of Support for Vietnamese Handicapped and Orphans (Hội Bảo trợ người tàn tật và trẻ 
mồ côi Việt Nam) was set up as a GONGO in 1992. In the view of one BF member, this was in part intended 
to compensate for the government’s initial refusal to register Bright Future (V41).  
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we had more quality. Our understanding kept improving, and our analysis got 
better too. (V41) 
Close connections with authorities are a prerequisite to engage in this form of 
advocacy.16 The Bright Future Group is embedded in the state system in two ways: first, 
it is registered as part of an official association, and second, some of its members are 
themselves current or former state employees. One BF member has also participated as 
a member of the NCCD executive committee since 2001 (BFG 2010a). Yet the network as 
a whole, and its members as individuals, make their own decisions and express their 
views without state control. Despite their close connection with ASVHO over the years, 
for instance, BF members have no hesitation in criticising the group in print for focusing 
too much on individual charity, rather than support to disabled people’s organisations 
and collective efforts (ThanhT 2010). Advocacy has taken place through three main 
channels: direct contact with government officials, complaints and petitions, and 
through workshops and events held together with international partners.  
All three channels were applied in a multi-year advocacy effort on national construction 
standards, first to include disability-related language in the standards, then to support 
their enforcement. One group member, who is an amputee, describes the beginning of 
this effort:  
Many of our group members are working in state agencies, even at the ministry 
level. We always talk about disability issues to everyone at every opportunity... 
The group makes copies of international documents, translates them and 
distributes to all participants at ministerial meetings... Since I work at the 
Ministry of Construction, I pay a lot of attention to [physical] accessibility. I’ve 
translated a lot of material from English to Vietnamese about this and written 
articles in specialised journals. At the ministry I often have the chance to meet 
leaders. One day (in 2000) I met Mr. L. who was Vice-Minister of Construction 
at the time. He told me that he was cooperating with Australia to develop 
national construction standards for Vietnam... I immediately said that there 
need to be standards relating to disabled accessibility in construction projects, 
                                                        
16 See p. 109. 
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and that this was a common international practice. He agreed and told me to 
get in touch with the drafting committee and research institutes. (V18) 
She introduced information provided by existing BF project partners in Hong Kong, 
Japan and the US, and was then invited to participate in a ministry delegation to the US 
for one month to look at US construction standards. This advocacy led to accessibility 
being included in construction standards issued in 2002, although enforcement remains 
a problem (V18).  
Bright Future members and other groups of PWD in Vietnam also made substantial 
contributions to the 2010 Law on People with Disabilities. BF members participated 
actively in online discussions and workshops leading up to the drafting of the law and 
commenting on MOLISA’s drafts, including events sponsored by NCCD, international 
NGOs, and United Nations agencies (V50).17 The Bright Future Group never sent 
coordinated comments as a network, which was perhaps a missed opportunity (V52), 
but members submitted individual comments and suggested additions and revisions to 
the draft law to DPO Hanoi, who collected their comments and sent them to the Drafting 
Committee. Not every comment was accepted, and the final law text omitted several 
points that BF members thought important and covered others in general language only 
(V42). However, feedback from PWD, including Bright Future members, verified that the 
law followed a rights-based approach and reflected priorities of people with disabilities, 
particularly on accessibility issues (V57). One result was that the name of the law was 
changed from tàn tật (“handicapped, crippled”) to khuyết tật (“disabled”), the term used 
by PWD themselves (V50); earlier legal documents used the older phrase even though 
                                                        
17 Similar events took place in China following the release of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
the Protection of Disabled Persons in 2008 (CANGO 2008:4). Both the Chinese and Vietnamese laws 
contain rights-based provisions in accordance with the 2007 UN Convention on the Rights of the Disabled, 
which both China and Vietnam have signed. 
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many PWD found this offensive. The law includes sections on independent living and on 
associations of the disabled, which have a specific function in “developing, monitoring 
and implementing policies and laws relating to people with disabilities” (National 
Assembly 2010, Article 9.1). PWD advocacy efforts also resulted in social welfare 
policies in the law being open to all PWD, not only those living beneath the poverty line 
(Article 44; V46).  
Bright Future members work both as individual activists and as part of a team. The 
network realises that some members have strengths in different areas of advocacy and 
seeks to bring all of these into play: “in order to influence a policy, many different sides 
need to join in, and every side will have its own way to make an impact” (V43). Some 
members speak in ways that officials want to hear, while others are more 
confrontational. “Within the group we have a division of labour. Some people who do not 
work for state agencies can speak out more strongly, while [those who do] have an 
advisory role” (V18). There are sometimes differences of opinion within the network, 
which tend to break down along generational lines and according to degrees of 
closeness or distance from the state. The Ministry of Construction employee, for 
instance, prefers face-to-face contacts with officials: advocacy requires knowing the 
right person and speaking at the right time. “Our group’s experience in policy advocacy 
is that we need to take advantage of access to state officials whenever we can, and need 
to build relationships (quan hệ = guanxi) with them. We also involve them in our project 
activities so that they understand more about the issues we want to affect” (V18). The 
head of the government’s drafting committee for the Disability Law appreciates this 
approach: “We are developing a legal system on the basis of rights, so people with 
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disabilities have the right to speak up... If people speak strongly, I think that’s a good 
thing, as it shows our society is developing” (V57). 
Not everyone in the Bright Future Group agrees. As a second-generation member puts it,  
The brothers and sisters in the first generation have a state mentality. Anything 
they do has to link to state agencies and seek permission in order to do 
anything. Those of us in the younger group have newer thinking and want to 
operate more independently. We think the state system works very slowly, 
asking permission for everything but taking a long time to make decisions, and 
this affects the quality of work. (V42) 
Yet this same member sees the value of varying roles within the group: 
The members of our group have different impact on policy depending on the 
strengths of each person. Mr. T. is an excellent speaker, so he always gets up to 
give speeches at public events. He used to work as a journalist so he has a lot of 
friends in the media... Ms. V. works for a ministry, so she has a lot of 
connections with other state agencies. I speak foreign languages so I am often 
in contact with foreign organisations. To impact policy, we need a lot of 
different paths. Our group doesn’t advocate only as a collective, but each 
member finds many ways and channels according to our own strengths. (V42)  
All of these techniques fit within the overall framework of embedded advocacy, 
summarised in the following tactics:   
Table 4.2 Advocacy tactics – Bright Future network 
Advocacy tactics Notes 
 Direct lobbying to officials 
 Letters, petitions, complaints 
 Speak at workshops, conferences 
 International travel  
 Form and register a membership 
association  
- Build a reputation as experts with access 
to specialised information, such as 
international contacts 
- Division of labour among group 
members according to comparative 
strengths 
- Use multiple methods to advocate on a 
single issue 
 Community advocacy: organise 
groups of PWD, support 
demonstrations 
- BF network plays supporting role to 
community –based groups 
Bright Future members realise that successful advocacy requires extending beyond their 
small membership. As one member describes, 
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When we engage in policy advocacy, my view is that we should select issues 
that relate to many people with disabilities, [issues where] we can have an 
impact, that don’t create large social conflicts and that can be accepted by the 
society. For instance, accessibility is a problem that affects many people with 
disabilities and doesn’t cause social conflict. While the problem of southern 
disabled veterans [not being recognised by the communist government] could 
easily lead to disputes, so we don’t advocate about that. We have to reach out to 
people with disabilities in the community and create a strong collective voice. 
(V41)  
This awareness has led Bright Future members in several directions in the last five 
years. International linkages have been an important aspect of the network since the 
mid-1990s and have continued to strengthen. At the same time, the founding members 
have been able to achieve their long-held goal of establishing a membership association, 
diffusing the Bright Future model throughout Vietnam. Meanwhile, some younger 
members have begun community organising among PWD, including on some 
controversial issues. In this way, they have taken steps away from embeddedness and 
towards a more community-based strategy. These activities have contributed to 
network effectiveness in the three senses of achieving policy objectives, growth and 
sustainability of the network, and affecting political space.  
International linkages 
Bright Future’s advocacy is supported and enabled by connections with international 
NGOs and organisations, as well as with regional and global disability networks. INGOs 
frequently invite BFG members to lead training courses and speak at conferences, which 
gives them credibility and face with Vietnamese authorities. “When there are 
conferences and workshops organised with government partners, the foreign 
organisations often demand that PWD are present, and this gives us an opportunity to 
speak” (V18). Through international projects, PWD and government policy-makers have 
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multiple chances to interact, and this helps to increase knowledge and awareness among 
both groups (V46).  
Travel to international conferences has been a significant advocacy opportunity for BFG 
members not only to meet foreign partners, but also, ironically, to engage with 
Vietnamese government officials on a more equal basis.  
The Ministry of Health had been implementing a community-based 
rehabilitation programme since the 1990s, but hadn’t invited our group to 
participate. However, on one international trip to attend a conference, Ministry 
of Health staff and Bright Future Group members both attended, and we met 
each other there and got to know each other. After that, the Ministry staff 
invited our group to participate…so we could raise the voices of people with 
disabilities. (V18)  
Another member adds, 
Since we’ve been able to go to international and regional conferences…we’ve 
learned more about disability movements in other countries, and gradually 
we’ve also learned how to write proposals, manage projects, and about the 
rights of people with disabilities. We’ve also studied books and documents so 
we know more information about disability and international experience. That 
way, when we go to meetings we can speak up strongly, and people will listen 
to us. (V41) 
Bright Future members view their links with regional disability networks and 
international NGOs as important primarily for exposure and contacts. Funding is a 
secondary benefit, in many cases small: several hundred dollars to attend a workshop, a 
few thousand for a training programme. BFG has received international funding on 
numerous occasions since the mid-1990s and has relied on these grants to carry out 
most of the activities listed above, as membership dues and other local contributions are 
hardly sufficient for the network to operate. But this funding has not been essential to 
forming or sustaining the network, which has remained internally driven. Instead, 
international organisations served as instigators, bridges and brokers, even unwittingly, 
as in the first effort from Bread for the World. In one case, funding from one 
organisation was used to leverage additional funds from other sources:  
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In 1995, with the permission of MOLISA, we received support from an 
American NGO, CRS to send two members, Ms. V. and Ms. H., to attend a 
conference on women with disabilities in the Asia Pacific [in Thailand]… It was 
at that conference that we raised funds from Hong Kong and Japan for language 
and computer teaching. This project contributed a lot to the development of our 
group. (BFG 2010a) 
Many donors explicitly do not fund international conference attendance and study tours, 
preferring to support discrete projects that can be measured and have set outcomes; but 
Bright Future’s experience shows that this can be short-sighted. The UN conference trip  
was very meaningful for me… It was the first time that I knew there was a UN 
Decade of the Disabled, that there were self-help groups of people with 
disabilities [in other countries], that there were so many international 
conventions and documents about the rights of persons with disabilities, and 
that there was an international and regional disability movement... It was also 
the first time I met funders and heard about regional NGO networks. (V18)  
In such ways, diffusion from disability movements in Asia, Europe and the USA has had 
significant influence on Vietnamese organisations and networks (Vasiljev 2003:141).18 
But in BFG’s experience, the impact of international funding has been mixed, presenting 
opportunities for advocacy and mobilisation of new members, but also management 
challenges. Most donors will only fund projects to provide services, not general support 
funds for advocacy. Some BF members’ ability to speak foreign languages and 
communicate well with donors enabled them to attract exposure and funding, but 
without a strong organisational structure, their actual project activities were not 
sustainable and ended after the funding ran out (V40). Speaking about disability self-
help groups generally, one BF member notes,  
People start participating for the personal, non-material benefits it brings them. 
But many people also want a little material benefit. When there is a project that 
supports a little of these costs, then everybody is motivated, but when the 
project ends members are no longer very interested. Almost all groups face 
these difficulties with funding, and no one has found a way out yet. (V43)  
                                                        
18 However, some regional and global disability networks use more confrontational advocacy tactics than 
BFG has adopted. For instance, Thai blind activists blocked a railroad near the office of the Asia-Pacific 
Development Centre on Disability (APCD) in Bangkok to protest government policies in 2005, leading to 
mass arrests (Buntan 2005). Korean and Japanese activists, similarly, use rhetoric and methods that are 
prevalent in the militant labour and human rights groups in their countries. 
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Network effectiveness: Policy change 
In the examples of accessible construction standards and development of the Disability 
Law cited above, Bright Future members leveraged their links with government 
ministries and diplomatic skills to promote policy change through an embedded 
strategy. The benefits and limitations of this strategy appear in sharper relief in a 
contentious episode in 2007. On 29 June, the Vietnamese government issued a 
regulation (SRV 2007b) restricting the registration and circulation of certain motorised 
vehicles under the pretext of “controlling transport accidents and traffic jams.” 
Previously, three-wheeled carts (xe ba bánh)19 had been exempt from licensing 
requirements; many are driven by disabled veterans who proudly note their status on 
the back of their vehicles. As traffic problems have increased in Vietnamese cities, 
however, these slow vehicles, including more than 2,000 in Hanoi alone, became a target 
for regulators.20 Under the new rules, all vehicles self-assembled by PWD were to be 
banned by 1 January 2008. PWD were also required to obtain driving licences, show 
evidence of “health”, register their vehicles (including motorised wheelchairs) and pass 
inspection “to assure sufficient quality, technical safety and environmental protection” 
(IDEA 2008). These requirements were perceived by PWD as highly burdensome and 
discriminatory.  
The regulations were issued in spite of earlier protests by disabled veterans. In March 
2007, the Ministry of Transport issued a letter requesting the Ministry of Public Security 
to ban three-wheeled vehicles. This led to an immediate response from members of the 
                                                        
19 These vehicles are similar to tuk-tuks or samlors in other Southeast Asian countries, but are used solely 
to transport goods. 
20 This has also been the case in China, where since 2000 most cities have banned motorised tricycles for 
passenger transport, putting many people with disabilities out of work (ChenX 2007:258). 
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Association of Disabled Veteran Drivers (Hội Anh em Thương Binh vận hành xe ba bánh), 
who drove their vehicles to block the entrance of the Ministry on 7 March (Thuy and 
Anh 2007).21 Facing a lack of response from authorities, the frustration and anger in the 
disability network grew. 
  
Drivers of three-wheeled vehicles occupy the entrance and parking lot of the Ministry of Transport, 6 March 
2007 (Source: http://vietbao.vn) 
In a letter to Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, Bright Future members used reason and 
persuasion. Three-wheeled drivers were mostly veterans and PWD over the age of 50. If 
the state forced them to stop using their own vehicles to carry goods, it was not realistic 
that they could get another job. The letter went unanswered. “[The authorities] are 
really hesitant to answer in writing – then they have to assume responsibility” (V47). 
When it looked like the ban would proceed, the Hanoi Association of PWD compiled 
statements and views into a packet that was shared with the Hanoi People’s Committee 
and other authorities, along with recommendations (V18).  
                                                        
21 In a similar case in Hunan province, China, disabled and non-disabled tricycle drivers organised protests 
at a district government in November 2000. When there was no reply from the authorities, 44 PWD 
occupied a government office overnight (ChenX 2007:258-9). 
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However, the leading role in the contentious episode was not played by BF members but 
by a group of 200 veterans who were drivers of three-wheeled vehicles. As one activist 
describes, 
In an NCCD meeting, the Ministry of Transport spokesperson…didn’t pay 
attention to people with disabilities and reaffirmed the decision [to ban three-
wheeled vehicles]. In Vietnam, debating legislation doesn’t get you anywhere. 
But when the group of drivers decided to get together, they circled their 
vehicles to block streets in several locations; the largest was several hundred 
vehicles in front of the National Assembly’s public reception office near the Ho 
Chi Minh Mausoleum.22 When they took strong steps like that, then the Ministry 
of Transport had to listen to them. They really knew how to struggle! When [the 
drivers] got up to speak, they didn’t say they opposed the law, but said they 
need support in order to work. Three-wheeled vehicles are our means to earn a 
living! If you ban them, then arrange some other jobs for us to do. So for more 
than a year now, the law has been suspended and people are still using three-
wheeled vehicles to make a living.   
Through this case, we can see that the self-initiating character of the masses23 is 
still stronger. This is their life, no one was able to help them, so they had to 
organise themselves to help each other. All the three-wheeled drivers know 
each other and they agreed to park their vehicles in certain places. Then they 
met and discussed what they would do. They were even prepared to take more 
drastic measures. If after this episode, their vehicles were still banned, they 
were ready to keep opposing until the end. The people in the Association of 
PWD just talked about it, they didn’t do anything strong like that. (V40) 
Bright Future members confirmed this account: 
IDEA and the Disability Forum organised a meeting and invited many groups to 
participate, including three-wheeled drivers. After this meeting, we drafted a 
petition that many people signed.… It was the drivers themselves who were the 
most heavily involved. They organised a demonstration with a lot of people and 
generated a lot of pressure [on the Ministry of Transport]. At the end, the state 
had to cancel their plans to carry out this unjust regulation. In addition the 
media was also very active. (V43)  
The DPO Hanoi vice-chair, by contrast, supports “policy advocacy through constructive 
means”, defending the use of a written petition to the Ministry of Transport “even 
though there were some groups who were organising in the style of a demonstration. 
The Association’s view is to work together with government and local mass 
                                                        
22 On Ba Dinh Square, the political centre of power in Vietnam (Thomas 2001). These demonstrations 
occurred in December 2007, shortly before the ban was to take effect, with the largest on 31 December 
(V42). 
23 One doesn’t often hear revolutionary-sounding rhetoric like this in Vietnam these days, especially with 
Trotskyist overtones. The speaker, who is not a BF member, is in his 60s and obviously lived through what 
Vietnamese euphemistically call the “subsidised period”, but his views are still unusual (and in a way 
refreshing).  
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organisations [to solve problems]” (V18). Other Bright Future members, however, did 
not find this convincing, saying the DPO leaders were “thinking like officials” (V42) and 
“didn’t have much of a voice” about the issue (V43). 
Bright Future members went ahead with a multiple-channel strategy. In addition to 
letter-writing, one member spoke out in an NCCD meeting on 21 December 2007 that 
included participation from the Ministry of Public Security (V42).24 Another member 
worked on a small World Bank-funded project on traffic safety for PWD that included a 
television programme, which she used to engage a Ministry of Transport official in 
dialogue about the three-wheeled vehicle issue. A third member was working at IDEA 
and organised a forum of PWD about the issue (V42). Many PWD learned about the case 
online; information got out to people on time, and activists used media effectively (V11). 
At the last minute, the government compromised, issuing a joint circular on 31 
December 2007 postponing the ban, initially for a one-year period. Furthermore, owners 
of three-wheeled vehicles were awarded cash support of up to 5 million dong (£160) to 
upgrade their vehicles to meet the standards.25  
The successful reversal of the ban on three-wheeled vehicles came about through “a 
mixture of push and pull factors” (V46), with various actors stressing different 
approaches. According to one BF member, meetings were more important than 
demonstrations overall: the protest actions forced the government to pay attention, but 
didn’t explain the positions of PWD (V42). An outside observer, however, believes the 
                                                        
24 Contrary to what external observers might assume, in this case Public Security was generally 
sympathetic to the drivers, while the Ministry of Transport was the most hard-line (V42). 
25 In the Chinese case referenced earlier, the local government also agreed to compensate drivers at a 
roughly similar level, though without rescinding the ban on three-wheeled vehicles (ChenX 2007:259). 
While the facts of the two cases appear remarkably similar overall, the Chinese writer concludes that 
“disruptive behaviour” was the main cause leading to government concessions, while “obedient tactics” 
helped to sustain the movement (277), a somewhat different conclusion than I reach here. 
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drivers’ demonstration was the critical turning point, since it was led by war veterans, a 
group the government was afraid to offend. The drivers also had sympathetic allies 
within NCCD and the Ministry of Transport, which helped to prevent any negative 
consequences from their protest actions (V50). Either community-based or embedded 
advocacy alone might have been insufficient to reverse the outcome, but the combined 
pressure from institutional and extra-institutional sources proved effective. 
One BF member reflected afterwards, “We didn’t discuss any of this in advance, but 
everyone used his or her own position to engage in policy advocacy” (V42). Although 
members stress their unity and high level of internal agreement (V42,V54), outsiders 
see less coordination of messages and perceive that most activism is carried out by 
individuals, not in the name of the Bright Future Group. This may be due to the fact that 
some members have strong individual voices and also due to differences in opinion and 
strategy within the network (V52). “Through this incident, the network also learned 
some experiences that we need to gather opinions from everyone in the [disability] 
community first, then need to outline who will meet whom and what they should say. At 
the moment, we’re still acting too separately” (V43).  
Network effectiveness: Sustainability  
Expanding their group to form an association of PWD was a Bright Future objective from 
the beginning. BF members, especially the more government-connected of them, 
reasoned that if women, veterans, and other social groups could have associations to 
represent them, then people with disabilities should also be able to register (V41). The 
formation of self-help groups into a national association, says the first BFG chair, enables 
outreach and support to PWD in all provinces who are interested in learning from BFG’s 
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model. “When people with disabilities recognise their benefits in joining activities...the 
disability movement [will] spread widely” (quoted in ThanhT 2010). There were also 
possible sensitivities in organising an association. Other social groups had mass 
organisations set up for them by the Party; would people with disabilities be thought 
“too self-important” for organising their own? And, keeping the Veterans Association in 
mind, what about Southern veterans? They fought for the other side, but many of them 
were disabled too; should they be included in a disabled people’s association? “In the 
past, people would have said no. But now the situation had changed. We didn’t hear 
anyone mention these sensitive issues anymore” (V41). 
Bright Future activists learned from their international exposure that all other ASEAN 
member states, plus China, South Korea and Japan already had national associations of 
the disabled (V41), more or less autonomous depending on each country’s political 
situation (United Nations 2006).26 Vietnam had no such association, despite a robust 
system of government-organised associations and Vietnamese people’s high level of 
participation in social groups (Dalton and Ong 2004:3-4). BF members also realised that 
international funding would one day end and thought it desirable to attract Vietnamese 
government funding at least for certain core activities (V18). The fact that by registering 
as a social organisation, the Hanoi Association of PWD would also be subject to 
heightened government regulation did not bother the organisers greatly, although some 
realised that by accepting city subsidies for their office, it did affect their ability to 
oppose city policies (V41). They focused instead on the increased opportunities for 
advocacy, “to be an intermediary between the government and people with disabilities. 
                                                        
26 For instance, the China Disabled Persons Federation (残联), a GONGO led by Deng Xiaoping’s son Deng 
Pufang, held its fifth national congress at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing in November 2008, several 
days before the much more modest BFG anniversary celebration in Hanoi (DingQW 2008:75). 
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If there is a new policy, the government will ask the Association to consult and submit 
opinions, or we will provide recommendations on our own” (V18). 
In 2005, recognising that political opportunities had shifted in their favour, BFG 
members worked with other self-help groups of PWD and city authorities to initiate the 
establishment of a Hanoi Association of PWD. They succeeded in raising funds from the 
Danish Society of Polio and Accident Victims (PTU) to set up the association. Their 
application to the Hanoi People’s Committee was approved, and the Hanoi Association of 
PWD held its founding conference in April 2006. BFG became the core of DPO Hanoi, 
owing to their recognised status in the disability community, as well as their levels of 
education, communication skills and connections with government and international 
organisations (V40). One could say this was pre-ordained, as BFG managed the funding 
that was used to set up the Association.27 The first chair of BFG was elected president, 
and four other BF members were elected as vice-chair and executive committee 
members (BFG 2010a). Leadership positions are unsalaried, as is required by law (SRV 
2003), but the Association has recruited two full-time and at least one part-time staff for 
projects funded by PTU and the International Labour Organisation (V42). The 
Association has set up branches in 17 of Hanoi’s 29 urban and peri-urban districts. In all, 
the association’s members include 3,000 out of an estimated 28,000 PWD in Hanoi 
(TrungT 2010; V18). Increasing membership is a key priority, among other reasons for 
stronger advocacy with local authorities, although the president states “[we are] not 
running after quantity [alone], because our first and the most important principle is that 
everyone should be voluntary” (ThanhT 2010).  
                                                        
27 Danish funding was also used to organise training courses for Association members and to publish the 
Association’s newsletter, Nắng Xuân (Spring Sunshine). A new phase of PTU support began in 2009 to 
expand the Association into additional new districts in Hanoi (Embassy of Denmark 2010). 
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As of April 2010, Bright Future is one of 37 organisational members of DPO Hanoi, each 
with one seat on the executive committee (V18). In an intriguing symbiotic relationship, 
BF is now legally part of the Association, while the Association is itself a product of BF, is 
led by BF members and constitutes one of the advocacy channels that BF members use. 
Rather than being subject to the tight management of its parent association, as 
Vietnamese regulations appear to stipulate (Sidel 2010), Bright Future has effectively 
set up and colonised its own GONGO, while continuing to operate independently in other 
areas. As one member describes, “The Association and Bright Future are almost like one 
entity... The association is a big tree, and our group is its largest root” (V42). A writer in 
the Association’s magazine argues that DPO Hanoi, with its multiple sub-associations, 
“has been established in a systematic way” and meets the “three deciding factors for the 
success of a network”: legitimacy, a strategic plan and fixed leadership (TrungT 
2010:34,36). 
From their new position in the Hanoi Association, BF members next began advocating 
for the establishment of a national disabled people’s organisation. Local networks and 
self-help groups of PWD have formed in many, though not all, Vietnamese cities and 
provinces over the past decade. Some of these groups exist informally, while others are 
registered with local governments or mass organisations. BF members drew on their 
own experiences of empowerment and personal change to mobilise others to join DPOs 
(TrungT 2009), particularly in the north, through an earlier INGO-funded project, as 
individual consultants and staff of local and international NGOs and more recently as 
part of the Hanoi Association of PWD. Dense network activity has also taken place in Ho 
Chi Minh City around two major nodes, Disability Resource and Development (DRD) 
linked to the Open University, and the HCMC Club of Disabled Youth, linked to the Youth 
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Union (IDEA 2009). The spreading of the network to other provinces also contributes 
toward resolving a perceived urban bias in organising among the disabled in Vietnam 
(Vasiljev 2003:146). As of July 2010, 15 provinces and cities have DPOs, and more will 
be formed after the formation of the national association, which is currently in process 
awaiting final approval by the government and the confirmation of a suitable president 
(V57). 
Efforts to set up DPO Hanoi and a national association have never faced serious 
opposition. However, bureaucratic procedures take significant amounts of time, and 
many different ministries and branches of government need to sign off on the plan 
(V57). The longest-running disability-related association, the Vietnam Blind 
Association,28 showed little enthusiasm for a national disability association.29 Other 
groups of PWD, such as the Hanoi Deaf Club, have participated actively (V18). Financing 
of a national association is also a consideration, as the Vietnamese government appears 
to have neither the funds nor the inclination to provide direct funding for the 
Association in the long run (V40). DPO leaders differentiate themselves from GONGOs, 
stating that their salaries are not paid by the government and that they are therefore 
able to represent their membership constituency more independently (V18). The Bright 
Future Group has been remarkably able to contain different approaches to organising 
                                                        
28 The Vietnam Blind Association (Hội Người Mù) was established in 1969 with initial support from 
fraternal socialist countries. Unlike other disability groups, it has long-term sources of funding from 
European donors and from the Vietnamese government, which has paid salaries of association leaders 
(V40). 
29 In 2007-08, I attended several NCCD meetings in which Blind Association representatives asked why 
the formation of a PWD Association was urgent, necessary or desirable, and pointed out that the Blind 
Association already had local chapters in over 40 provinces, while PWD Associations existed at that time 
only in a handful of places. It was clear that their main objection was that the Blind Association would lose 
its status as a separate association and would instead become a member of the PWD Association.  
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within its own membership, and has thus contributed to cooperation and conflict 
reduction among different strands of the disability movement. 
Over time, the example of Bright Future has spread by diffusion to other parts of 
Vietnam: 
At first there was just our group up north and the Disabled Youth Club down in 
the south. Gradually other people with disabilities heard information about us, 
then held meetings of the disabled in all parts of the country, so people with 
disabilities in the provinces also formed groups. Then there were international 
projects that helped support them too. When you add it all up, awareness in 
society has really changed, and the awareness of people with disabilities 
ourselves has changed too. (V41) 
The Bright Future model has been replicated widely, including to student groups and 
local NGOs (V52). BFG members are optimistic about their network’s continuity. “I think 
in the future the Bright Future Group will continue to exist. We will continue to 
contribute many voices...” (V42).  
In the future, we still have to continue policy advocacy and awareness raising 
towards the society and authorities. Many people ask why we have to keep on 
raising awareness for such a long time! I reply “because awareness sometimes 
rises but sometimes falls”! One important contribution of the Bright Future 
Group is to help change the image of people with disabilities and change social 
attitudes about people with disabilities. (V43)  
But the same member also adds a cautionary note: “If group members lack commitment, 
then it will be hard to preserve the reputation of the Bright Future Group. For many 
years, we have been considered pioneers in the disability movement, but now we don’t 
yet have a new direction” (V43).  
Network effectiveness: Political space 
While Bright Future members have made conscious decisions to engage in advocacy, 
they rarely speak of their work as political.30 “We don’t do politics,” says one member. 
“In other countries, where there may be many parties, what we do might be political, but 
                                                        
30 See p. 7 for meanings of the “political” in Vietnamese discourse. 
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in Vietnam the idea of politics is different” (V54). As one donor representative with long 
experience in the sector notes, the fact that disability issues are generally not considered 
“sensitive” makes advocacy on these issues acceptable while other rights-based claims 
might be restricted by the state (V50). A BF member says, “we pay attention to anything 
that is relevant to us. But if the question is who becomes prime minister, then we don’t 
care much about that, since we can’t affect this anyway” (V42). 
If “political civil society” is equated with dissidence and political opposition (Thayer 
2009), then disability rights advocacy does not qualify. But in a broader definition of 
politics as a process of public deliberation31, which would be shared by most 
international disability activists, Bright Future’s advocacy activities certainly do qualify. 
Given that BFG members seek equal rights and inclusion for PWD, their choices of 
embedded and community-based advocacy strategies are appropriate for the network’s 
goals. Even if some individual BFG members might like to see larger changes in their 
political system, the main goal of their advocacy is not to replace the system, but rather 
to join it. 
Aware of the broader political context, Bright Future members have generally chosen 
low profile tactics (V41), keeping their distance from transgressive actions such as the 
2007 three-wheeled protests as well as from the large public rallies (mít-tinh)32 
organised by ASVHO and other mass organisations on International Disability Day (3 
December) and Vietnamese Disability Day (18 April). The Bright Future name is not 
                                                        
31 See p. 7. 
32 The mít-tinh, which constitutes part of the Vietnamese repertoire of collective action, originates from a 
19th century French borrowing of the English “meeting”. In contrast to political demonstrations (biểu tình), 
these rallies are typically highly staged events, lacking spontaneity or participatory character, as in 
traditional Communist Party propaganda events (Woodside 1976:266). Holding a (legal) mít-tinh in 
contemporary Vietnam requires a permit from local authorities, which can be issued or denied arbitrarily 
(US Department of State 2009:12-3). 
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frequently used in advocacy efforts, with many members acting under the auspices of 
DPO Hanoi, NCCD or the Disability Forum. After the formation of DPO Hanoi, the status 
of BFG appeared “smaller by comparison”, and it was often more advantageous to use 
the name of the Association (V42). As noted with previous public statements by the 
group, there is no evidence here of “self-censorship”, but rather smart strategising.  
 
Bright Future Group members and NCCD staff sit together at the International Disability Day rally at 
Reunification Park, Hanoi (December 2009). Source: www.dphanoi.org.vn. 
Conclusion  
BFG considers that “its contribution to the disability movement in Vietnam has been 
very large nationwide” (BFG 2008). Indeed, in large measure due to the efforts of Bright 
Future, it is now possible to speak of a “movement” (phong trào), a term increasingly 
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used by BF members and other activists to describe their activities.33 Defined in 
ecological terms,34 the disability movement comprises numerous networks, non-
governmental and government-linked organisations, many of which were present at 
Bright Future’s 20th anniversary celebration. Membership among the various networks 
that make up the disability movement is overlapping, and members both advance their 
own interests, for instance through education and income generation projects, as well as 
advocate for policy change. However, the degree of coordination among various 
disability networks remains relatively low. 
Although its public statements are equivocal, in practice the Bright Future Group has 
prioritised advocacy over its own fundraising and organisational development, which 
could be characterised as ad hoc and opportunistic. A blind activist in Hanoi who keeps a 
critical distance from Bright Future and the Association believes that self-sustaining 
disability organisations are possible, and groups like his arts and employment centre 
should seek ways in which “one activity can nourish another” to directly improve the 
[material] lives of PWD (V40). As BF members have noted, however, this is less feasible 
for an advocacy-centred network with no market basis. The question is how long an 
advocacy focus can be maintained, compared with the desire of members to benefit from 
network activities through training, job creation and other needs (V40).   
In one view, disability groups are most effective when small, up to about 10 participants 
who can really support each other, as was the case with BFG initially (V40). How can this 
spirit be maintained within the Hanoi Association of 3,000 members, let alone a national 
                                                        
33 In addition to being the Vietnamese term for “(social) movement”, phong trào is also the phrase used for 
Party-led propaganda campaigns, and can thus have a positive or negative connotation depending on the 
situation and speaker. 
34 See p. 51. 
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association of PWD? To be an effective network or larger organisation, the activist critic 
suggests, leaders need to be more serious about structure, think about fundraising and 
sustainability, and find ways to maintain a professional core but participatory methods 
that meet the needs of members. In this view, it is more important to offer services that 
people really need than engage in “movement-building” (V40). This debate between 
service provision and advocacy is likely to continue for some time. 
Cognisant of structural limitations in the Vietnamese context, Bright Future members do 
not aim to engage in confrontational actions for disability rights. Instead, they have 
found numerous opportunities to advocate within the system, which they generally view 
as preferable (V18). Some BF members have become the nucleus of a quasi-
governmental association, while others continue to engage in a range of advocacy efforts 
on behalf of the group. This posture may be viewed both as a weakness and a strength. 
The Bright Future Group has remained small, retaining many of its original 
characteristics as a club of educated people with mobility impairments. Although the 
network is vitally important to the lives of members, its collective voice is often not as 
strong as the uncoordinated voices of individual members (V68).  
BFG has chosen embedded advocacy strategies that are fundamentally elite-based, yet 
have been effective at influencing policy changes and inspiring other PWD to join in 
advocacy and self-empowerment. Bright Future’s horizontal structure and division of 
roles and responsibilities among members have kept it away from the bureaucratisation 
and intra-organisational infighting that have posed an obstacle for many civil society 
groups (Piven and Cloward 1977:xxii, Lewis 2001:173). The informal and subsidiary 
status of BFG has enabled members to focus on advocacy without requiring permission 
164 
 
 
 
from authorities, on one hand, or incurring the risk of repression on the other. The 
combination of embedded and community strategies they have pursued has taken shape 
over more than 20 years and has considerable potential for effective advocacy in 
cooperation with newer disability activists. As a longstanding network, Bright Future’s 
experience has much to offer other civil society actors, though their strategy is not the 
only possible one.  
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  Chapter 5 THE CHINA WOMEN’S NETWORK AGAINST AIDS, BETWEEN 
DONORS AND THE GRASSROOTS 
 
In May 2010, a fundraising dinner took place at Shanghai’s world-class art museum to 
commemorate the 27th annual International AIDS Candlelight Memorial Day. Three 
groups were selected as beneficiaries: the Shanghai Red Cross Society, a Hong Kong-
based foundation, and a newly-formed network of HIV-positive women’s support 
groups, the Women’s Network against AIDS - China (女性抗艾网络 - 中国, Nǚxìng 
k{ng’aì wǎnglùo – Zhōngguó). When the network’s secretary-general took the podium, 
she said, “Because of this virus in our blood, we sought each other out, talked among 
ourselves and formed small groups. Finally, we connected into a network… [As] Chinese 
women affected by AIDS, we are facing the disease while still pursuing life” (WNAC 
2010:4). From its share of donated proceeds of the event, the Women’s Network 
(WNAC) received 40,000 yuan (approximately £4,000), a substantial contribution to the 
network’s budget.  
The Women’s Network against AIDS formed in July 2009 on the basis of a web-based 
network of individuals that had existed for several years previously (China Development 
Brief 2009). Most of its 21 organisational members can be better characterised as peer 
support groups than NGOs. From its organic, virtual roots, the network has transformed 
into a national body with a significant degree of formal organisation, at least on paper. In 
a sector already containing multiple and sometimes competing networks of people living 
with HIV, some observers hoped that WNAC could become a less contentious, more 
inclusive network than other existing groups (C40). In the network’s short history to 
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date, it faces many challenges in its development, and it is too soon to draw conclusions 
about its success or sustainability. 
Less than a month after the successful fundraising dinner in Shanghai, the network 
closed its Beijing coordination office, citing rising rents and the end of grant funding 
from its major donor, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). 
Although a new UNAIDS grant is reportedly in process, it had not yet been approved as 
of August 2010 (C76). The network secretariat decided to “temporarily withdraw the 
Beijing office until the next phase of the project and then consider whether the 
application is successful before re-establishing the office” (WNAC 2010:1). After less 
than a year of formal operations, the Women’s Network’s future lay in the balance. 
The politics of HIV1 have been contentious in many settings. People living with HIV 
(PLWH) are subject to extreme social stigma and discrimination due to both the high 
morbidity of the virus and its most frequent means of transmission: homosexual and 
heterosexual contact and blood transmission, including injecting drug use (C68). Since 
the first Chinese case of AIDS was discovered in 1985, government policy towards HIV 
has opened considerably, with the attempted cover-ups of the Henan blood scandal and 
other public health crises such as the SARS epidemic in 2003 forming key turning points 
(C58, HuJ 2007, Kaufman 2010).2 Government services to PLWH and cooperation with 
social and community groups began around 2000, leading to policy and attitudinal 
changes within the state (C83). The “four frees, one care” (四免一关怀) policy, offering 
                                                        
1 In keeping with current international practice, this chapter refers to the Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
(HIV) and people living with HIV (PLWH). This usage is preferred by most advocates over referring to 
AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome), a disease that affects people in late stages of HIV infection. 
In Chinese, the word AIDS (艾滋病, aìzībìng) is commonly used, and some international programmes 
continue to use AIDS or “HIV/AIDS” in their titles. 
2 A similar transformation took place during the same time period in Vietnam, where HIV had previously 
been labelled as a “social evil” (Government of Vietnam 2004). 
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free HIV testing, counselling, and anti-retroviral therapy, was announced at the end of 
2003 (Kaufman et al 2006). Comprehensive regulations on HIV and AIDS prevention, 
treatment, care and support were promulgated in 2006, banning discrimination against 
PLWH (Xinhuanet 2006). The Chinese government has increasingly recognised the role 
of civil society in HIV prevention and treatment, while still selectively restricting groups’ 
operations (MengL 2009, Thompson and Jia 2010). International donors speak highly of 
the Ministry of Health’s commitment to accepting civil society roles and find them a 
relatively open-minded and progressive branch of the government (C76). As a result, 
while HIV issues are still contentious, the level of political restriction or “sensitivity” has 
decreased, with an emerging balance between public health and rights-based 
approaches (C40).  
More than 500 community groups and organisations, including GONGOs, contribute to 
China’s AIDS response (Ministry of Health 2010:62), including some registered NGOs 
and many unregistered support groups and networks (C40). Few of these groups, 
however, represent women affected by HIV.3 According to official statistics, women 
make up 30.5% of China’s estimated 740,000 PLWH (Ministry of Health 2010:5). But 
they have historically been under-represented in HIV policy and programmes (Bu and 
Liu 2010, UNAIDS 2006). The latest edition of the annual China HIV/AIDS NGO Directory 
now runs to over 300 pages, but includes only a handful of women’s support groups 
(CHAIN 2010). National surveys show that women have less knowledge about HIV than 
men, particularly in rural areas (HanJL et al 2009:23-4), and less access to HIV treatment 
                                                        
3 “Affected” by HIV is a broad term that can include people living with HIV (PLWH) as well as those with a 
HIV-positive family member. In China, different from most international usage, PLWH commonly refer to 
themselves as “infected” (感染者, gǎnrǎnzhě “the infected ones”). I use PLWH in recognition of the limits of 
designating people by an acronym for an “illness identity” (HeXP 2006:19). 
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(Bu and Liu 2010). The dominant “scientific” approach to HIV prioritises medical aspects 
over the social reality of the disease, disempowering women who are affected (HeXP 
2006:8). A major study in 2010 concluded that support to NGOs and groups of HIV-
positive women is “the most important proposal” (Bu and Liu 2010:10). 
Such gendered considerations have not always taken the priority in civil society 
research that they deserve (Howell 2006). In China, women’s organisations and 
networks began to emerge from the “monopoly” of the All China Women’s Federation 
(ACWF) following the 1995 United Nations World Conference on Women (C16, Milwertz 
2002, Howell 2004b). Two civil society networks on gender & development and 
domestic violence, respectively, have formed in Beijing among these groups (Keech-
Marx 2008).4 But these networks have not taken an active role in HIV activism and are 
perceived as a relatively closed group with little success in mainstreaming their issues 
(C25). As Wainwright describes (2005:112), “the encounter of Chinese women with 
Western feminism gave independent Chinese women’s organisations access to a new 
language and stream of thinking about self-determination, autonomy and self-organised 
agency.” However, Howell critiques some newer women’s groups as limited by a service 
delivery orientation, a perceived lack of legitimacy, and weak networks and alliances 
with state agencies, together with dependence on international donors (2004b:13-4,67). 
Such mixed influences are also apparent in the experience of WNAC since its 
establishment as a nationwide HIV network.  
 
                                                        
4 The Gender and Development in China Network has over 40 organisational members, with large bi-
annual conferences and a research focus. The gender-based violence network has developed an integrated 
intervention model including NGOs, the ACWF, hospitals and police. A third network on gender and public 
policy is newer and more advocacy-focused, with support from an international NGO (C37).  
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Network formation and history 
Silent weeds, inconspicuous flowers 
We bloom freely and fly with wind 
For the dream of a new settlement and growth 
We go through trials and hardships with no fear to death 
Showing the power of life 
We knit a red scarf with the stories of HIV/AIDS 
With the soft hands of women 
Knitting a wall against AIDS for the world5 
In the early years of China’s HIV epidemic, stigma and fear kept most HIV-positive 
women “in the closet” about their status, although in many cases they were eventually 
“exposed” (暴露, bàolù) by neighbours or even health staff (HeXP 2006:70). Many 
women (and men) made the unwelcome choice to move away from their homes and 
families for the anonymity and access to treatment of major cities. For those who were 
unable or unwilling to do this, their immediate need was to find someone who would 
understand and offer support (C82). At first, communication took place by long-distance 
telephone. The spread of the Internet, however, offered new possibilities for connection 
through instant message boards and chat rooms. In these virtual spaces, people could 
share their experiences with HIV without telling their real name or identity, even their 
location. They could also talk to people while revealing nothing at all about their HIV 
status. Many PLWH went on to develop personal websites and blogs as tools for 
organising (HeXP 2006:94). This process led to the formation of the Dandelion Network 
(蒲公英, Púgōngyīng), a virtual predecessor to the Women’s Network against AIDS. 
In May 2006, I was losing my mind on receiving a HIV-positive report. Without 
enough explanation and care from doctors, I had no choice but to search for 
information and help via the internet. I met many friends who were suffering 
and struggling against the disease. They helped me solve my initial problems 
and gave me important advice when I was facing therapy options. Then, when I 
could finally face my HIV status calmly, my first thought was doing something 
for the patients with same experience as me who were struggling for care and 
support and try my best to help them. 
                                                        
5 This poem was written for the Dandelion Network of Women Living with HIV by the director of a real 
estate company in Guangdong province (HeTT 2009). 
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I began to write treatment notes on Sina Blog with the hope that my experience 
and thoughts could encourage HIV-positive people to fight bravely against the 
disease. As more accessed, more people made consultations to me. In order to 
promote the communication between women positives, I created a QQ group6 
in February 2007 named “Dandelion”. Dandelion is a soft but strong plant that 
spreads her seeds with love around at her season…  
Based on the QQ group, some active members…decided to set up the Dandelion 
Network of Women Living with HIV/AIDS in March 2007. We hoped, through 
the internet, to unite more women to help our friends in difficulties and to raise 
our unified voice. It’s an open organization that has no office space and staff, 
but with several core members and more than 100 volunteers and members 
that join or quit at their will. (HeTT 2009)7 
The use of message boards such as QQ was essential to building links among women in 
different provinces. Prior to the Internet, such links would have been impossible; as a 
Hong Kong-based activist says, “there is no way to overstate the importance” of the 
Internet (C7).  
Many people think QQ groups childish, but this web-based chatting tool 
successfully meets the needs of people located in different geographic areas 
and provides the requirement of privacy. The members can communicate freely 
at anytime, from anywhere, as long as the internet is available. In our QQ group, 
women get along very well, caring and encouraging each other. We discuss 
reproduction, self-caring, family caring and all topics women are interested in. 
Communication and discussion help us think about the problems we are facing 
and enable us to make informed decisions. Visiting the QQ group has become 
our daily habit. Neighboring members even meet and hang out occasionally. 
Although the internet is virtual, the friendship between us really exists. (HeTT 
2009) 
The Dandelion activists and other women’s support groups also used existing 
publications and channels of communication provided by other HIV networks to raise 
the profile of women’s issues. For instance, the November 2008 issue of “Our Voice” (我
们的声音), published by Ark of Love,8 contains articles entitled “A person who comes 
                                                        
6 QQ is a popular Chinese message board, similar to Yahoo or Windows Messenger.  
7 This article was translated into English by China Global Fund Watch. 
8 Ark of Love (爱之方舟, Aì zhī fāngzhōu) is a Beijing-based NGO that coordinates one of two national 
PLWH networks, the China Alliance of People Living with HIV/AIDS (CAP+), with support from the Ford 
Foundation. From an initial 24 members at its launch in 2006, the network has now expanded to 109, 
although these do not all participate at the same level (C71). The second network, the China National 
Network of AIDS CBOs (CNNAC) has 133 members, largely comprised of MSM support groups. It is 
coordinated by the Aizhixing Institute (爱知行, “Love-Knowledge-Action”), a longstanding activist NGO in 
Beijing. In addition to workshops, training, and some work on legal aid, CNNAC has set up a community 
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out of the shadows” and “Infected women: stand up and come out!”, the latter by the 
future WNAC secretary-general, and profiles two women’s support groups, Half the Sky 
and the Guiyang Garden of Health and Care, which later became WNAC founding 
members (HeTT 2008).  
Women’s organising took place in the midst of a complex web of overlapping and in 
some cases competing field of civil society actors. Networks of HIV support groups first 
emerged after 2001 due to the conditions of government policy openings, international 
funding, and expanding access to the Internet and other communications technologies. 
Groups that formed early, were located in major cities, and were led by charismatic, 
well-connected individuals had built-in advantages.9 Several previously established 
groups used their existing connections with government and donors to build national 
networks of peer groups, particularly those representing gay men (MSM).10 From others’ 
perspectives, the leaders of these networks could easily appear to be “gatekeepers” with 
unfair access to donor funds (C40). Other networks formed expressly for the purpose of 
accessing international resources, leading to cases in which multiple groups received 
small grants for overlapping activities in the same cities (Young and Mian 2007). The 
increased availability of funding fostered competition among HIV support groups and 
networks, as well as among donors (C68). As one long-term donor describes, “Everyone 
                                                                                                                                                                             
fund that provides small-scale financial support to between 30-40 members (C54). The departure of 
Aizhixing’s director to the US in May 2010 (see pp. 129-30) has weakened CNNAC’s standing, but also 
given it an opportunity to restructure its operations. A third cluster of HIV networks, with closer links to 
CAP+ than CNNAC, has formed in south-western China through the coordination of AIDS Care China, and 
focuses mainly on service delivery and community support to PLWH, rather than policy advocacy 
(International HIV/AIDS Alliance 2010, Robertson 2007). 
9 International experience was also helpful, but not essential. Many network leaders, including WNAC, do 
not speak foreign languages. 
10 The neutral term “men who have sex with men” (MSM) is commonly used in international health and 
also in China, where many MSM do not self-identify as gay. The prevailing Chinese slang used by MSM to 
describe themselves is 同志 (tóngzhì, “comrade”), with the full political irony of the term intended (Young 
and Mian 2007). 
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wants to be king of the mountain” (C58). Added to great geographic diversity, HIV 
groups and networks segmented into vertical sub-sectors representing different affected 
groups: MSM, PLWH, drug users, sex workers, youth/students and women (C54,C76).11  
In February 2009, 12 delegates from groups of HIV-infected and affected women in eight 
provinces met in Beijing to hold the first organisational meeting of the Women’s 
Network against AIDS. As the Women’s Network against AIDS was forming in early 
2009, the group’s first media release described their rationale in this way: 
The number of women affected and infected by AIDS is rising rapidly. Although 
women have always played an important role in the process of the struggle 
against AIDS, on some occasions women’s voices have been weak or even 
nonexistent. HIV-positive women in many locations have already become 
aware of the need to form small groups to participate in serving the community 
and protecting their own rights. At the same time, women have sensed that 
their own capacity is not sufficient, their access to information is not smooth, 
and they lack autonomy and the right to speak. Thus, it is necessary to form a 
working network to develop collaboration. (China Development Brief 2009) 
According to materials shared by the WNAC secretariat, the goals of this first meeting 
were to share experiences and explore network strategy. This was followed by group 
interviews to evaluate needs and existing capacities within the network. A second 
preparatory meeting followed to discuss a strategic plan and draft network by-laws. 
After six months of preparation, the official launch of the network occurred on 9 July in 
Beijing (C61). As the network’s secretary-general describes, 
We mobilized the key members of women positive groups and women 
community workers around the country to establish a nationwide network… 
We want to expand the existing internet-based network into a substantial one. 
We hope it could play a strategic role in information sharing, collective actions 
and establishing an enabling environment for living and treatment, as well as to 
promote the development of women positive groups… We believe that Chinese 
women’s efforts against HIV/AIDS are on the journey and last forever as the 
seeds of a dandelion. (HeTT 2009) 
                                                        
11 The China HIV/AIDS NGO Directory lists 80 PLWH support groups and an additional 116 MSM groups 
(CHAIN 2010). The directory is produced by the China HIV/AIDS Information Network together with the 
China Centre for Disease Control’s HIV programme. In its brochure, CHAIN describes itself as a “platform 
for information exchange and open discussion” that was co-founded by three GONGOs in 2002. It operates 
a website and circulates printed information about HIV, but is not a “real” membership network (C40). 
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   Preparatory meeting for establishment of WNAC,        Delegates at the second WNAC preparatory meeting  
                          Beijing, February 2009            (source for both pictures: WNAC presentation) 
Network membership and structure 
The Women’s Network against AIDS has 21 initial organisational members from 11 
Chinese provinces and cities (Douban 2009). The membership, strategies and activity 
plans of the network have been well organised and documented for distribution among 
members as well as to the network’s external donor, UNAIDS, which began support in 
the preparatory phase of the network. As a result, WNAC has a more formal structure 
than many other civil society networks with a longer history. WNAC’s reported budget 
in 2009 was 200,000 yuan (£20,000), all of which came from UNAIDS (CHAIN 
2009:304). 
Most WNAC member organisations are local groups of women living with HIV; several 
also include women whose family members are affected by HIV, or carry out other 
activities. For instance, Bitter Grass in Yunnan includes HIV-positive women, children 
and female sex workers among its members, the only group in China to do so (C61,C82). 
Silk Road Posthouse, in Harbin, conducts activities for MSM, youth, migrant workers and 
other at-risk groups, and has received three small grants totalling 15,000 yuan (£1,500) 
from the Global Fund (CHAIN 2009:297). Shenyang Firefly, also in the northeast, has 
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received 35,000 yuan in two GF grants as well as small projects with the Liaoning 
provincial Red Cross, the Hong Kong AIDS Foundation, and other donors to conduct a 
wide variety of activities for HIV positive women and men (CHAIN 2009:62). The largest 
member in terms of project funding is Ningming Light of the Lotus City, a peer support 
group in a Guangxi town near the Vietnamese border, which has an annual budget of 
150,000 yuan and projects with Family Health International and Action Aid (CHAIN 
2009:49), reflecting the denser presence of INGOs in south-western China than other 
regions. One WNAC member is a traditional development NGO, not a HIV support group: 
the Liangshan Institute, which implements projects for drug users, sex workers and 
PLWH with support from a GONGO and the Global Fund (CHAIN 2009:273). 
In all, at least nine of the 21 organisational members have received some external 
funding and are listed in a national directory of HIV/AIDS groups (see table below). 
Regardless of this, 18 of the 21 are unregistered. The organisational members represent 
between 50 and 200 participants each, a total of over 2,000 women nationwide (C61). 
No membership fees or dues are charged, as most members would be unable to pay and 
are themselves looking for funding. The network supports its members through training 
and organising meetings and workshops, but does not distribute any financial support 
(C61), in contrast to other HIV networks that have channelled sub-grants to members. 
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Table 5.1 Members of the China Women’s Network against AIDS 
Chinese name English translation12 Location (province) 
1. 蒲公英女性网络 Dandelion Network for Women Living 
with HIV/AIDS* 
Virtual network 
(Beijing/Guangxi) 
2. 河南金色阳光 Henan Golden Sunshine Children 
Support/Care Association* 
Henan 
3. 郑州祥宇 Zhengzhou Auspicious Home Henan 
4. 商丘腊梅花 Shangqiu Winter Plum Flowers Henan 
5. 登封阳光女性家园 Henan Dengfeng Home of Joyful Women* Henan 
6. 新乡爱心协会 Xinxiang Loving Hearts Federation Henan 
7. 巩义康乐家园 Gongyi Happy Home Henan 
8. 凉山社会性别与艾滋病防
治研究会 
Liangshan Institute for Gender and AIDS 
Prevention* 
Sichuan 
9. 临汾绿色港湾“手牵手” Linfen Green Harbour “Hand In Hand” Shanxi 
10. 河北永清“半边天” Hebei Yongqing “Half the Sky” Hebei 
11. 中山阳光公社 Zhongshan Sunshine Commune Guangdong 
12. 柳州雨后阳光 Liuzhou Sunshine After Rain Guangxi 
13. 宁明荷城之光 Ningming Light of the Lotus City* Guangxi 
14. 贵阳健康关爱苑 Guiyang Garden of Health and Care* Guizhou 
15. 南明滋心小组 Nanming Bursting Hearts Small Group Fujian 
16. 浙江互助会-网络支持 Zhejiang Mutual Help Society and 
Support Network   
Zhejiang 
17. 上海美丽人生-依依茉莉 Shanghai Beautiful Lives- Supple Jasmine Shanghai  
18. 苦草工作室 Bitter Grass Studio* Yunnan 
19. 七台河爱心家园 Qitaihe Loving Hearts Home Heilongjiang 
20. 丝路驿站 Silk Road Posthouse* Heilongjiang 
21. 沈阳萤火虫 Shenyang Firefly* Liaoning 
* Organisations listed in the 2009-10 China HIV/AIDS NGO Directory  
WNAC began its formal existence in 2009 with three staff: a secretary-general, 
administrative officer and an assistant, based in a small apartment in an industrial area 
of Beijing, near a hospital that provided the first HIV treatment in the city and still 
houses several other HIV-related organisations (C61,C78). The secretary-general, an 
HIV-positive woman, was the founder of the Dandelion network; the HIV status of the 
other two staff (one female, one male) is unknown to me. According to materials 
                                                        
12 Translations are mine except for organisations listed in the HIV NGO Directory, in which case I have 
followed the English name listed there, even in cases where it is not a complete translations of the Chinese 
name. 
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provided by the secretary-general, the network operates through a hub-and-spokes 
structure, with the secretariat at the centre and members at the periphery. This may 
reflect some network communication paths, but in reality some members have closer 
links to the secretariat than others, particularly Golden Sunshine and Shanghai Beautiful 
Lives.13 With nearly one-third of WNAC members coming from Henan, Golden Sunshine 
plays a regional coordinating role in the province that has intensified in 2010 with the 
formation of a provincial women’s network that it coordinates (YuanWL 2010). Outside 
of Henan, most other provinces are only represented by a single organisation, with a 
fairly wide national spread, but there is only sparse coverage in the high-prevalence 
provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi where the AIDS Care-organised network is active.14 
There is also no membership group based in Beijing, yet the secretary-general felt it 
important to have the network coordination office there in order to interact with donors 
and other HIV organisations (C61). The network has made an effort to reach out to 
women in other locations, not always successfully.15 While some existing women’s 
groups joined immediately, others “don’t understand yet what we’re about, or are 
waiting to see what benefits the network might bring them” (C61). Depending on needs 
and interest, WNAC plans to add five new members per year (C61), although none have 
joined since July 2009. 
                                                        
13 These relationships are shown graphically in the observed structure in Figure 5.2. 
14 On AIDS Care, see footnote 8, p. 171. 
15 The secretary-general cites the story of one sex workers’ group in Guangzhou who was invited to 
participate, but insisted on being provided air tickets to Beijing rather than the train tickets that were 
budgeted (C61).  
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Figure 5.2 Structure of the Women’s Network against AIDS16 
              
Network structure from WNAC materials (2009)              Observed network structure 
Soon after its formal establishment, WNAC developed a strategic plan, objectives and 
activities covering the period from 2009-12. In 2009, the network aimed to focus on 
“establishment and expansion,” consisting of participation in local meetings and 
conferences, development of partnerships, writing for media and internet, and 
establishing a national office in Beijing. From 2010-12, a three-year strategy includes 
four objectives:  
1. Establish mechanisms for women’s leadership and organisational capacity. 
2. Develop organisation to implement cooperative projects for HIV-affected 
women. 
3. WNAC extends its organisation and sustains its external development. 
4. Advocate for gender-sensitive AIDS policies and measures. 
Each of these objectives is then described in chart format with outputs and activities, in 
a version of the ubiquitous “logframe” (logical framework) used by many development 
agencies. For instance, objective 1 consists of a series of capacity building training on 
service delivery, management and leadership, while objective 2 includes media, internet 
                                                        
16 See footnote 11, p. 139. 
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and publications, as well as income generation for HIV-affected women through 
handicraft production and exhibitions. The language and tone of these materials could 
not be more different than the women’s online testimonies shared during the 
formational period of the Dandelion network. The strategy document is clearly intended 
for a donor audience, not for local women participants in WNAC member organisations. 
Advocacy strategies 
As a newly-formed network, WNAC does not yet have an extensive record of advocacy 
activities. However, WNAC members have conducted local advocacy in their respective 
provinces, in some cases contributing to national-level discussions about HIV-AIDS 
policies affecting women. WNAC uses primarily community advocacy strategies, aiming 
to attract more HIV-positive women and support groups to join their activities. Both 
mainstream media and HIV-specific newsletters and publications are used for 
awareness raising and mobilisation, with particularly effective use of literature and art 
as advocacy techniques. Links to policy have been weaker: network leaders have taken 
part in some policy discussions and expressed their opinions, but since its members are 
relatively disadvantaged and far from the centres of power, the network has few strong 
connections with policy-makers. 
Table 5.3 Advocacy tactics – Women’s Network against AIDS 
Advocacy tactics Notes 
 Hold public events and exhibits 
 Write media articles and books 
 Speak at workshops, conferences 
 Reach out to HIV-affected women in 
communities  
- Engage women and media through 
creative use of art and design 
- Use donor connections to enter higher-
level government meetings and 
discussions 
- Public opinion is main object of 
advocacy at present 
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Network members have engaged in collective advocacy since the formation of the 
Dandelion network. In 2008, Dandelion members started knitting a “Red Scarf” to 
symbolise the lives of HIV-positive women. The scarf was sent by post from province to 
province, and women in each location displayed it, added to it and sent in on, “just like 
the Olympic torch relay” that was occurring at the same time (C61).17 Knitting the scarf 
was an “attempt to check whether we, who were united by internet, could come to a 
collective action” (HeTT 2009). The scarf campaign received support from Mangrove, a 
PLWH support group in Beijing, together with ActionAid China. A Chinese-American 
filmmaker who is active in HIV circles produced a documentary that was shown along 
with the completed red scarf at Beijing’s main avant-garde art centre to commemorate 
the 2008 World AIDS Day. The exhibit later moved to Shanghai and was shown again in 
Beijing in 2010 as part of a series entitled “The Secret Language of Women” (Yuanfen 
2010). Not only was the scarf a powerful symbol of women’s lives and hopes, it was a 
key mobilising activity for WNAC. 
The Women’s Network coordinator is also one of 41 “Positive Talks” speakers 
nationwide who are open about their HIV-positive status and hold training sessions and 
talks for government, business, media, NGOs and rural communities. Implemented by 
Marie Stopes International with funds from UNDP and UNAIDS, this is a form of 
community advocacy that aims to empower the speakers, communicate to audiences 
and promote the inclusion of PLWH in “client-initiated and client-centred” policy 
development regarding the prevention and treatment of HIV (UNAIDS et al 2010). 
According to Positive Talks, 
                                                        
17 Although WNAC members did not mention the connection, this is similar to the original AIDS Quilt in 
the USA, which was a highly effective awareness-raising and advocacy tool in the 1980s. Red is a universal 
colour used by HIV movements and has no political meaning within China. 
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Training sessions in rural areas... are especially important given that rural areas 
constitute the main sources of migrant workers, who are considered to be key 
populations at risk of HIV. Training sessions in rural areas generally last half a 
day, and focus on disseminating key advocacy messages, emphasising that HIV 
can affect us all, and that the response to AIDS requires participation from all 
sectors of society, [such as] not discriminating against people living with HIV, 
or being afraid of becoming infected through casual contact. Training sessions 
in rural areas are very popular, and generally attract a large number of 
participants. (UNAIDS et al 2010) 
In 2009, after WNAC’s launch, members collected personal stories from around China 
and published these in an illustrated book, Writing the Life (写生) written collectively by 
women living with HIV, their families and community social workers. The book was 
released in a public event at a Beijing hotel in November, once again timed to coincide 
with World AIDS Day.  
Some, but not all of these activities are included in WNAC’s strategic plan, completed in 
late 2009. As noted previously, the fourth objective of the plan covers advocacy. The 
Powerpoint slide detailing this objective is copied and translated below: 
Figure 5.4 WNAC advocacy strategy 
4. Advocate for gender-
sensitive AIDS policies and 
measures
Mass communication
Plan dialogue 
programmes with 
women speakers from 
the community
Documentary film on 
theme of HIV-positive 
women
Theatre troupe of HIV-
positive women
Women's culture 
programmes
Painting, weaving,
embroidery, paper 
cutting, photography, 
books, charity bazaar
Broadcast AIDS-
themed movies and 
documentaries
Literary and art tour
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This chart reads like a brainstorming of potential new activities, rather than a full 
advocacy strategy. Although the objective statement mentions “gender-sensitive AIDS 
policies”, there is no specific policy change described, target audience, nor any details on 
actors or intended outcomes. This content may be clarified later, or may exist already in 
an action plan that is not public to outsiders. The strategic plan shows that while the 
donor and network leaders wish to engage in policy advocacy, most network members 
do not view this as a high priority and prefer instead to focus on what the network can 
do for them in terms of access to training and project funding (C40).18 A more promising 
alternative would be to build on the network’s existing strengths in community and 
media advocacy, seeking to add members and change local awareness about issues faced 
by women living with HIV. The uses of art, poetry and story-telling offer powerfully 
engaging opportunities to reach ordinary Chinese; in that sense, the set of activities in 
the strategic plan might be fully appropriate, if concrete objectives were clarified that 
could meet both members’ capacities and the donor’s expectations.  
      
Dandelion network participants, their faces blurred       WNAC members meet with the United Nations Special  
      for anonymity, weaving the red scarf, 2008                     Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Asia and the Pacific, Beijing,  
             (source: WNAC)           November 2009 (source: UNAIDS)             
 
                                                        
18 A similar dynamic was observed in several Vietnamese networks (Desmond et al 2007, Hoang and Bui 
2008). 
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International linkages 
When I returned to Beijing in August 2010 after a nine-month absence, I was initially not 
able to contact the women’s network. Not only the office phone, but cell phones of 
secretariat staff were disconnected, and e-mails bounced back. Contacts in other groups 
who knew WNAC said that the secretary-general had purportedly gone back to her 
home in Guangxi province to receive treatment. Others claimed that WNAC’s funding 
from UNAIDS had ended. After nearly a month, I made contact with the secretary and 
several other members, who shared their most recent working report. UNAIDS 
confirmed that they had received a new proposal from WNAC and were still “designing” 
the next phase of funding for the network.  
UNAIDS has supported the women’s network for two years now.19 Our initial 
support was for development of institutional governance structures, set up in a 
consultative way. The network’s work last year [2009] focussed on advocacy... 
Advocacy on HIV among civil society is not well organised. The field is 
dominated by MSM and PLWH groups, while the women’s voices, sex workers 
and IDUs [intravenous drug users] are very low. UNAIDS’ strategy is to 
strengthen these groups and help them form networks... Networks are our 
entry point. (C76) 
 
In the early years of the 21st century, large-scale international funding for HIV 
prevention, treatment, care and support began to flow into China. The largest donor is 
the Global Fund against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GF), which has contributed 
over US $500 million to HIV programmes since 2001 (Ministry of Health 2010:58); other 
major donors have been the Clinton, Ford and Gates Foundations, as well as USAID, DFID 
and other bilateral government funders. Most of these grants are channelled through the 
Ministry of Health and other Chinese government agencies; only 1% of GF funding is 
contributed directly to grassroots organisations (C58). The scale of GF support to China 
has led to some international criticism, given China’s economic resources and greater 
                                                        
19 By my count, UNAIDS support actually extended for 18 months (January 2009-June 2010). 
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HIV prevalence in many poorer countries (Chow 2010), although the amount 
contributed per capita remains relatively low. 
HIV support groups, previously under-funded and isolated at the margins of Chinese 
society, found themselves almost overnight at the centre of international efforts to 
increase civil society action to reduce the spread of the disease. UNAIDS’ funding 
strategy is to support networks among HIV-affected groups who are not yet included in 
formal structures. Seeing limited gender responsiveness in existing HIV programming, 
UNAIDS seeks to “empower women by providing specific support to CBOs [community-
based organisations] and increasing the participation of women’s networks, leaders, and 
women living with HIV” (Aye 2010). Although UNAIDS has its own core funding, it also 
acts as an intermediary donor; its network funding in this case originates from the Gates 
Foundation (C40). In addition to WNAC, UNAIDS support in 2009 also went to at least 
four other networks: CAP+, a separate sex worker forum, a Yunnan drug users’ network, 
and the International Treatment Preparedness Coalition (C76). 
UNAIDS funding is provided one year at a time (C76); the initial grant to WNAC during 
its preparatory phase was for only six months (C61). Although year-on-year funding is 
not unusual in the HIV sector,20 the grant duration sends a contradictory message to 
UNAIDS’ stated desire to support the long-term growth of networks. Especially for a new 
network, short-term core funding may produce high levels of stress and uncertainty and 
send inadvertent messages that the grantee cannot be trusted, or that the donor is 
                                                        
20 The US government’s PEPFAR programme (President’s Emergency Programme for AIDS Relief) also 
provides funds on a renewable annual basis. In Vietnam, the only PEPFAR priority country in Asia, USAID 
has also set up a women’s network of local support groups (Asia Catalyst 2009:13).  
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overly controlling. In UNAIDS’ view, the short funding cycle encourages grantees to 
develop strategic plans and carry out “evidence-based advocacy” (C76).  
UNAIDS has encouraged WNAC to link with other Chinese organisations outside the HIV 
sector. In 2009, UNAIDS introduced WNAC to a Shanghai-based social enterprise group, 
CSR Pioneers (公益堂, Gōngyì Táng). UNAIDS hoped that CSR Pioneers would assist 
WNAC in organisational development, capacity building and fundraising, while WNAC 
would introduce principles of gender sensitivity and stigma reduction (Douban 2009). A 
partnership between the two groups was established on paper, but has not resulted in 
any shared activities to date beyond a short WNAC web page hosted on CSR’s site. 
UNAIDS also has plans to build an “intimate partnership” between WNAC and the All 
China Women’s Federation, with similar expected mutual benefits (Aye 2010:19). 
UNAIDS hopes to increase participation of women in networks, including the ACWF, and 
“use them as agents of change in promoting rights of women” (C77). While such a 
partnership could build on the ACWF’s “dual role” and close links to authorities (Howell 
2004b:62-5, Wainwright 2005), it is difficult to picture how such a partnership might 
operate given the incongruities between a newly-established civil society network and a 
GONGO with millions of national members. More disturbing is UNAIDS’ unilateral 
planning: nearly two months after the partnership plan was announced at a regional 
Global Fund meeting, UNAIDS staff stated that “we probably should inform the Women’s 
Network about this before we go further with these plans” (C76). 
UNAIDS’ strategy and support for WNAC are well-intentioned. Yet the donor’s focus on 
“capacity building” and national-level advocacy may not match the needs of network 
members (C40). The network secretariat seems to spend the majority of its time 
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preparing reports and documents for the donor, and close contact to donors was the 
primary reason for setting up the Beijing office in the first place. The network arguably 
provided more concrete results and support for women living with HIV before it became 
formalised and received donor support. 
Regardless of the positive or negative aspects of a single donor’s role, it is generally 
unwise and undesirable for any organisation or network to depend on only one source 
of funds (Fowler 1997:150-1). Yet many newly-formed groups have little choice in the 
matter. WNAC’s secretary-general admits the situation is “not ideal” and is searching for 
other sources, but finds domestic resources hard to come by (C61). The problem is 
particularly acute for a network whose members are by definition disadvantaged and 
relatively poor. Given its wide geographic spread, WNAC is not able to hold informal 
meetings in coffeehouses or at members’ homes. Without external funding, members 
have few resources of their own to draw on to sustain the network’s operations. As 
noted above, the Women’s Network aims to raise funds through social enterprise, 
producing and selling handicrafts and books, so that “we can stand on two feet” (C61). 
Reflecting the dominance of business management approaches among Chinese NGOs 
and the increasing role of domestic corporate foundations (C15,C25), income generation 
from social enterprise is a legitimate strategy for many local organisations. But it is 
unusual and probably impractical for a national network with organisational members 
who are themselves seeking operational funds. More realistically, WNAC members might 
engage in a variety of income-generating activities and contribute a portion of the 
proceeds to the network. No mechanism for such revenue sharing exists at present. 
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Network effectiveness: Policy change 
WNAC members have faced difficulties in transposing community and media advocacy 
efforts into effects on policy. Up to now, WNAC has had “little to no contact with 
government”, including the Ministry of Health (C61). “China’s current HIV policies say 
little about women,” the secretary-general complains. “In the HIV law, it states that HIV-
positive women have a right to have children, for instance, but other laws contradict 
this. There are no regulations or implementation guidelines to allow this” (C61). In press 
interviews, WNAC members have spoken about issues such as access to subsidised 
treatment and second-line antiviral medication, and called for improved communication 
and cooperation between authorities and civil society to form “a united front against 
HIV/AIDS” (SheL 2009). In 2010, the WNAC secretary-general was selected as one of 14 
people on the steering committee of the China Red Ribbon Forum, a government-civil 
society dialogue group on human rights (UNAIDS 2010).21  
In the secretary-general’s view, the government has not been too willing to talk directly 
with civil society networks; instead, HIV groups often advocate through intermediaries. 
For instance, WNAC has contact with the China Foundation for Prevention of STD and 
AIDS, a GONGO with no particular focus on women. At the 2009 International Congress 
on HIV/AIDS in Asia and Pacific in Bali, the GONGO’s representative reportedly 
presented WNAC activities as their own; rather than take offence, the Women’s Network 
secretary used the opportunity to ask for support from the foundation. However, it has 
not yet provided any specific help (C61).  
                                                        
21 The Red Ribbon Forum has no connection to the Red Scarf campaign described earlier. 
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The most significant civil society effort to improve participation in HIV policy-making 
has taken place through elections to the Global Fund Country Coordinating Mechanism 
or CCM (Gnep 2009). Over several years of intense debate, activists succeeded in 
establishing democratic procedures for election of NGO representatives to the CCM.22 
There were initially 11 NGO committee members, of which one seat was reserved for 
“female organizations” and another open to any PLWH (JiaP 2009:4,13-14). However, 
from 2007-09, the CCM committee position reserved for women or children affected by 
HIV was vacant. The absence of women’s participation was “a great pity,” said one 
WNAC member, but led a consensus about the need for advocacy: 
In the past two years, the number of women groups and women community 
workers has increased rapidly and their involvement has been strengthened in 
China… At the end of February 2009, the participants to [WNAC’s] first 
preparatory meeting shared their thoughts on promoting women’s 
participation to the CCM membership election and conducted thorough 
discussion. They publicized their recommendations on “Improving Election 
Options and Promoting Women’s Participation”, which received wide 
responses from the community and 39 organizations declared their support. 
(YuanWL 2009) 
A WNAC member from Golden Sunshine in Henan province subsequently initiated a 
campaign and was elected to fill the women’s representative position (C40). Women’s 
network members also offered four amendments to the CCM guidelines on gender 
equity issues, of which two were approved (UNAIDS 2009). Yet despite efforts of WNAC 
members, no women were elected to the CCM NGO Work Committee, although more 
women had been nominated than in 2007. 
The Women’s Network has demonstrated that it is able to carry out collective campaigns 
and projects for public awareness and mobilise the media. Other HIV networks, 
                                                        
22 This process has significance beyond the HIV field: these were the first independent national elections 
of any kind in China organised by non-members of the Communist Party. As a result, “the CCM represents 
a rare instance in which government officials sit as equals with civil society on a decision-making body” 
(Thompson and Jia 2010). 
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however, have formed stronger links to government. The coordinator of the CAP+ 
network says, 
With government relations, we’ve always had some difficulties, and also always 
had some cooperation. There are legal and internal government issues. Every 
grassroots organisation has to deal with these issues – we’re all the same in this 
way. The difference is in how we deal with it. We don’t have particularly close 
cooperation with government, but also no particular opposition. We stay 
focussed on issues of concern to PLHIV. We don’t get involved in broader 
political issues around civil society, democracy and so on. (C71) 
The second major PLWH network, CNNAC states that “[t]he first priority of HIV/AIDS 
prevention is to influence policies of Chinese government and UN Agencies” (CNNAC 
2008). WNAC’s secretary-general, for her part, sees UNAIDS as the main object of the 
network’s advocacy; UNAIDS will then channel women’s concerns to the government 
(C61). Without stronger government links, it is difficult to see how the network will have 
any major impact on HIV policy, as advocacy through an international donor offers only 
indirect access to “invited spaces” of policy discussion (Gaventa 2007). 
Network effectiveness: Sustainability and political space 
As more voices, stories and experiences of PLWH have appeared in public, Chinese 
society has become more tolerant towards people affected by HIV. These stories not 
only change images and social assumptions, but have also led to effective and powerful 
social organising (HeXP 2006:121-2). In this case, women being open about their HIV 
status and reaching out to others through Internet and social networks formed the 
preconditions for establishment of WNAC. According to Howell, women’s organising on 
social issues may be seen as a barometer of civil society development and state-society 
relations in China (2004b:70-1). The formation of a national network of women affected 
by HIV and more open public discussion of social impacts of HIV point the barometer 
firmly in a positive direction. The needle is wavering, however, due to the effects of 
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competition among HIV networks, intensive donor pressure, and limited response to 
date from government authorities. A Chinese academic survey concludes that HIV 
networks are “still in the early stages of development”: their advocacy work mainly aims 
to improve awareness among PLWH, but is under-resourced and lacks technical capacity 
for larger-scale interventions (HanJL et al 2009:40). 
As UNAIDS describes, 
The women’s network is at the beginning of their development – to develop a 
resource mobilisation plan will take more time. They are used to working at a 
local level. But for advocacy, you need to work at a higher level and have a 
national perspective. This is their weak point at the moment. Networks do want 
to deliver something to their members: why are we here if not to help 
ourselves? This becomes harder as networks have more members; then they 
need a more focussed agenda. If the network is providing services to members, 
then secretariat capacity and clear leadership is key. When [another network] 
wanted to do this, they were overwhelmed and had no time for advocacy. (C76) 
UNAIDS’ ultimate stated goal is to create a single nationwide HIV network co-
functioning as the Global Fund CCM (C76). Such a national association could have 
numerous benefits: enabling strategic alliances with the state, strengthening member 
networks and adding legitimacy (Howell 2004b:13-4). This objective managed to unite 
the entire spectrum of Chinese HIV networks as never before, but in opposition to 
UNAIDS’ proposal. One activist terms the concept “naïve” (C68). Another states that a 
single network is “a very bad idea”, even if it were achievable. A single voice towards the 
government would be desirable, but any unified network would make authorities 
nervous, so they would attempt to control, manipulate or damage it (C54). If donors and 
government get together to control a sector, the space for networks to advocate 
independently could be greatly reduced. In this view, multiple networks are beneficial as 
they amplify voices of civil society and allow for more people to occupy hub positions. 
Competition among networks, within limits, is a natural and healthy phenomenon (C40). 
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A centrifugal tendency is also present in the formation of provincial and local networks. 
The provincial women’s network begun by WNAC members in Henan appears to have 
occurred spontaneously based on local needs, but could be viewed as duplicating or 
competing with the national network. The Henan network has received funding from the 
US International Republican Institute, after UNAIDS reportedly intervened 
unsuccessfully to argue that the funds should be given to WNAC instead (C40). The fact 
that a network has developed in Henan can be considered a major accomplishment, 
given that several years ago the province was noted for its division and lack of 
coordination among NGOs, PLWH and the local government (Young and Mian 2008). The 
Henan network is also integrated into the WNAC structure, which is not yet the case 
with the AIDS Care-initiated women’s network in the southwest.  
As a new network of women activists mostly in their thirties, WNAC holds the potential 
of developing a more collaborative structure than certain other HIV networks, which 
remain male-dominated and tone-deaf on gender issues (C40,C68). WNAC has had 
“some contacts, but not much cooperation” with the two main PLWH networks (C61), 
limited to attending each others’ events (WNAC 2010:2). Even if WNAC leaders are 
“aware enough to avoid dictatorship” (C40), the influence of pre-existing networks 
remains strong. 
From a donor or international NGO standpoint, the experience of the Women’s Network 
raises questions of how much support is desirable to help networks form. In a 2007 
interview, the Red Scarf filmmaker criticised donor ambitions: “People at the moment 
feel a lot of the grassroots NGOs are too small, so people get them together in networks 
or pingtai [平台, ‘platforms’]. But this creates the opposite effect of what is intended: 
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frictions, tensions, criticisms.” A better approach would be “a wildflower effect: let them 
grow in their own way and in the end they cover the mountain” (cited in Young and 
Mian 2007). Yet the leadership qualities necessary to “cover the mountain” may not be 
the same as those needed to form a small group. At present, many WNAC members are 
strong leaders of local support groups, but this does not automatically translate into an 
effective national network (C78). The mountain is also very spread out geographically 
and politically, so that a laissez-faire approach to organising may not result in full 
coverage. 
Greater cooperation among women’s civil society networks also remains elusive. When 
the WNAC secretary-general met with Beijing-based gender-and-development and 
domestic violence networks in 2009, she asked them to pay greater attention to women 
affected by HIV; their leaders replied that their government sponsors did not want them 
to have projects in sensitive areas, but that the networks might be able to conduct some 
joint activities or workshops (C61). The formation of WNAC offers an opportunity for 
these disparate networks to intersect, but this may not be sufficient on its own.23 One 
INGO staff observes that women’s networks may encounter fewer initial obstacles to 
formation than networks in other sectors because gender issues are seen as less 
“political”, but if networks focus on marginalised women, they face the reality that China 
is still a “patriarchal society” and “even NGOs don’t see gender as a priority” (C37). 
Organising around HIV in China remains controversial: organisations, networks and 
support groups representing PLWH face additional legal, political and social challenges 
                                                        
23 Some transnational organising in this area has not yet reached China. In 2004, UNAIDS launched a 
Global Coalition on Women and AIDS, which “works at global and national levels to highlight the effects of 
AIDS on women and girls and to stimulate concrete and effective action to prevent the spread of HIV”. 
GCWA has no partners or projects in China (GCWA 2010). 
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compared to other civil society actors. In part to overcome stigma, HIV advocates have 
adopted relatively contentious strategies to draw public and official awareness to their 
situation. Chinese activists have been arrested for exposing a major blood transfusion 
contamination scandal (C7, Gnep 2009), held protests (C40, Young and Mian 2008), and 
in several cases left the country based on perceived threats to their personal safety 
(Wong 2010, Thurber 2009). HIV networks’ use of the internet, however, does not 
appear to be a major issue with authorities. The QQ message board used by the 
Dandelion network is a domestic Chinese service, thus less liable to blockage than 
services by foreign providers such as Google. In all, restrictions on the Internet are an 
occasional annoyance to HIV activists, but do not effectively deter them from 
communication.24 
Conclusion  
The Women’s Network against AIDS began as an informal lifeline among HIV-positive 
women. With donor interest and funding, the network transformed quickly, perhaps too 
quickly, from a virtual social network into a formal organisational network before strong 
horizontal ties could be formed among members in different locations around China. 
From the donor’s perspective, the network is now making “quite slow process… within a 
few years they will be some of the key voices, [but] now they are still fairly quiet 
compared to other leaders [in the HIV field]” (C76). Many of the challenges WNAC faces 
are common to other “donor-created networks”, and that is indeed how some other 
actors in the HIV sector perceive it (C54,C58,C83).  
                                                        
24 See p. 118. 
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The development of HIV networks in China follows a worldwide pattern observed by the 
United Nations that “organizations of people living with HIV are initially created to 
provide mutual support and care, and evolve gradually to play wider and more varied 
roles in the epidemic response as their capacity and collective voice strengthen” 
(UNAIDS 2006:212). A UN meeting in South Africa recommended that there was “a 
pressing need to professionalize informal structures to enable them to function 
effectively and participate independently in high-powered organizations and forums.” 
But UNAIDS also noted that “Discussions also revealed a tendency for networks to lose 
touch with the grass roots as they engage with the wider world” (213). How can Chinese 
networks maintain this balance? 
 
The common donor response to these dilemmas is to provide “technical skills” and 
“capacity-building training” to network members. But what skills do members really 
need? Many courses focus on project management, proposal writing, and other 
functional competencies that are necessary to work with donors but may take activists 
further from their own roots, and do not develop vision or leadership (C78). The 
broader question is what members want out of their participation in a network. In the 
case of WNAC, women joined local and online peer groups for counselling and social 
support. These groups then formed a national network in order to reach a wider 
audience, engage in policy advocacy and attract donor funding – a mixed set of 
motivations captured variously in poetry, testimonials and logframes. 
In principle, gender considerations should be mainstreamed in all development projects, 
not separated into a sub-sector for women only. In a situation in which existing male-
dominated PLWH networks are not willing to change, however, women’s groups have 
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little choice but to form their own network. This strategy could be better combined with 
increased cooperation with other networks (C68). Once their voices are more equal with 
others, women’s network members could then look at national collaboration in the long 
term (C76). This will require overcoming divisions and mistrust that exist between sub-
groups and at the local level, as well as better coordination among donors. If these 
conditions are absent, the Women’s Network against AIDS will continue to be caught 
between donor priorities and its members’ needs. 
  
195 
 
 
 
  Chapter 6: INSIDE-OUTSIDE ADVOCACY AND VIRTUAL NETWORKS IN 
PRESERVING REUNIFICATION PARK 
 
In spring 2007, city authorities approved a plan by two private companies to privatise 
Hanoi’s Reunification Park and transform it into “a small-scale Disneyland” (TrangAN 
2007, PhungS 2007).1 Details of the proposal, including in-depth interviews with the 
company directors, were published in at least 15 articles in the local state-controlled 
press and online. Although the corporations insisted that redevelopment would serve 
the interests of all residents of Hanoi, this was belied by descriptions of a planned five-
level underground car park and shopping area, 3-D theatre and nightclub, and an 
investment of 1,500 billion dong or approximately £50 million (Dantri 2007). Local 
residents spoke out on the Internet against the plans, which were portrayed as corrupt 
and anti-poor. Influential citizens, including respected retired officials, editorialised 
against the agreement.2  
The initially uncoordinated efforts to oppose privatisation came together in the summer 
of 2007 to form the beginnings of a civil society network. In early August, a Canadian 
NGO, HealthBridge joined with the Vietnam Urban Planning Association, a quasi-
independent GONGO, to organise a one-day workshop on the “System of Green Public 
                                                        
1 The two companies were Vincom, a real estate corporation whose directors made money in Ukraine and 
invest in Vietnam (V41), and Tan Hoang Minh, a taxi and trading company whose aging yellow vehicles 
were known for a poor safety record before disappearing from Hanoi streets since 2007. Vincom owns a 
shopping and office complex that towers over the eastern edge of Reunification Park. The developers 
intended a private theme park modelled after Disneyland; the Walt Disney Corporation was never 
involved in these plans, but as in other cases of brand piracy, was probably not harmed by the publicity. 
2 Portions of this chapter concerning the 2007 park preservation campaign are adapted from an article, 
“Political Space in Vietnam: A View from the ‘Rice-Roots’”, which appeared in Pacific Review (Wells-Dang 
2010). 
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Space in Hanoi” (V27, Tien Phong 2007).3 The academics and architects who gathered at 
the conference issued a call to “save green space in Hanoi” that was posted on the 
Internet. Faced with an upsurge of public outrage, the city government backed down in 
August 2007, putting the park redevelopment plan on hold. 
Reunification Park (Công viên Thống Nhất) is the largest public area in the centre of the 
crowded Vietnamese capital, which has one of the lowest areas of green space per capita 
of any major world city. The park was built by volunteer labour from 1958-61 on what 
had been an uninhabited, swampy dump site outside the city centre. From the start, the 
park was intended to have “national importance” (V63). Originally named in hopes of 
national unification, the park’s name was changed to Lenin Park in 1980 and then back 
in 2003. While not as prominent as the public spaces of Hoan Kiem Lake or Ba Dinh 
Square (Thomas 2001:308), the park’s commemoration of Reunification has symbolic 
political overtones of “the power of solidarity, the unity of the nation and of the people 
of the capital in the task of defending and developing the country” (DangHV 2009). 
Reunification Park is popular with rich and poor alike who pay the equivalent of a few 
pence each to enter. The park facilities, managed by a state-owned company, are poorly 
maintained, with shabby carnival rides and informal hawkers occupying much of the 
open area at the park’s main entrance. Several better-constructed play areas were 
constructed by multinational corporations in 2001, which raised eyebrows in the 
international media given the site’s association with Leninism (Hayton 2006).  
                                                        
3 Douglass et al (2008:5) differentiate between “civil society space” (metaphorical), “public space” (which 
can also include government in the sense of public services), and “civic space” (free community spaces 
that are open to all, but can be public or private, as in the case of cafes and pubs). As Koh describes in a 
chapter on Hanoi, civil society can also use market spaces to double up as civic spaces (Douglass et al 
2008:168). I use public space as a general term including both public and civic spaces in these senses. 
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Less than a year after the privatisation episode, Hanoi authorities announced plans to 
build a four-star hotel, “Novotel on the Park,” on land taken from Reunification Park 
(HoangH 2008). By early 2009, public opinion had crystallised against the hotel, and the 
network members were ready to act (Steinglass 2009). As in summer 2007, a flood of 
media articles, online comments and petitions to government leaders followed. 
HealthBridge played a secondary role this time, helping to organise a public conference 
on green space in Hanoi in March 2009. A week later, the city authorities reversed their 
decision, cancelling the hotel project. 
                      
  Reunification Park viewed from the southwest, with the             Sketch of “Disneyland” released by Tan Hoang  
                    Vincom Towers at upper right                                                       Minh Co., February 2007  
                 (source: http://tintuconline.com.vn)                                         (source: VietNamNet) 
As the network formed through these two episodes of collective action, its advocacy 
strategy shifted from embedded efforts to privately influence leaders to inside-outside 
approaches, including public statements, use of media channels, public opinion and 
external resources. Following the cancellation of hotel construction in the park, 
supporters gathered at a Chinese restaurant in downtown Hanoi for a quiet celebration 
and “networking event”.4 The approximately 20 people attending talked about further 
                                                        
4 I attended this event in association with Action for the City (see p. 22). 
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cases of public space encroachment in Hanoi and how they should respond. The idea of 
establishing a more formal network, with a name and dedicated staff, was also discussed 
at this event and afterwards. No formal structure has since come into being; the 
Reunification Park network maintains a virtual existence. It is a reality in the minds of 
its participants, but has no formal name, legal identity, or membership. Despite, or 
perhaps because of, its lack of formal organisational trappings, the network has 
demonstrated potential for effective actions to preserve public space. 
Existing literature on parks and public space in Hanoi comes primarily from the urban 
planning and geography fields (Logan 2000, Drummond 2000, Thomas 2001, Kürten 
2008), including one joint master’s thesis on Reunification Park (Hellberg and Johansson 
2008). The first public parks were designed during French colonial rule, creating a 
“garden city” of parks and lakes (V63). Since the 1945 revolution, city plans for Hanoi 
have been redrafted seven times according to changing principles and priorities from 
the socialist period to a current emphasis on cultural heritage (V53). With the coming of 
đổi mới and a market economy, the Hanoi city government assigned the management of 
parks to a convoluted group of state-owned companies, responsible to a variety of 
government departments at different levels of power. Each major park has its own “one-
member corporation” (công ty một thanh viên) with management authority, while 
smaller parks are supervised directly by district or ward governments or by companies 
reporting to them. According to the retired former director of the Hanoi planning 
department, significant management problems arose as functional ownership of parks 
shifted from “the people” to state companies and then to joint-stock companies run as 
for-profit enterprises by their former state-appointed directors (V63). Overlapping and 
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disjointed management has resulted in the gradual loss of nearly all of the parks, lakes 
and open spaces in the city (V53, Tran and Linh 2010). 
Network formation and history 
Over several decades prior to 2007, individual activists engaged in advocacy on public 
space issues in Hanoi, with little coordination among them. In 1993, five respected 
scientists wrote separate letters to the Prime Minister and Hanoi People’s Committee 
opposing the transfer of part of Thu Le Park in western Hanoi to build the five-star 
Daewoo Hotel. This controversial decision was not discussed in the press, and the 
scientists’ letters were not made public. The city government approved the hotel project, 
promising the scientists that the loss of parkland would be compensated by the 
construction of a national zoo in another location, which has never happened (V58). 
Activists achieved somewhat better results in the case of the Golden Hanoi Hotel (Khách 
sạn Hà Nội Vàng) planned by Hong Kong-based investors to overlook Hoan Kiem Lake in 
the city centre (V53,V58). The plan for an 11-story building clearly violated the height 
limit of five stories in the area. In 1996, the Vietnam Architects’ Association and Vietnam 
History Association protested the hotel’s construction through official letters in what 
Logan describes as the first successful public protest over urban changes occurring since 
Renewal (Đổi mới), “a foretaste of what could be expected [and] an important political 
change” (Logan 2000:238-9). The architects’ intervention halted construction of the 
hotel, which stood as a half-built shell for over ten years before a bank and boutique 
shops were completed on the site in 2007. There was no open expression of public 
opinion on the issue, but the embedded advocacy of professional associations was 
sufficient to change the minds of city leaders at the time.  
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Several years later, a major corruption case concerning the planned Thang Long Water 
Park was exposed by a landscape architect in the Ministry of Construction’s Institute of 
Rural and Urban Planning, acting at considerable personal risk. In 1999, the Prime 
Minister reversed previous decisions and cancelled the plans; “correcting such an error 
after a big project had already been approved and announced by the authorities was 
very difficult, and many people had to pay the price” (TranTV 2007b). In the past several 
years, citizen pressure and media articles have halted the replacement of the historic 
19th December market and proposals for a museum and a high-rise office building on 
land surrounding Hoan Kiem Lake (V27,V21,V64, PhungTH et al 2008). In these and 
other cases of public space activism, limited success came about through existing, 
embedded advocacy channels, yet these efforts did not coalesce into a civil society 
network.5 
Figure 6.1 Major parks in Hanoi 
 
Aerial map of Hanoi showing limited green space (Source: Action for the City 2008) 
 
                                                        
5 Similar advocacy, led by scholar-activists, has taken place in Beijing, Tianjin and other Chinese cities to 
preserve hutong neighbourhoods and remaining historic structures, with more failures than successes 
(Meyer 2009, Johnson 2004). An excellent case study of Shanghai citizens resisting development of a park 
can be found in Zhu and Ho (2008) and Shi and Cai (2006). 
Botanic Garden 
Hoan Kiem Lake 
Thu Le Park (Zoo) 
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Saving the park and the city 
The 2007 Reunification Park privatisation case attracted the attention of some of the 
same professional associations and activists as earlier public space campaigning, but 
differed from these examples due to the facilitation of HealthBridge and the presence of 
a common cause with well-organised opponents (V27,V64). Initial media reports of the 
two companies’ plans for the park were presented in a neutral to positive light as a 
business news story, attracting little public comment. Several months then passed 
without media coverage of the park. According to a journalist, this was not due to any 
censorship or external intervention, simply that there was nothing new to report (V51). 
Private discussion behind the scenes, however, was increasing as more Hanoians 
became aware of the redevelopment plans, and their interest soon turned to dismay and 
outcry. An architect was the first to put his misgivings on paper in mid-April (Vietnam 
Studies Group 2007). His polemic, “Let’s save the park! Let’s save our city!” was posted 
on a city issues website, http://dothi.net, then sent by the Hanoi representative of an 
international NGO to an academic list-serve with over 300 members inside and outside 
the country. 
As an architect who has worked and studied overseas for many years, I always 
follow every new step and current affairs of my country. When I heard the news 
that Hanoi will have a new entertainment centre to serve people in the 
capital…I immediately looked to find out where this centre will be located. 
When I saw it would be in Reunification Park, I truly couldn’t believe my eyes. I 
can’t believe that such a big and strategic project could be approved without 
any criticism. This is such a big mistake that anyone with just a little 
professional knowledge would never make… 
Historically speaking, this park is very meaningful… The park was built through 
the efforts of thousands of workers and people in Hanoi. In those days, we lived 
for the common interest rather than for personal interest. We lived without 
thinking much about ourselves. We were poor but always smiled. We were 
much more “human” than we are now. Our park was born in such a situation 
like that…  
Those people should know that thousands of workers and citizens of the 
capital, both young and old, will have no green space or clean environment for 
their morning exercises and no place to play sport in the afternoon… In 
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addition, an entertainment park will make foreign tourists feel uncomfortable. 
They travel here to find nature, not to go to chaotic entertainment centres that 
exist only for money and forget human values... We shouldn’t trade small and 
short-term economic gain for serious long-term consequences in the future. 
My friends, each of us should contribute our own small efforts to save our park. 
Please don’t destroy history and culture just for money, because no matter how 
much money we have later, we can never replace their value. SAVE THE PARK, 
SAVE OUR CITY!   
PLEASE SEND THIS ARTICLE TO ALL YOUR FRIENDS. (VSG 2007) 
The architect’s article prompted 18 responses on the list-serve, all critical of the project; 
one respondent wrote “This is one of the saddest things I have read in a long time.” A 
Ford Foundation programme officer expressed shock that the city had approved the 
plans without any public hearing and cited rising public anger over the decision (VSG 
2007). Other statements soon appeared on Vietnamese-language blogs and websites, 
including at least one, www.savehanoipark.com, set up especially for the purpose by a 
Vietnamese living in Australia (V27).6 The mainstream media, which had reported news 
of the redevelopment plans and given a mouthpiece to corporate leaders, did not pick up 
on the groundswell of public concern until later. By May, Viet Nam News referred to 
“cries of protest” from Hanoi residents in an article that presented a neutral but 
confused picture of the debate (ThuH 2007).  
The debate attracted the notice of HealthBridge, formerly known as PATH Canada, an 
international NGO with a range of programming from tobacco control to urban 
environmental protection. As part of a small project on developing a “healthy urban 
living environment”, the NGO identified Reunification Park as a priority issue. With 
assistance from international supporters, HealthBridge developed a plan for a campaign 
to oppose the construction plan that was revised and approved by the head office in 
Canada (HealthBridge 2008). HealthBridge had regional experience in Asia, knowledge 
                                                        
6 The website was not maintained and has been unavailable since 2009. 
203 
 
 
 
of advocacy techniques, and a good reputation with Vietnamese authorities, but did not 
have extensive local connections to draw on or contact with affected people (V20). 
HealthBridge’s in-country staff are all Vietnamese nationals; realising they couldn’t do 
much on their own, they began to look for partners who could join in a local network. 
“We found a lot of people – professionals, experts, media – who supported us but didn’t 
speak out. Others didn’t know about the park, but when they found out, they wanted to 
act” (V27). HealthBridge gathered information on the investment plans and city policies, 
interviewed residents using the park, and posted notices online on students’, overseas 
Vietnamese, architecture, and urban planning websites, with “many positive responses” 
(HealthBridge 2008). “At first, it was hard to identify people – we had to see who could 
do what,” said HealthBridge’s organiser. Most meetings and discussions were on an 
individual basis, since links between people were weak (V27).7  
On 3 August 2007, HealthBridge and the Vietnam Urban Planning Association organised 
a workshop on “Community Green Space in Hanoi,” held (ironically) in a meeting room 
that had been constructed on the grounds of the Botanic Garden, near the Ho Chi Minh 
Mausoleum. Presenters included architects, lawyers, professors, and central government 
representatives from the Office of the Government and the Ministry of Construction 
(HealthBridge 2008). The workshop was scientific and professional in tone, but it was 
also the first public discussion of Reunification Park since the privatisation project was 
announced. An international participant recalls high levels of worry and fear, especially 
from the Urban Planning Association, of the consequences of “taking on Vincom”, known 
                                                        
7 In a previously published article (Wells-Dang 2010), I wrote that the 2007 campaign was “not primarily 
led by NGOs; these only entered the network towards the end of the campaign. International actors played 
only a minor role in publicising the issue and funding the August 2007 conference”. In fact, HealthBridge’s 
role was central in initiating advocacy, though they did not publicly lead it. 
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to be a well-connected corporation: “No one from Vincom showed up at the conference. 
What a relief. But we were still waiting to see what would come of our comments to the 
press. We knew that if the story ran, the Party would not be against us” (V67). 
An article summarising the workshop appeared in one leading newspaper on the 
following day, stating that participants found the park project unjustifiable and 
promising to sue if it went forward (Tien Phong 2007). On 7 August, VietNamNet (VNN), 
a leading news website, interviewed one of the presenters at the workshop – the 
landscape architect who had exposed the Thang Long Water Park scandal in the 1990s 
(HoangH 2007a). The architect had been a late addition to the workshop: until 
HealthBridge called to invite her, she had been unaware of the park case and was busy 
with other work (V21). On the same day, VNN also published an angry letter to the State 
President written by a well-known retired biologist who had previously spoken up in 
the Hoan Kiem Lake and Thu Le park cases (VietNamNet 2007a). These articles became 
the catalysts for an unexpected groundswell of public opinion, drawing widespread 
praise (and some criticism) from readers (VietNamNet 2007b). The printed comments 
were only a small fraction of the over 500 responses that VNN received (V51,V21), split 
roughly 80%/20% against the corporations.  
Other workshop presenters also gave interviews or wrote articles over the following 
week. In all, more than 50 articles appeared in print media during August, as well as a 
series of three television reports on the evening news (HealthBridge 2008). On 10 
August, a reporter interviewed the deputy director of the Hanoi Department of Planning, 
who stated that the final plans for the park had not yet been approved, and promised to 
“gather public opinion first” before making a decision (TrongP 2007). This brought the 
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city government in compliance with national laws that had been ignored up to that 
point. According to the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance (SRV 2007) and other legal 
documents, the proposal to redevelop Reunification Park should have been posted for 
public discussion by the Hanoi People’s Committee before a decision was made. In 
practice, the invitation to two well-connected corporations was made behind closed 
doors, and leaked to the public after the fact (Action for the City 2008:60). 
The director of Tan Hoang Minh Co. responded in print on 13 August with a rambling 
tirade defending his actions (DoAD 2007). His response backfired against the investors, 
leading to more critical readers’ comments (V51). In subsequent articles, activists 
quoted online comments from dozens of readers in support of their arguments, showing 
that public opinion was overwhelmingly on their side (TranTV 2007a). As one activist 
describes, “This is the way we won” (V21).  
In addition to facts and logic, the often neglected factor of emotion comes forth clearly in 
both activists’ postings and reader responses (Aminzade et al 2001:4). History and 
political meanings led many people to identify viscerally with the park, as in the 
repeatedly-cited metaphor that privatisation would be like “removing a lung of the city”, 
a phrase that comes up in seven separate media articles and blogs in August alone (for 
instance, VietNamNet 2007b, The Dung 2007a). Some of the strongest statements came 
from network participants who are sitting central government officials. The director of 
the Ministry of Construction’s Architectural Research Institute emphasised: 
For the welfare of citizens of this city, for the whole community, and as a leader 
of a professional agency, I forcefully oppose the proposal to reconstruct 
Reunification Park into an entertainment centre like Disneyland. Not a single 
modern city or ancient city in developed countries would do anything like this. 
There is nothing to guarantee that the investors will keep their promises not to 
take over public space from the people. It’s all about profit. (TheD 2007a) 
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The director of the Institute for Urban Research and Infrastructure Development, a 
former vice-chair of the Hanoi People’s Committee and Vice-Minister of Construction, 
continued: 
At a recent workshop on this issue, I already stated my opposition to the 
proposal to turn Reunification Park into an amusement area. Let Reunification 
Park remain as it has been. The “upgrading” of the park that Hanoi is planning 
will only benefit the interests of the investors, since anyone can see that this is a 
gigantic piece of valuable land in the middle of the city. (TheD 2007a) 
These statements by central government officials expanded on their presentations at the 
conference. Importantly, they had links to the national government, not only to city 
authorities. When these critics spoke publicly about Reunification Park, they did so as 
residents of Hanoi with links to a different (and higher) level of government than the 
one directly responsible for administering the park. 
Both officials and ordinary people combined environmental and political appeals to stop 
the proposed redevelopment of Reunification Park. Access to the park for poor people 
was a common theme of online postings, even if the bloggers themselves may not have 
been very poor. Concern about corporate ownership also surfaced repeatedly, but the 
largest single concern was losing the little remaining public space in central Hanoi. 
While the physical space of the park was not co-terminus with the political space to 
discuss its fate—no actual protest activities took place within the park itself—activists 
made a clear connection between these spaces and quality of life in the city. By claiming 
Reunification Park as public property, contenders also asserted their right to speak for 
and as citizens of the Vietnamese polity. 
When the city government suspended the redevelopment plans, leaders backtracked on 
their previous statements:  
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The city [government] has never agreed for investors to build an amusement 
centre in Reunification Park. The city only said that this was a project to 
renovate and upgrade the park... The city will gather public opinion about 
designing the park. After that, we will see if proposals are compliant with the 
city plan before allowing any investment. (DoanL 2007) 
Tan Hoang Minh and Vincom also backed down, stating they had no intention of taking 
away public space and only wanted to improve the current park (TheD 2007b).  
The 2009 hotel dispute 
Less than a year after the “Disneyland” case was resolved, controversy again erupted 
around Reunification Park. In June 2008, another group of developers, with no 
connection to the 2007 investors, announced the groundbreaking of “Novotel on the 
Park,” a four-star hotel on one hectare of parkland. The hotel would have 400 rooms and 
cost US $40 million to build (Dantri 2009). A brief news article described the investors 
as the city-owned Hanoi Tourist Co., Singapore-based SIH Investment Ltd., and the 
international hotel chain Accor. Accor’s deputy Asia director told media the hotel would 
be “a resort in the heart of the city” (HoangH 2008). As with initial announcements in 
2007, this news generated no immediate comment or public reaction, but activists 
picked up on the statement later to frame the developers as elitist: “In the plans it says it 
will be a ‘resort’. People here don’t even know what a ‘resort’ is, but they know it’s not 
for them” (Steinglass 2009). 
Plans for a hotel in this approximate location had been approved much earlier, in 1991, 
as Vietnam was just beginning to open its doors to foreign investors. The developers at 
that time were Swedish, and the structure was to be named the SAS Hotel, located at a 
major intersection near Reunification Park, but not on park land (a Japanese hotel was 
later built across the street from this site). However, construction on the original site 
would have required compensating and resettling several hundred families living there, 
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and the city government did not have the funds or inclination for this. Hence, the hotel 
site was quietly moved into park land (V63). Although the investment never 
materialised, the hotel was listed (in its original site) on the 1992 and 1998 city plans 
and was mentioned in passing in articles about the park (DoAD 2007, HoangH 2007b).   
Clearance of the hotel site for construction began in late 2008. The speed of these events 
surprised activists, who were focusing their attention elsewhere (V21). HealthBridge’s 
public space project had ended, and there was no established mechanism for network 
participants to communicate except by individual phone calls and emails. Once 
activated, however, the network regrouped quickly, instigated this time by the 
landscape architect who had been a vocal late addition to the 2007 workshop. As in 
2007, success initially seemed far-fetched. An international supporter recalls that when 
he heard construction had begun, “I thought it was hopeless [as it is] quite tough to close 
down a project under construction. [HealthBridge staff] said no, we have to try. So we 
began again with the experience of the first fight” (V67). 
       
In July 2010, a photo and description of the          The hotel site under construction, February 2009 
  “Novotel on the Park” was still posted at                                              (LeN et al 2009) 
                     the site (source: V58) 
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The hotel investors attempted to use history to their advantage. They created a shell 
company, “SAS Royal Hotel Hanoi Joint Venture Co.” to lead the project.8 In effect, the 
partners pretended that they were the successors of the 1991 Swedish investors and 
attempted to mislead the public. Furthermore, it was later revealed that the Singapore-
based partner, SIH Investments, did not stand for “Scandinavian International Hotels,” a 
company that had not existed for more than a decade (V67). SIH was misrepresenting 
itself in order to hide that it is actually 75% owned by VinaCapital, a large domestic 
developer comparable to Vincom (Thu and Linh 2009), with the remaining funds from 
Accor and a third company (Dantri 2009). In short, virtually no foreign interests were 
involved.  
Park network participants began uncovering this information in late 2008. The husband 
of the landscape architect had good contacts with the Swedish Embassy from his 
previous government job, and he called the ambassador, who confirmed that no Swedish 
firm was an investor in the hotel and invited the couple to the embassy to discuss the 
case. Rather than accept this invitation, however, the architect planned a more indirect 
strategy: 
At first, we just realised that building a hotel in the park was wrong. Then we 
found grounds for opposing it, based on city planning and the approval 
process... Instead of going to meet the Swedish ambassador, where we might 
have been observed, I realised it was better if we got someone from the city 
government to ask the Swedish embassy themselves. Sometimes we have to 
take a detour to get the best results.  
 
I saw from the beginning that we needed an external point of pressure, so I 
wrote to the foreign investors. If they knew the real situation, they would pull 
out. I also said that Nguyen The Thao [the chair of the Hanoi People’s 
Committee] was misled and should cancel the project. The problem was that his 
advisors knew all about it, but they didn’t tell him. (V21) 
                                                        
8 See the top line of the sign in the picture on the left, p. 208. 
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The architect’s first online article criticising the hotel was published in Vietnam Week on 
10 February 2009, shortly after the Tet new year holidays: good timing for reaching a 
wide audience (TranTV 2009). On 12 February, newspapers reported that the city 
government had approved construction of the hotel (Thanh Nien 2009). When the 
architect’s comments came out in the press, “we all waited. On one website, I counted 27 
pages of comments! Unbelievable – we were all afraid, [the Urban Planning Association] 
would not talk about this on the telephone. We would have to meet face to face” (V67). 
Over the next week, critical articles appeared by other network participants affiliated 
with the Urban Planning Association, Architects’ Association and HealthBridge. Senior 
retired officials also spoke out: the former vice-chair of Hanoi and vice-minister of 
construction quoted in 2007, plus a new participant, a former vice-minister of 
Environment and Natural Resources. As in 2007, the quantity and tone of public 
comments overwhelmed advocates’ expectations. VietNamNet alone published 105 
reader comments from 10-12 February, all opposed to the hotel; a small, illustrative 
sample follows, from the impassioned to the ironic. 
Name: Quang Huy  
Address: [none given]  
Email: bodoicu_ho@yahoo.com9  
I was truly shocked to read that Reunification Park is being cut up to built a hotel. It’s unbelievable that 
the city could allow a project like this without more awareness of the people’s rights. The environment is 
already so polluted, we need to open more park space in the coming time. Not only are they not 
expanding, they’re planning to take over a park of the city’s lung. I can’t understand it.  
And I’m also concerned that on such an important issue causing so much public criticism, vietnamnet.vn is 
the only credible source!!! There must be some powerful interest behind this project?  
Name: ViệtQuang  
Address: Hanoi  
Email: vietngoc141@yahoo.com  
From a slightly different perspective, there are a lot of benefits to building this hotel. Such as: 
1. At present, we’re still poor and don’t have money to manage and improve the park. We don’t even have 
enough to keep the park clean. If there’s a hotel, there will be funds for that. And reducing the park by 1 
ha to build the hotel is 1 ha less to clean up.  
2. This project will contribute to “reducing poverty” for a few families. Maybe they’re so poor they can’t 
                                                        
9 The e-mail address translates as “Old soldier of Ho [Chi Minh]”. 
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afford to trade in their car for a new model, or are a little money short of building a country estate. Rich 
people, strong country.10 
 
Name: Trần Thọ Quảng  
Address: 6 Hẻm 310/90/35, Ng. Văn Cừ, Hà Nội11  
Email: thoquang@viettel.vn  
The Party and the government ought to listen to the opinions of the people in order to serve the long-term 
interests of the community, if the leaders are really for the people and of the people (vì dân và do dân).12 
There are already enough articles from within and outside the country opposing “cutting up” 
Reunification Park. I wish the leaders of the Party and government would pay more attention to working 
people, people who have and continue to selflessly defend the country and the achievements of our 
revolution.  
Name: Chau  
Address: Ho Chi Minh city 
Email: aidienchau@gmail.com  
I’m not from Hanoi, but I love the city, and I love Reunification Park where so many young people used 
their sweat to enthusiastically build a park on a dump site. I’m really heartbroken that one of the few 
public spaces in Hanoi is being taken over for private interests of one group of people. Selling a part of 
Reunification Park is not just selling part of Hanoi’s soul, but selling part of all of our souls, because Hanoi 
is the heart of the country… 
(Source for all comments: http://www.tuanvietnam.net/vn/thongtindachieu/6091/index.aspx) 
 
On 13 February, the Hanoi People’s Committee held a press conference, announcing that 
construction of the hotel would continue, as the location had already been set, and 
“issues that have been handed down from the past we have to accept for now”. 
Authorities further claimed that the hotel land did not belong to Reunification Park but 
was unallocated “public land” (LeN et al 2009). Out of either ignorance or deviousness, a 
city spokesman also defended the hotel on the basis of “protecting rights of foreign 
investors... If anyone causes difficulties for the implementation of the project, this will 
have a very big influence on the foreign investment environment in Vietnam generally 
and particularly in Hanoi” (LinhT 2009).  
                                                        
10 Cynically evoking the beginning of the pre-eminent Party slogan, “a rich people, a strong nation and a 
just, democratic and civilised society”. 
11 An address deep down an alley in a poor area of the city across the Red River, home to many migrant 
workers. 
12 This phrase, originating from Abraham Lincoln, is used frequently in Vietnamese political discourse.  
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Those newspapers most directly controlled by the city government – Hà nội Mới (New 
Hanoi) and An ninh Thủ Độ (Capital Security), for instance – reported on the authorities’ 
statements without comment. A columnist in Kinh tế Đô thị (Urban Economy) 
newspaper linked construction of the hotel to Vietnam’s historical friendship and debt 
to Sweden. Other newspapers and websites, however, noted that “almost all public 
comments are opposed to the project” and quoted statements by park network 
members criticising the hotel (LinhT 2009). Foreign journalists also reported on the 
story, quoting one activist with a representative view: “We protect the genuine wishes of 
the people. They had no right to use the common land of the community for the interests 
of their own, and they offer to the foreigners to make money in our country. It’s terrible” 
(Steinglass 2009). 
Park advocates drew on powerful visual and emotional frames to mobilise public 
opinion. In 2007, photos published in the media featured views of the natural 
environment of Reunification Park and of Hanoians exercising or relaxing in the park. By 
2009, network members had collected historical photos and old city maps and began 
placing these in articles. They also prepared a photo gallery that was published online 
using lines from a popular, nostalgic song as captions (NguyenB 2009). The photos 
recalled the socialist past and volunteer labour that constructed the park, a powerful 
image with older residents that also outbalanced city authorities’ claims of historic debts 
to Sweden or to other foreign investors. Maps established continuity with the past, and 
also responded to authorities’ claims that the hotel was not actually on park land. City 
plans from the 1960s until 2001 showed that it was (TranHA 2009). A retired official 
underlined this argument, stating that “public land” could not be given away for the 
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purposes of private business, and that city leaders were confusing the meaning of what 
was “public”. Although officials claimed to be following the law, in fact a public hearing 
and auction should have been held if the land was to be sold (DangHV 2009).  
             
 Archival photo of Hanoi workers constructing      Detail from 2001 city plan in which hotel site  
       Reunification Park (TranTV 2009)                          is depicted as park land (TranHA 2009) 
One particular historical document helped to turn the corner on the hotel case. The 
retired biologist, who has several rooms full of old documents in his modest house, 
found a letter that had been signed by then-Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet in 1996 
recommending that the SAS hotel project be moved to a location outside the city centre 
(V21,V58). This document effectively outweighed any subsequent statement or decision 
by Hanoi city leaders.  
With a firm political basis for cancelling the hotel project, the president of the Urban 
Planning Association then set up a meeting with the Hanoi People’s Committee 
chairman. The association had previously sent an official letter to the city government 
expressing opposition on 18 February, released to the press on 23 February along with 
the text of Vo Van Kiet’s 1996 decision (Tuan Vietnam 2009). The president and the city 
chairman knew each other: both of them had studied in Poland at different times, and in 
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the small world of Hanoi intellectuals, they were former “schoolmates” (V21).13 The 
meeting took place on 24 February and included representatives from the Ministry of 
Construction (Ashui 2009). As the landscape architect (who was not present) recounted 
afterwards, 
The chairman said, “We authorities were put under a great deal of pressure. 
This is also a foreign relations issue.” Mr. B [the association president] replied, 
“I don’t know about that. But we are strongly opposed to this project. If there 
are foreign relations consequences to stopping it, then you have to solve those!” 
The chairman considered this and agreed that he would ask the Swedes about 
the case. Everything was going according to our script. If it didn’t work, we 
were prepared to call Stockholm! (V21) 
As planned in the activists’ strategy, the Swedish embassy responded to the Hanoi 
People’s Committee that they had no interest in the case (KimT 2009). 
International activists initiated a campaign to boycott Accor Group properties and write 
to the company in protest of the hotel project. The campaign was designed in 
coordination with HealthBridge, who calculated that there was a reasonable chance of 
convincing Accor to withdraw from the project (V27). “I am outraged by Accor’s plan to 
build a hotel within Thong Nhat [Reunification] Park,” a sample letter stated. “There is 
simply no legitimate justification – whether it’s ‘job creation’ or some rationalized 
contribution to Hanoi’s tourist industry – for Accor to put profit over the public good” 
(VSG 2009). The boycott and letter-writing campaign resulted in several hundred 
messages from “people in professional positions” to Accor’s regional vice president for 
communications, resulting in complaints from management about the bad exposure they 
were receiving (V67).  
                                                        
13 This may seem like a weak link to influence policy, but research on guanxi in China also suggests that 
classmate (同学) relations are an important facet of social networks (Gold et al 2002:6). As proof of the 
“strength of weak ties” (Granovetter 1973), this was enough to get the association president in the 
mayor’s door, and the case unfolded from there. 
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HealthBridge and the Urban Planning Association moved forward with plans for a public 
workshop, similar to the August 2007 seminar, on the subject of “Effective Management 
of Parks and Gardens in Hanoi.” This was held on 17 March in a club overlooking the 
gate to Reunification Park. The ten presenters, including associations, NGOs, architects 
and lawyers, described the history of park planning in Hanoi, international comparisons, 
park design, and legal structures. The sense at the workshop was that the campaign was 
close to success, and just needed finishing touches.   
Their advocacy came to fruition the following week. Many public comments had 
suggested that since Reunification Park had become a national concern, the central 
government should intervene to reverse the decision of city authorities (LinhT 2009). 
On 25 March, the Ministry of Construction recommended that the Prime Minister stop 
construction of the hotel (Ashui 2009). This sounds convoluted, but has force in the 
Vietnamese unitary political system, where in the absence of an independent judiciary, 
only a higher level of government can overrule a lower level decision. On April 13, the 
Prime Minister issued a circular ordering the city to halt the project (AFP 2009). 
Network membership and structure 
Reunification Park network participants can be categorised into three groups with 
varying degrees of connections to the Hanoi city government and other authorities 
(V27,V64). The first, and largest, category consists of leaders and members of 
professional associations, in this case the Urban Planning Association, Vietnam 
Architects’ Association, and Vietnam Environment Association, among others (V53). 
These associations’ leaders are typically retired officials of medium to high rank 
(department directors or vice-directors), while rank-and-file members are active 
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practitioners and/or university professors, mostly middle-aged. Association members 
usually engage in advocacy in an individual capacity, but they may also use the 
association’s offices and stamp when a more official approach is necessary or when it 
serves their interests (V56). Some associations are seen as more effective than others, 
depending both on the characteristics of individual leaders and the status and 
connections of their members (V63). Younger members feel that the older generation is 
“too conservative” and state-centred (V64);14 in contrast, some retired officials are also 
known for direct and fearless criticism of government policies, as they have nothing to 
lose from saying what they think (V53).  
A second category of network participants consists of journalists employed by print or 
online media who covered the Reunification Park story and later developed a personal 
interest (V51). Other semi-professional journalists participate by blogging or submitting 
articles to online publications; there is some overlap between this group and 
association-based activists in the first group. Third, and smallest in numbers, are 
organisational network participants, including HealthBridge and Action for the City. 
Staff of these organisations are employed to work on issues that relate to public space 
and engage in advocacy on this basis. Several international NGO-based individuals have 
also posted comments and taken part in workshops.  
  
                                                        
14 The same dynamic exists in the Bright Future network (see p. 146). 
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Figure 6.2 Reunification Park network structure 
   
The 2007 campaign resulted in increased ties among members, and by the time of the 
hotel case in early 2009, the network’s structure was more egalitarian, with several 
well-connected core members and others at the periphery. HealthBridge was still an 
informal focal point, with one staff person contributing part of her time to the case, but 
initiatives came from many nodes in the network. Membership has remained loose and 
undefined, so that while some individuals and organisations do describe themselves as 
network members, others do not. 
The whole network has hardly ever met together in one place, with the exception of the 
two HealthBridge workshops, which also included outside participants (and in the case 
of the 2009 workshop, was open to the public), and the networking dinner noted above. 
Instead, different sub-groups meet as needed to share information and discuss the case, 
such as a media node made up of online journalists from VNN, Dantri, and VN Express 
(V51) and a node comprising HealthBridge and several association leaders (V27). For 
other participants, activism on Reunification Park is only a minor part of a wider set of 
urban and political issues on which they “mostly work alone and independently” (V58).  
As one network member summarises, 
218 
 
 
 
We all know each other, but we don’t meet very often. Mostly I write an article 
from my point of view, then someone else comments and writes from their 
expertise (chuyên môn). Even if people write using pen names, we still know 
who it is… We see each other occasionally and talk at conferences and 
meetings, but we don’t write e-mails or meet in public. That might attract 
attention and they would say “Aha, they are up to something”. Often we don’t 
even call. (V56)  
Interviews showed that in fact not all network participants do know everyone else, or at 
least not very well: several respondents mixed up or could not remember names of 
other participants who are in other nodes of the network. Even after several years of 
collaboration, the Reunification Park network remains primarily virtual. 
Advocacy strategies 
Public space advocacy in Hanoi prior to the Reunification Park case followed an 
embedded strategy: individuals with connections to government decision-makers 
attempted to influence them through letters, petitions, workshops and direct personal 
appeals. In early cases such as Thu Le Park, the contents of the letters were not even 
publicised, and most were never answered (V58). As might be expected, the success rate 
of this approach is relatively low, although a direct meeting with the Hanoi chairman did 
play a role in stopping hotel construction in 2009.15 Recommendations of individual 
experts can easily be ignored. Embedded advocacy might have been more effective had 
activists formed a network, perhaps similar to the Bright Future Group. This did not 
occur, in part due to the lack of a shared identity among potential members, the 
presence of individual egos, and the fact that most activists were already well 
established in their careers when they began speaking out about parks and public space. 
These limitations continue today, as illustrated by the finding that no fewer than five 
                                                        
15 This tactic is similar to the “Zhou Enlai end run” described in chapter 3, p. 110. 
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individuals believe that their personal contributions were the deciding factor in either 
the 2007 Disneyland campaign, 2009 hotel case, or both.16 
These perceptions notwithstanding, the Reunification Park campaigns were a group 
effort, and many contributions were essential to their success. Particularly in 2007, 
HealthBridge was a catalyst in bringing network participants together and offering 
experience from advocacy for “livable cities” in other Asian and global contexts. 
HealthBridge’s international status gave them credibility and status with Vietnamese 
officials, even if they were saying the same thing as local activists (V64). Wisely, 
HealthBridge did not attempt to dominate activities or seize the spotlight for itself, nor 
did it use funding to dominate the network. By 2009, HealthBridge’s participation was 
secondary, helpful but not necessary.  
HealthBridge staff view their main contribution to the network as hosting and 
organising workshops (V27). 17 One international participant who planned the campaign 
with HealthBridge describes “a strategy straight out of Saul Alinsky” (V67), but actually 
little direct community organising took place. They employed a methodology of network 
coordination and communication (V64) more aligned with Habermasian communicative 
action (Habermas 1984). As an international NGO, HealthBridge feels it has little space 
for more direct advocacy, preferring “to be constructive, not criticise the government” 
                                                        
16 In its report covering the privatisation campaign, HealthBridge (2008) states that it had successfully 
“created a front group” and convinced the Urban Planning Association to act as its leader. A foreign 
journalist who covered the park story noted, “it seems as if HealthBridge is taking all the credit” (V22). In 
discussions with HealthBridge staff, I became convinced that “front group” was actually a poor choice of 
words by a non-native English speaker; more accurately, staff describe in Vietnamese that they helped to 
create a “forum” (diễn dàn) or a “network” (V27).  
17 Most respondents agree with this assessment, but one consultant on urban planning feels that the basic 
structure of organising in 2009 was in fact the same as 2007; network members were simply more 
confident because they had already won once (V64). 
220 
 
 
 
(V27). Meetings and conferences with government partners are, of course, embedded 
advocacy techniques, and this formed the “inside” part of the new strategy. 
The initial efforts of HealthBridge and workshop participants were amplified through 
the “outside” component of the strategy, which relied on media and the Internet to 
leverage public opinion within and outside Vietnam. Originally, HealthBridge also 
planned to distribute leaflets to people coming to the park, but this idea was dropped 
since media advocacy seemed more effective (HealthBridge 2008). The response to 
media stories on the park came as a surprise to everyone involved, including the 
reporters themselves, who suddenly found themselves working evenings and weekends 
to respond to public comments. “We didn’t have any plan to cover this issue,” says a 
journalist. “It just happened. It needed one person to light a match and it started a big 
fire. We didn’t start it, we just reported the news” (V51). 
Online postings came not only from Hanoi, but other parts of Vietnam and from the 
millions of Vietnamese living outside the country, primarily in the USA, Eastern Europe 
and Australia. In many cases, it was not possible to know where comments originated, as 
only an e-mail address was given. Through the Internet, the locality-specific park 
controversies became rapidly transnationalised in a way that previous public space 
issues were not. For instance, August 2007 workshop papers were posted immediately 
on the savehanoipark.com website, based in Australia.  
Framing of the issue was enabled by the existence of clear opponents. The involvement 
of private corporate investors, and their arrogant statements to the media, stimulated 
and targeted public anger in both the 2007 and 2009 cases. For instance, when the Tan 
Hoang Minh company director criticised several activists by name in August 2007, park 
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network members were able to frame him, probably unfairly, as uninformed and 
uncultured, while emphasising their own civil behaviour in avoiding personal attacks or 
arguments in print (V21).   
Defenders of Reunification Park did not publicly oppose or criticise government officials, 
a far riskier tactic. In reality, as network members knew well, some city government 
officials were aligned with the developers. But other officials – perhaps those who had 
no way to benefit from the projects – stood aside or were critical. This fragmentation of 
levels, branches and interests within the state gave the civil society network space to 
speak out and form alliances (Gupta 2006:231).  
Advocacy requires divisions among government officials. As long as someone is 
benefiting and someone else is not – someone gets this cup of tea and someone 
else doesn’t – then the person not benefiting becomes my ally, and I have space 
to advocate. What’s more, this is always the case. There are always differences 
of opinion among the elite, thus spaces to exploit. If all the leaders agreed, then 
I wouldn’t be able to say or do anything. But all the leaders never agree. (V56, 
emphasis added)18 
Advocates did not defeat the corporations or the government head-on, but simply 
gathered enough allies in other parts of the state, media, associations and international 
organisations to tip the scales in their favour: that is, engage in “jujitsu advocacy.”19 As 
one activist states, “we have to have tactics and tricks, because they [opponents] have so 
many tactics and tricks” (V21). Capital city-based activists may have an advantage in 
over others in terms of greater access to central government, but the principle of 
engaging multiple levels of the state holds in many situations. 
As a stand-alone tactic, Internet postings would not have been sufficient to tip the 
balance against the park projects: the “Let’s save our city” appeal and the Accor letter-
                                                        
18 This insight recalls Shi Tianjian’s description of “political participation” in Beijing; see p. 115. 
19 See p. 128. 
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writing campaign both raised public awareness, but did not produce any concrete result. 
Conversely, embedded actions alone would also not have been sufficient, as shown by 
previous cases of failure. HealthBridge’s role was important but not decisive; the key 
public statements by network participants occurred after the August workshop was 
over.  
If a group of intellectuals have a workshop and present papers and talk among 
themselves, it doesn’t change anything in public opinion because no one knows 
about it. But if articles are published in the media, then it affects what officials 
say and do, and what people think. Even knowing that there was a conference 
on quality of life in the city makes them take notice. If I publish an article in the 
morning, by the afternoon people are reading it, discussing it and commenting 
on it… Once [officials] see that I write articles that have value, then they come 
to me and ask about ideas and plans before they are released. They want to 
know what the public’s reaction will be. (V56) 
A leader of the Urban Planning Association states that in spite of well-written articles 
and clear presentations at workshops, information is still not strong enough to convince 
officials at many different levels, some of whom lack awareness and education. A more 
effective strategy is to stimulate public opinion, which will get better results from 
authorities who see the media as “the voice of the people” (V53).  
Once inside-outside advocacy efforts began, they produced results in a remarkably short 
time. At the beginning of August 2007, though many individuals were opposed to 
privatising the park, there was no organised campaign or public discussion. When this 
began, it “went viral” and became, for a short time, the biggest story in Hanoi. The same 
pattern repeated in 2009 of a long period of preparation and strategising, followed by a 
one-month burst of online and media attention resulting in government concessions. “At 
first, no one took much of an interest in the case, we figured the companies had already 
won” (V21), but once public concern reached a tipping point, there was no turning back. 
In 2007, this happened almost accidentally, as an unplanned public reaction (V51); by 
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2009, it was part of a conscious strategy among network members to stop the hotel 
(V21). 
As network participants learned from their previous experiences, their framing of public 
space issues also became more sophisticated. By 2009, their focus was not just on 
“saving the park” but connecting with public expression. Network members made 
efforts to align themselves with “the people”. As no political opinion polls or opposition 
parties exist, public comments on websites were seen as the best way to gauge attitudes 
(V59, Tran and Linh 2010). This allowed network members to claim they were 
representing large groups of Hanoians (Dantri 2009). By identifying themselves with 
“the majority”, the activists painted the corporations and their government allies into a 
corner. 
Table 6.3 Advocacy tactics – Reunification Park network 
Advocacy tactics Notes 
Embedded advocacy 
 Direct lobbying to officials 
 Letters, petitions, complaints 
 Speak at workshops, conferences 
 Academic and technical research 
  
- Use personal connections to sympathetic 
officials 
- Embedded advocacy done by 
associations and GONGOs as part of a 
diversified network strategy 
- International supporters cooperate with 
embedded actors to organise workshops 
Media advocacy 
 Write articles in print and online 
media 
 Blogging 
- Journalists participate actively as 
network members 
- Use interactive media as a way to 
demonstrate public opinion on the side 
of the network 
Network members credit much of their success at advocacy to media exposure. As the 
landscape architect describes, 
The role of the media is extremely important. If the media are afraid of 
authorities, we wouldn’t have any space to advocate. When I took on the Thang 
Long water park case, the media couldn’t intervene or report on this. I had to 
copy documents and go around from person to person distributing them. Now 
things are much more advantageous. I can sit at home, write articles and talk to 
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everyone. The media do a much better job now... they give me a forum and are 
open to balanced views.  
 
What I do is only one part. The opening of the media is more important. Many 
people still complain there’s no press freedom here. But I think a lot of this 
depends on us. If we say the right things at the right time, the media will listen. 
(V21) 
These varied and nuanced perceptions of media are remarkable in a system in which all 
media remain state-owned.20 One explanation of the diversity of media opinion 
corresponds to the arguments above about elite fragmentation, as each branch and level 
of government owns its own newspaper, sometimes more than one. Second, media is 
seen as an outlet for political discussion, and “authorities tolerate or even encourage a 
certain level of policy debate” (Heng 2003:562). This is despite the fact that the 1999 
Law on Media restricts media roles to “information, description and propaganda,” not 
“critique” (NguyenHV 2007). At different times during the Reunification Park events, 
media served the purposes of city government and corporate interests, but also interests 
of activists. The media also followed their own commercial interests. For instance, at one 
stage in 2007, the editor in chief of VietNamNet was reportedly told not to publish any 
more on the park issue (V21). However, a special VNN feature, the online magazine Tuan 
Vietnam [Vietnam Week] had just started publishing several months earlier, and its 
editor was eager to increase their exposure and market share. The webzine’s format is 
to publish differing views on an issue, then invite readers’ responses (V51). The park 
case was a compelling story for this medium, and no one could criticise the editors as 
they also presented the companies’ views.  
                                                        
20 As defined in chapter 3 (p. 115), “media” includes all information and communication activities of 
networks, from newspapers to the Internet and other interactive technologies. However, Vietnamese law 
applies only to institutional content providers, particularly print and broadcast media, and more recently 
websites.   
225 
 
 
 
On the other hand, the media’s role was also limited due both to political restrictions 
and capacity issues. Journalists did not strategise or plan the campaign, or even engage 
in investigative reporting. Media responses often happen too late: “It is better to know 
about plans in advance, while in the case of Reunification Park, we didn’t find out about 
the [hotel] project until it was already approved” (V56). “If we had a more professional 
media,” a journalist complains, “we wouldn’t all have to check in the office at eight every 
morning. We could go out to research and collect information ourselves, instead of 
depending on documents someone else gives us” (V51). Debate about Reunification Park 
could have been shut down at any time by the Ministry of Information and 
Communications, which supervises the media. The fact that expression was not 
censored does not mean that the subject is not politically sensitive, but rather that there 
was no unanimity among leaders to take action. Some leaders at high levels agreed with 
the park activists, while others supported the corporations; this allowed activists to 
speak out and the media to report differing views.21 
The most significant recent change in Vietnamese media has been the emergence of 
online news and blogs as the industry leaders (NgocV 2005, NguyenHV 2007). Already 
in the 2007 Disneyland case, print media played a smaller role than the leading news 
websites such as VietNamNet and dantri.com.vn.22 In 2009, the disparity was even more 
noticeable: all the key interviews and articles involving network participants appeared 
                                                        
21 This is a slightly different analysis than one I presented earlier that state censorship only takes place if 
opponents are seen as anti-government or anti-Party (Wells-Dang 2010:99). 
22 Earlier accounts note that newspapers managed by the Labour Union and Youth Union are generally 
more independent than other state-owned media (Heng 2003:562). In 2005, while working on an 
advocacy campaign on US-Vietnam relations, I noticed how stories would be picked up first by one of 
these papers, most often Ho Chi Minh City-based Tuoi Tre [Youth], then copied or repeated by other 
newspapers one or two days later. These papers were also weakened by a crackdown on anti-corruption 
reporting in 2008 that saw two of their reporters arrested and editors fired for standing up for the 
reporters’ rights (Reuters 2008, Hayton 2010:135-40). 
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in VietNamNet and Vietnam Week first before being re-posted elsewhere (LinhT 2009). 
Online media conducted interviews and published articles, then gathered public 
comments; the print media then reported on the controversy. Without the political 
space provided by the Internet, organisation of the Reunification Park network would 
have been much harder. Physical meetings would have required more logistical 
preparation and funding, plus the risk of confrontation or restrictions from authorities 
or corporate representatives. Blogs allowed activists to post their concerns directly 
without passing through the official media. The Reunification Park campaign was the 
first public effort in Vietnam to have been conducted in this primarily virtual format.23  
International linkages 
The participation of international NGOs, Hanoi-based expatriates, and overseas 
Vietnamese was a contributing but not deciding factor in the success of the Reunification 
Park campaigns. The term “international” should be qualified in that INGO involvement 
took place largely via Vietnamese staff of a single, small organisation, not through 
complex transnational advocacy structures or large external donors. The non-
Vietnamese who spoke out about the park all have existing ties to Vietnam, including 
many who have lived in Hanoi for many years and speak Vietnamese. Overseas 
Vietnamese participated as individual cyber-citizens posting online comments. While 
each of these forms of engagement was helpful, HealthBridge’s role in initiating a 
strategy and network in 2007 was the most important. HealthBridge served as the 
contact point between international supporters and Vietnamese advocates (V67). 
International participation brought useful comparative perspectives, showing local 
                                                        
23 Others have followed in their footsteps, most notably the bauxite network mentioned in chapter 3, pp. 
93, 96. 
227 
 
 
 
activists they are not alone, and helped to provide “cover” that undoubtedly reduced 
some participants’ initial fear of speaking out (V64). HealthBridge’s low-budget, 
supportive but not dominating approach avoided risks of forming a “donor-initiated 
network” and demonstrates a model worthy of emulation by other international actors.  
No Vietnamese interview respondents felt that international engagement is required for 
effective advocacy in all cases, pointing to examples where virtual networking and local 
advocacy succeeded on their own. HealthBridge’s role was less significant in 2009 than 
in 2007, and in earlier cases of activism, no international participants were involved at 
all. One participant sees the park network as a “seed” that can inspire and inform other 
activism, even if the original members no longer participate (V64).  
Network effectiveness: Policy change 
Participants in the Reunification Park campaigns strategically used available political 
opportunities to spread their views and reach their objectives. Four inter-related factors 
combined to bring about success: first, the people speaking out had sufficient and timely 
access to information; second, they had personal connections to leaders at the 
appropriate level and branch of government that makes decisions (V21), and are viewed 
as professional experts who leaders will take seriously. Third, success requires a base in 
public opinion that is in favour of the activists. Finally, the media is able to report and 
reflect activists’ and the public’s views. 
If all of these factors hold, there is no need for a large network. Even a few activists are 
sufficient: in the Reunification Park cases, fewer than 20 people were active. “We need to 
have people who are experts on the issue and who the public will trust. Sometimes even 
fewer people are involved; even one or two people can lead on an issue but they have to 
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do a lot of work to have their documents and facts straight” (V56). Another activist 
argues, “A weak network with strong connections to the state is more effective than a 
strong network with denser ties” (V21). A large group of people, such as a Catholic 
parish, will be unsuccessful (at least at this type of inside-outside advocacy) if they do 
not meet these conditions. If the first condition of access to leaders holds, but the media 
and public opinion conditions do not, an embedded advocacy strategy might be a better 
choice.24  
A positive interpretation of this finding is that if conditions can be met, they offer an 
effective model for advocacy on a range of issues: witness how park activists learned 
from their unplanned results in 2007 to strategise in 2009. Less optimistically, the 
conditions also imply that while a few big cases can be won, many smaller cases cannot 
(V59). Success in a few cases has led advocates to realise how much further they have to 
go. “Every day in Hanoi there are hundreds of violations of green space,” says one 
activist. “We should be working on all of these local issues, not just the big ones like 
Reunification Park” (V20). In an unpublished report on Hanoi wetlands, two network 
members lament that 
we have to accept the truth: rivers and lakes continue to become more polluted 
and are still taken over for construction. The media is one link in the whole 
process of discovering violations, raising voices to expose them, protecting and 
implementing decisions, and monitoring the situation; but clearly not the 
strongest link. The number of cases that have been resolved is very small 
compared to the number that have been raised in the media. Especially, the 
number of cases that have been fully solved are even fewer. This doesn’t yet 
consider the not uncommon situation in which violations continue to occur 
even after a supervising agency has dealt with the case. Then there are all kinds 
of cases that have just been identified but not dealt with at all. (Tran and Linh 
2010) 
                                                        
24 This differs somewhat from Cai Yongshun’s (2008) findings on factors of effectiveness in Chinese 
contention: large numbers of participants, media coverage, and casualties. The cases are not exactly 
comparable, as Cai’s research focuses on disruptive protests, different tactics than those employed here. 
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In certain cases, the third condition of media interest is present, but the other factors are 
not. Even then, mass media will only cover national-level or city-wide cases, not 
community conflicts (V51), and will only have influence over government in big cases 
(V53). Similarly, blogs can be posted by anyone, but only large, symbolic issues will 
mobilise public opinion. Experts and well-connected public figures have limited time 
and social capital, so they will reserve their credibility to speak out on the most 
important issues (V64). When advocacy conditions are absent, state agencies and 
private corporations generally act as they wish, including privatising public space for 
profit, because of economic incentives (V56), weak management and fragmented 
authority structures (V63). But they can be stopped in some cases if they go too far. 
Network effectiveness: Sustainability  
Individual activists played key roles, using their contacts in the media and government 
to advocate for a change in the city’s decisions. In the process, they engendered a public 
debate that involved hundreds if not thousands of Hanoians in reflection about the 
nature of development in their city and the value of public space. The network’s 
advocacy efforts have been remarkably successful even in the absence of formal 
structure and dense ties among members.  
In 2009, following the conclusion of the hotel campaign, HealthBridge considered taking 
steps to formalise the network under its own leadership. However, HealthBridge’s local 
Vietnamese staff felt this would result in additional work and responsibility for 
themselves unless extra staff positions were added, which was apparently not 
considered. Rather than a formal network under HealthBridge’s coordination, 
Vietnamese staff preferred a looser network in which different sub-groups act in 
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different roles – essentially a description of the existing loose structure (V27). This view 
is shared by other network participants (in fact, it is one of the few things that all 
interviewees seemed to agree on). “Advocacy on the web is good – better than an 
organisation,” says one activist, in part because it is easy to reach overseas Vietnamese, 
and also allows each activist to be selective as to which people and which issues to 
engage with and respond to (V21). As activists work with a variety of people on different 
issues and call on issue-specific experts – urban planners, chemists who measure water 
pollution, and so on – it is often hard to say who is a network member and who isn’t; this 
changes from issue to issue (V56). 
It’s better not to have an organisation. If we did, we would have to worry about 
structure and funding, then if we did something controversial, it would be shut 
down and then where would we be? It is better this way. We can speak openly 
without risk of reprisals. The network operates based on events: when there is 
a need, then people speak out... Depending on what the issue is, different people 
take the lead. (V56) 
This mix of reasons combines to form a strong argument for choosing informal network 
structures rather than more permanent, formalised ones.  
The Reunification Park experience also shows that virtual networks have several major 
disadvantages. Without a coordinating body, collective action depends on volunteer 
individual leadership, and individuals may be busy, uninterested, or otherwise 
unavailable. Second, the network stands in basically a reactive pose: “If another issue 
comes up,” says an association leader, “we’re ready to hold workshops and organise 
again” (V53). This is doubtless so, as the 2009 case shows, but it leaves much to chance 
and timing. Ultimately, the reason no formal network has emerged from the park 
campaigns is that no person or organisation has stepped up to lead it (V66). Funding is 
also an issue: even a modest annual budget of £5,000-10,000 would be beyond the 
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means of Vietnamese network participants alone, though by international standards this 
amount is quite small. HealthBridge, the most likely funder, didn’t want to impose.  
Given that there are important allies within the state and participants from different 
sectors and types of organisations, there is no reason why a more formal public space 
network could not succeed, if participants desired it.25 There are many steps short of full 
formalisation that the network could take: more frequent meetings, development of a 
dedicated website, or identification of a staff person as a full- or part-time administrator 
or coordinator, based in one participating organisation. But no structure can emerge 
unless participants are ready for it. 
Network effectiveness: Political space 
From an urban planning perspective, “the forces of globalization are radically 
restructuring cities as they intersect with local histories and shifting constellations of 
power” (Douglass 2008:27), and this process of “rapid urbanisation...is the backdrop to 
which the controversies over Thong Nhat Park must be reflected” (Hellberg and 
Johansson 2008:29). Globalisation and capitalist development are certainly relevant to 
the case, as seen in the selection of “Disneyland” as the corporations’ pretext for 
appropriating public land and links to overseas (and overseas Vietnamese) investment 
and social capital. Connections to the past are also important, particularly in nostalgia 
for an imagined purer socialist period in which “we were more human,” and also in the 
attempt by developers to invoke Vietnam’s historical relationship with neutral, social-
democratic Sweden as an obligation to build a luxury hotel. It seems too reductionist to 
describe all these as results of rapid urbanisation. Ultimately, debates over Reunification 
                                                        
25 The experience of other groups, such as the Vietnam Rivers Network (see p. 96), shows that formal 
networks are possible, even on potentially sensitive topics. 
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Park and public space are political, in the sense used in this thesis of public deliberation 
over issues of common concern.  
Reunification Park network participants have an explicit understanding of their 
activities as political, and not only because of the role of senior government officials in 
decision making. Media websites filed stories on the park under the categories “politics” 
and “society”, sometimes both, with “politics” being used more frequently in the 2009 
hotel case. As a journalist states, 
This case is definitely political! In this city, every square meter of land is 
political – especially something involving a large piece of land in the centre of 
the city. The state owns all land in Vietnam. It’s not private property. So any 
time land is transferred from one use to another, this has to be approved by the 
authorities. The companies know this, and there were political interests 
involved. (V51) 
Procedurally, the politics of the park can be traced through a series of city government 
decisions taken and reversed in response to pressure from private investors on one 
hand and civil society on the other. City officials felt pressure to satisfy investors, as 
shown in the early worried responses in the hotel case concerning FDI and economic 
growth; this pressure comes both from the incentives to attract development and 
policies emanating from the central government and its backers in the World Bank and 
IMF (Painter 2005:273-6). The political economy of land rights in a single-party 
developmental state are clear enough and would predict “symbiotic clientelism” or 
“wicked coalitions” between officials and developers (LuYY 2008:45, LiC 2009:xxvii). 
Perhaps more surprising, given the Vietnamese political system, is the level of state 
responsiveness to public opinion as filtered through media and other civil society 
advocacy. In the absence of formal accountability mechanisms such as elections, what 
alternative forms of accountability explain government actions? 
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Interview respondents offer several interpretations. One observation is that current 
Hanoi leaders are relatively enlightened compared to some of their recent predecessors: 
they have a background in construction and planning, and “know how to listen to 
people” (V64). A second explanation concerns embedded social networks that link 
current city officials to their former teachers and patrons who are now retired, including 
some Reunification Park network participants who are able to exert influence on the 
younger generation, or at least speak their mind freely (V53,V63). Leaders are also city 
residents, so they would rather not do anything harmful to the city; although they may 
have received bad advice, they are not foolish or incompetent (V21). Wanting to at least 
appear to be good, honest officials, leaders have some incentive to respond to citizen 
demands (Hildebrant 2009). These factors are all potentially valid, but do not fully 
explain city government actions, which come across as insecure and indecisive. Not too 
convinced of the rightness of their actions, leaders bend and even reverse policies when 
expedient or pressed to do so. As noted above, inside-outside advocacy requires a 
fractured elite.26  
 The companies weren’t afraid of us. They know how to deal with the media. If 
they couldn’t invest in this project, they have a lot of others. But the authorities, 
they were afraid. What if someone above them calls them up and asks what 
they were doing? Or what if they are asked about it later in the National 
Assembly? (V51) 
Thus, the same fragmentation of authority and flexibility in implementation that allow 
for regulations to be ignored also gives civil society space to advocate for change. When 
pressure from below becomes too intense, the state is willing to make concessions to 
                                                        
26 As one Hanoi architect jokes, “there are three models of administration. The first is that the government 
fears its people, as in the US. The second is that the people fear their government, as in China. Then there’s 
Hanoi: the government and people fear one another and go about their business” (cited in Meyer 
2009:121). 
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limit the potential for broader social discontent or unrest (Chu 2006:27).27 In response 
to large-scale Catholic vigils in 2008, Hanoi authorities converted two disputed 
properties, which otherwise might have been sold for commercial use, into public parks 
(Wells-Dang 2010:102). Several park network participants view this outcome as a step 
forward: “Hanoi needs more parks, we’ll take them any way we can get them!” said one 
(V64). They are strange parks, however, with narrow pathways and signs to keep off the 
grass, designed like Ba Dinh Square to eliminate the possibility of mass gatherings.  
Most park network members say that they feel safe from government crackdowns or 
reprisals for their actions, since they are not publicly anti-government or oppositional in 
their stances, though at times harshly critical of corporate and city statements about the 
park. Activists emphasise that they speak from a position of professional expertise, not 
like bloggers or dissidents who they view as expressing themselves too generally or 
unwisely on political subjects (V21,V56). However, definitions of “unwise” and 
“political” vary among the group, as do the limits of what is “professional”. Several 
network participants have expressed views on ongoing disputes about Vietnam-China 
relations, particularly the bauxite mining case. This may be viewed as a natural 
outgrowth or complement to concerns about corruption and misuse of power in public 
space, and could be interpreted as evidence that civil society networks on moderately 
sensitive topics such as Reunification Park might lead to more oppositional or dissident 
                                                        
27 Such unrest remains a latent but ever-present possibility in Vietnam. As I rode my father-in-law’s 
motorbike to the home of one of the Reunification Park activists in July 2010, traffic slowed as I passed the 
Vietnamese Government’s office for receiving public complaints (Văn phòng tiếp dân), where a group of 
about 50 demonstrators were standing on the pavement holding identical printed signs: “The Ecopark 
project, Hanoi’s largest eco-development, is stealing land from the residents of Van Giang commune, Hung 
Yen!” In spite of its name, the “Ecopark” development is not a park at all, but rather a planned gated 
community for the rich, the antithesis of an open public space. Such new housing developments are 
proposed or underway in formerly agricultural areas surrounding Hanoi in all directions, and may be 
expected to result in further public contention in coming years (Hayton 2010:41-2). 
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organising later (Thomas 2002). Alternately, nationalistic controversies such as the 
bauxite case could be a distracting step backwards from advocacy on topics such as 
public space where network members have more relevant expertise and better chances 
of success.  
Conclusion  
Once the hotel project was cancelled, the city authorities offered to compensate 
VinaCapital with another piece of land not far from the French Quarter. As the site is too 
small for a luxury hotel, the company planned to build a shopping complex and high-rise 
apartments there (V21). In early 2010, however, the Prime Minister put a hold on new 
high-rise developments in the city centre. The investors then demanded a 2.5 hectare 
site on the outskirts of the city (DPA 2010). “They are still making really unfair 
statements,” says the landscape architect. “They say they lost an opportunity, but really 
it was just an opportunity to cheat people” (V21).  
In 2009, as in the 2007 Disneyland case, advocates succeeded in protecting a small part 
of Hanoi’s limited green space from development. More importantly, as a journalist 
points out, they demonstrated that citizens have political space to influence policy, and 
that private investment should be balanced by preserving the positive aspects of 
Vietnam’s socialist legacy (Steinglass 2009). However, the hotel campaign may be 
interpreted as less than a complete victory, as the investors might end up with more 
valuable land than they began with, while the hotel land remains fenced off from public 
use. “If you really want to understand all of the interests involved in this case,” one 
respondent says, 
 don’t just look at what was in the media. Look at the people who sent in stories, 
who spoke out about the case, who were asked to contribute. What are their 
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interests, and why were they involved?… You should look at who was acting out 
of self-interest and who out of public interest. There are people who opposed 
the hotel who have done things that have been quite harmful to the city and the 
nation. They approved other projects and may have benefited from that. Please 
don’t portray this just as an example of successful organising. It goes a lot 
deeper than that. (V51) 
One interpretation of the above journalist’s warning is that certain advocates for and 
against the hotel on the park might have land interests in one or more new development 
areas outside the city, and thus be subject to a conflict of interest.  
While some park network members have moved on to other issues, most have stayed 
focussed on their areas of professional or journalistic interest, expressing more concern 
about Hanoi than national or international issues and accepting the broader political 
space for what it is. The ability to write articles and engage in public discussion along 
with a community of colleagues and the broader public gives them a sense of value and 
some influence in society. One architect comes every morning to a typical backstreet 
café in the Old Quarter where he meets friends and discusses both personal and 
professional topics, part of the “culture of debate” among intellectuals, media, and some 
officials (V56). Such a café scene has long been part of Hanoi’s artistic and literary 
environment and is one of the ways that global cities provide “thick enabling 
environments” for networks (Sassen 2002:217).28 Cafés are also, of course, a specific 
historical origin of Habermas’s “public sphere” (1962). Thomas notes that “[t]he public 
are sharing views and gathering together to exchange information and ideas, allowing a 
‘public sphere’ to develop in much the same way that it did in Europe in the 18th 
century” (2002:1621; also Kürten 2008). 
                                                        
28 In the architect’s opinion, however, a similar culture of debate does not exist in Singapore, China, or Ho 
Chi Minh City, where “people are more constrained in what they can say to the media and to officials” 
(V56); see p. 61. 
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Other analysts of social networks in Leninist settings have reached a contrasting 
conclusion that by replacing formal organisations and mass media, networks become “a 
substitute for a public sphere,” rather than the origins of one (Osa 2003:78, O’Brien and 
Stern 2008:17). Neither statement applies exactly to Hanoi networks at the present 
time. Osa’s characterisation of a substitute public sphere (in pre-Solidarity Poland) fits 
better with Vietnam in the 1990s, when an intellectual elite engaged in embedded 
advocacy without engaging the media. The changing role of the press and particularly 
online media has extended the scope of these debates to include potentially the majority 
of urban residents. Citizens are now doing more than just “exchanging information and 
ideas,” but also advocating and networking for policy change, a step beyond Thomas’s 
earlier observation. Whether this is indeed forming a public sphere in the Habermasian 
sense (let alone repeating the European Enlightenment) is questionable. Public and 
media discussion on many other political issues in Vietnam, such as religion-state 
relations or land protests, remains limited. Rather than a single, society-wide public 
sphere, it may make more sense to envision multiple, overlapping smaller spheres – an 
“urban public sphere,” a “green public sphere,” an “artistic sphere” and so on (Yang and 
Calhoun 2008, Howell 2004a), each composed of one or more networks of organisations 
and individual activists. One effort among many, the Reunification Park network’s 
experience offers a rich set of lessons and good practices for future advocacy.  
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Chapter 7:   THE CHANGING FLOW OF THE CHINA RIVERS NETWORK 
 
On 19 August 2003 China Youth Daily reported a plan to build 13 dams on the Nu River   
(怒江) in Tibet and Yunnan.1 This news shocked environmentalists (Haggart and Mu 
2003, Yardley 2004), especially since the area had been declared a UNESCO World 
Natural Heritage site the previous month. Over a decade earlier, construction of the 
Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze had begun without open debate (DaiQ 1998). The Nu 
River case was different. In “an unprecedented public campaign [that] brought together 
NGOs, scientists, government officials as well as the general public” (Liang and Yang 
2007:xii), an emerging, informal network of activists sought to tip the balance of Chinese 
media and public opinion against the proposed dams. At a SEPA2 symposium in Beijing 
in September 2003, 36 Chinese and international experts and NGO participants spoke 
out against the proposed dams, with extensive media coverage. A subsequent 
conference in Kunming revealed “bitter divisions” among state officials and academics 
(Xue and Wang 2007:69). Anti-dam advocates found open supporters in central 
government, particularly SEPA, and attempted to leverage their support against 
                                                        
1 The Nu (“Angry”) river, known downstream as the Salween in Myanmar (Burma), is the westernmost 
and most remote of the Three Parallel Rivers in southwest China (see Figure 7.1, p. 241). The other rivers 
are the Lancang (澜沧江), which flows south into Laos and Thailand where it is known as the Mekong, and 
the Jinsha (金沙江) which passes through “Tiger Leaping Gorge” (虎跳峡), then turns east and is the major 
source for the Yangtze (长江). Dams are proposed or underway on all three rivers, beginning with the 
Manwan dam on the Lancang, completed in 1994. Three other Lancang dams have been built since, and 
four more are proposed, raising concern from downstream Mekong countries due to potential effects on 
water levels and fisheries (Osborne 2007). The largest of these, Xiaowan, has more power capacity than 
the Three Gorges dam (Economist 2010, Xinhua 2010). Eighteen dams are planned for the Jinsha and 
upper Yangtze, plus 200 on its tributaries (Biello 2009), including a dam at Tiger Leaping Gorge. Two 
dams on the Jinsha, Xiluodu and Xiangjiaba, will be the second and third-largest dams in China when 
completed in 2015 and 2012 respectively, requiring the resettlement of over 100,000 people (China Daily 
2006, XuD 2010). 
2 The State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) was elevated in status to become the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP) in 2008. 
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provincial government officials and hydropower corporations (C25, LuYY 2005, Sun and 
Zhao 2008:158). At the annual conference of the China Environment and Culture 
Promotion Association (a GONGO) in October, activists collected the signatures of 62 
scientists, artists and journalists for a public petition: “Please preserve the last ecological 
river – the Nu River” (YanY 2009).3 In December, a local environmental group in 
Chongqing collected 10,000 students’ signatures opposing the Nu dams (Büsgen 
2006:30). This combination of petitions, direct lobbying and media pressure is widely 
credited with prompting Premier Wen Jiabao to suspend the project in April 2004, citing 
the “high level of social concern” the proposal generated (Yang and Calhoun 2008:69). 
The Nu River had been preserved, at least temporarily. 
Large dams have a totemic significance in the extractive development model favoured 
by China’s technocratic leadership, symbols of Man’s dominance over Nature and by 
extension, of national sovereignty and economic development (Smil 1993, Economy 
2004, Ekins 1992:88). By the time the Nu River plans were made public in 2003, 
however, environmental issues had become a higher priority of the central government 
as well as of Chinese citizens concerned about pollution and other problems. 
Environmental NGOs began forming in the mid-1990s; by 2008, over 3,500 were 
registered, with an estimated 2,000 others unregistered and operating informally, 
including numerous student groups in both categories (XieL 2009:3, XuN 2009). The 
increasingly professional and assertive Chinese media had begun in-depth coverage of 
environmental issues, including dams (Yang and Calhoun 2008). The controversy 
around the Nu River project is widely viewed as a key turning point in Chinese 
environmentalism (TongZF 2009), catalysing sustained environmental activism that has 
                                                        
3 The Nu is the last undammed major river in China, and one of only two in Asia (Wang and Zhou 2009). 
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continued to the present and explored the boundaries of advocacy in China (LinTC 
2007:156).4  
Opposition to the Nu River dams united a disparate group of scientists, academics, NGO 
activists and journalists both inside and outside state employment. Initially, this 
network formed and operated informally. In 2004, core activists formalised their 
cooperation as the China Rivers Network (中国河网, Zhōnggúo Héwǎng). When this 
structure proved unworkable, the network returned to its original informal basis. For 
the past five years (2006-10), the network has continued to raise awareness about the 
proposed dams and advocate for alternative forms of development in the Three Rivers 
area and beyond. In recent years, the focus of advocacy has expanded past the Nu to 
include the Jinsha-Yangtze, Lancang, and other rivers in Yunnan and Sichuan, as well as 
other issues of national significance such as the north-south water diversion scheme and 
the 2008 Sichuan earthquake (C70, Probe 2008, YangDP 2009).5 
  
                                                        
4 Some material in this chapter is adapted from a paper I presented on “Civil Society Networks in 
Authoritarian Contexts: Beyond State Dominance” for a conference on Civil Society in East and Southeast 
Asia: Understanding the Local Impact of the Global Promotion of Civil Society, University of Bristol, January 
2010.  
5 One scientist, a member of the rivers network’s extended membership, aroused controversy in 2008 by 
pointing out possible links between the Sichuan earthquake and the Zipingpu Dam just miles from the 
epicentre (XuDH 2010). 
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Figure 7.1 Proposed dams on the Nu, Lancang and Jinsha rivers 
 
Source: International Rivers, 
www.internationalrivers.org/en/ 
china. 
In addition to interviews with network members and media articles, this case study 
draws on an extensive secondary literature on Chinese river activism. As one of the 
largest and earliest sectors of Chinese NGOs, environmental organisations (ENGOs) are 
the subject of numerous studies from a development/NGO perspective (Ho 2001, 
Schwartz 2004, YangGB 2005,2010, Cooper 2006, LuYY 2005,2007, FuT 2007, XieL 
2009) and a social movement perspective (Dai and Vermeer 1999, Stalley and Yang 
2006, Sun and Zhao 2007, Ho and Edmonds 2008, Hildebrant and Turner 2009). ENGOs 
have probably received more scholarly attention than any other type of social 
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organisation in China. Other books and articles focus on rural environmental issues and 
environment-linked protests (JunJ 2003, MaJ 2004, Economy 2004, Brettell 2008). 
Regarding the Nu River campaign, accounts by participants include Dore and Yu (2003) 
and Xue and Wang (2007); the most complete secondary sources are Büsgen (2006), 
Sun and Zhao (2007), and Mertha (2008). 
Most studies of the Nu and other rivers are framed in terms of the costs and benefits of 
dam construction (Xue and Wang 2007, Hensengerth 2010, Brown and Xu 2010). Other 
texts have examined river activism from a political or sociological angle as a case of 
environmental movement-building (Sun and Zhao 2008, McDonald 2007, XieL 2007, 
TongZF 2009), NGO involvement in civil society (Büsgen 2006, Garcia 2006, LinTC 
2007), a “green public sphere” (Yang and Calhoun 2008, GuHY 2008), or changes in 
public policy and governance led by individual “policy entrepreneurs” (Magee 2006, 
Mertha 2008). The above studies, which include an MA dissertation and two PhD theses, 
are China-specific and emphasise the domestic origins and character of river activism; 
exceptions are Litzinger (2007) and Chen Jie (2010), who view much of the impetus for 
activism as coming from transnational advocacy groups. 
All of the above approaches are valid frames to approach river activism that has 
contributed to the growth of Chinese environmentalism and to improved environmental 
policy. Each provides important insights towards environmental issues, advocacy 
strategies and political implications. Most analyses, however, have not considered the 
identity, membership and structure of the network over time. Several sources, looking 
primarily at NGO activities, mention the China Rivers Network in passing (FuT 
2007:293, Ho 2008b:36, Mertha 2008), while others do not include it at all (Litzinger 
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2007, Yang and Calhoun 2008, Hensengerth 2010). Many published accounts end with 
the suspension of hydropower plans on the Nu River as the culmination of 
environmental struggle, while concentrating less on recent events and advocacy 
outcomes. In this chapter, I describe river advocacy organised and led by a civil society 
network that has changed forms and developed over time, contributing new empirical 
research based on interviews with network members that serves to update and revise 
existing accounts.6 
Network formation and history 
The origins of the China Rivers Network lie in personal ties among leaders and staff of 
environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) in Beijing and Kunming (XieL 
2007).7 Environmental activism in the 1990s was “relatively quiet,” as organisations 
stayed small and worked separately (C65), but everyone knew everyone else.8 For 
instance, Friends of Nature hosted an annual New Year’s party for all the environmental 
groups in Beijing at the time (WuF 2007). Before there was any programmatic 
cooperation among organisations, the leaders of these pioneer environmental agencies 
developed a high level of mutual trust, even though their positions did not always agree. 
“At first, we came together out of friendship,” recalls one activist. “We all knew each 
other for more than ten years. ‘I trust you, so I support you.’ This was done through the 
personal energy of NGO leaders” (C74). Around the same time, international 
                                                        
6 In an interview, one network member encouraged me to look at the whole history of the China Rivers 
Network, not just 2004 and 2005 (C47).  
7 This follows Diani’s finding on Italian “green networks” that informal ties among members of different 
environmental organisations helped to develop a common identity (Tarrow 1998:135). 
8 China’s first ENGO was formed in Liaoning province in 1991 (XuN 2009), but the most prominent groups 
developed in Beijing later in the 1990s, including Friends of Nature (自然之友, Zìr|n zhī yóu), Global 
Village Beijing (北京地球村环境教育中心, Běijīng Dìqīucūn Hu|njìng Jiāoyǔ Zhōngxīn), and Green Earth 
Volunteers (绿家园, Lǜjīayu|n). For more on these groups, see Young (2001), Economy (2004,2005), 
Liang and Yang (2007), Fu Tao (2007), Xu Nan (2009), Zhao Tao (2010). 
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environmental NGOs also established a presence in China (ChenJ 2010).9 Many of these 
organisations hired Chinese directors and senior staff who were also part of local 
personal networks. The relationship between INGOs and local ENGOs has been 
“symbiotic”, with significant funding and joint activities (YangGB 2005:57).  
Both local and international ENGOs focussed initially on environmental education and 
endangered species protection (C53). The first large-scale campaigns took place in the 
late 1990s to protect the snub-nosed monkey and the Tibetan antelope (Economy 
2004:149-55, Sun and Zhao 2008:147-51). “At that time, we didn’t think about a 
‘network’”, says an activist; “it was just an issue, and we thought about how to involve 
other NGOs and media” (C74). Campaigns brought the Beijing organisations together 
with emerging NGOs in western provinces, including several Yunnan-based groups.10 As 
one NGO staff describes, “We realised that the space for action was much bigger, and we 
could get involved in environmental politics” (C53). The perceived benefits of 
cooperation began to outweigh the potential costs. An activist recalls,  
At this time, environmental groups were still trying to feel each other out. Who 
was effective? Who was knowledgeable? There were different opinions about 
this. People realised that there were a lot of issues on which we couldn’t work 
on our own. We needed each other...even though we didn’t all like each other 
too well. (C65) 
Once cooperation began, before long it appeared that environmental NGOs were always 
working together, rarely acting on their own, and there was “an enormous amount of 
cooperation” (Economy 2005:18). 
                                                        
9 INGOs operating environmental programmes in China include World Wildlife Fund, Conservation 
International, Oxfam, The Nature Conservancy, and Greenpeace, among others. 
10 The most significant of the Yunnan ENGOs in river activism have been Green Watershed (绿色蓅域, Lǜsè 
Líuyù) and the Centre for Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge (CBIK). See Xu Nan (2009), Büsgen 
(2006:28), Mertha (2008). 
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The first episode of dam activism took place in June 2003. While travelling in Sichuan 
province, the founder of Green Earth Volunteers and a media colleague from China Youth 
Daily (中国青年报) heard about plans to build a dam on a tributary of the Yangtze near 
Dujiangyan (都江堰), an ancient system of water gates that is believed to be the world's 
oldest operating irrigation scheme.11 A World Heritage site, Dujiangyan would have been 
submerged by the dam. The activists found this a “truly shameful” violation showing 
ignorance of China’s history and culture (Xue and Wang 2007:67), and began writing 
press articles about the case. After returning to Beijing, the two women spoke at a 
“journalists’ salon” (记者沙龙, jìzhě shālóng) organised by Green Earth Volunteers. In the 
next two months, 180 articles about the plans appeared in the Chinese and international 
media (C63). For the first time, said the GEV director, the general public “had a say in a 
decision on an important project” (Haggart and Mu 2003), as ordinary people posted 
their opposition on online bulletin boards, creating space for public expression that had 
not been present before and was not “given from above” (C28). Activists’ framing of the 
dam as a threat to cultural heritage was a strong argument to attract public attention 
and influence leaders (C48, Mertha 2008:20). On 29 August, the Sichuan provincial 
government reversed their decision and cancelled the dam (YanY 2009).  
The spontaneous, informal discussion among ENGO leaders and media in the journalists’ 
salons crystallised into a civil society network. The salons began to be held biweekly, 
hosting speakers from other organisations and government agencies in what might be 
considered the beginnings of a “green public sphere” (Yang and Calhoun 2008). Other 
NGOs, scientists and academics were affiliated to this core group, but citing their lack of 
                                                        
11 Dujiangyan is near the epicentre of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Following the quake, the city is being 
reconstructed with a focus on historic preservation (YanY 2009).  
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experience, they let the more activist NGOs take the lead, particularly Green Earth 
Volunteers and Green Watershed (Büsgen 2006:23). When plans for the Nu River dams 
were announced, this informal network was ready to take up the challenge.12 
In August 2004, following the initial successes of Dujiangyan and the Nu River, seven 
ENGOs joined in formalising the China Rivers Network. Although environmentalists had 
cooperated on specific issues for some years, the concept of a formal network was new 
in China. The name China Rivers Network was modelled after the International Rivers 
Network, a US-based NGO.13 The idea to start a formal network arose during a trip in 
early 2004 to the Nu River valley and other proposed dam sites in western China to 
write articles, document the ecology of the area, and meet with local residents (YanY 
2009). The group of 20 included leaders of Green Earth Volunteers, Friends of Nature 
and Green Watershed, as well as individual activists and journalists.  
While we were on the trip, we heard the news that a dam at Tiger Leaping 
Gorge was going to be built on the Jinsha. I went there myself and came back 
with a report that it was true, preparatory work had already started and was 
causing major problems. Back in Beijing, I spoke about this at the Green 
Journalists’ Salon… It was on the day of that salon that [the founder of GEV] had 
the idea to form a network, since there was already a group of organisations 
and individuals who were very interested in the issue. (C70) 
In an internal report to the China programme of Global Greengrants Fund, which 
supported the exposure trip with a small grant, the GEV founder wrote, “After our trip, 
we created the Chinese Rivers Network, together with other partner NGOs and media 
persons who are especially concerned with retaining the Chinese natural rivers and 
streams in recent years” (GEV 2006). The network aimed to work proactively to save 
                                                        
12 A chronology of river activism (in Chinese) is online via Friends of Nature (2010). 
13 IRN is actually an NGO, not a network, and has since shortened its name to “International Rivers”. The 
search for international models is common in Chinese environmentalism: Friends of Nature’s name was 
adopted from Friends of the Earth (XuN 2009), and another well-known activist began his career by 
setting up a local environmental group in his high school, which he called “Greenpeace” after a banner he 
had seen on TV (C31). 
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rivers, not only respond in emergency cases. In its first year of operation, network 
members produced a series of further media reports about the Nu, a documentary film, 
and a website (www.nujiang.ngo.cn) with photo essays and other information.14 
Activists used heated rhetoric: the proposed dams comprised “government-sponsored 
anarchy” and “a messy free-for-all” that would be “more disastrous than floods, droughts 
or earthquakes, even more devastating than war” (Xue and Wang 2007:66-7). While the 
ecosystem could recover from natural disasters or violent conflict, dams would 
irredeemably destroy the river, and no compensation could cover these losses. The dam 
project would thus become “the hydropower equivalent of the Great Leap Forward” 
(79).15 In response, CRN outlined a programme of research and ecological development 
for riverine communities, with an equal focus on protecting biodiversity and preventing 
or mitigating costs of resettlement. The network hoped to raise funds for independent 
studies by scientists that could debunk or balance government studies perceived to be 
biased (C74), with the results publicised in a “dam database on the internet” to raise 
public awareness of the harm caused by dams (GEV 2006). 
Despite these ambitious goals, CRN “never really got off the ground”. In its first year, the 
network held quarterly meetings of its membership and organised a few public events 
and lectures, but had “no big successes” (C74). It had a difficult time establishing an 
identity, in part as there was no way for a network to register to have legal status, a 
stamp or a bank account. There were no previous models for a formal network of this 
type in China; its leaders had no previous experience in forming or managing a network 
                                                        
14 This website, originally hosted by the Institute for Environment and Development in Beijing, is still 
operational. A second, CRN-specific website, www.chinarivers.org.cn, was available online when I began 
research in 2008, but is no longer maintained. 
15 A minimum of 30 million people died in the Great Leap Forward and resulting famine in 1958-61 
(YangDL 1996:38). 
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and no clear strategy to carry it out (C28). Management issues, especially staff and 
leadership structures, took up a great deal of time and effort (C65). CRN began without 
any external funding: instead, member organisations (some of which did have 
international funding) put resources into the network. Although network members 
differ on the precise details, at least six organisations contributed between 5-10,000 
RMB each, approximately £500-1,000 (C28,C31,C47,C74). On the one hand, this “self-
regulating” behaviour was admirable and formed a new direction in Chinese civil society 
(Xue and Wang 2007:87). On the other hand, the amounts members could commit were 
hardly enough to sustain the network, and fundraising became a major challenge.  
No sooner had the network begun to deal with these organisational challenges than it 
began to face strong pressures from opponents. Beginning in 2005, pro-dam advocates 
began to speak out forcefully against environmentalists, putting CRN under “a lot of 
challenge and pressure” (C47). At a conference in Kunming in April, a group of nine pro-
dam scientists attacked CRN members for naively opposing development. The fact that 
few CRN members have technical backgrounds in water or dam issues made them 
vulnerable to such criticism. One prominent scholar titled his speech “A direct attack on 
fake-environmentalist dam opponents”, ridiculing activists for their lack of experience 
and “environmental fundamentalism” (Büsgen 2006:41). Several days later, once most 
CRN speakers had returned to Beijing, pro-dam advocates held a press conference at 
Yunnan University and continued personal criticism of CRN members (ShiLH 2010). 
Opponents rejected environmentalists’ ability to represent people, questioned their 
grounds of legitimacy, and labelled their advocacy claims “unscientific”, a charge taken 
quite seriously in China (Bao and Liu 2007).  
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These arguments dovetailed with a broader tightening of government policy towards 
NGO activities and accusations of manipulation by foreign interests (C25). The Chinese 
government was reportedly fearful of “colour revolutions” such as those that took place 
in several Eastern European and Central Asian countries in 2005 (Ma 2005, Wexler et al 
2006:56-7). One CRN member organisation, Global Village Beijing, was audited 
concerning funding they received from the German Green Party’s Heinrich Böll 
Foundation (C74, Büsgen 2006:41-2, Ho and Edmonds 2008:219).16 Other CRN 
members were threatened with closure, and individual leaders were in danger of arrest. 
GVB withdrew from CRN as a defensive measure. Conditions in Yunnan were 
particularly serious, with CRN members unable to travel to dam-affected communities. 
Mertha speculates that only past revolutionary connections kept the leader of Green 
Watershed from being detained by police (2008:144). Instead, his passport was seized 
for a year and he lost his affiliation with the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, but 
Green Watershed was able to continue operation (C47). The dispute worsened relations 
between NGOs and the Yunnan provincial government, at the same time that officials 
took action to address the resettlement problems that Green Watershed had raised 
(McGray and McDonald 2007:38,103). The activist director of FON left the organisation, 
facing political pressure as well as reported conflict with FON’s founder, who was more 
cautious politically and reportedly felt the director was acting too aggressively 
(C64,C75).   
Authorities did not tell CRN to shut down or take any action against the network itself. 
Rather, faced with operational challenges and funding difficulties, CRN members 
                                                        
16 As a German writer notes, “Many European NGOs would [dream] to be as influential as they are thought 
to be by some Chinese officials” (Sausmikat 2010:87). 
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decided at a January 2006 meeting to end formal operations and return to an informal 
structure like the one that had emerged organically in 2003 (C74,C80). It appeared that 
CRN had “died a natural death” (C74). But the formal network’s dissolution was only a 
tactical retreat. CRN members saw that their public network was becoming a magnet for 
opponents and took the strategic move of becoming more opaque (C65). The collective 
decision to disband the formal network structure was informed by actors’ perceptions of 
political opportunities and constraints, together with responses to actions taken by state 
agencies. Since 2006, network members have continued to meet when needed and 
coordinate their efforts on a variety of environmental and river-related causes 
(C63,C64). 
Network membership and structure 
The seven founding member organisations, according to a former CRN staff, were 
Friends of Nature, Global Village Beijing, Green Earth Volunteers, Green Watershed, 
Institute for Environment and Development, Brooks Education Institute (天下溪, Tiānxìa 
Xī) and Wild China Films (C80). Up to ten different organisations have participated in 
CRN at different times.17 Membership was organisational, but it is not quite accurate to 
call CRN an NGO network. Of the seven members, “only two or three were registered at 
the time” (C47), and others, such as GEV and Wild China Films, are volunteer-based or 
small enterprises, though they also regard themselves as NGOs. The boundaries of the 
                                                        
17 Büsgen (2006:24) lists eight “NGOs”, not seven, subtracting Wild China Films and adding Green Island 
and Green Hanjiang. Ho (2008b:36) cites Büsgen’s list. This information was also provided by a key 
network member, showing that participation in CRN varied over time and was not always clear even to 
members themselves. Mertha’s list is identical to mine, but misspells the name of Tianxia Xi (2008:61). 
Tong Zhifeng (2009) lists nine organisations as part of a Nu River NGO alliance, including Green Island but 
not Tianxia Xi/Brooks, plus two other organisations that were to my knowledge not involved in CRN. A 
chronology of the Chinese environmental movement posted on FON’s Chinese-language website also 
states that nine organisations founded CRN, but does not specify which ones (Friends of Nature 2010).  
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network have always been uncertain: numerous individuals and other environmental 
organisations joined in river advocacy activities, both before and after the establishment 
of CRN. Participants met at events and communicated by e-mail and cell phones. Unlike 
many NGO networks, CRN was formed for the purpose of advocacy, not only for 
exchanging information or capacity building. 
CRN members intended leadership of the network to be shared democratically. The 
director of Green Watershed served as the first coordinator in 2004-05; after this the 
network shifted to a secretariat structure (C47) and moved to Beijing, where most 
members were based. The leader of Wild China Films became secretary-general on a 
voluntary basis and worked out of office space donated by Friends of Nature, which 
seconded one young staff person as deputy secretary. The FON director at the time was 
a well-spoken activist who became the main driver for formalisation of CRN’s structure 
(C64). On his own initiative, he drafted an agenda and a strategic plan for the network 
and presented this at a CRN conference in June 2005 (C74). The director’s personal 
involvement and the fact that the secretariat was based at FON, however, posed a risk of 
the network being too closely identified with a single individual: when he departed, the 
network was left without effective leadership (C31).   
On paper, CRN had a hub-and-spokes structure consisting of a small secretariat and 
organisational members. In reality, CRN was less a coalition of organisations than a 
network “driven by a few committed individuals…Closer networking emerged 
gradually” (Büsgen 2006:23).18 A core group of the most active individuals worked 
                                                        
18 Büsgen has an in-depth understanding of the rivers network’s structure and advocacy, and his 2006 
paper and subsequent interviews have been a major guide for this case study. His analysis is on the level 
of a “campaign” around the Nu River dams, including all the actors which I describe as part of the network. 
He separates CRN from the broader campaign, as a formal structure among NGOs, while I analyse changes 
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together informally, as they had before the formalisation of CRN; core members included 
the directors of several environmental organisations plus at least one other individual 
who had returned from study overseas and was not affiliated to any organisation at the 
time (C47). The legitimacy of CRN derived from the support and endorsement of these 
founders, but they had diverging working styles and expectations for the network (C31). 
The fact that the scientists and academics, as well as some NGO staff, were also 
government employees with multiple professional backgrounds contributed to a variety 
of levels of participation within the network. The actual structure was thus concentric 
circles, with a small core and a large outer circle including staff of “member 
organisations” as well as journalists, scientists, academics and sympathetic 
environmental protection officials (C70,C74).19 CRN was bigger than it appeared. 
Figure 7.2 Formal and informal CRN structures 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in the network’s structure over time, with the CRN formal period as one of the stages in an ongoing 
advocacy effort that is larger than a single dam campaign. 
19 Mertha (2008) correctly notes the importance of individual leaders and the media in dam activism. 
While CRN core members can be described in one sense as “policy entrepreneurs,” Mertha’s focus on 
individuals understates the importance of networking and cooperation that takes place among them.  
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The volunteer secretary-general did not stay for long: in summer 2005, she accepted a 
film contract that she felt unable to refuse (C74). The deputy secretary became 
coordinator. While enthusiastic, he was unequipped for the challenging task of 
coordinating among multiple organisations and leaders, many of them with strong 
personalities (C28). In fairness, no junior employee would be up to this task, which like 
any multi-party negotiation can be likened to “herding cats” (Crocker et al 1999). Not 
included in the core group of leaders, he acted more as an administrative assistant, 
editing films, selling books and organising quarterly meetings (C80). The coordinator 
position ended after January 2006. 
After returning to an informal basis of operations, network participants selected a new 
structure that was more flexible, allowing for specialisation among members and 
cooperation on a broader spectrum of issues.20 As one core activist describes,  
There were seven or eight active groups in CRN at that time [2006]. We tried 
everything we could to make it work as a formal network, but it didn’t happen. 
Then we said, “we can function anyway! We have done it before. We don’t have 
to be stuck on this one thing”21... Dam issues are politically charged. To give a 
definite title or name to this issue might defeat the purpose. It could invite 
adversaries to respond and give them a clear target... [Now] we find it more 
effective to be informal. We’ve tested this, and it works. (C65)  
The current informal network structure is viewed as highly effective by individual 
participants and continues to show success in advocacy on environmental issues with 
the Chinese state. “To this day, a group of people continues to act whenever there is a 
problem... I still take advantage of the network. Although it’s very loose, it’s effective” 
(C70). Since actions are decided by individuals, there is often no need for “a whole 
internal organisational process. It is easier just to work on the level of leaders. This 
                                                        
20 This change is reflected by the use in this chapter of “China Rivers Network” in upper case during the 
formalised period in 2004-06, and “the rivers network” in the informal period thereafter. 
21 Compare this statement to the virtually identical description of the Bright Future Group’s internal 
process after their initial application to register was denied by the Vietnamese government (see p. 135). 
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model can function very well” (C74). The “intangible network” is versatile, reduces 
political risk and sensitivity, and also allows for shared ownership and participation, 
mobilising people’s social capital to the extent that they are comfortable (C65). 
The intense period of 2003-06 had led to increased trust and cooperation among 
network members. 
 Time tested our relationships. Everyone played a role in this fight. Everybody 
learned a lot about how to constructively talk about things – and that being 
critical also has a value. Being loud continuously can have its benefits, too, to 
keep an issue on the agenda. In order to be heard, we need a strategy. So 
although we are different, people now appreciate each other more, and respect 
each other’s limitations too. Everyone has his or her own social network and 
back-door influences. Now we are at peace with each other; everyone has won 
some respect. (C65) 
Through the informal structure, each organisation or individual member takes the lead 
on specific actions, and others support them as they are able (C47,C65, Garcia 2006:65). 
This reflects a growing specialisation and professional division of labour among ENGOs: 
as cycles of activism rise and fall over time, members may act as leaders in some areas 
and followers in others (C25). Some previous individual members are no longer active, 
such as the former FON director, and several more moderate environmental 
organisations participate less than they once did (C25,C64). Nodes on the periphery of 
rivers activism still support network initiatives when needed, such as serving as co-
sponsors of an event or signing a petition. In return, network members also contribute 
to issues initiated by others, as well as participating in other civil society networks 
(C55). One formerly active member, now on the periphery says,  
I participated in the Nu River efforts before I became director of [my current 
organisation]. I’ve known [the GEV founder] for over ten years, since we were 
in a women’s leadership training together. At this point we’re still good friends, 
and I participate in events and the journalists’ salon when I am able. I support 
the network’s policy advocacy efforts, and sometimes contribute [donations] to 
trips to the Nu River area. I still participate as an individual, and sometimes my 
organisation goes along too. (C72) 
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This individual’s participation is through a single personal link to a CRN core member, 
and as such is not a densely-structured connection. The organisation she directs is a 
moderate, collaborative NGO that operates very differently from CRN. Compare this 
statement with that of a core member, who also directs a mainstream ENGO but is much 
more connected to CRN: 
Organising a network like this is quite difficult. We all have our own work and 
identity as NGOs. It works because we have a high level of trust with each other 
that we are all working for the good of the environment, not for any other 
reason. That has allowed us to keep going and cooperate for a period of nearly 
ten years now. (C70) 
This member is clear that he has two different roles: one in his organisation, and another 
as a river issues activist. It may be difficult to say which comes first. In his sparsely 
furnished office, a lone display case contains pictures and memorabilia of trips to the 
Three Rivers in Yunnan, even though the organisation he leads has no projects in the 
area. 
The rest of CRN’s original core group has remained stable, and has not added any new 
members since 2005 (C74). Instead, there is a wider extended membership of 20-30 
sympathetic scientists, academics and journalists who serve as expanded network 
members on a case-by-case basis. Not everyone participates all the time due to time 
limitations or sensitivity. Sometimes just two or three people act, other times more 
(C65). The small core group is able to reach many other organisations and individuals, 
some of which have participated actively in recent advocacy efforts (C47). Other 
members describe a shifting group of participants, with no clear definition who is in or 
out of the network (C65). 
Of the original members, the director of Green Earth Volunteers is perceived by many as 
the de facto network coordinator (C55,C70,C74). GEV was one of the leading groups on 
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the Nu River campaign and has continued to emphasise river activism in an ambitious 
“Decade Rivers Project” to document changes in rivers across western China, and 
through a comprehensive bilingual website of news postings (www.greensos.cn). It is 
not easy to determine where GEV activities end and the rivers network begins, or what 
are the individual efforts of GEV’s founder.22 GEV is the only group that contributes full-
time effort to rivers issues; all other network members participate on a part-time, 
limited basis. No Chinese organisation is working exclusively on dams, both because of 
the sensitivity of the topic and because of funding constraints (C25). This is partly a 
capacity issue, as the number of dam projects in China is immense, and no single 
organisation has the ability to monitor all of them. After river issues became politicised, 
it was hard for anyone to be seen as the public leader and also keep the trust and respect 
of all participating NGOs (C74).  
Advocacy strategies  
Through changing structures and political fortunes, CRN has maintained a consistent 
repertoire of advocacy, combining embedded, media, and community-based tactics into 
a distinctive inside-outside strategy. Ho and Edmonds (2008:220) describe CRN as “[a]n 
excellent illustration of the political leverage of embedded activism”, but the network’s 
activities actually extend far beyond an embedded-only model. Different network 
members emphasise various tactics: journalists and those with close media ties describe 
their advocacy primarily in these terms, while those with connections to government 
officials prioritise direct, personal lobbying, and several more activist NGOs have 
                                                        
22 The GEV founder’s position in the network is analogous in some ways to that of the landscape architect 
in the Reunification Park case (chapter 6), although the architect does not work through any organisation 
at all. The two networks share other common challenges in coordination and organisation, yet have 
engaged in advocacy regardless. 
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engaged in community organising in dam-affected areas.23 This could appear to be a 
scattershot, unfocused approach to advocacy – as one informant states, “we’ve tried 
everything now” (C65) – but is actually a coordinated strategy of alliance-building, based 
on members’ multiple identities.  
Their various “hats” enable rivers network members to present themselves in differing 
ways to distinct audiences in order to establish their credentials or reduce political risk. 
When reporting, these journalists draw on their identities as environmentalists; when 
speaking about environmental issues, they identify as reporters. This gives 
environmental journalists multiple channels to influence government decision-making 
(YanY 2009). Other network members use academic identities: when travelling to 
Manwan in 2004, for instance, the director of Green Watershed identified himself to 
villagers as “from the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences” (ShiLH 2004), which was his 
state-linked affiliation at the time, giving him official cover for potentially sensitive 
activities.  
In other words, network members are best described as shape-shifting individual 
activists, not solely as NGO leaders. The organisations they form are not separate, 
autonomous entities, but reflections of these multiple identities.24 In concepts of 
“boundary-spanning contention” (O’Brien and Li 2006) and “organisational 
amphibiousness” (DingXL 1994), people and institutions are seen to move back and 
forth across the ambiguous line separating the state and non-state sectors. This type of 
                                                        
23 Yang Guobin (2005:52) views a varied collective action repertoire as a key characteristic of Chinese 
ENGOs. 
24 Some observers attribute these conditions to self-censorship in which “true NGOs” hide their identity as 
“entities they are not” (Ho 2008a:10, also JiangR 2005), while others suggest they are not “real” NGOs at 
all (LiuXB 2007, Stalley and Yang 2006). Both are misconceptions that result from ingrained normative 
thinking that NGOs need to be autonomous, separate organisations in their own sector of society, missing 
the point of multiple identities. 
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identity shifting also occurs within the rivers network, while at other times individuals 
use multiple non-state identities. The critical distinction is not state versus society, but 
which of several identities each network member adopts when engaging in advocacy. 
Several organisations and authors have attempted to depict this mixed advocacy model 
in graphic form. Global Village Beijing (undated) uses this picture to describe their 
organisational advocacy activities: 
Figure 7.3 GVB advocacy diagram 
Policy influence 
           Media platform     GVB    Expert network 
Public campaign 
This picture shows the cross-sectoral nature of river advocacy, but it is too simply 
drawn to capture complex dynamics and multiple strategies. Like three-sector diagrams 
of civil society, a static depiction cannot show the processes or results of advocacy. 
Büsgen (2006:28-9) is more detailed, depicting the network’s advocacy strategy in this 
way:   
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Figure 7.4 Nu River campaign allies and opponents 
 
This schema includes most of the main actors in river advocacy, as well as the direction 
of messages, although it undervalues the importance of media and community members. 
In fact, CRN has used all of the tactics and channels depicted in the model in Figure 3.1,25 
a more dynamic presentation of advocacy. 
Embedded advocacy 
The “inside” elements of rivers network advocacy include direct connections to 
government officials, petitions and letters. A journalist describes the first approach as 
“making contact with official resources through private networks” (XuN 2009). The 
most significant personal network in the environmental movement belonged to FON 
founder Liang Congjie, who was also a member of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), combining “unique social capital” and “cultural 
privilege” (TongZF 2009).26 In cases including the Nu River, he could make proposals 
                                                        
25 See p. 107. 
26 Liang passed away in October 2010 as this chapter was being revised. As the son of a famous architect 
who unsuccessfully urged Mao Zedong to preserve Beijing’s old city (Meyer 2009:275-93) and the 
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and write letters directly to Premier Wen Jiabao and other senior leaders, guaranteeing 
their attention and at times, action. Environmental activists may at times “have the ear 
of very senior people within the government” (Economy 2005:5), but this influence can 
also be overstated.27 In any case, leverage from the central government is key to 
achieving the network’s advocacy goals; without it, there are few other avenues to affect 
decisions of provincial and local governments (JiangR 2005:25). 
Central government priorities facilitated the expansion of environmental activism in the 
early years of the 21st century. President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen promoted a 
“harmonious society”, including environmental protection, over economic growth at all 
costs (LoSP 2007, LamW 2007a). Provincial and local governments, nevertheless, still 
had pressure and incentives to develop rapidly and place profits over the environment 
(C25). Yunnan’s provincial government, with central support, has followed an 
infrastructure-led approach to rapid economic growth since the 1990s (Donaldson 
2009). Leading electricity and dam-building companies were assigned to exploit 
different “powersheds” (Magee 2006) in southwest China: China Electric Company 
(Huadian) is responsible for the Lancang, the Three Gorges Project Corporation for the 
Jinsha, and Beijing State Power for the Nu (Xue and Wang 2007:63). All have 
connections to top leaders, particularly former premier Li Peng (C75). Advocates find 
that “these power conglomerates are very big and powerful, and it makes the situation 
difficult for us, as the government and corporations are working together” (C53). Like 
CRN, pro-dam interests draw on sympathetic journalists and allies in various 
                                                                                                                                                                             
grandson of an even more famous late Qing dynasty reformer, he possessed impeccable academic and 
political connections with Beijing’s intellectual elite (Ho 2008b:33-4; Mertha 2008:20, though he 
associates Liang with the wrong organisation). 
27 Liang Congjie reportedly stated that none of his efforts to lobby through the CPPCC had any impact on 
outcomes (C28). On the other hand, his actions may have reduced political risk for FON (TongZF 2009). 
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government agencies. In this sense, dam proponents have adopted CRN’s tactics and 
formed a counter-network, though one without any civil society characteristics.28 
CRN’s main government allies are located in MEP, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the 
CPPCC, among other agencies. MEP is generally regarded as well-meaning but weak: as 
one journalist writes, “Environmental protection in China…is a power struggle between 
different interest groups…when it comes to a battle of strength, [MEP] rarely has the 
upper hand.” Despite being “virtually powerless”, MEP has “acquired a great number of 
enemies” (LiuJQ 2007b). In addition to hydroelectric companies and the Ministry of 
Water Resources, these include economic growth-focused agencies such as the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), previously known as the State Planning 
Commission (Mertha 2008:41-5). The rivers network is not well connected at NDRC, 
although this is the agency that controls energy planning and generation (C53, LiuJQ 
2007b). The crackdown in 2005-6 also affected CRN allies in the government: a SEPA 
official who was a close contact of the network had to step down, while other supportive 
officials were told to keep quiet (Büsgen 2006:29-30, Mertha 2008:122). This has had a 
significant long-term impact on river advocacy, as key inside sources were no longer 
available to provide information.  
CRN members have used multiple embedded advocacy tactics, but have also gone 
beyond them. “The first part of our strategy to affect leaders is to use individual 
connections to pass memos to key people. Second, we also try to affect public opinion, 
and through the public also reach the leaders” (C65). The combination of lobbying 
                                                        
28 In an example of “astroturfing” (corporations creating fake “grassroots” support), two Nu villagers were 
brought to Beijing in 2005 to speak in favour of the dam’s potential to improve their lives. When a 
journalist re-interviewed the two in 2006, he found they were actually local cadres, and one of the two 
didn’t actually support the dam (LiuJQ 2007a). 
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through personal and indirect channels may actually lead to faster responses from 
leaders than in democratic systems. “We can push in only a few places, but if we keep 
pushing we can get results” (C55). Well-connected journalists are also able to write 
internal-circulation (内参, nèicān) documents, which are viewed as particularly effective 
(LuYY 2005:2).  
On positive days, I feel that society has created space where leaders have to 
act...or is it just that leaders don’t want to look bad, so then they will act? We 
can’t force leaders to act. Leaders need to show that they are actually 
answering to issues; this gives them some meaning of legitimacy. But leaders’ 
main interest is where they sit. They want their ministry to be important and 
effective. MEP also wants the water to be cleaner, and may have genuine care 
for the environment. So to do responsible policy advocacy, we need to assure 
leaders that we will act professionally, not embarrass them. The network has 
ensured the handling of sympathetic officials, not jeopardising individuals’ 
interests. (C65) 
This statement captures the ambiguity in the rivers network’s relations with various 
parts of the Chinese government. “NGOs have some friends in the government, but our 
friends aren’t the most powerful ones. These officials see it as in their interest to work 
with NGOs, but others don’t” (C53). The network must join with government allies in 
order to tip the balance against opposition in other parts of the state.  
The primary tactic the rivers network has used in jujitsu advocacy is the open letter: a 
petition that is concurrently sent to leaders and released (or leaked) to the media 
and/or posted on the Internet. Since this technique was first used in the Nu campaign in 
2003, open sign-on letters have been employed in almost every CRN advocacy episode 
since. Sent both to allies and opponents, open letters have frequently led to desired 
results. For instance, in August 2005, 61 organisations and 99 individual activists signed 
a petition to call for public disclosure of the Nu River Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) and other major hydropower development plans (YangDP 2007:xxviii). That 
October, the Communist Party Central Committee changed the wording of the Eleventh 
263 
 
 
 
Five Year Plan from “proactively develop hydropower projects” to “develop hydropower 
projects in an orderly manner while protecting the environment” (YangDP 2007:xxix). 
By the end of 2007, dam companies began to disclose EIA information on the Yunnan 
provincial environmental protection bureau’s website (C70).29  
In recent years, the number of signatories on open letters has declined compared to the 
height of the Nu controversy. Network members are willing to act with only two or three 
members signing their names (C65) but believe that larger lists of signatories, including 
peripheral network participants and supporters, send a stronger message.  
The core group exchanges information and raises issues. When we need 
something, we all support each other. Others are not so active, but when there’s 
an issue then people participate. They understand the issues and we can 
mobilise them when needed. We can get 60 organisations and 200 individuals 
to sign a petition letter, including famous intellectuals and professors who 
participate. Each member organisation has some links with these people. (C47) 
Letters are an effective tactic to attract support from moderate environmental NGOs, 
academics and international organisations who might not support activist methods. 
Rivers network members do not hesitate to criticise certain INGOs for being too close to 
the Chinese government and believing that “dams are OK if you do it better” (C63). Yet 
the same members draw on connections with the Nature Conservancy or Conservation 
International’s senior Chinese staff to gather information from their government 
contacts. In some cases, these staff also participate in CRN advocacy efforts as 
individuals (C74). Letters are crafted to make the network’s appeal representative of all 
environmental organisations, regardless of political stance, minimising risk to each 
individual signatory.  
                                                        
29 Of course, this sequence of events is not proof of causality. Activists believe that their letter influenced 
the policy process, but what really happens in the black box of policy making is unclear (C28), at least 
within the scope of this thesis. Although open letters are an important campaigning instrument, it is not 
easy to identify their impact on policy change (C25). 
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Open letters are also sent to hydropower companies. Advocacy towards corporations 
has somewhat more space than that directly seeking to affect government behaviour, 
since activists can claim to be supporting government policy to build a “harmonious 
society”, while criticising law-breaking activities of companies, even state-owned 
enterprises, that are causing social disorder (C66). In many cases, dams are now built by 
companies that are private at least in name and listed on stock markets; this ambiguity 
enables public criticism since the companies are not directly state-owned (C48). Larger 
companies connected to the central government may be more susceptible to advocacy, 
since they have to follow policy guidelines, while smaller provincial companies (such as 
China Southern Power Grid, which is developing Mekong dams in Laos) seem 
impervious to criticism and have “so far ignored all inquiries from civil society” 
(Bosshard 2010). 
Media advocacy 
The second main component of the rivers network’s advocacy links to domestic print 
and online media. As a network member states, “the key element of NGO advocacy in 
China is how we work with the media” (C63) – or are the media: the core members 
responsible for developing the network’s pioneering media strategy see themselves as 
journalists first and NGOs second (LuYY 2005:2, Yang and Calhoun 2008:77-8, Mertha 
2008:11-12).30 Their connections to official media put them in a “unique position” with 
regards to authorities (C74). Chinese media remains state-owned and subject to 
restrictions, but in practice journalists have significant leeway to write on issues of 
                                                        
30 One Chinese sociologist convincingly describes the anti-dam movement as a “NGO-media network”. 
Unlike pollution campaigns in which the media is simply used to mobilise resources for activists, in the Nu 
River campaign media were co-initiators and participants (TongZF 2009). 
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social concern (Zhao and Sun 2007). The power of the media “can’t be underestimated” 
(C65).  
If the network were made up of only NGOs, it would be very difficult to quickly 
tell everyone what is happening. If we depended only on media without an 
organiser, it would not be so strong, since the media has a short attention 
span… NGOs are better at motivating the public, while media can get 
information out quickly and reach the government. (C63)  
Activists primarily engage Chinese media, but foreign media can also play a role, 
providing cover for controversial activities (C48). Media also provides access to 
government leaders, particularly if an article is published prominently in the right 
newspaper at the right time. For instance, in 2004 Green Earth Volunteers and other 
CRN members invited the retired vice-director of China Central Broadcasting on a trip to 
dam-affected areas. On returning to Beijing, he published an article in the CPPCC’s 
newspaper that was reprinted on the same day in major Beijing and Shanghai dailies, 
calling on officials to pay greater attention to dam policies. According to GEV (2006), this 
article had great influence on Chinese leaders’ awareness, more than if the article had 
been written by an ordinary journalist.31  
Table 7.5 Advocacy tactics – China Rivers Network 
Advocacy tactics Notes 
Embedded advocacy 
 Direct lobbying to officials 
 Letters, petitions, complaints 
 Speak at workshops, conferences 
 Exposure trips for opinion leaders 
 
- Use social capital of leaders to reach 
decision makers 
- Each network member keeps 
connections with one or more experts or 
leaders 
- Use of open letters as both advocacy and 
mobilising techniques  
Media advocacy 
 Journalists’ salons 
 Place articles in print and online 
media 
 
- Include journalists as network members 
- Bring key journalists on fact-finding 
tours to dam-affected areas 
                                                        
31 This characterisation differs from a portrayal of the Chinese media as “capitalist behind a socialist 
veneer,” basically commercial in motivation and unable to engage in political discourse (LeeCC 2002), and 
shows how the media has evolved since the 1990s. 
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 Use of internet and online media - Circulate information via NGO websites 
and publications 
Community advocacy 
 Traditional development projects 
 Video and audio  
 Community organising (by Green 
Watershed in particular) 
- Frequent visits to dam-affected 
communities 
- Document community situation and 
views, share with other dam-affected 
people 
- Bring villagers to public conferences in 
Kunming, Beijing 
Network members use the Internet both for internal communication and for advocacy. 
E-forums and newsletters are well developed among environmental NGOs (YangGB 
2005); organisations use their own websites, bulletin boards, e-mail groups and internal 
publications as mobilisation techniques (TongZF 2009). The Internet connects and 
amplifies voices, increases influence on policy-making, and enables joint advocacy with 
intensive interaction among organisations (FuT 2007:296). “We communicate with each 
other by e-mail first. If we need to consult experts or other outsiders, we call and they 
will respond” (C65). Online media and blogs are also integral parts of advocacy. 
Although most articles appear in print first, they are then posted and re-posted on 
multiple websites, giving them a permanent presence in cyberspace and much wider 
coverage than in a single daily newspaper. Zhou Yongming (2002) describes Chinese 
intellectual websites as “an intermediary domain between private intellectual discourse, 
which is quite free, and a still-controlled official intellectual discourse,” resulting in 
“expanded space under refined control.”32 While some topics are still off-limits, print 
and online media reporting of environmental issues has continued to expand in the past 
decade, in part due to the media advocacy activities of the rivers network itself.  
                                                        
32 Zhou’s description may apply better to Vietnam than to China at present. In the Reunification Park case, 
online media and blogs have been noticeably freer than newspapers, while in China the print media 
appears equally involved in environmental issues. 
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As coverage of the environment has increased, some observers feel that the media is 
biased in favour of NGOs (C25). While not true of all media, this description may apply to 
several key papers that give frequent, prominent coverage to river issues, such as China 
Youth Daily and Southern Weekend (南方周末, Nánfāng Zhōumò), which contains a 
weekly environment section.33 These newspapers not only cover activities of the rivers 
network, but serve as its mouthpiece and even as part of the network, to the extent of 
publishing laudatory personal profiles of network leaders, which are then posted and 
sometimes translated into English on GEV’s environmental media site and other 
comparable sites (He and Meng 2010, ZhaoT 2010). One article summarises the 
argument with its headline that “Media has turned into NGOs” (MengDK 2010).  
The rivers network makes effective use of domestic media in framing its own messages 
and informal identity (Sun and Zhao 2008:161). At the same time, media framing also 
distorts the rivers network’s messages in certain ways. Media tends to focus on stories 
of exemplary individuals, rather than efficient networks or well-managed organisations. 
At times, these portrayals cross over to the sycophantic, such as likening network 
members to Superman “saving the world” (He and Meng 2010, HuangW 2000).34 In 
addition to setting up false expectations, this coverage reinforces the distorting practice 
of referring to an organisation as belonging to a single leader, and under-represents the 
coordination that takes place among organisations and network members.35  
                                                        
33 Mertha (2008:10) terms Southern Weekend a “maverick” publication, while China Youth Daily is one of 
the “traditional bastions of official propaganda”. This does not necessarily result in differences in their 
coverage. 
34 The same metaphor appears, with a touch of irony, in an article about one Reunification Park network 
member in Hanoi (Steinglass 2009, “More powerful than a tall building”). 
35 This tendency also appears in international scholarship: for instance, Litzinger (2007:289) refers to 
environmental organisations as belonging to a single person, as in “Liang Congjie’s Friends of Nature”. 
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Some of the limitations of media framing can be overcome through the more direct 
medium of video. During the height of the Nu campaign in 2003-4, activists appeared on 
prominent national television programmes (Büsgen 2006:31). One network member is 
an environmental filmmaker married to a well-known wildlife photographer. In 2004, 
the filmmaker produced a 30-minute documentary, “Voices of the Nu River” (怒江之声, 
Nùjiāng zhī shēng). A second film, “Rivers, Our Home” (江河-我们的家, Héjiāng – 
wǒmende jiā) was released in 2010. As an advocacy tactic, video is more powerful than a 
report or article, as viewers see events as they happened, including village meetings 
along the Jinsha and arguments between pro-dam scientists and environmental 
advocates. According to the filmmaker, the main intended audience for “Rivers, Our 
Home” is local residents in dam-affected areas, so they can see themselves and their 
neighbours in other river communities and learn about the threat of dams and forced 
migration. The use of video thus contributes to a community organising strategy in a 
way that reports never can. For this reason, it is also sensitive, since it could be seen as 
encouraging local protests (C74, McGray and McDonald 2007:38,103). In 2006, “Voices 
of the Nu River” was scheduled to be shown at a film festival in Kunming but was 
cancelled at the last minute due to organisers’ fear of repercussions. The screening was 
moved to a local bar. “Rivers, Our Home” has not been shown publicly, but only in 
private screenings in Kunming and Beijing. The filmmaker believes that the 2004 film’s 
circulation might have been partially responsible for authorities’ crackdown in 2005-6.  
Community advocacy 
Network members affirm that increased links with dam-affected communities are 
desirable, both in principle and as a defence against attacks from dam proponents. The 
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principled argument is that the network’s ultimate objective “isn’t [resolving] the 
environmental problems…the main thing is to raise public awareness” (C63) and “to 
allow ordinary people to participate in decision-making” (cited in Büsgen 2006:24). In a 
printed article, a member argues, 
We have also been calling for public engagement on this issue, as we believe 
that building a dam in an area like this one requires considering the views of all 
the people who will be affected. But while we have been making these appeals, 
the surveying of the Nu River has continued apace, and people living along the 
Nu know little about our appeal or these preparations for dam construction. 
(WangYC 2008) 
In 2006, one CRN member stated that over time, the network’s goals have “shifted from 
biodiversity to people” (Büsgen 2006:24). “We focus not just on the destiny of rivers, but 
also the destiny of people living along the rivers,” said a core member in 2009. “Who is 
responsible for the migrants? How can we bring this under control, to provide electricity 
and also provide a livelihood to villagers?” (C63). In fact, connections to local 
communities have always been central to the network’s identity (Economy 2005:30), 
starting from trips by network members to the Nu area in 2003-04. The group most 
associated with local river communities has been Green Watershed, both due to its 
Kunming base and its leadership’s willingness to take risks. In addition to taking Nu 
River villagers to see and meet dam migrants from Manwan, Green Watershed brought a 
Jinsha community leader and other residents to Beijing for a United Nations consultation 
on sustainable hydropower in October 2004 (C47, GeQX 2004, Büsgen 2006:33). This 
was a dramatic statement, but it also led to repercussions from authorities. 
The instrumental argument for involving communities, despite the risks, is that it is 
necessary for success in mobilising public opinion and affecting government policies. 
One CRN member states, “We have looked for all sorts of solutions from the market, a 
legal system, and so on. But we concluded that we need the public to participate, or else 
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there will be no solution” (C70). Such community participation is limited, but it does 
exist and has been growing in significance. The fact that some local people stand up and 
speak out serves as an inspiration to others. At a public event in Beijing in August 2010, 
one CRN member noted, “If we are just making intellectual arguments in books and 
reports, it’s hard to win” (C70). Another core member agrees: “Ordinary people (老百姓
lăob|ixìng) are closely connected to our end goal. They understand that this land is 
world cultural heritage. If they can speak up and participate, that dialogue is the key to 
success” (C47).  
Links to communities also refute opponents’ claims that environmentalists are idealists 
who care only about preserving beautiful landscapes, not about people’s desire for 
development.36 “People say we don’t care about migrants. But I have been there eight 
times and done interviews with over 100 migrants!” (C63). Efforts to bring literacy and 
development projects to the Nu and Jinsha areas may be interpreted as symbolic 
statements of solidarity, in addition to the tangible benefits they bring. In the Jinsha–
Tiger Leaping Gorge area, strong community leadership has resulted in well-informed 
villagers who are able to keep government officials at a distance (C25,C74, GeQX 2004), 
while Nu villagers are “easily manipulated, they want to escape poverty and will believe 
what experts say” (C65). Given these differing opportunities, network members link 
with communities on a case-by-case basis.  
 
 
                                                        
36 Litzinger (2007:292) shares the view that elite NGOs favour preservation over the needs of local 
residents; this may have been true in 1990s endangered species campaigns, but I don’t see evidence of it 
in the Three Parallel Rivers. 
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International linkages 
CRN has received little international funding (Büsgen 2006:23). Its independence from 
foreign donors may be interpreted as evidence of its organic, domestically-focused 
character, based on pooled social capital (C28). A few donors, notably Conservation 
International, Global Greengrants and Oxfam, offered limited funds for advocacy 
activities channelled through GEV and Green Watershed. IRN did not have a direct role, 
in part due to reluctance on the part of CRN members to be seen as a “branch office of 
IRN”, which they viewed as too oppositional (C31,C74).37 In retrospect this might have 
been a missed opportunity from both sides. Major foundations and environmental 
organisations also did not speak out, even though they arguably faced less risk than local 
network members (C28). “Local NGOs need to lead,” says one network member. 
“International organisations play it too safe – they can’t be leaders” (C65). Other INGOs 
felt dam advocacy was too sensitive to support directly; instead, they provided 
“technical support” by bringing Chinese activists outside the country for training, mainly 
to Thailand and the USA. This exposed the Chinese to regional and international civil 
society networks and empowered them to go back to China and increase their activism. 
In this way, “the funding was less important than the contacts” (C48). However, CRN 
members state that they attempted to raise funds from a number of other sources 
without success (C74). Although information sharing and coordination could continue 
on a shoestring budget, the lack of consistent core funding reduced CRN’s effectiveness. 
Most recently, CRN members have begun to look at the impact of Chinese dams in 
Southeast Asia and beyond. This is a natural development in the case of the Mekong and 
                                                        
37 IRN does serve as one of the advisors of GGF and makes recommendations on small grants to Chinese 
NGOs, including CRN members (Global Greengrants Fund 2010).  
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Salween rivers that originate in China and flow into neighbouring countries (Manahan 
2010). Chinese companies are among those proposing new downstream dams on these 
rivers (Schieber and Xu 2010, Cronin 2009). Contact between Chinese and regional 
networks has existed since the Nu campaign, and has increased in recent years 
(C48,C64,C66).38 Rivers network members are engaging in regional civil society efforts, 
such as the Save the Mekong campaign (Hirsch 2010:319-20). Green Watershed, with its 
Yunnan base, is particularly well connected with Thailand and has also engaged in 
regional research programs including an Australian research centre (C47). International 
Rivers has quietly supported some activities and international conferences (C63) and 
adopted a more collaborative approach to working in China (Bosshard 2010). Another 
INGO, Probe International, does not work within China but has translated and posted 
numerous documents on dam projects. Most coordination, however, takes place not with 
developed-country NGOs but via regional organisations and networks headquartered in 
Thailand (C66).39  
Chinese activists have not historically linked to global anti-dam campaigns such as the 
Narmada case in India (Kaldor et al 2007:125-33, Khagram 2000). Conversely, most 
international campaigns have also not considered Chinese examples or built ties to 
Chinese civil society. However, transnational links exist and are growing. Advocacy 
frames are changing to include more international messages, particularly concerning 
dams on the Lancang/Mekong that have significant downstream impacts (C65). Regional 
                                                        
38 Although they have attended a few common regional meetings, there has yet to be substantial contact 
between CRN and the Vietnam Rivers Network, which is a formal issue-based forum rather than an 
informal advocacy network (see chapter 2, p. 92). 
39 Some Chinese activists have had extensive exposure to Thai experience, including the well-known case 
of the Pak Mun dam (Lertchoosakul 2003), where local residents were heavily involved in anti-dam 
activism (Missingham 2006). 
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links will likely increase in the future as Chinese networks become more experienced 
and confident to contribute to, as well as benefit from transnational organising.  
Network effectiveness: Policy change 
The rivers network’s engagement in recent dam controversies shows how its advocacy 
has developed since the Nu campaign. The highest profile case at present concerns 
Xiaonanhai, proposed to be built outside the rapidly growing city of Chongqing in a 
national protected area established as a compromise for lost habitat from the Three 
Gorges dam (C65). Chongqing’s pro-business city government supports dam 
construction to meet anticipated energy needs. In May 2009, after an internal meeting in 
Beijing, eight rivers network members sent a petition to the MEP expert committee with 
responsibility for national protected areas, appealing for them to overrule the 
Chongqing authorities in the name of protecting endangered fish species (C25,C65): 
“The negative impacts of overdevelopment of hydropower would destroy the river's 
diverse aquatic life.” As per usual practice, the letter made no mention of a network and 
was signed in the names of individual environmentalists and scientists. The petition was 
released to the domestic and international press and enjoyed wide coverage (ChanJ 
2009, Hance 2009, Reuters 2009).  
The Xiaonanhai advocacy campaign appeared to be achieving its objective. After the 
petition’s release, MEP suspended the project, but Chongqing authorities persisted with 
plans to rezone the protected area. In November 2010, 18 months after the start of the 
campaign, MEP informed Friends of Nature that the rezoning had been approved 
(HanZY 2011). Seven network members wrote a joint letter to MEP asking for a public 
hearing on the issue, and FON followed with an open letter to the National People’s 
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Congress (MengS 2011). Some of the most strongly-worded opposition came from the 
Chinese project manager at the generally conservative Nature Conservancy, upset that 
“a terrible precedent” is being set for protected areas (Watts 2011). In spite of these 
efforts, as of March 2011 construction of the Xiaonanhai dam is poised to go ahead.   
Controversy has also widened over eight proposed dams on the upper and middle 
Jinsha.40 At Ludila and Longkaikou, proposed by state-owned conglomerates Huadian 
(China Electric) and Huaneng (China Energy) respectively, preparatory construction 
work including dikes and water diversion tunnels, began in 2007 without a completed 
EIA (Yauch 2010). In June 2009, MEP rejected EIAs for the two dams (MEP 2009, 
Bezlova 2009) in what one journalist termed “the severest punishment in the country's 
environmental appraisal history,” yet corporations stated the ruling would have little 
impact (LiJR 2009). MEP ordered additional studies on environmental impacts for other 
sections of the Jinsha, including Tiger Leaping Gorge (MEP 2009). Several days later, 
rivers network members issued a joint letter signed by 16 organisations and 20 
individuals that called on MEP to suspend construction of all dams on the Jinsha (Probe 
International 2009). 
As Huaneng and Huadian continued their noncompliance, in August 2009, Chongqing 
Green Volunteers Union filed a lawsuit against the companies in the Wuhan Maritime 
Court to try and stop construction, the first time such a public interest law tactic has 
been tried. More than a year later, the court has not responded (C25,C75). CGVU then 
issued a request for administrative review of the case to MEP and NDRC, claiming that 
                                                        
40 From north to south, the eight are Tiger Leaping Gorge, Liangjia, Liyuan, Ahai, Jin'anqiao, Longkaikou, 
Ludila and Guanyinyan (Wang and Zhou 2010a). Other dams are under construction on the lower Jinsha 
and Yangtze. The fate of Tiger Leaping Gorge is still unclear (Wang and Zhou 2010b). 
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the dam builders were violating policy by proceeding with construction before the dam’s 
EIA had been approved (C65). 
In August 2010, a network member told a sympathetic Beijing audience, 
From 2006 up to now, projects have been postponed, but that doesn’t mean the 
problem is over. Local residents in the affected areas are still very concerned. 
There is a lot of pressure to start the dam projects. Hydropower is still a 
national priority, and demand is high. It’s possible that one or more new 
projects will start next year. But I’m also hopeful that they will be restrained... 
We shouldn’t assume that GDP growth will inevitably result in dam building. 
We need to consider the negative economic effects of pollution, and challenge 
the whole idea of GDP as the end goal. Second, there are a lot of possible means 
to increasing electricity production, not just hydropower. (C47) 
In spite of years of effort, CRN has little advance notice or inside information of 
government plans, which are only publicised when an EIA is completed or resettlement 
plans are announced (JiangGM 2009, Hensengerth 2010:7). It is sometimes harder now 
for the network to get unofficial data than in the past, as one key MEP ally who worked 
on EIAs is no longer in office (C53). Network members search the Internet for public 
announcements of government projects, sometimes finding information by chance, as 
when one member happened to see an announcement about the Ahai dam on the Jinsha, 
just 15 days before construction was scheduled to begin (C74). Rivers network members 
commented publicly on the EIA but were unable to stop construction of the dam (Wang 
and Zhou 2010a). The 2003 EIA law allows for expert consultation meetings and public 
hearings, but protocols for observing these are not yet established. Activists try to use 
the tools they have access to in the law, but it is not followed in all cases (C65). In some 
cases, activists are able to access information in time to take action. In other cases, they 
learn of environmentally harmful dam projects only after the public comment period on 
the EIA has passed (MengDK 2009), or companies begin construction before an EIA is 
released, making the process “a mere formality…nonsensical” (Wang and Zhou 2010a). 
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Though not successful in every case, network members are convinced that they 
collectively have played a role in improving the public participation and information 
around EIAs and large dams (ChenJL 2010). 
    
Life along the Nu River: “I don’t know if photos this       Construction of the Ludila power plant on the Jinsha  
beautiful can still be taken ten years from now. But                      River (both photos: WangYC 2008) 
we have many people working on it, and we have hope”. 
  
Network effectiveness: Sustainability  
Since CRN ceased its formal structure, its name is no longer used publicly, and most 
written accounts hardly mention its existence. The network’s anonymity does not 
bother members, some of whom view a low profile as strategically necessary, while 
others see it as positively desirable. Most would still, in theory, prefer a formal network, 
but view this as risky.  
 We had two choices: we could register CRN legally, then we could have an 
office, raise funds and so on – but this wasn’t possible at that time. The second 
choice was to keep a loose network, since a close network would have been 
considered illegal. Everyone agreed to cooperate on activities, write petition 
letters, and have informal meetings. When there is something to discuss, we all 
get together. (C47) 
At a meeting in Hangzhou in July 2010, one member reportedly proposed re-establishing 
a more formal network structure. Others resisted the idea, feeling it is still too risky and 
would invite opposition (C65). Their caution is understandable given the network’s past 
experiences and an uncertain future: a formal structure might be politically possible 
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now, but this could change next year. The political context has arguably relaxed since 
2005, and CRN has more space to operate than it once did. But most network members 
still perceive that opportunities are limited.  
Fundraising also remains an issue. One member agrees that network members have the 
capacity to raise funds if needed, but if not done strategically, this could “defeat the 
purpose” (C65). The network’s lack of registration and formal structure limits funding 
possibilities. “If we were to write a proposal, we would have to put someone’s name on it 
who is accountable to donors. Donors won’t fund an intangible group” (C65). Another 
member prefers corporate donations to foundation grants, since the corporations let her 
do what she wants, while international donors put conditions on their funds and 
demand formal structures, so that members have to spend all their time raising money 
and managing staff (C28).  
CRN members have differing ideas about the benefits of an informal network. Some 
argue that informal networks are a necessary second-best solution because of political 
limitations, while others favour informality for other reasons. The first argument runs as 
follows: 
The concept of a looser network prevailed because we had no way to register. If 
we did sensitive work without registering, it could bring all the organisations 
involved into serious trouble... Most organisations and individuals would prefer 
a formal network if the registration issue could be solved. (C70)  
The second argument is that “we prefer to work together closely, but not set up a formal 
network. We could do this if we wanted, it wouldn’t be difficult” (C63). There are, of 
course, other options: a more formalised, but still unregistered, network; or a strong 
coordinating organisation that manages the network as a “project”. So far, however, 
these possibilities have not attracted strong support. The issue of coordination is one 
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obstacle, as no one is stepping forward as a formal coordinator, and members differ on 
who would be most effective (C65,C70). Location also plays a role: most members are 
based in Beijing, where organisations have more opportunities for funding and 
connections with the government. Beijing members feel coordination should take place 
there, even though the rivers themselves and several capable organisations are in 
southwest China.41 Broadly speaking, CRN has worked with central government allies 
against provincial government opponents, so it makes more sense to locate near allies 
where there is more political space (C48).  
Political and regulatory restrictions thus remain the major obstacles to an expanded or 
more formalised network structure (Yang and Calhoun 2008:84, McGray and McDonald 
2007:46). Capacity and funding are secondary barriers that could be overcome. If 
network members did re-establish a formal mechanism, however, the political limits 
would still be there, and might become more intense. If, conversely, the political 
environment were to relax, it would then be easier to deal with resource issues. Such 
shifts have occurred before; the space that may be there now could also contract in the 
future. To be sure, no one knows the exact limits of what is possible (C79, MqVU 2010) 
or what might provoke a response from the “anaconda in the chandelier,” as Link (2002) 
evocatively describes the Chinese security apparatus. Given that some rivers network 
members are well connected with Chinese authorities, their readings of the tea leaves 
may be assumed to be accurate, or at least closer than the speculations of foreign 
researchers. 
                                                        
41 The centralisation of advocacy has had implications for my research as well. After making one visit to 
Yunnan in April 2009, I concluded that Beijing was the best location to gather information about the rivers 
network, and subsequent trips in November 2009 and August 2010 were only to Beijing (see p. 18). 
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A mature network, CRN has been able to frame itself as a successful example of 
advocacy, a perception to which outside researchers have also contributed (C59). As 
newer networks emerge in China, however, the future and ongoing relevance of CRN is 
seen by some to be unclear. With its informal structure, the network has no public, 
coherent strategy, regular meetings, or clearly defined membership (C25). Many of the 
potential projects outlined years ago have yet to be realised (GEV 2006, C74). CRN 
appears to be reactive, initiating advocacy on dam disputes only when there is an urgent 
need.  
A younger activist who does not participate in the rivers network tells the following 
story: 
 Earlier this year [2010] I attended a dinner for environmental activists 
organised by Nanfang Zhoumo [newspaper]…older [rivers network] members 
were there. As soon as the dinner started, they said, “Let’s go over here and talk 
about our project”, and then they completely ignored the rest of us. They’re an 
exclusive group. If the older generation doesn’t want to include me, I’ll do my 
own work. There are lots of things to do, it’s not necessary to join their projects! 
(C75) 
This anecdote reflects generational differences in the environmental sector, and 
illustrates limitations of a small, close network based on personal ties. The story also 
demonstrates something that the younger activist did not realise: the network members 
must not have met face-to-face for some time, and they needed to use the newspaper’s 
dinner as an opportunity to talk.  
Rivers network members are clear that they never intended to become a large, public 
group; they had an elite structure from the beginning.  
It’s easier if we have fewer people involved. With many members, including a 
lot of new younger NGOs, there would be a lot of different agendas in the 
network, and this would be ineffective for making consensual decisions. 
Besides, some information is sensitive and we need to be careful with it. It’s 
better for us to reach out to different groups depending on the issue. (C74) 
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This member expresses concern that with more public exposure, river activism could 
get “out of control”, with competing NGOs, copycat groups, and too much political 
attention (C74). In short, the issue could become the basis for a broader social 
movement. Activists in many countries might be delighted with this prospect, but as the 
older generation remembers, Chinese experiences with such movements have not 
turned out well.  
As environmental protection and transparency have become priorities of the Chinese 
state, activists can frame advocacy to align with central government policies (LoSP 2007, 
Mertha 2008:18-23). The more moderate the frame, the more people the network can 
bring in as co-signatories or supporters. Conversely, if network leaders get too far ahead 
of their constituencies, this could lead to dissension within their ranks: as one core 
member describes, “we involve influential [supporters] on a case-by-case basis, but do 
not want to demand their involvement on issues that are sensitive” (C65). Friends of 
Nature is the only network member with a large membership base of its own, but it does 
not yet have any members’ groups in Chongqing, Sichuan or Yunnan. Even if they had, 
FON is hesitant to ask them to take action on dam issues due to possible local 
repercussions. 
Thus, the hypothesised shift towards community advocacy42 has not yet taken place in 
the case of the China rivers network; if anything, community connections were stronger 
in the early years of the network before strong opposition arose from local governments. 
The relative role of media and online advocacy has increased somewhat in recent years, 
                                                        
42 See p. 124. 
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as these sectors continue to develop, while embedded advocacy has taken a slightly less 
prominent position, in part because several key government allies have stepped down.  
Network effectiveness: Political space 
CRN’s initial accomplishments in blocking Nu River dams expanded political space for 
environmental activism, but due in part to opponents’ reactions, did not become the 
breakthrough for civil society that some hoped (C28). The political opportunity 
structure surrounding river activism is “restrictive and conducive at the same time” (Ho 
2008a:3), with elements of openness as well as state control. Pressure from authorities 
was not the only reason for CRN’s formal dissolution in 2006; registration, funding and 
capacity questions also played a role. Yet if political opportunities had been different, 
these other issues could have been solved: “maybe if [CRN] had existed longer and 
developed, it would have opened up later” (C74).  
The backlash of 2005-6, as unwelcome as it was for CRN, is significant in a number of 
ways. It serves as a reminder that civil society development is not a linear progression 
or a game theory matrix with clear winners and losers. Whether a victory or a 
crackdown, a single event is rarely the end of the story, as political contention extends 
across episodes and cycles (Tarrow 1998:141, McAdam et al 2001). Not only can 
activists not win every time, there are also costs to winning, one of which is retribution 
from opponents who may have lost a policy decision but remain strongly connected to 
sources of power. Reprisals illustrate the pendulum of the Chinese (and Vietnamese) 
political system, alternating between repression and opening (Shieh 2010). While 
certain aspects of network formation and strategising are potentially significant in all 
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political contexts, there also remain particular features of the Chinese political 
opportunity structure that cannot be generalised. 
The China rivers network has consciously chosen network structures, advocacy 
strategies, and message frames to express their criticism of certain hydropower projects 
without opposing the Chinese government as such. At times, some network members 
have used provocative language to express what they see as the potentially catastrophic 
damage of dam projects. At no point have they aimed to change the overall political 
system. I see little evidence of “self-imposed censorship” (Ho 2008a:8) in the network’s 
activities. Nor do activists limit their concerns to “politically safe and innocuous issues” 
(YangGB 2010:101). Instead, they see conservation and participation as linked. The 
network aims to protect rivers and ecosystems, stop or limit effects of dams, and 
support sustainable development for people in affected areas. Network members speak 
openly and passionately about these goals, which are broadly consistent with the 
government’s own stated policy for environmental protection. The network seeks 
“fundamental, not radical” political change (Büsgen 2006:27) within the existing Chinese 
regime. In one sociologist’s view, Chinese environmentalism has divided into a 
conservation movement and a protest movement, with river activism as an example of 
the former (TongZF 2009). 
For these reasons, it is misleading and possibly damaging to characterise rivers network 
members as “water warriors,” in the unfortunate title of Mertha’s otherwise valuable 
2008 book.43 Mertha uses particularly strong language to describe Green Watershed, 
                                                        
43 The phrase is based on what were known as “water wars” in Bolivia and other developing countries 
(Manahan 2010). Google Books lists 13 published volumes with “Water Wars” in their title, dating back to 
1993. These struggles are usually over access to clean, affordable drinking water, not about dams. I find 
war analogies unhelpful for understanding the China Rivers Network, a nonviolent and usually non-
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which he situates “[o]n the extreme end of the spectrum of viable Chinese NGOs” (62), 
using “unprecedented” methods and “guerrilla tactics” (144,113). At times, this seems 
an appropriate characterisation, as Green Watershed’s community advocacy activities in 
2004-5 were indeed groundbreaking and viewed as sensitive by government officials 
(LuYY 2005:3). In another respects, however, Green Watershed is a “typical advocacy 
group” (FuT 2007:294) whose strategy and activities lie fully within the mainstream.44  
CRN members have applied learning from rivers advocacy in the formation and 
operation of new networks on earthquake relief and climate change, primarily for 
information sharing but with some engagement in advocacy.45 Compared to the rivers 
network, the Climate Change Action Network has greater political opportunity and 
access to resources. International NGOs emphasise responses to climate change more 
than dam issues, in part because they favour constructive approaches to the Chinese 
government, but also because even activist INGOs have set international strategies that 
local staff cannot easily affect (C65). 
Political barriers to community advocacy persist in rural areas affected by dams. The 
deputy director of public relations in one Sichuan district along the Jinsha River told 
reporters in July 2010, “Resettlement work has strong political nature, is extremely 
policy-guided and very sensitive. Since the Hanyuan incident in October 2004, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
confrontational form of civil society mobilisation, and in part for this reason I have avoided the use of 
military metaphors (“battle,” “forces,” “target,” etc.) in this thesis. 
44 In addition to advocacy on river issues, Green Watershed has engaged since 2005 in a range of 
development projects along the Jinsha, participated in Sichuan earthquake relief, and formed a new 
network on green finance (C47). Many of these activities are in cooperation with other CRN members. 
Green Watershed has also developed a speciality in independent research, such as an investigation on 
effects of the Manwan dam on the Lancang, funded by Australian donors (C25). The organisation plans to 
set up a training centre in southwest China for regional and local NGO networks, which could form the 
basis of a more formal network in the future (C47,C64) and would help to decentralise river activism away 
from Beijing. “This has to be a ten to twenty year project,” says Green Watershed’s director. “We need to 
keep advocating for environmental standards to improve every year. It will be very difficult” (C47).  
45 See Table 2.4, p. 96. 
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provincial government has strict regulations on the coverage of resettlement for 
hydropower projects” (XuDH 2010). In Hanyuan county, Sichuan, 20,000 villagers 
protested the low resettlement compensation they were offered for the construction of 
the Pubugou dam in western Sichuan. The protests led to delay of construction for a year 
and the dismissal of key local government officials (HeQL 2007; CaiYS 2008:170-1; 
Mertha 2008:65-93). While Chinese writers view the protests as successful, Mertha 
notes that “there was next to no impact on policy” (66), and that by shifting the frame 
from dam construction to political protest, the villagers lost the chance to attract 
support of environmental and media allies, including members of the rivers network.  
In general, NGOs played a very limited role. Individual NGO officers acted as 
intermediaries communicating what was unfolding on the ground to Chinese 
media outlets. Several of these individuals made visits to Hanyuan wearing 
their journalist hats in the summer of 2004. However, like the rest of the media, 
once events in Hanyuan became overtly political, these NGO representatives 
recognised their limited ability to influence them. The political “spaces” 
disappeared, replaced by the overwhelming imperative to maintain social 
stability. (Mertha 2008:89) 
Mertha concludes that political considerations keep “policy entrepreneurs” such as 
rivers network members from community mobilisation, since this could be interpreted 
as a threat to authorities (93), and feels that local protests are insufficient to achieve 
policy change (115). Yet disputes over dam construction continue to occur, and will 
likely escalate as more dams are built (Buckley 2009). On 2 June 2010, people displaced 
by construction of the Xiangjiaba dam on the Jinsha River protested at the dam builders’ 
project office; dozens were injured in a resulting clash with police (XuDH 2010). The 
rivers network is not able or willing to take part in such protests. The network’s existing 
“elite hierarchy” (Ho 2008b:34) of environmentalists and journalists has enabled 
effective advocacy in many ways, but it may be less of an advantage using these newer 
methods; in particular, it is difficult to represent community interests through an 
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informal network structure (C74). Chongqing Green Volunteers Union has pioneered the 
use of lawsuits to block or delay dam construction, and other rivers network members 
are currently considering similar strategies in different cases (C65).  
Realising that community-level work is often most effective when linked to service 
delivery, Green Watershed and Green Earth Volunteers have begun charitable and 
poverty alleviation projects in Jinsha and Nu River communities (C47); some of these 
ideas were envisioned by CRN from the beginning. While the content of the projects is 
traditional, such as livelihood support and construction of local libraries, the purpose is 
linked to community advocacy, building connections with villagers and encouraging 
them to speak and act about environmental issues. Network members have also 
distributed printed materials, copies of videos, and information about relevant Chinese 
laws. Some Jinsha villagers have begun organising other communities on their own, 
while Nu valley residents are still more passive (C25,C74, WangYC 2006).  
Some analysts claim that the rivers network’s advocacy has promoted “democracy” (XuN 
2009) or “pluralism” (Mertha 2008:xv). At first glance, this seems exaggerated. However, 
if democracy is interpreted not as a regime type, but as increased popular participation 
within the current political system, then the claims make more sense. The rivers 
network members have certainly asserted their own right to participate in the policy-
making process. Even so, the question should be raised of how much broader societal 
participation this has promoted. As a result of media exposure, sections of the general 
public are more aware of environmental issues, and dams in particular, than they were 
before the rivers network formed. Communities in dam-affected areas are also better 
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informed, and in some cases more actively involved, although there are still limits on 
their participation.  
Conclusion  
Seven years after the formation of the China Rivers Network, both the network’s future 
and the Chinese government’s dam construction plans remain in limbo. On the Nu River, 
SEPA approved an EIA for a reduced plan for four dams, parts of which were leaked to 
the press in January 2006, although the full report was withheld as a “state secret” 
(Yardley 2006, Mertha 2008:140-1). Although none of these dams have received final 
approval, the four are listed in the 2010-14 Five Year Plan. Dam companies are able to 
start “preparatory work” on this basis, including construction of access roads, buildings 
and electric lines (C47, JiangGM 2009). 1,000 people were relocated from proposed dam 
areas during 2006-08; their housing and health have worsened, and the compensation 
they received is not enough to build new houses (C63). The national government 
continues to put a hold on construction, most recently restated by Wen Jiabao in May 
2009 (ShiJT 2008,2009; Bezlova 2009). Network members continue to campaign for 
protection of the Nu, as well as conduct research and study trips, but community 
organising is not possible due to opposition from the local government (C47). The 
situation on the Jinsha and other rivers is broadly similar. 
In a 2006 article, Stalley and Yang argue that Chinese environmentalism “lacks sustained 
contention” since “there is no network of organisations or individuals who are a 
persistent source of external pressure on environmental policy”, and “scattered protests 
and campaigns” fail to add up to a broader movement (336-7). Yet the experience of the 
China rivers network suggests otherwise. In spite of political obstacles and limitations 
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on capacity and funding, the network has sustained its advocacy over an extended 
period and contributed to incremental political change towards more open decision-
making processes on dam construction, a core concern of China’s environmental 
movement and civil society in the past decade.  
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   CONCLUSION: CIVIL SOCIETY NETWORKS AND POLITICAL CHANGE 
 
The four case studies of networks presented in this thesis, despite differences in sectoral 
focus, history and composition, share numerous common features. Since the cases were 
chosen for their illustrative potential, not as a representative sample, the findings may 
not apply to all civil society networks in different subject areas or geographic locations. 
However, the in-depth descriptions presented here are sufficient to assemble a 
composite story of how networks form and operate, using a method of analytic 
induction (Becker 1998:194-212). This narrative demonstrates the possibilities of a 
network-based approach to civil society that is distinct from the standard three-sector 
division as well as from theories of partial or state-led civil society. If networks can 
comprise civil society in the perhaps unexpected settings of China and Vietnam, then a 
focus on networks might also be productive in other contexts.1  
The story of civil society networks begins with personal connections among a group of 
individual activists. These “pre-existing social networks nurture critical thinking and 
incubate resistance” (O’Brien and Stern 2008:17). Personal or virtual ties transform into 
civil society networks in response to the combination of perceived need and political 
opportunities. For instance, both the Bright Future Group and Chinese activists against 
the Three Gorges Dam mobilised around common grievances, but their initial attempts 
at advocacy were blocked by the state. When the political field later shifted, networks 
emerged and began to participate in politics. Other mobilising resources, such as 
funding, organisational structures, and identified leaders, can be helpful but are not 
                                                        
1 The reasoning here follows Casanova’s on Ukraine (1998:203): “if a civil society can emerge in such an 
unexpected setting as Ukraine, it could possibly emerge in many other unlikely places.” 
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necessary or sufficient for network formation: of the four case studies, only the Women’s 
Network against AIDS had access to these resources at the time it began. External 
funding can support an existing network to operate and grow, but cannot create a new 
network as a development project (Desmond et al 2007:17). 
Contrary to Keck and Sikkink’s findings (1998:9), networks do not depend primarily on 
international or domestic NGOs but are largely comprised of dynamic, often inspiring 
individual members who are consciously at the forefront of organising around their 
issues. Civil society networks stress human values of trust, solidarity, creativity and 
emotion in counterpoint to dominant discourses of economic growth and scientific 
progress. However, the processes of network formation, structuring and advocacy are 
not smooth or easy, and should not be romanticised. Every aspect of these networks is 
contested through multiple, overlapping relationships with central and local authorities 
over registration, legitimacy and policy directions; with state and private corporations 
who are objects of advocacy, but also counter-actors with their own strategies; with 
donors and international organisations who are often supportive allies, but sometimes 
with strings attached; and finally within networks themselves, in debates over identity, 
goals and tactics. Many individual activists are connected to both organisations and 
networks, often multiple networks, and wear multiple hats linked to state agencies and 
media. Thus, there is no clear separation between state and non-state actors. Of the 
profiled networks, only WNAC could be described as autonomous from the state, yet due 
to its close ties to a single donor, it is in other respects the least autonomous of the four. 
Autonomy is not a crucial or even relevant indicator of a network’s effectiveness. 
Instead, networks negotiate complex relationships and structural challenges to create 
opportunities for pathbreaking social change.  
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Within this overall narrative, each of the four network case studies follows a distinct 
trajectory, summarised in the below table. The evidence is not sufficient to show any 
fundamental differences between Chinese and Vietnamese contexts. With their focus on 
group identity and equal participation, the disability and HIV networks presented in 
chapters 4-5 are more similar to each other than either resembles the other case study 
from the same country. The same is true for the public space and environment networks 
in chapters 6-7, which share a common mission of increasing public participation in 
planning and decision-making. 
Table 8.1 Comparison of network case studies 
Network History Structure Advocacy 
strategies 
International 
links 
Effectiveness 
Bright 
Future Group  
Long-standing 
club of 
individual 
activists took 
on more 
public role as 
opportunities 
emerged  
Concentric 
circles with 
elected exec 
committee. 
Decisions 
through 
discussion and 
consensus. 
Primarily 
embedded 
advocacy with 
govt allies, 
though some 
members 
reaching out to 
community 
None at first; 
important for 
legitimacy and 
advocacy in 
1990s; 
multiple small 
project funding 
since 
High level of 
policy impact, 
though gaps 
between law and 
practice. A model 
for other 
disability groups.  
Women’s 
Network 
against AIDS  
Newest of the 
networks. 
Began 
virtually, then 
developed 
formal 
structure with 
peer support 
groups as 
members 
Hub-and-
spokes 
structure with 
paid staff in 
secretariat. 
Provincial 
clusters 
emerging 
Creative use of 
media and arts 
aiming at 
changing 
public 
perceptions of 
HIV-affected 
women. Few 
links to govt 
Few initially; 
reliance on 
single donor in 
formalisation 
of network 
Little policy 
impact yet. 
Potentially a 
strong model for 
other networks, 
but 
sustainability is 
uncertain. 
Reunification 
Park public 
space 
network  
Coalesced 
from personal 
ties in 
response to an 
external threat  
Informal 
structure with 
de facto core 
group. Strong 
media 
involvement 
Inside-outside 
strategy 
combining 
embedded and 
media 
approaches 
One INGO and 
several indiv. 
play effective 
facilitating 
roles 
Effective at 
stopping large 
park 
privatisation 
projects. Unclear 
sustainability or 
broader impact 
 
China Rivers 
Network  
Personal 
network 
became formal 
network in 
2004-5, then 
reverted to 
Concentric 
circles. 
Informal 
alliance of NGO 
leaders and 
journalists. 
Inside-outside, 
some use of all 
3 strategies 
Some members 
are 
internationally 
funded and 
connected to 
regional 
Postponed 
numerous dam 
projects. Strong 
demonstration 
value, diffusion 
to other 
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informal 
status  
networks networks 
 
In chapters 2-3, six hypotheses were developed concerning network structure, advocacy 
and effectiveness. Some, but not all of these postulates are confirmed by case study 
findings.  
Hypothesis A, that networks with more cooperation or social capital will be more 
effective, is supported by the observation that the networks that have existed for a 
longer period (Bright Future and CRN) have had greater impact overall in the senses of 
effectiveness as network sustainability and political space. Networks with a capital city 
base, some level of independent resources, and links to authorities and elites have had 
greater impact on policy. In China, there has been noticeably greater cooperation to date 
among environmental groups than in the HIV sector, perhaps because environmentalists 
are united by a common external mission rather than identity-based politics 
(C31,C55,C58). The Women’s Network against AIDS is too new a network to reach 
definitive conclusions on effectiveness, but given further time to develop, its social 
capital may also increase. Further exploration of this hypothesis should also consider 
examples of rural networks with fewer links to elites but potentially other forms of 
social capital.  
Hypothesis B, that networks that are more structured and larger will be more effective, 
is not supported by the evidence.2 Size does not appear to be a relevant factor for 
effectiveness in any of the three senses. Contrary to expectations, formal networks 
(WNAC and CRN prior to 2006) do not demonstrate greater effectiveness than informal 
                                                        
2 This is also contrary to Keck and Sikkink’s conclusions (1998:206), perhaps because they only consider 
formal networks. 
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structures; in fact, many members prefer informality, as the experiences of CRN and 
Reunification Park reveal. The structure networks adopt is determined by the political 
and resource contexts they face, together with members’ capacities for leadership. 
Where political obstacles exist, respondents argued that it is better to form multiple 
small networks focussed on practical goals, rather than a single large structure (V17). 
This confirms Melucci’s counter-intuitive finding that new social movements “seem to 
mutate towards informality” (1996:331). 
Hypothesis C is that the advocacy strategies of embeddedness, media and community 
participation comprise a cumulative, chronological process. This hypothesis is partly 
supported in that the three longer-existing networks have gradually moved away from a 
reliance on embedded tactics alone to combined inside-outside strategies. However, the 
hypothesised shift towards community advocacy has not yet occurred, largely because 
of political constraints on NGO-community links from both Chinese and Vietnamese 
authorities. Informal network structures offer one possible way around this restriction, 
and community-based strategies may increase in the future if opportunity structures 
shift. 
Hypothesis D states that networks select strategies based on the presence of allies at 
different locations within the elite. All four networks have identified and sought out elite 
allies, including government officials, academic experts, and prominent journalists. The 
CRN and Reunification Park strategies are the most similar in that both networks seek to 
leverage allies to prevent their opponents, private or state-owned corporations, from 
implementing development projects that network members view as harmful. BFG has 
mainly aimed to influence the attitudes and actions of central government allies. For the 
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Chinese women’s network, donor relations have so far been more important than 
domestic alliances, suggesting that this hypothesis might vary among different types of 
networks.  
Hypothesis E regarding multiple advocacy strategies is well supported by the case 
studies. Hypothesis F, that effective networks will include diverse members who 
specialise in different strategies and tactics, also applies to all cases but comes through 
especially strongly in the two Vietnamese cases. By comparison, CRN could probably 
benefit from more diverse membership, but has chosen instead to remain small and 
informal, while WNAC’s membership is diverse geographically while emphasising 
solidarity around a common positive identity. 
These findings are significant for the internal operations of networks, for donors and 
other supporters, and more broadly for theory on civil society, social movements and 
networks. I will consider these implications in four areas relating to network formation 
and leadership, selection of network structures, resources, and the multiple aspects of 
effectiveness. Finally, I elaborate on the potential significance of network activism on 
political change in China and Vietnam. 
 
Network formation and leadership  
Case study findings demonstrate that civil society networks form for a combination of 
external reasons, such as advocacy opportunities or grievances, and internal identities.3 
The motivations for individuals to join existing networks are similarly mixed. In the 
                                                        
3 On internal and external functions of networks, see chapter 2, p. 88. 
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view of one Chinese activist, these include psychological reasons to belong to a group, 
perceived access to funding or power, and protection from opponents through strength 
in numbers (C40). An Asia Foundation study in Vietnam (2008:37) concludes that 
networking increases public perceptions of organisational cohesiveness, facilitates 
fundraising and access to resources, creates alliances for advocacy, and builds capacity 
through training and information sharing. A member of a newly-formed child rights 
forum emphasises external opportunities: “In order to have a voice with government, we 
needed to form a network… If we do this, we can unify our voices and speak out on 
questions of orphans, domestic violence and education” (V35). The coordinator of an 
HIV network, by contrast, stresses benefits to members. “We aren’t creating a network 
just for the purpose of creating a network, but in order to do things to help people. It’s 
not just about getting money…it needs to be based on real needs and conditions of its 
members” (C71). Successful networks must do both: without support to members, 
networks may disintegrate, while too much internal focus could weaken the civil society 
focus of the network, reverting to a personal network for members’ private benefit only. 
A related question is why some individuals and groups do not join networks, preferring 
to work alone or limit cooperation to loose structures for exchange and information 
sharing (C46). In an uncertain political environment, some fear that joining a network 
will lead to reprisals. Not knowing which other people or organisations can be trusted 
not to get in political trouble, they keep their distance to avoid being labelled by 
association (C43). These attitudes seem particularly strong in provinces where there is 
less perceived political space and among religious groups (C41,C48). Other NGOs see 
networks as a waste of effort compared to service delivery: “it seems that networks 
make people crazy and use up resources and energy” (C54). Another NGO staff asserts, 
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“What is the result of all this advocacy? Leaders of these NGOs are very famous, but the 
people don’t get services they need. We do more and talk less” (C20).  
Setting a balance between advocacy and capacity building depends on effective 
leadership. Case study findings confirm that a single individual leader is rarely sufficient 
to develop a network; this is a weakness of the paid coordinator structure of WNAC. 
Networks develop more strongly if they have at least two or three key drivers with ideas 
and commitment (C28). This reduces the risk of a cult of personality forming around a 
leader who uses the network as a basis for individual ambition (C40,C58); such leaders 
eventually retire or move on, taking the network with them. Reliance on a single 
charismatic, authoritarian individual is seen by some respondents as a cultural 
characteristic (V48, MaQS 2006:129), but network experiences show this need not be 
the case. “For people to cooperate, we need to be clear on sharing benefits and success. If 
one group stands up and takes credit, it’s hard to work with them” (V48). Duplication of 
roles within a network may appear inefficient, but actually serve as a resource to 
counteract defections and repression, keeping a network going through troughs in 
waves of collective action. 
The case studies presented in this thesis also demonstrate the emergence of sub-group 
agendas, often linked to generational change and conflict. Both Chinese and Vietnamese 
activists note differences between the older generation who lived through the American 
War and Cultural Revolution, and those who grew up since. An activist in her twenties 
explicitly draws this connection:  
The main factor for network success is leadership. Are the leaders really open? 
Are they representing members’ interests, or on their own agenda or power 
trip? Leaders need to be capable to lead and represent their members, while 
staying open and flexible… In China, this is a generational issue. Older adults 
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tend to be inflexible and want to hold on to power. If we want change, we need 
to get younger people involved. (C68) 
The counter-argument to shared leadership is that strong leaders may be necessary, 
especially at the early stages of a network, to motivate and bring people together (C78). 
Networks that operate on an all-volunteer basis, without full-time staff, never become 
professional. Paid network staff or a secretariat is seen as desirable for financial 
management and accountability (V44). Yet networks with paid staff risk dependency on 
donor support. Most donors lack the capacity to evaluate or fund a whole network; 
instead, they want a “one-stop shop”, working through an individual leader who can 
reach the membership.4 “A good donor will choose the right person to fund… If the 
wrong group gets the funding, it will all fall apart” (C82). In sum, there are risks to both 
too much leadership and too little. The most effective networks are led by a small, 
committed and diverse core group of individuals who may be employed with member 
organisations, or have multiple affiliations, but are not paid directly as network staff. A 
second prevalent model, seen in the cases of WNAC and many of the networks profiled 
in Table 2.4,5 consists of a single coordinating agency or secretariat with paid staff. The 
experience of the China rivers network is revealing in this regard, as it experimented 
with the coordinating agency model, then chose to return to a more informal core group. 
Leadership choices also have implications for network structures.  
Formal and informal structures 
The major unexpected finding in this research is respondents’ preference for informal 
over formal network structures (Hypothesis B). This was affected, to be sure, by the 
                                                        
4 There is a structural basis for this preference: many private foundations are legally bound to fund only 
registered organisations, not individuals or networks. 
5 See p. 96. 
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choice of issue-based, advocacy and membership networks as case studies rather than 
NGO coalitions and forums, but arguments for informality emerged from many sources 
over the course of research. Networks with formal organisational structures have not 
been noticeably more successful at advocacy. States do not prefer to deal with more 
formal networks. Both the Bright Future Group and China Rivers Network experimented 
with formal structures earlier in their existence; CRN gave up for both political and 
organisational reasons, while BFG successfully spun off a formal association. For the 
Women’s Network against AIDS, it is too early to tell whether a formal structure can be 
sustained, or whether it might return to its original virtual network form. In all these 
cases, personal ties among network members and long-term commitment to issues have 
mattered more than organisational structures or funding. 
One variant of this argument is that formal networks may be desirable in some 
circumstances, but in settings with limited political opportunity structures, informal or 
virtual organising is the only viable option (V59).6 In this view, political context 
determines network structure. Formal networks are limited directly by the lack of a 
legal framework for networks to register and indirectly by restrictions on potential 
network members in terms of fundraising, geographical operations, and issue 
sensitivity. Establishment of a formal network requires funding and staff or volunteer 
capacity, which potential individual or organisational members may not be able to 
provide (V64). These conditions apply in China and Vietnam, as well as other settings 
                                                        
6 This partially echoes Tarrow’s argument that in undemocratic conditions, transnational advocacy 
networks “provide a second-best but safer alternative to social movements” (1998:189). However, 
Tarrow’s claim that transnational activism replaces domestic organising does not apply to cases in this 
thesis. He also claims that transnational actors diffuse collective action frames for domestic actors who are 
assumed to be “resource-poor”. While I find considerable evidence of cross-border diffusion, Chinese and 
Vietnamese networks are not without resources and repertoires of their own.  
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where states, conflict, or economic deprivation hinder development of formal 
organisational structures. As one Hong Kong-based activist describes, 
We try to stay low profile and network informally. There are more formal 
networks based in Beijing, but these are more likely to be donor-driven or co-
opted by the government. Formal networks aren’t worth the effort, and they 
tend to get dominated by the same people. (C7) 
A stronger, universal argument for informal networks is that they are more effective 
vehicles for advocacy (while formal structures may still be better for information 
sharing or other purposes). In this view, networks are not second-best arrangements in 
restrictive environments, but virtual communities or “soft organisations”, compared to 
less flexible “hard organisations” such as NGOs (V21).7 “The most successful networks 
are informal, independent and set up on their own” (C40). For instance, several 
respondents suggested creating a new website and internet forum for social networking 
around public space issues in Vietnam, as this is not costly, can be managed by just a few 
people, and can reach many people with little political risk (V64,V67). The availability of 
the Internet and communication technologies create different structural incentives for 
advocacy than in previous generations. In a cultural version of this argument, the 
importance of personal connections and guanxi in China and Vietnam also favour 
informal networks, but this does not explain why civil society networks have formed at 
some times rather than others. At most, perhaps, cultural preferences compensate for 
the real, though not particularly effective attempts by governments to restrict online 
organising. 
One Vietnamese activist combines both arguments in a practice of “organisational non-
ego”, both a philosophy of activism and a response to political uncertainty: 
                                                        
7 A comparison with Taiwan may be revealing in this regard: with a similar cultural heritage, Taiwan has a 
consolidated democracy, while civil society still uses informal forms of engagement (King 2010). 
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The issue needs to come first. Everything we do, we do in service of the issue. 
The organisation follows: it is a vehicle for the issue. If the organisation is shut 
down, the movement continues. If the growth of the organisation is your main 
goal, then you won’t get where you want to go; you will get somewhere else 
instead… Big organisations or organisations that take controversial stands may 
attract notice from powerful people who will try to shut it down. Whereas 
[with] a network or a web, if one member closes, the network is still strong. 8 
Also, smaller organisations are more sustainable and easier for fundraising. 
Instead of one big organisation with a lot of pressure to raise funds to stay big, 
this is spread out among many organisations who can sustain themselves in 
different ways. I don’t want a united civil society that replaces government. I 
want diversity, not hierarchy. But we can still take advantage of economies of 
scale by joining together and acting as a network. (V20) 
As this example shows, the emergence of civil society networks is “more than a strategic 
response to difficult political conditions” (C28). There is also a cultural component of 
building trust and sharing resources that has traditional roots in both China and 
Vietnam, yet runs counter to much of the aggressive materialism in present-day 
societies.  
In the informal structure of the China rivers network since 2006, several organisations 
specialise on each issue; when needed, they organise campaigns with the support of 
other network members (C25). Core individual participants are “sleepers” between 
campaigns (C58) and can act as leaders in some areas, followers in others. This structure 
allows for waves of collective action without having to maintain formal network 
structures. Complete internal democracy, with rotating leadership, may not always be 
possible, but a network with multiple centres is more balanced and is not dominated by 
a single leader. The four case studies also suggest possible steps that networks could 
take towards greater levels of activity while remaining informally structured: more 
regular meetings (even social events), clearer communication pathways, proactive 
rather than reactive planning, and development of concrete advocacy strategies with 
                                                        
8 This echoes Mayfair Yang’s statement about “rhizomatic networks” (see p. 79); see also Yang Guobin 
(2008:133) and Vala and O’Brien (2008:116) on networks reducing risks of political repression. 
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position papers, clear objectives and indicators of success. These changes do not require 
large amounts of funding or time commitments and are within the present capacities of 
members. Indeed, several networks are currently making efforts or discussing such 
moves towards increased substantive cooperation, not just information sharing (V61). 
As networks become larger, bureaucratic structures and a more focussed agenda 
become necessary (C76,V46). “The more members we have, the more complicated it 
gets,” says one Vietnamese network coordinator. “But since we want to raise awareness 
of the whole society, if we only worked with [a few] NGOs that would be too narrow” 
(V45). 
The majority of CRN members favour the context-specific argument for informality, 
stating that a formal network could not succeed because it could not be legally 
registered and would become a target for criticism and retaliation by opponents. This 
seemed to be the case in 2005, but may no longer hold. In the past several years, formal 
networks have emerged in China and Vietnam that have found ways around legal and 
political restrictions, for instance by operating the network as a project of a coordinating 
organisation.9 The selection of structure may vary depending on the perceived 
sensitivity of a network’s activities, as well as on the preferences and desires of its 
members.  
In informal networks, the question of membership is often unclear even to others in the 
network. According to Knoke and Kuklinski’s “realist criterion” (1982:22), a network 
member is someone who self-identifies as such.10 This criterion fits with an actor-
                                                        
9 This model is used by the 5-12 Sichuan Earthquake network, CIFPEN, and the Vietnam Rivers Network, 
among others; see Table 2.4, p. 96. 
10 See chapter 1, p. 41. 
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centred approach, but may be too narrow for networks such as CRN, which comprises 
not only a small group of NGOs but also journalists, scientists, and even certain central 
government officials who have joined in advocacy, whether these individuals identify 
themselves as CRN members or not. Just as there is no firm boundary between state and 
non-state actors in civil society networks, it is best to assume no strong distinction 
between a core group of committed individual or organisational members and a wider 
associated group of supporters who are linked to core members and join certain, but not 
all, network activities. In such cases, it may make more sense to speak of network 
participants rather than members. 
Resources and the roles of donors 
Resources in the forms of funding and time are needed to grow and sustain any network, 
increasing with size and level of formality. Case study findings show that networks with 
greater internal resources (members or individual donors) have more options for 
strategic and structural choices, as shown in the social capital of CRN compared to the 
Women’s Network against AIDS. International presence and support, with or without 
funding, can help open political opportunities, as with the Bright Future Group in the 
1990s, and allow for a high level of autonomy, if networks do not have to worry about 
core funding. External donors can also bring risks of political blowback, as some CRN 
members experienced in 2005, as well as donor interference in the network’s 
operations. Large-scale funding opportunities, as in the HIV sector, can lead to conflict 
over resources, while ironically networks in under-funded sectors may have more 
incentive to cooperate (C63,C75).11 Whether donor support is helpful or harmful 
                                                        
11 With these conflicts in mind, Korten argues (1990a:124) that “the surest way to kill a movement is to 
smother it with money”. However, I did not see evidence of donor dependence to the extent of Hudock’s 
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depends on the case and the donor’s willingness “to share respectfully, not to lead” 
(C25). “So many networks are kept alive artificially by carrots. People only participate in 
order to get funds, or they do ‘capacity building’ to satisfy donors’ needs for reports and 
proposals” (C28). If all funds are provided externally, then members do not see a need to 
contribute by bringing their own resources: networks need to be demand-driven, not 
external resource-driven. 
Availability of external funds may also lead to bureaucratisation, as leaders seek to build 
formal organisations rather than escalate advocacy (Piven and Cloward 1977:xxii). This 
recalls Eccleston’s (1996:67) findings that north-south collaboration can increase 
advocacy effectiveness of southern partners, but can also lead to internal management 
problems and adverse government reactions. As one Vietnamese network coordinator 
states, 
There are groups of people living with HIV in different districts of Hanoi. They 
may be operating well on their own, but there is no broader movement. Then a 
donor comes in and gives grants to one or more groups. This may lead to 
conflict. Even if not, if there is a policy issue, each group will be busy with their 
own project and they won’t be able to work together. (V32) 
The main advocacy focus of the civil society networks considered in this thesis is 
domestic government authorities at the national or local level. Some network members 
have international connections, and a few networks include foreign participants 
resident in their countries, but the level of transnational campaigning remains low. This 
is in part a result of language barriers; few Chinese and Vietnamese activists can speak a 
common language. It also reflects political reality in several ways. First, and probably 
most importantly, networks are focused on the immensity of social and political issues 
in their own countries and communities, not on international issues or on their 
                                                                                                                                                                             
finding that financial control from northern donors disempowers southern organisations and externally 
determines their capacity (1999:2). 
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country’s behaviour overseas (although there is some sign this is starting to change in 
China around issues of climate change and corporate responsibility). Second, there is 
potential political risk in being closely identified with foreign networks and civil society. 
Most NGOs and networks wish to cooperate with government where possible and seek 
to protect their existing connections. In a reversal of Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) 
“boomerang model”, in which civil society activists leverage external allies against their 
national governments, international connections can easily boomerang back on the 
activists themselves if the state uses perceived external interference as an excuse to 
crack down on domestic civil society, as occurred to some CRN members in 2005 as well 
as members of HIV and dissident networks referenced in chapters 2-3.12 
Civil society networks that are able to draw on internal resources and diverse sources of 
external funding both avoid dependence on a single donor and reduce risk from state-
imposed restrictions on access to international funds, which tightened in 2010 in both 
China and Vietnam. In China, the growth of domestic corporate foundations offers a 
potential opportunity for local network fundraising, although most foundations prefer 
social enterprise and direct service projects and are new to the idea of advocacy 
(C25,C27,C65). Such foundations are not yet common in Vietnam, but may be expected 
to become more important in the coming years (V48). 
Donor support of networks appears more effective when funds are channelled to 
existing networks rather than creating new ones.13 Evidence shows that donor-initiated 
networks restrict members’ independence and may cause more problems than they 
                                                        
12 See pp. 93, 129. 
13 This conclusion is similar to that reached by Edwards (2004:105-107) who recommends that donors 
look for existing, independent associational life and focus on the ecosystem level. 
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solve. “A network is about individuals. It’s not a project or funding. A donor can’t solve 
it…the problems of consolidation and maturity have to be solved internally” (C58). As a 
Chinese HIV activist says, “most infighting takes place because of the intervention of 
outsiders, not from the community themselves. But the community always gets blamed 
for it” (C40). If no network exists on a particular issue, a supportive donor could 
encourage informal and personal networking among existing actors from all sectors 
(including NGOs, informal groups, academic researchers, and media, among others), 
focussing first on trust-building and learning (Noteboom 2006). Donors should not 
expect network members to engage in advocacy immediately, but rather give small 
grants to meet immediate needs and allow networks time to develop strategies 
(C28,C82). Rather than one-off advocacy training workshops, networks benefit more 
from small-scale, ongoing coaching, for instance on developing communications and 
media strategies, the “least normative and interfering option” (Wexler et al 2006:39) for 
donor support. In the longer term, no amount of funding will be sufficient to maintain 
network members’ motivation to continue in uncertain and risky advocacy activities. 
Many effective networks (and NGOs) “never have [external] funding, but still do 
impactful work. These are the groups that keep the movement going” (C40). 
Effectiveness 
This thesis considers network effectiveness in three aspects of policy change, network 
sustainability, and changes in political space.14 Each of the network case studies has 
demonstrated its effectiveness in one or more of these aspects and shown changes over 
time: the Bright Future Group did not have many policy results to show in its first 
                                                        
14 See p. 97. 
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decade, but much more since, while the Women’s Network against AIDS is too new to be 
assessed fully. The longer-existing networks (BFG and CRN) have contributed more in 
terms of changes in policy formation and implementation, with the Vietnamese 
Disability Law and the Chinese Environmental Impact Assessment Law as prime 
examples. The Hanoi public space network has affected implementation (or prevented 
mis-implementation) of laws and regulations, but not yet affected policy formulation. 
WNAC, similarly, has been able to improve implementation of HIV policies in a few 
instances to be more inclusive of women’s concerns.  
Considering sustainability, BFG has maintained itself as a core of activists for over 20 
years; though it has not grown significantly in size as a network, BFG set up the 
Association of People with Disabilities, a legal association under which BFG has formally 
registered. Though this required compromises with the state that some BFG members 
question, the Association is definitely a sustainable structure. The China rivers network 
may appear less sustainable by comparison, moving away from a formal structure and 
continuing as an almost submerged group of individual activists. Yet it has continued 
strong advocacy over a period of seven years.  
Impact on social and political space is harder to measure. BFG has had a significant 
impact on the disability sector in Vietnam, opening opportunities and models for other 
self-help groups to start, and indeed providing advice and material support to many of 
these groups. The efforts of the Women’s Network against AIDS, along with other HIV 
and women’s groups, have contributed to heightened awareness of HIV in Chinese 
society, lower costs to becoming “exposed” as HIV-positive, and more public discussion 
of sexuality and gender issues, making it easier for new groups of women affected by 
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HIV to form around the country. The impact of this advocacy has mostly been on the 
media and public opinion, but state agencies’ awareness has also been affected. Bright 
Future and WNAC are identity networks representing the interests of particular 
constituencies, with some internal democratic and participatory mechanisms. Through 
the BFG and DPO Hanoi executive committee elections, and to some extent the CCM 
elections in China, both BFG and WNAC can claim to be accountable and representative 
of their constituencies. 
The Hanoi public space network, on the other hand, began without a constituency but 
demonstrated through its media advocacy that it speaks for the majority of Hanoians. In 
this sense, the network may be the most representative of public opinion, even though it 
is the least organised of the four case studies and has no internal mechanisms. As for 
CRN, its members certainly speak for a large number of Chinese, including Nu and Jinsha 
villagers, who care about protecting water resources and the environment, but some 
segments of public opinion are also against them. Both CRN and the Reunification Park 
network have demonstrated new repertoires of collective action based on media 
outreach and public opinion that may be used by other networks to affect state planning 
or oppose damaging development projects. Not all networks share the same degree of 
connections and sophistication as these, but their advocacy has increased political space 
by showing the potential of an inside-outside strategy.  
Interview respondents and secondary sources cite a number of factors as key to success 
of network advocacy, in one or more of the senses considered here. A Vietnamese 
activist suggests that the three main factors leading to effectiveness are use of e-mail 
and Internet; links to international knowledge and resources; and inclusion of 
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prominent individuals in the network (V20). Two Chinese analysts of community 
campaigns see capable leadership as the most important factor; successful leaders are 
persistent in using personal channels as well as media to influence high-level leadership 
(Shi and Cai 2006:329,321). Desmond (2007:17) hypothesises two criteria for network 
success: organic formation and membership of sub-national organisations. All of these 
explanations fit well with the experience of network case studies. These networks’ 
effectiveness may be summarised as based on the presence of influential allies, a balance 
between inside and outside ties, support from public opinion, and leadership from either 
a committed core group or a leading organisation. However, a sole focus on internal 
capacities risks committing the “fundamental attribution error” of interpreting a 
situation as based on individual strengths and weaknesses, rather than systematic and 
structural issues (McAdam et al 1996:9). 
Civil society networks have been able to raise public awareness on their issues of 
concern and, in the case of environmental and public space networks, stop or postpone 
some of the most egregious examples of what they view as destructive projects. These 
are significant achievements given the strength of the opposition these networks face. 
Yet dam-building, land grabs, and corruption continue, as does stigma against people 
with disabilities and HIV. Networks alone cannot resolve all of these issues or produce 
regime-level political change (Marsh and Rhodes 1992:260). And following Gamson’s 
(1990:41) theory of movement success, effective networks focus on single issues and 
seek limited goals that do not displace elites.  
Collective action has a demonstration value for both allies and opponents (Tarrow 
1996:58). The informal networking and advocacy strategies developed by civil society 
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networks can also be used by counter-movements and opponents for private gain. 
Advocacy outside institutional politics might develop into a pattern of embedded insider 
contacts and deal-making that is opaque and undemocratic. When networks that 
represent private or corrupt interests use the same strategies, they will likely be at least 
as effective as civil society actors, since they may be expected to be better resourced and 
connected to elites. If this pessimistic assessment is correct, civil society networks will 
lose more often than they win, and informal networks may in the long run be a poor 
alternative to more transparent and accountable institutional practices linking society to 
the state. 
Civil society networks, social movements and political change 
The social and political changes sought by most civil society networks are limited ones. 
Advocacy carried out by the four case study networks seeks to engage and cooperate 
with state agencies, not confront or press for regime change. Broad political change is 
not on their agenda; the networks considered here seek instead to work within and 
around existing structures to stop dams, support disadvantaged constituencies, and 
protect public space. The political boundaries are generally clear enough: if activists 
avoid explicitly anti-government statements or positions, it is possible to accomplish 
many things, while open dissidence will lead to the network being shut down and even 
members’ imprisonment.   
Although chances of regime change in China and Vietnam appear slim in the foreseeable 
future, authorities continue to show concern about possible “peaceful evolution”, such as 
evidenced in the “colour revolutions” in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the past 
decade, or 2011 unrest in the Middle East. In the pre-1989 Eastern European 
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experience, civil society networks that began without an explicit agenda for regime 
change came together with others and became politicised, for instance via Solidarity and 
certain Catholic youth groups in Poland (Osa 2003). Reform outcomes are more likely 
when multiple movements converge and issues are “coupled” (Kingdon 2003:181, 
Tarrow 1996). There is little to suggest such meta-network organising capacity among 
Chinese or Vietnamese networks at present. Networks’ impact on democratisation is 
remote: a functioning civil society is only one of many prerequisites for a democratic 
transition (Schmitter 1997:240, Linz and Stepan 1997:17). Networks that operate with 
internal democracy, such as the Bright Future Group or the China Global Fund CCM,15 
may claim with justification that they are modelling a more democratic society (JiaP 
2009). But the influence of this demonstration effect on the regime remains small. In 
contrast, dissident networks such as Vietnam’s Bloc 8406 and China’s Charter 08 and 
China Democracy Party (Wright 2002,2004) have few allies and have mostly been 
repressed before they can transform from personal into civil society networks (Béja 
2009).  
The Chinese and Vietnamese states have demonstrated their ability to crack down on 
unwelcome political action at any time, sometimes using external events as a timely 
excuse. The nature of the state system and structural opportunities change slowly, yet 
civil society networks have found ways to organise even in the midst of apparently more 
restrictive periods. A core question asked by activists is how to promote change without 
provoking a negative response from the state (V20,V56). “You have to be strategic in 
highlighting sensitive issues without irritating government officials,” says a Chinese 
                                                        
15 See chapter 5, p. 187. 
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environmental activist (quoted in Ford 2009). “If you are seen as a troublemaker...they 
will shut your mouth and shut you down”. 
Whether networks may come together to form a broader social movement thus depends 
on many external factors, including state attitudes or repression, external events like 
natural disasters, economic shocks or epidemics, and actions of other networks. In 
Tarrow’s view of movement formation, “ordinary people” face political opportunities, 
constraints, and resources; this leads to episodes of contentious politics, which 
sometimes develop into full-fledged social movements. One of the conditions for forming 
social movements is “dense social networks” (1998:71,19). The picture presented in this 
thesis is similar in many respects, but begins instead with the view that society is 
formed of personal networks. Facing political opportunities, constraints and resources, 
some personal ties develop into civil society networks, which engage in collective action 
and advocacy using a strategic repertoire that can include institutionalised and/or 
contentious politics. If networks have adequate resources, leadership, and political 
space, they might come together to form longer-term coalitions and social movements. 
It is a matter of debate whether present-day disability, environmental, or HIV solidarity 
groups in Vietnam or China meet these conditions. The sector that has received the most 
scholarly attention is Chinese environmentalism, which some identify as a social 
movement (Sun and Zhao 2007) while others hesitate (Stalley and Yang 2006). One 
informant, an expatriate with long experience in China, thinks “movement” is a western 
linear model, not rooted in Chinese culture; many groups say they prefer to be part of a 
“circle” instead (C59). A Chinese environmental activist says that while perhaps not 
meeting all the characteristics of a “western-style movement”, it could still be one “in a 
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Chinese sense”, and that there is a Chinese tradition of social movements historically 
(C31).16 Such a movement would employ a different repertoire of collective action than 
the historical western European repertoire, though both are related via transnational 
brokering and diffusion.17 The roles of state and business interests in Chinese 
environmentalism are quite strong and also adopt progressive and environmental 
causes for their own benefit (Hildebrant 2009). As these interests cannot easily be 
separated, it is difficult to identify a single “green public sphere” (Yang and Calhoun 
2008) out of what continues to be a mix of competing interests (C69).  
The same argument applies for the Vietnamese disability movement or for HIV activist 
movements, which each comprise multiple networks with varying degrees of 
effectiveness, but have not yet demonstrated a capacity for sustained, large-scale 
collective action.18 Informal networks may be effective at mobilising people to join 
collective action but not enough to sustain a movement (Kyaw 2004:390, Tarrow 
1998:124,131). The cases in this thesis demonstrate that informal networks may indeed 
have substantial staying power and show increased networking and organisation over 
time. Yet they have so far not coalesced into any challenge to the Chinese or Vietnamese 
regimes (Bernstein and Lu 2003:117,165,151, Thayer 2009:18). When larger 
movements do arise, as with the 1989 Chinese student movement or Falun Gong, they 
will likely result in “dogged protest-containment efforts” by authorities (Béja 2009:8), 
whether or not the movements claim to have radical or regime-changing goals.  
                                                        
16 Similarly, Milwertz (2002:4) argues that “organizing by women in Beijing qualifies as social movement 
activism, even though it does not fit neatly and precisely” into existing definitions. 
17 As illustrated, for example, in the Vietnamese term mít-tinh (see p. 160). 
18 The definition of social movements presented in Table 1.3, p. 54. 
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In Tilly’s formulation, social movements are characterised by public displays of “WUNC”: 
worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (2004:4). Some, but not all of these 
elements apply in the cases of civil society networks. Network members demonstrate 
worthiness by speaking the language of state authorities, keeping important links and 
relationships with officials, and refraining from anti-government activities or 
statements. They also show obvious commitment through their years of activism and 
contributions of time and resources to the network. However, there is a much lower 
premium placed on unity and numbers. The multiplicity of views and roles within 
networks is one of their greatest assets, and most networks agree on the value of 
remaining small. In place of unity and numbers, an element of flexibility forms a core 
network competency. 
The revision of “WUNC” to “WCF” may be viewed as a contextual adaptation. Tilly 
emphasises the specificity of his conception of social movements to western Europe 
since the 18th century (2004:x), while Chinese and Vietnamese actors draw on different 
historical legacies and political institutions. A more structural approach would posit that 
the difference is primarily not cultural or historical, but rather one of scale: large social 
movements do in fact require unity and numbers, whatever their national context, while 
networks are smaller and more flexible (Khagram et al 2002:6-9, Bandy and Smith 
2005:3). Varieties of social movement have existed in China and Vietnam in the past, and 
may well emerge again; the current rarity of such movements is a temporary political 
condition, not a cultural constraint.  
In the contemporary contexts of China and Vietnam, civil society networks will continue 
as a modular form of citizen advocacy as long as the issues and grievances that 
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prompted their formation continue or recur, resources are available, and the current 
opportunity structure persists. With their features of worthiness, commitment and 
flexibility, these networks will likely remain small, largely informal and unregistered, 
and maintain a focus on social and political issues, not organisational growth or regime-
level political change. They will include a diverse membership of activists, some with 
links to authorities, others independent, and use multiple strategies of embedded, 
media, and community advocacy. By expanding their web of ties, linking previously 
unconnected nodes, and leveraging other actors and resources, civil society networks 
have the potential to create new political spaces for advocacy. 
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APPENDIX. LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED 
China interviews 
 
# Network / Org Date Location of 
interview 
Language 
C1 NGO / international 2/12/08 Hong Kong English 
C2 NGO / international 2/12/08 
C3 Media / Hong Kong 2/12/08 
C4 NGO / HK 2/13/08 
C5 NGO / HK 2/13/08 
C6 NGO / HK 2/13/08 
C7 NGO / HK 2/13/08 
C8 Academic / international  2/14/08 
C9 NGO / international 2/15/08 
C10 Academic / international 2/15/08 
C11 NGO / HK 2/16/08 
C12 NGO / HK 4/4/08 Hanoi 
C13 GONGO / Chinese 3/23/09 Shanghai 
C14 Academic / Chinese 3/23/09 Chinese 
C15 NGO / Chinese 3/25/09 English 
C16 NGO / Chinese 3/25/09 
C17 Academic / Chinese 3/25/09 Chinese 
C18 Academic / Chinese 3/25/09 
C19 Academic / Chinese 3/25/09 
C20 NGO / Chinese 3/27/09 Nanjing English 
C21 NGO / Chinese 3/27/09  
Chinese  C22 Academic / Chinese 3/27/09 
C23 Academic / international 3/27/09 English 
C24 Academic / Chinese 3/30/09  Beijing 
C25 NGO / Chinese 3/30/09, 11/3/09, 
8/5/10, 8/24/10 
C26 Academic/ international 3/30/09 
C27 Foundation / Chinese 3/31/09 
C28 NGO / international 3/31/09, 8/19/10 
C29 NGO / Chinese 4/1/09 Chinese 
C30 NGO / international 4/1/09 English 
C31 Foundation / Chinese  4/1/09, 11/5/09 
C32 Academic / Chinese 4/2/09 Chinese 
C33 Academic/ international  4/2/09, 11/2/09, 
8/25/10 
English 
C34 Academic / Chinese 4/2/09 
C35 Academic / Chinese 4/2/09 
C36 NGO / Chinese 4/3/09 Chinese 
C37 NGO / HK 4/3/09 English 
315 
 
 
 
C38 NGO / Chinese 4/3/09 
C39 GONGO / Chinese 4/3/09 Chinese 
C40 NGO / Chinese 4/3/09, 11/3/09, 
8/18/10 
English 
C41 Private sector / Chinese 4/6/09 Kunming 
C42 NGO / Chinese 4/6/09 
C43 NGO / international 4/7/09 
C44 Academic / Chinese 4/7/09 
C45 NGO / Chinese 4/7/09 Chinese 
C46 NGO / Chinese 4/8/09 
C47 China Rivers Network 
member 
4/8/09, 11/2/09, 
8/7/10 
Kunming, 
Beijing 
English, 
Chinese 
C48 China Rivers Network 
member 
4/9/09, 1/31/10 Kunming, 
Bangkok 
English 
C49 NGO / Chinese 4/9/09 Kunming 
C50 NGO / Chinese 4/9/09 Chinese 
C51 Media / Chinese 11/2/09 Beijing 
C52 Academic / international 11/2/09 English 
C53 NGO / Chinese 11/4/09 
C54 NGO / Chinese 11/4/09, 11/7/09 Beijing, 
Tianjin 
C55 NGO / Chinese 11/5/09 Beijing 
C56 NGO / Chinese 11/5/09 
C57 NGO / Chinese 11/5/09 
C58 Foundation / 
international 
11/6/09 
C59 Foundation / 
international 
11/6/09 
C60 NGO / Chinese 11/7/09 Tianjin Chinese 
C61 Women’s Network Against 
AIDS 
11/9/09 Beijing 
C62 Academic / Chinese 11/9/09 English 
C63 China Rivers Network 
member 
11/9/09, 8/7/10 English, 
Chinese 
C64 NGO / Chinese 11/9/09, 8/26/10 
C65 China Rivers Network 
member 
11/10/09, 
8/27/10  
English 
C66 NGO / HK 1/31/10 Bangkok 
C67 NGO / Chinese 8/5/10 Beijing Chinese 
C68 NGO / Chinese 8/9/10 English 
C69 Academic / international 8/15/10 
C70 China Rivers Network 
member 
8/16/10 
C71 NGO / Chinese  8/17/10 Chinese 
C72 NGO / Chinese 8/18/10 
C73 NGO / Chinese 8/18/10 English 
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C74 China Rivers Network 
member 
8/19/10 
C75 NGO / international 8/19/10 
C76 International organisation 8/20/10 
C77 International organisation 8/20/10 
C78 Academic / international 8/20/10 
C79 Government / 
international 
8/24/10 
C80 China Rivers Network  8/29/10 Chinese  
C81 NGO / international 8/30/10 English 
C82 NGO / Chinese 8/30/10 
C83 Government / China 8/31/10 Chinese 
C84 NGO / international 9/1/10 English 
C85 NGO / international 9/2/10 By phone 
C86 Academic / Chinese 10/12/10 
     
 
Vietnam interviews  
 
# Network / Org Date Location of 
interview 
Language 
V1 Academic / international 2/15/08 Hong Kong 
 
English 
V2 Academic / HK 2/15/08 
V3 Foundation / international 3/8/08 Hanoi 
V4 NGO / Vietnamese 4/11/08, 
10/27/09 
Vietnamese 
V5 Academic / international 4/13/08 English 
V6 Media / international 4/14/08 
V7 NGO / Vietnamese 4/15/08 Vietnamese 
V8 NGO / international 4/15/08 English 
V9 NGO / Vietnamese 4/19/08 Vietnamese 
V10 Academic / international 4/22/08 English 
V11 NGO / Vietnamese 4/22/08, 
6/8/10 
V12 NGO / international 5/20/08 
V13 GONGO / Vietnamese 5/26/08 Vietnamese 
V14 NGO / international 5/26/08 English 
V15 NGO / international 5/27/08 
V16 NGO / international 5/27/08, 
7/22/10 
V17 NGO / Vietnamese 5/29/08 Vietnamese 
V18 Bright Future Group member 5/29/08, 
10/26/09 
V19 NGO / Vietnamese 7/11/08 
V20 Public space network 
member 
7/19/08, 
5/22/10 
English 
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V21 Public space network 
member 
8/13/08, 
7/23/10 
Vietnamese 
V22 Media / international 9/8/08 Birmingham English 
V23 NGO / international 10/16/08 Hanoi 
V24 NGO / Vietnamese 10/23/08 Vietnamese 
V25 NGO / Vietnamese 10/23/08, 
3/3/09 
V26 NGO / Vietnamese 10/23/08 
V27 Public space network 
member 
3/2/09 
V28 Government / international 3/4/09 English 
V29 NGO / Vietnamese 3/18/09 Vietnamese 
V30 NGO / Vietnamese 3/18/09 
V31 NGO / Vietnamese 3/18/09 
V32 NGO / Vietnamese 3/18/09, 
6/9/10 
English 
V33 NGO / Vietnamese 3/18/09 Vietnamese 
V34 GONGO / Vietnamese 3/19/09 English 
V35 NGO / Vietnamese 3/19/09 Vietnamese 
V36 NGO / Vietnamese 3/20/09 English 
V37 Academic / international 5/7/09 Toronto 
V38 Academic / international 5/26/09 Hanoi 
V39 Academic / international 7/14/09 
V40 NGO / Vietnamese 10/23/09 Vietnamese 
V41 Bright Future Group member 10/26/09 
V42 Bright Future Group member 10/27/09, 
7/25/10 
V43 Bright Future Group member 10/28/09 Vietnamese 
V44 NGO / international 11/4/09 Beijing English 
V45 NGO / Vietnamese 12/2/09 Hanoi 
V46 12/2/09, 
11/26/10 
Vietnamese 
V47 Bright Future Group member 4/9/10 Haiphong 
V48 NGO / Vietnamese 6/1/10 Hanoi English 
V49 NGO / international 7/21/10 
V50 Government / international 7/22/10 
V51 Public space network 
member 
7/22/10 Vietnamese 
V52 NGO / international 7/23/10 English 
V53 Public space network 
member 
7/23/10 Vietnamese 
V54 Bright Future Group member 7/25/10 
V55 Bright Future Group member 7/25/10 
V56 Public space network 
member 
7/26/10, 
8/2/10 
V57 Government / Vietnam 7/26/10 
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V58 Public space network 
member 
7/27/10 
V59 NGO / international 7/29/10 English 
V60 Public space network 
member 
7/29/10 Vietnamese 
V61 GONGO / Vietnamese 7/30/10 
V62 Government / Vietnam 7/30/10 
V63 Public space network 
member 
7/31/10 
V64 Public space network 
member 
7/31/10 
V65 NGO / Vietnamese 8/3/10 
V66 Academic / international 8/8/10 By email English 
V67 Public space network 
member 
8/11/10 
V68 NGO / international 8/26/10 
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